Decarbonising Commercial Real Estate: The Role of Operational Performance
Firefighter survival awareness
1.
2. Just as firefighters prepare to fight fires
FF must also prepare for the situation they hope to
avoid
The incidents where firefighters have lost their lives, or
where they lived to tell about it, have a consistent
theme:
Inadequate situational awareness
3. Several NIOSH line-of-duty-death (LODD)
investigations indicate Firefighters :
May not be adequately trained on fire ground survival
procedures
How to call a Mayday
Actions to take while waiting to be rescued
4. ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI FD. May 3, 2002.
The NIOSH incident report can be viewed at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200220.html
.
Lessons learned include:
Team continuity
FFs operating on the floor above a fire should have
charged hoseline.
Train FFs to manually activate Personal Alert Safety
Systems PASS when lost or disoriented
5. HOUSTON, TEXAS FD. FEB 19, 2005.
The NIOSH incident report can be viewed at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200509.html
.
Lessons learned include:
Proper size up
Communicate interior condition to the outside IC.
Train FFs on the actions to take while waiting to be
rescued
Use exit locators such as high intensity floodlights /
strobe lights
6. Preventing a Mayday must consciously occupy a fire
fighter’s thoughts during:
Training
Emergency calls
Summarize the knowledge and skills fire fighters must
acquire during drills to prevent a real Mayday
7. MAINTAINING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
Firefighters most often find themselves in trouble
because:
Develop tunnel vision
Operate off the hose line and lose their “lifeline”
Fail to monitor their SCBA air consumption
Get separated from their partner
Operate alone.
8. Firefighters need to assess the situation for changing
conditions also improves situational awareness and
safety
stay on or close to the hose line
closely monitor their SCBA air supply
Listening to radio traffic
What’s going on about the fire ground
Firefighters should never push the safety envelope
9. To increase survivability, firefighters must become
familiar with their response districts
Allows us to see:
Construction elements
Discuss strategies
Recognize potential response problems
Provide clues to where and when a building may fail
10. May prevent a Mayday situation
Ultimately, this knowledge allows personnel to
anticipate building compromise during fire
involvement so fireground safety is maintained.
11. Critical findings during a preplan:
Building construction
Roof construction
Conventional construction
regular timber or metal beams
Light-weight construction
truss systems.
12. Further classified as:
Protected construction
Has a fire rated covering.
Unprotected construction
Structural members are fully exposed.
Unprotected lightweight construction is the most
dangerous.
Must be identified on the preplan
13. Inherently dangerous
Must be considered high risk
National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) and Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
lightweight “I-joist “ was exposed to fire
collapsed in only six minutes
14. Phoenix / NIOSH
Lightweight roof trusses
Only eight minutes
Collapse will occur about the time firefighters arrive on
scene
15. UL also found
Insulation qualities of flooring and carpet above light-
weight truss systems:
1,200 degree fire below
100 degree above
Measured just prior to collapse
Misleading “cool” environment
Inability of thermal imaging cameras to detect the
severity of fire below in the basement
16. All contents stored in a
building
Add fuel to the fire
Determine the rate of spread
Amount of heat released from
burning fuels plays a significant
role in fire spread
17. Heat release / Time to peak heat release
Significantly enhanced when the fuel is contained
within an enclosure
Generally, contemporary furnishings made of synthetics
such as polyurethanes and microsuede fabrics, have a
higher heat release
19. Rapid fire growth
Smoke rapidly fills the occupancy
Difficult to locate the fire
A decision
Search above the fire floor
Before having hose lines in place on the floor below
Resulted in fire fighter fatalities and numerous Mayday
situations
20. HVAC units
Tanks
Excessive roofing material
Billboards
Snow (Standing water)
23. Critical fire ground survival task
Assess the risk versus benefit
Assessment of the situation
Changes
Mode of attack for the operation
Fire fighters should risk very little to save just the
building and/or its contents
24. Four critical components
Construction
Location and Extent
Occupancy
Life Hazard
25. Construction
Assessing the way the fire building is erected. Questions
to ask include:
How is the building built?
How long will it contain the fire to its current location?
How long will the building allow fire crews to operate inside
if the decision is made to enter?
Was the building built using light-weight truss construction?
26. Location and Extent
Where the fire is located in the building
How it will spread inside due to the construction style.
Reading of smoke conditions
Identifying the color, velocity, density and volume of the
smoke
27. Occupancy
Is the building an empty factory
Occupied
Single family
Two-unit apartment building
Consider secondary means of egress prior to entering
the fire building
28. Life Hazard
Where
Survivability
Risk versus benefit analysis
29. Would you enter a building filled with propane?
Propane is extremely dangerous because they are
susceptible to gas explosions
Smoke filled buildings are just as dangerous
30. The flammable range and ignition
temperatures of propane
and smoke are similar
31. Recognize the dangers associated with the smoke
conditions:
En route
Upon arrival
During fire fighting operations
32. Missing signs
Flash over
Smoke explosions
Backdraft
Rapid fire development
Deadly to fire fighters
The ability to read smoke correctly will prevent a
Mayday situation from occurring
33. The following is a description of each characteristic:
Volume
Velocity
Density
Color
34. Volume
Quantity of smoke
Indicates the fuel load and
Fire flow required
35. Velocity
Speed the smoke comes out
of the building
Help locate the fire
High velocity indicates high
heat
36. Density
Thickness
Most important factor
Indicates
Continuous fuels burning
Possible flashover conditions
Fire fighters should not enter
structures where dense smoke is
banking down the walls and nearing
the floor.
37. Color
How long the fire has been
burning
Distance the smoke has
traveled to the outside
Gray/white and slow
moving
young fire
38. Color
Gray/white smoke exiting
with high velocity
Hot fire - smoke has
traveled a distance
39. Color
Brown smoke
Mid-to-late-heating
burning unfinished wood
products
40. Color
Black smoke
The fire has been burning
for a while.
Black, dense smoke
a precursor to flash
over…Get out
41. Stay oriented
Critical to being able to get
Fire fighters must know at all times are:
1. Where they are
2. How they got there.
3. How they can get out.
42. Dispatch
Recall that they know about the building
Prior knowledge
Create images of what you might see when you arrive
Anticipate what they expect to see when they arrive
Share any information that may be of value
Girlfriend lives in complex, etc
46. Orientation
Knows where you are
“I’m in a bedroom because I feel a bed and a window.”
Remember how you got there
“I entered the bedroom from a hallway adjacent to the
kitchen.”
Know how to get out
“I can use the bedroom window if conditions worsen.”
47. Awareness of worsening conditions alert the fire fighter
that it’s time to exit the building
Continued increase in heat or flame production
Cracking noises
Monitoring radio traffic
indicate worsening
The fire fighter should never hesitate abandoning a
position and exiting the building if conditions worsen.
48. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) Scientific Study of the Iowa Fire in December
1999
Post incident analysis of fire fighter fatality
In December 1999 a two story duplex fire in Iowa claimed
the lives of three fire fighters.
The fire was reported by a 9-1-1 caller at 0824.
Upon arrival fire fighters found white to dark brown smoke
coming from a single unit of a two-story two-unit duplex.
49. First floor layout of the unit involved. Fire fighters entered on
the A-side, through the front door (left side of diagram where
the porch is located). Fire originated on the stove in the
kitchen (C-side). One fire fighter was found in the living
room.
50. Second floor layout of the unit involved. Hot gases
and fire extended up the stairwell. One fire fighter
was found on the second floor near the stairwell and
another in bedroom 1.
51. The following timeline, along with computer images
of the fire at various stages, indicate how thermal
conditions trapped fire fighters only minutes after
arriving on scene.
52.
53. The following FDS/Smokeview images are scientific re-creations of the incident.
This data
includes: size of the building, materials used in construction, and building contents
(furnishings, window coverings).
View looking through the
wall (D-side) into the living
and dining rooms with the
kitchen behind the yellow
door. Thermal conditions at
approximately 0832 (491 s
into the simulation). Hot
gases (390 °F to 570 °F)
rapidly extending into the
adjacent rooms.
54. Thermal conditions at
approximately 0833 (524
s into simulation).
Thermal conditions
consistent with flash over
extending further into the
structure.
Temperatures exceeding
1000° F were
experienced in areas
where fire fighters were
searching for children.
55. View from the opposite
side with the walls
removed. The
front door is on the right
and the kitchen on the
left. Thermal conditions at
approximately 0834 (605
s into simulation).
Temperatures exceeding
1000° F were consistent
with a flash over event.
Fire extending up
stairwell where fire
fighters were searching
for victims.
56. All fire ground personnel are responsible for safety and
must be aware of fire conditions that may lead to a Mayday
situation
All personnel must maintain situational awareness to
prevent a Mayday.
A coordinated effort with good communications will help
with an ongoing assessment.
57. Ongoing reports from:
Interior operations
Ventilation teams
Exposure groups
Help the IC make better decisions to continue the current
attack or move to a defensive, exterior position.
Preventing a Mayday requires all personnel to
communicate what they see, especially when conditions
indicate immediate disengagement is necessary.
Editor's Notes
Smoke and hot gases from the fire began to spread through the house within seconds after ignition. However, the Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS)/Smokeview simulation of the flame front indicated that the fire itself did not spread beyond the kitchen until approximately eight minutes after flaming ignition. This timeline places fire fighters on scene as hot gases from the fire extended into adjacent rooms and stairwell.
NIST scientists found the critical event in the fire to be the on-set of conditions consistent with flashover in the kitchen. At approximately 0832, the fire started a transition from a single room and contents fire with smoke throughout the structure, to a fire that involved the majority of the structure within approximately 60 seconds.
The hot gas layer temperatures in the living room increased from approximately 200 °C to 300 °C (390 °F to 570 °F) to more than 600 °C (1110 °F) in less than a minute. The hot gases and flames continued to spread rapidly from the living room, through the stairway, to the second floor. This quick change in thermal conditions and flame spread through the duplex led to the three fire fighters being trapped inside and succumbing to the effects of the fire environment.
View looking through the wall (D-side) into the living and dining rooms with the kitchen behind the yellow door. Thermal conditions at approximately 0832 (491 s into the simulation). Hot gases (390 °F to 570 °F) rapidly extending into the adjacent rooms.