This document summarizes a discussion between Dan Little and Federica Russo about Dan Little's new book on the philosophy of social science. Federica appreciates Dan's engagement with scientific practice and ability to revive debates. She is most interested in the relationships between social ontology, causation, and realism. Federica asks questions about defining the social and causes in the social world, and how approaches to these issues should be iterative with methodology. She also discusses the possibility of social constructivism and reconciling methodological pluralism with unity in science. Overall, Federica's comments aim to foster further dialogue on these challenging issues.

1. Commentary:
New Directions in the Philosophy of
Social Science
by Dan Little
Federica Russo
University of Amsterdam
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2. Intro
• Thanks and honored
• Reading Dan always a pleasure
• See recurring themes in his work on phil soc
sci
• Quite an overlap with my own interests
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3. What I liked
• Idea behind the project
– Innovative writing
• Engagement with scientific practice and with
philosophy
• Ability to revive old debates and authors, and
to read recent ones
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4. What I was most interested in
• Relation between social ontology – causation
– realism
– [Didn’t have to read this book to know I much I
agree with Dan, and still, how much I still learn
from him!]
• Not going to repeat his arguments, rather ask
questions that hopefully foster further
dialogue and progress in understanding
thorny issues
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5. What is the social
• General features of social ontology
– E.g. heterogeneity, plasticity …
• YES, but:
– Why keep saying what the social is, using comparison with
natural science?
– Especially if agree with Cartwright’s Dappled World?
• Opening of the book gives impression that we figure
out social ontology independently of methodology
– Is it possible?
– Shouldn’t the approach iterative instead?
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6. Causes of the social
• Mechanisms and powers: yes, very much
– Big improvement with respect to then dominating
causal-mechanical philosophy of physics (or
skepticism about causation altogether)
• Methodological localism as a way of working out
causation across different levels of the social: yes
very much
• Here impression is reversed: methods and
epistemology helps work out the metaphysics
– Did I get it right?
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7. Building bridges
• Two ideas that have been developed outside phil soc sc,
but very similar to Dan’s
1. Minimal mechanism: latest development in phil mechs,
characterisation due to Illari & Glennan
1. Meant to be widely applicable, stresses organisation, doesn’t
presuppose rigid ontology
2. Evidential pluralism: to establish causal claims we need
correlations and mechanisms due to Russo & Williamson,
now EBM+
1. Started in medicine, but explored also outside; meant to be
epistemological and methodological, not fixed ontology
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8. What realism for the social
• Yes, big question about correspondentist theory of truth
and about traditional conceptions of realism
• Super interesting to read about Bashkar
• Again, why keeping the comparison with natural sciences?
– Much recent work also there to show that cannot be a naïve
from of entity realism. So we have many challenges in common
• Found missing: social constructivism. Why?
– Interest I’d find in there is to try develop a middle position
between constructivim and realism, along the lines of
constructionism (see Flordi). Beyond Kant. Somehow possible to
recover hermeneutic approach in a realist position
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9. Unity or disunity of science
• Methodological pluralism: yes, couldn’t agree
more
• BUT: what keeps the sciences together qua
sciences then?
– How to reconcile the need for acknowledging
diversity with need of having unity of method
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10. • ‘just see’ in the practice??
– Can’t be only just see. It requires a special way of looking at the
practice
• Take off neoposistivistic glasses!!
• Argument for social realism
– Caveat: not like nat sciences. A disaggregated claim about the social
world.
• [Gianluca’s comment] : no inconsistency about the interlevel.
Explanatory autonomy vs ontological autonomy
• Spooky holism, see e.g. Luckmann
• ?? Who is the person asking from Mixed Methods perspective??
– Pluralism in methods >> pluralism in causation, ontology etc.
• Why ontology in the first place??
– Ontology related to methodology
• Causal mechanisms!!
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