Running Head:, PROGRESS ASSIGNMENT, 18MAY2020
PROGRESS ASSIGNMENT, 18MAY2020
Title: Progress Assignment
Introduction
Immigration has been one of the most emotive topics in the world over the years. This is especially so in Germany since the country is not only home to numerous immigrants but also continues to receive and accommodate many immigrants from many middle eastern and African countries who are either escaping their countries due to war, political and civil conflicts, invitation by relatives or even looking for employment among other reasons. However, immigration, which involves the movement of people into a different country, also raises several concerns regarding both the security of the immigrants and the country. (Great intro!)
Thesis Statement
Based on the foregoing background information, the purpose of this research will be to explore whether the refugee crisis from certain African and Middle Eastern countries has impacted human security in Germany. This is in an attempt to not only understand the extent of the problem but also contribute to the existing body of literature regarding the topic by providing actionable recommendations. (While this identifies the purpose of your paper, this is not a thesis statement. A thesis statement would be framed like: “The refugee crisis from African and Middle Eastern countries is adversely impacting the economic, political, and social stability of Germany.” You need to identify exactly what it is your research proves.)
Background
Germany according to Ostrand, (2015) is one of the countries that accommodate many refugees from African and Middle Eastern countries like Syria. According to research, Germany and Sweden were the countries that accommodated most of the refugees escaping Syria due to war in 2014 (Ostrand, 2015). As a result, the country incurs certain burdens (This is vague. Be specific about what those burdens are.) in accommodating refugees. One of the key issues regarding immigration is human security.
Over the past years, a lot of research regarding the implications of immigration in Germany has been carried out. However, most of the research has largely focused on national security, crime and violent extremism. However, human security which is the focus of this paper involves the lives of people and their livelihoods both for the natives of Germany as well as those seeking or immigrating into the country. (This paragraph belongs in the opening where you should establish the importance of the topic and how your research contributes to our field of study.)
Issues around Immigration
The main issues that arise regarding immigration and human security involve the laws protecting the citizens and the immigrants, the number of immigrants moving into Germany and its implications to population growth and security as well as measures put in place to ensure human security. (Issues look good. You are going to need some research in this section. Also, which theoretical framework wil.
1. Running Head:, PROGRESS ASSIGNMENT, 18MAY2020
PROGRESS ASSIGNMENT, 18MAY2020
Title: Progress Assignment
Introduction
Immigration has been one of the most emotive topics in the
world over the years. This is especially so in Germany since the
country is not only home to numerous immigrants but also
continues to receive and accommodate many immigrants from
many middle eastern and African countries who are either
escaping their countries due to war, political and civil conflicts,
invitation by relatives or even looking for employment among
other reasons. However, immigration, which involves the
movement of people into a different country, also raises several
concerns regarding both the security of the immigrants and the
country. (Great intro!)
Thesis Statement
Based on the foregoing background information, the purpose of
this research will be to explore whether the refugee crisis from
certain African and Middle Eastern countries has impacted
human security in Germany. This is in an attempt to not only
understand the extent of the problem but also contribute to the
existing body of literature regarding the topic by providing
actionable recommendations. (While this identifies the purpose
of your paper, this is not a thesis statement. A thesis statement
would be framed like: “The refugee crisis from African and
Middle Eastern countries is adversely impacting the economic,
political, and social stability of Germany.” You need to identify
exactly what it is your research proves.)
Background
2. Germany according to Ostrand, (2015) is one of the countries
that accommodate many refugees from African and Middle
Eastern countries like Syria. According to research, Germany
and Sweden were the countries that accommodated most of the
refugees escaping Syria due to war in 2014 (Ostrand, 2015). As
a result, the country incurs certain burdens (This is vague. Be
specific about what those burdens are.) in accommodating
refugees. One of the key issues regarding immigration is human
security.
Over the past years, a lot of research regarding the implications
of immigration in Germany has been carried out. However, most
of the research has largely focused on national security, crime
and violent extremism. However, human security which is the
focus of this paper involves the lives of people and their
livelihoods both for the natives of Germany as well as those
seeking or immigrating into the country. (This paragraph
belongs in the opening where you should establish the
importance of the topic and how your research contributes to
our field of study.)
Issues around Immigration
The main issues that arise regarding immigration and human
security involve the laws protecting the citizens and the
immigrants, the number of immigrants moving into Germany
and its implications to population growth and security as well as
measures put in place to ensure human security. (Issues look
good. You are going to need some research in this section. Also,
which theoretical framework will you apply in your analysis –
realist, idealist, constructivist?)
Complications regarding immigration (You will need research
in this section in the final paper)
While the country has developed both policies and laws to
ensure that immigrants and natives are secured, immigration
raises certain complications. Some of the complications that the
country faces include dealing with illegal immigration which
has been on the rise over the past years. (complicating factor 1)
3. Moreover, immigration issues in the country are further
complicated by its willingness to accommodate as many
immigrants as possible. This is evidenced by the fact that the
country has enacted a law that makes it easy for immigrants
with certain skills to move to the country.(Complicating factor
two) (What is the purpose of this law? Are they trying to fill
shortages in the workforce, shortages that are proving difficult
to resolve with their current population?) (You are missing a
complicating factor)
You are missing a section evaluating possible solutions. Be sure
to offer enough specific to answer the “who, what, where, when,
why, and how” questions. Evaluate the advantages and
limitations of each approach.
You are missing your own recommendations for resolving the
problem. Be sure to offer enough specific to answer the “who,
what, where, when, why, and how” questions. Evaluate the
advantages and limitations of your recommended approach.
You are missing an anticipated outcome for the
recommendations you are proposing to resolve the problem.
Conclusion
As observed in this paper, the refugee crisis in certain African
countries and Middle Eastern countries such as Syria has had
(numerous implications)(vague) for human security in Germany.
These implications not only involve the costs that the country
has to incur in accommodating refugees but also the protection
of both native Germans and the refugees moving into the
country. This is not a conclusion. Your conclusions are based
on your research, analysis, and recommendations. What is likely
to happen if the problem is left unaddressed? What is likely to
happen if we implement your recommendations for resolving the
problem?
You are missing a thesis statement. (5 pt deduction) Background
section could use some more specifics. (2 pt deduction) How
many refugees? Are there enough jobs, housing, etc? Are there
conflicts? Are there barriers to integrating? Programs to support
them? What are the benefits and the disadvantages (look at both
4. the pros and cons). You identify three issues contributing to the
problem but you do not identify a theoretical perspective in the
issues section. (2 pt deduction) You are missing one
complicating factor. (1 pt deduction) You will need to
incorporate some research into the issues and complicating
factors sections of your final paper. You are missing possible
solutions, recommendations, and anticipated outcomes. (15 pt
deduction) When you write the paper, be sure to weigh the
advantages and limitations of your possible solutions and your
own recommendations. This will strengthen your credibility and
persuasiveness. You should incorporate research into those
sections of your paper as well. Your closing paragraph will
prove easier to write when you complete the missing sections.
Your project design is incomplete. You have a logical flow to
the information you presented. There are several areas in need
of research. You list two sources in your reference list but only
mention one in the work above. (5 pt deduction) You earned:
Criteria
Exemplary
16-20
Accomplished 11-15
Developing
6-10
Beginning
0-5
Total
Purpose/Audience
15
15/20
Thesis and Support
6. 1
3
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US Elections 2020 World Environment Soccer US Politics
Business Tech Science
'Migrants are not a threat': US aid
groups brace for fight with Trump
Central Americans at US border face security crackdown as
president rails against approaching caravan
Edwin Delgado
in El Paso, Texas,
and Ciudad
Juárez, Mexico
Thu 1 Nov 2018
02.00 EDT
174
‘When we arrived, we were told to wait but they haven’t given
us any information of how long we’ll have to wait,’
said one father seeking to cross the border. Photograph: Edwin
Delgado/The Guardian
7. C
Reuse this content
entral American migrants approaching US3Mexico border
crossing
sites in recent days to apply for asylum are getting a taste of
what
may be ahead for the human “caravans” still hundreds of miles
to
the south, as Donald Trump further hardens his immigration
policies and rhetoric.
A normal scene in El Paso, Texas, finds US border agents, with
handguns in
holsters on their belts, routinely supervising migrants crossing a
bridge from
Mexico towards the port of entry on the US side. But earlier this
week,
individuals and small groups, including parents and children,
found the
agents with assault rifles instead, blocking their path and
turning them back
halfway across the bridge.
Last Sunday, the border was closed temporarily while Customs
and Border
Protection (CBP) agents ran drills in riot gear, to prepare for the
kind of
shutdown the president has threatened if migrant caravans
crowd the
southern border. And many thousands of active duty US troops
are making
their way to the border in armored vehicles.
8. Meanwhile, a man and his son who were stopped at the halfway
point of the
bridge that connects Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, with El Paso,
Texas, spoke to
the Guardian, but were too afraid to give their names.
“I have been two days here at the bridge. When we arrived, we
were told to
wait but they haven’t given us any information of how long
we’ll have to
wait,” the father said. He and his teenage son fled gang violence
in their
hometown of Huehuetenango, Guatemala, seven months ago, he
said.
The pair sat with a handful of others waiting for information,
leaning against
the wall of the path approaching the bridge. Volunteers from the
lone
migrant shelter in Ciudad Juárez, Casa del Migrante, and other
samaritans
from both sides of the border brought them some sandwiches,
blankets and
fresh clothes.
They may be battling the odds, but as the Trump administration
prepares for
a fight with migrants, perhaps literally, American aid groups are
gearing up,
ready to go head to head with the authorities to protect people’s
right to have
their cases heard.
“Under both international and US
law, anyone who claims a fear of
9. persecution in their home country
has a right to apply for asylum,” said
Robert Painter, director of pro bono
services and communications at
American Gateways, a Texas not-for-
profit organization providing legal
services to migrants.
He added: “We expect the
Department of Homeland Security to
honor that right and ensure that
everyone seeking asylum is put through a fair adjudication
process.”
Asylum-granting power lies with US immigration judges.
Advocates fear the administration is trying to undercut the only
legal avenue
for migrants to make their asylum claims, as Trump has made it
clear he
doesn’t want to hear the migrants’ stories, instead threatening to
cut aid to
Central America, close the border and deploy as many as 15,000
soldiers,
according to the latest report.
“It’s the complete opposite of a smart response on migration.
We see this
idea of sending troops to the border as another attempt by the
Trump
administration to manufacture a crisis where there isn’t one,”
said Shaw
Drake at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Border
Rights Center in
El Paso. “We [already] have ample law enforcement presence at
our borders.
10. Migrants are certainly not a threat to anyone, much less a threat
that requires
troops to be deployed into the backyards of border
communities.”
The homeland security secretary, Kirstjen Nielsen, said last
week that troops
were not intending to shoot migrants “right now”. But advocates
are
concerned.
“My greatest fear is that US government officials will bring
about more
violence and suffering on families who have done nothing
wrong – only
sought safety and freedom in the United States,” said Conchita
Cruz, co-
founder of Asylum Seekers Advocacy Project.
The Department of Homeland Security did not respond to a
request for
comment on how federal officials are preparing to handle any
large groups of
migrants approaching the border.
According to a report in the New York Times, the
administration is
considering multiple options, including a renewed version of the
controversial family separation policy that would make parents
entering the
US with their children choose between surrendering the minors
to foster care
or being imprisoned as a family and waiving their children’s
right to have
detention limited to 20 days.
11. The government is also weighing further tightening asylum
rules, speeding
up deportations and extending the use of GPS ankle monitors
for those with
court dates.
And it is considering a temporary ban on all migrants from the
Central
American region entering the US, citing national security,
according to the
New York Times report, a move that advocacy and migrant
rights groups say
would be immediately challenged in court.
“This is straight-up a Latino ban,” said Jess Morales Rocketto,
chair of the
advocacy group Families Belong Together, adding: “The Trump
administration and the Republican party have become the party
of cruelty to
families … This goes against our values as Americans.”
According to CBP data, in fiscal year 2018, about 520,000
undocumented
immigrants were apprehended by CBP. The average number of
annual arrests
from 2000 to 2018 is approximately 741,000, 30% more than
this year. The
ACLU’s Drake said that DHS now has a “vastly greater” budget
and number of
immigration officials than at the time when arrests were double
or triple the
current levels.
In April, another caravan of migrants made their way from
Central America
all the way to the San Diego and Calexico ports of entry in
12. California. They
were mostly allowed to enter and apply for asylum, but after
that, Trump
cracked down, with the controversial zero-tolerance and family
separation
policies.
With the midterm election just days away and Trump keen to
turn the
national conversation away from domestic terrorism and an
antisemitic mass
shooting, Drake said: “There is no doubt they view this as an
opportunity to
ramp up and bring back some of the cruelest policies they’ve
implemented,”
adding: “The US is fully capable of processing and receiving
migrants; our
reaction will say more about who we are and who we want to
be.” The ACLU
will resort to court challenges wherever necessary, he said.
Though the current caravan remains far from the border, in
recent days more
than 70 migrants from Guatemala and Cuba who intend to ask
for asylum
arrived at the Santa Fe International Bridge, which connects
downtown
Ciudad Juárez with El Paso.
The father and son from Guatemala and small clutches of other
migrants
waited on the walkway. Most who were willing to talk were
unaware of the
larger caravan making its way from the south. They are aware of
hostility
from US leadership but say they are driven to make the
13. dangerous trek to the
US.
“We left because of necessity. In Guatemala, there are no jobs.
If I stayed in
Guatemala, we would’ve run out of money and not have
anything to eat,”
said another man traveling with his wife and two children. “I
want to come
here to work. We’re not bad people.”
A migrant at the bridge from Cuba was fleeing the oppression of
the Castro
regime, he said.
He felt confident he would pass the “credible fear” asylum test
because some
of his friends and family are political prisoners in Cuba.
While traversing the Chiapas region of Mexico two weeks ago,
he saw the
migrant caravan coming from Central America. Instead of
joining it he
rushed ahead, hoping to be admitted before any possible
shutdown of the
border, he said.
A spokesman for CBP said the agency was monitoring the
caravan.
“We have been making – and will continue to make – necessary
preparation.
Regardless of the operational contingencies we may face, please
know this:
we will ensure border security – we will not allow a large group
to enter the
14. US unlawfully, we will act in accordance with the highest
principles of law
enforcement, and we will treat intending migrants humanely and
professionally at all times.”
Drake decried Trump’s election tactics. “The US is a beacon of
hope and this
administration is dragging us to the pit of anger and fear,” he
said.
America faces an epic choice ...
... in the coming year, and the results will define the country for
a
generation. These are perilous times. Over the last three years,
much of
what the Guardian holds dear has been threatened – democracy,
civility,
truth. This administration has cleared out science and scientists
across all
departments. America's reputation as a competent global leader
is in peril.
Truth is being chased away. But with your help we can continue
to put it
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Topics
Trump further
stokes immigration
fears by saying he'll
send 15,000 troops
to border
Read more
Migrants receive food handouts at the US border Photograph:
Edwin Delgado/The Guardian
Migrant caravan
seen as safer option
16. for travelling: 'Going
alone is risky'
Read more
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saying it violates American
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19 COMMENTS
National security and the nexus of
climate, conflict and migration
BY AMANDA RODEWALD, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR —
02/25/19 05:30 PM EST
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Does climate change pose a national security threat? That is the
question
to be addressed by a proposed Presidential Committee on
Climate
Security, according to .
The proposal to establish the committee follows several high-
profile
reports indicating that climate change does indeed threaten our
security.
Remember the released in late
November that warned of dire outcomes for the U.S., including
a loss of
up to 10 percent of GDP by 2100 —
? A mid-January Defense Department report identified
climate change as both a national security issue and threat to
U.S. military
installations in many parts of the world.
The
submitted to the Senate Intelligence
Committee in late January by Daniel
Coats, the director of National
Intelligence, stated that “Global
32. environmental and ecological
degradation, as well as climate
change, are likely to fuel competition
for resources, economic distress,
and social discontent through 2019
and beyond.” And a
detailed case studies of climate impacts on human mobility,
global
migration, and security. Notably, these reports were issued by
relatively
conservative or independent authors and agencies that are far
removed
from the deep-state narrative often suggested by climate
deniers.
Although the idea of a federal advisory committee on climate
security
might seem like a positive move on face value, the motivation is
questionable. For starters, the committee will be spear-headed
by climate
skeptic William Happer, an advisor to the National Security
Council;
Happer has
.
Moreover, the National Security Council’s own white paper
states that
“scientific and national security judgments have not undergone
a rigorous
independent and adversarial scientific peer review to examine
the
certainties and uncertainties of climate science, as well as
implications for
national security.” Most Americans will recognize this
33. statement as false,
given the well-established, extensive, and rigorous peer review
process
underlying climate science. But fewer people are as familiar
with the
evidence linking climate change to national security.
Climate change is widely viewed as a “threat multiplier” that
operates
along to compromise national security. One pathway is
by reducing the availability or access to critical resources, such
as water,
food and productive land, which can provoke or exacerbate
social unrest,
conflict and displacement or forced migration. Another pathway
flows
from the
, which also can act to undermine
security.
The Syrian conflict provides a useful . Widespread crop failure
and reduced groundwater supplies followed the most severe
drought on
record, a three-year drought .
Climate-induced environmental stressors prompted a mass
migration of
rural farming families to Syrian cities, where soaring urban
populations
strained economic resources, social services, and infrastructure
to the
point of inciting conflict and violence. The internal conflict,
coupled with
limited resources, resulted in the forced migration of millions of
people
and, subsequently, triggered fear, blame, social unrest and
34. political
discord in many receiving countries.
Such feedbacks are not unique to Syria, and scientists have
detected
similar patterns globally. For instance, a meta-analysis of 60
studies found
that
patterns, and the frequency of
violence among groups rises by 14 percent with each one-
standard
deviation.
Another study reported that when
temperatures in 103 countries
shifted outside of ranges that best
supported agriculture,
from 2000-2014.
of asylum seekers
across 157 countries from 2006 to
2015 showed that as climate change
increased the intensity and extent of
drought, the probability of armed
conflict and subsequent
outmigration of refugees rose as well. Thus, compelling
empirical
evidence supports the existence of strong connections across
multiple
spatial and temporal scales.
With ’s strong emphasis on security — especially as
related to immigration — one might expect greater attention to
36. Worldwide Threat Assessment
January report
from the Government Accountability
Office
previously extolled the benefits of increased CO and
warming for mankind
2
different pathways
pressure that migrants might place on resources, services, and
the economy of receiving geographies
case study
attributed to human-caused climate change
likelihood of conflict since the 1950s increases with departures
from
normal precipitation and temperature
Don't Buy a New PC - Try This
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asylum
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European Union A
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https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action
https://thehill.com/blogs/in-the-know
https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows
https://thehill.com/
https://thehill.com/policy/defense
46. Abstract
This introductory article outlines a framework to bridge some of
the current fragmentation
and knowledge hierarchies in the sociological field of
migration. The article builds on the
insights – and epistemological roots – used in different parts of
the world to reflect on
21st-century realities of migration and human security. It
considers international migrants,
internally displaced persons, refugees and trafficked persons as
part of a continuum
of migrants who exhibit seasonal, temporary and long-term
migration patterns. The
framework draws upon the scholarship of the Global South and
North on political-economic
processes that have historically influenced migration and
migrants’ lives and continue to do
so today. It considers the dominant approach used in studies of
international migration and
shows why it is necessary to go beyond the focus on nation-
states and an emphasis on a
particular group of migrants. The framework weaves the
insights of scholars who work on
international, internal migration and forced migration, as well
as the critical literatures on
intersectionality and human rights to build an approach that
centers questions of migrants’
human security. The framework emphasizes the glocal – i.e.
intersecting global-national-
local – terrains of migration and discusses human security
within glocal terrains.
Keywords
Forced migration, glocal terrain, human rights, human security,
internal migration,
47. international migration, migrants’ knowledge hierarchies
Introduction
Over the last few years, headline news and social media around
the world have featured
men, women and children who were fleeing large-scale
violence, disasters and loss of
Corresponding author:
Bandana Purkayastha, University of Connecticut, Manchester
Hall, Storrs, CT 06269-1068, USA.
Email: [email protected]
736302CSI0010.1177/0011392117736302Current
SociologyPurkayastha
research-article2017
Article
https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/journals-permissions
https://journals.sagepub.com/home/csi
mailto:[email protected]
http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F00113921
17736302&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2017-11-23
168 Current Sociology Monograph 1 66(2)
prospects of livelihood. Their search for safer havens has been
interrupted by expanding
terrains of state security initiatives on land and sea to prevent
migrants from reaching
their territories, incarceration in detention camps within and
across nation-states, and the
growth of human smuggling rings that fail to deliver on
48. promises to move people safely.
According to the estimates by the United Nations, 65.3 million
people had fled, or had
been forced off their homelands by the end of 2015 (UNHCR,
2016a), and deserts and
seas are littered with the bodies of those who perished trying to
reach safe havens in
recent years (New York Times, 2015). Recent global headlines
also highlight a series of
additional political efforts to control migration to the US, UK,
EU and other countries.
While there are many diverse scholarly conversations on
migration and migrants in
the Global North and South,1 the dominant sociological
conversations2 on migration
continue to focus on international migrants’ and their
integration within nation-states.
This monograph issue attempts to bridge the fragmented
conversations and knowledge
hierarchies on migration and migrants and highlight some of the
contours of contempo-
rary contexts of migration. Bringing an awareness of the
political-economic-social pro-
cesses that shape migration and migrants’ lives, the insights
from the scholarship on
forced migration, and the critical literatures on intersectionality
and human rights, this
monograph issue emphasizes the glocal, i.e. intersecting global-
national-local – terrains
of migration and the human security of migrants. The articles
draw upon the insights –
and epistemological roots – used in different parts of the world
to reflect on 21st-century
realities of migration and human security.
49. This framework builds upon three key realities. First, neither
nation-states nor
migrants’ lives are now contained within the territorial
boundaries of nation-states. With
the rapid improvement in communication technology,3 many
aspects of migrants’ lives
are organized in virtual spaces and range through multiple
countries depending on their
networks. These aspects of their lives are part of, not apart
from, their lives in tangible
geographic (local, national and transnational) spaces. At the
same time, powerful nation-
states, and many other actors including global security regimes,
operate transnationally
to track migrants across tangible and virtual spaces.4 Many
nation-states reach out to
‘their people’ offering access to resources in the ‘home country’
via dual citizenships or
overseas citizenships. These transnational actions intersect with
the national, regional
and local dynamics that impede or facilitate different types of
migration.
Second, if we look across the different conversations on
migration in the Global North
and South, scholars have identified many actors that shape
migrants’ lives prior to, dur-
ing, and after migration in the contemporary world. While
nation-states and states’
migration-regimes remain critically important for understanding
migration, international
organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, labor bro-
kers, traffickers, smugglers, purveyors of violence, as well as
humanitarian and aid agen-
cies are involved in shaping terrains of migration. States are
50. shaped by powerful
political-economic interests that push them to balance the needs
for cheaper labor with
their powerful groups’ interests to maintain their hegemony.
Migration streams and
migrants’ lives emerge through these contradictory and
coalescing forces.
Third, along with considering the intersecting social structures
that shape processes of
migration and migrants’ lives within nation-states, in the last
decade, many scholars have
begun to use the language and framework of human rights –
including the human right
Purkayastha 169
of people to move – to delineate the structures that affect
different types of migrants.
Here, I argue that the human rights approach, and the implicit
assumption about the role
and ability of nation-states to ensure these rights, is no longer
sufficient to understand the
structures that substantively enable and impede migrants to
fulfill their quest for secure
lives. Hence it is important to understand migration and
migrants in terms of human
security in the expanded glocal contexts shaped by many actors.
The human security framework includes the objectives of the
human rights charters
and conventions and re-centers the focus on migrants’
experiences within terrains of
migration that are not confined to the territorial limits of
51. nation-states. By focusing on
human security, the issues of migrants’ survival, their ability to
access resources and
opportunities to build lives of human dignity, and the socio-
economic and political con-
ditions that promote or impede their well-being are placed at the
center of research. This
approach, as I discuss later, can be used to analyze the
experiences of a variety of migrants
identified in the research in the Global North and South,
ranging from those who travel
across international boundaries in search of better life
conditions to those who are forced
to move and/or are trafficked. Focusing on expanded terrains of
migration and a focus on
different types of migrants offers a way of traversing some of
the existing knowledge
hierarchies between and within the Global North and South that
have lead to the frag-
mentation of the field of migration. The next sections explain
the lens for analyzing
actors and structures that affect migration and migrants’ access
to substantive human
rights, including their quest – often unfulfilled – for human
security.
Migrations and migrants
Many diverging circles of conversations now mark studies of
migrations and migrants in
the Global North and South; these conversations overlap with
studies of ethnicities (and
the factors that keep migrant groups distinct from mainstreams),
studies of diasporas (on
issues of multiple migrations and the persistence of ties to
symbolic homes) and explora-
52. tions of citizenships (including the discussions about the nature
of rights granted to
migrants in exchange for their labor). Other conversations
examine forced migrations
and the structures of marginalization that shape the migrants’
experiences.
Thematically, the global scholarship on migration examines
many forms of interna-
tional, internal, temporary, permanent and cyclical migration.
These studies include
altered contexts of migration (e.g. Aguilar, 1999; Kofman,
2013; Walsh, 2014), cyber
migration (e.g. Aneesh, 2006), demographic characteristics of
migrants (e.g. Boyd and
Alboim, 2011), historical and contemporary indentured
migration (e.g. Adur, 2011;
Desai and Vahed, 2010), gendered labor migration (e.g. Bhatt,
2009; Kofman, 2013,
2014; Ueno, 2010), global care chains (e.g. Raghuram, 2012),
internal migration (e.g.
Abby and Mahamoud, 2005), marriage migration (e.g.
Constable, 2003; Davin, 2007;
Kang, 2011; Kim, 2015; Tyldom, 2013; Yeoh et al., 2013),
migrant rights (e.g. Choo,
2013), return migration (e.g. Jain, 2013; Xiang, 2004; Xiang et
al., 2013), seasonal
migration (e.g. Korra, 2011; Mendiburo, 2015), settlement
patterns, intergenerational
integration and segmented assimilation of migrants within
nation-states (e.g. Alba and
Nee, 1997; Portes et al., 2005; Zhou, 1997) and students’
migration (e.g. Fielding, 2015).
A particularly robust conversation focuses on forced migration
and trafficking in humans
53. 170 Current Sociology Monograph 1 66(2)
enmeshed within powerful and often violent global political-
economic forces, for
instance, Abby and Mahamoud (2005) on displaced persons in
Somalia, Baruah (2003)
on displacements in North East India, Giri (2005) on Bhutanese
women and children
refugees, Grabska (2008) on refugees in Egypt, Hanafi and
Long (2008) on Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon, Majumdar et al. (2015) on the Rohingyas,
Muggah (2017) on Latin
American forced migration, Ray (2017) on Burmese refugees,
Sanyal (2014) on urban-
izing refugees, and Yousaf and Purkayastha (2015) on
trafficking in Pakistan.
Constellations of scholarship have examined these different
types of migration and
the structural conditions in which migrants are enmeshed prior
to, during, and after
migration. At the heart of these conversations are theoretical
and methodological ques-
tions about appropriate frameworks to analyze the causes and
consequences of migra-
tion. These conversations are not clearly separable as
scholarship of the Global North
and South, but the dominant approach emanating from the
Global North – and used in
parts of the Global South – reflects an overarching concern
about migrants who cross
nation-states’ boundaries. In this formulation, migrants are
mostly assumed to move
from less developed, less modern parts of the world to modern,
54. developed nation-states
of the North. The indicators of assimilation and integration
originate from these assump-
tions and focus mostly on the record of migrants’ efforts to
integrate (e.g. Alba and Nee,
1997; Portes et al., 2005).
However, this dominant stream of migration research in the
Global North, as well as
the mobilities framework that has developed over the last two
decades (see Sheller
[2017] for an overview), coexists with significant critiques by
scholars who point to the
failure of these frameworks to consider the gendered, racialized,
sexualized structures
and processes through which migrants’ movements, rights and
freedoms are curtailed
(e.g. Aranda and Vaquera, 2015; Asencio, 2009; Das Gupta,
2008; Glenn, 2002; Golash-
Boza, 2011; Kibria, 2002; Kofman, 2013; Kurien, 2007; Ortiz
and Pombo, 2014;
Purkayastha, 2005). For instance, in contrast to those who study
assimilation in the USA,
other American sociologists have examined migration through
the lens of racism and
genders. They have documented the creation and maintenance of
hierarchies between
migrants and natives, the continuing relevance of understanding
earlier migration
streams, especially the conditions that enslaved people, the
internments, forced repatria-
tion of migrants from Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well
as the internal migration of
settler colonialist ‘natives’ and forced removal of indigenous
populations to accommo-
date these settlers (e.g. Das Gupta, 2008; Glenn, 2015; Golash-
55. Boza, 2011; Selod and
Garner, 2015; Weglyn, 1976). A focus on the varieties of female
migrants – who now
make up close to half the world’s migrants – uncovers other
political-economic-social
constraints that shape their experiences (e.g. Abraham, 2000).
Recent studies of transna-
tional cultural assemblages, especially the ‘soft power’ of
racism through these assem-
blages (Patil and Purkayastha, 2017), reveal how mobilities
within contemporary
dynamic spatio-temporal relations are interrupted and impeded.
These structural impediments migrants face are key to
understanding migration and
human security. Scholars from different countries (e.g.
Dustmann et al., 2016; Giri,
2005; Kang, 2011; Kofman and Raghuram, 2005; Krisjánsdóttir
and DeTurk, 2013; Li,
2011; Thomas, 2014; Yuval-Davis et al., 2005) have examined
the impact of intersecting
structures on migration processes and migrants. Authors have
argued that migrants are
Purkayastha 171
relatively privileged or marginalized because of their social
location relative to the inter-
secting structures of
nationality/gender/class/race/ethnicity/caste/religion/sexuality/a
ge
and, consequently, in their ability to move and access
substantive rights after internal or
international migration. Furthermore, they emphasized that
56. force and violence by the
state and other groups within and across nation-states play a
crucial role in shaping
migration and the continuing insecurities of migrants (Glenn,
2002; Purkayastha and
Ratcliff, 2014). Thus, who are likely to access which rights and
under which set of cir-
cumstances they are able to move and integrate are empirical
questions rather than facts
that migration scholars can take for granted (e.g. Aguilar, 1999;
Bhattacharya et al.,
2002; Das Gupta et al., 2010; Espiritu, 2003; Kofman, 2013;
Purkayastha, 2012). The
emphasis on intersectionality, with its emphasis on analyzing
multiple levels of intersect-
ing structures of domination and marginalization, sets this
stream of conversation apart
from the mobilities approach (see Sheller, 2017; Urry, 2000),
which also recognizes the
dynamic processes and flows shaping the contemporary world.
Using a theoretical approach that uses intersectionality to
analyze migration and
migrants’ experiences emphasizes questions about the rights of
different types of
migrants and has, inevitably, overlapped with the rapidly
growing literature on human
rights. While the writing of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in the middle of
the 20th century and subsequent covenants and charters
facilitate, in theory, the ability
of individuals and collectivities to seek human rights
irrespective of the political system
in which they are located, there are significant debates about the
grounded realities of
these rights (e.g. Armaline et al., 2011, 2015; Baxi, 2006;
57. Xiang, 2004). With a focus on
human security, this monograph issue draws upon one strand of
the conversation: as
states, and constellations of states, continue to delink migrants’
labor from political and
social rights (e.g. Adur, 2011; Walsh, 2014) or offer very
limited citizenship-based
rights (Aguilar, 1999; Kim, 2015), can we rely on states to
uphold the human rights of
migrants? A particular concern is the failure of the dominant
nation-focused migration
literature to recognize that other formal bodies of
institutionalized authority, such as the
United Nations or the World Health Organization, as well as
global purveyors of vio-
lence such as privatized military groups and criminal gangs,
shape migration and the
lives of migrants in the 20th and 21st century (Armaline et al.,
2015, 2017). To what
extent do states resist, cooperate with and/or facilitate the
actions of these extra-state
entities? Focusing on different types of migrants and their
rights raises questions about
the complex structural circumstances that enable migrants to
build secure lives, i.e.
lives that are secure from threats ‘derived from economic, food,
health or environmental
security, and threats to personal, community, and political
security, or human rights
violations’ (Tripp et al., 2013: 6).
Since the diverse conversations focus on very different types of
migration and
migrants it is important to clarify a few of the critiques,
concerns, and assumptions about
the categories of migration and migrants that are discussed in
58. migration research.
Currently, there is a significant bifurcation in the literature
between internal and interna-
tional migration and migrants. The overwhelming focus on
international migration as
defined in the Global North has led to charges of
methodological nationalism by scholars
who point out that this dominant focus erases historical and
contemporary power rela-
tions that shape migration (e.g. Dirlik, 2009; Samaddar, 2015;
see also Amelina and
172 Current Sociology Monograph 1 66(2)
Faist, 2012). Equally important, others who migrate across
international boundaries
include trafficked persons and refugees (i.e. those who are
designated as refugees by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees); these groups
are typically studied
separately. Similarly, internal migrants include those who are
displaced internally, those
who are trafficked, and those who move for jobs and better life
opportunities. Since
many nation-states include significant political/social/cultural
diversities, internal
migrants can be treated as foreigners in the places where they
settle, or are forced to
reside, especially if they are marked as linguistic, religious,
political, racial, caste or
tribal outsiders (see Njiru, this issue). Yet these internal
migrant groups are mostly invis-
ible within the overwhelming focus on a particular type of
international migrant.
59. Discussing the need to bridge the divide between internal and
international migration,
King and Skeldon (2010) have argued that it is often difficult to
clearly delineate internal
and international migrants; the location and nature of national
boundaries change, and
migrants themselves might move in ways that blur the
boundaries between different
types of migration. They argue that creating middle order
theories that cover both sets of
migrants could be developed based on:
… the application of a systems approach, originally derived
from the study of internal migration,
to international migration; the application of integration theory,
traditionally applied with
international migrants, to internal migrants; and the bringing
together of internal and
international migration in the debate on migration and
development. (King and Skeldon, 2010:
1640)
Their argument provides one path for reconciling a source of
fragmentation in the
field. However, it is important to examine other, critical
perspectives as well. Raghuram
(2009) and Yousaf and Purkayastha (2015), among others, have
argued that we need to
interrogate the West-centric nation–state–modernity–
development nexus by placing
forced migration and global political-economic structural
processes at the center of
migration frameworks. A series of publications by the Calcutta
Research Group question
the ways in which nation-states are taken for granted in the
60. dominant migration literature
(MCRG, 2006).5 As a member of this group, Samaddar (1999)
has emphasized that
nation-states are relatively new entities within the streams of
histories in many parts of
the world. He uses the term transborder migration to identify
the structures that separate
migrants from natives politically, socially, economically and
culturally. Many of the
political borders – internal and international – that currently
serve the political needs of
nation-states impede long-established channels of seasonal,
circular, temporary and
long-term migration, or these borders set up groups to become
stateless people, as in the
case of the Rohingyas (see Majumdar et al., 2015). The maps of
the colonial era bounda-
ries of many nation-states in Africa, Asia and Latin America are
testimonies to imposed
borders. At the same time, continuing colonial relations extend
the borders of territories,
for instance, the extension of European Union boundaries in the
Caribbean, so that peo-
ple located far away from the contiguous territory of the EU,
are drawn into distant sys-
tems (Boatca, forthcoming). The politics of borders – and
consequently the classification
of migrants and natives, issues of settler colonialists and
migrants’ rights – emerge
through these histories.
Purkayastha 173
Heeding the calls to move beyond the dominant frameworks of
61. the Global North,6 I
propose that in order to understand migration more holistically,
we conceptualize
migrants, and the structures and processes in which they are
enmeshed, as though they
are arrayed on a continuum: from international migrants (at one
end), through internal
migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons, and trafficked
persons (at the other
end). The distinctions between these classifications of migrants
are dynamic, with a
change in structural circumstances migrants might end up in
different categories during
their lifetime.7 These are broad categories, more fine-grained
types, such as seasonal,
temporary, or circular migration, can be accommodated within
this array. It brings into
focus conditions prior to, during, and after migration. Who is a
migrant and which type
of migration describes their journey at any point in time are
classifications that reflect
worlds of formal policies and laws that govern their moves
across borders, their ability
to settle, and their access to critical resources that are needed
for their survival and well-
being. Since the questions of human security – especially the
critical issues of survival
and well-being – are related to violence (see Abraham and
Tastsoglou, 2016), another
way of thinking about these different types of migrants is to
think about each category
relative to their vulnerabilities to violence (German, 2013;
Purkayastha and Ratcliff,
2014). While we are able to imagine the violence trafficked
persons experience, interna-
tional (family) migrants experience partner violence (e.g.
62. Abraham, 2000), or violence
from hate groups or the state depending on how welcome they
are in a particular place
(Jani, 2017). As Samaddar has argued, the terrain of internal to
international migration
does not exist as a benign continuum, instead:
Studies of hunger in the 19th century, of itinerant movements,
transportations of coolies, spread
of famines, shipping of children, adult girls, trafficking in sex,
labour, and human organs, and
welfare legislations to cope with this great infamy tell us how
actually we have arrived at our
own time of subject formation under the conditions of empire.
This is certainly different from
the tradition of nation-centred histories. (Samaddar, 2015: 50)
Hence, migrants are conceptualized as a continuum of migrants
whose experiences
before, during, and after migration within and across countries
are important for under-
standing migration beyond the confines of nation-state-centric
frames. While this mono-
graph issue does not resolve all the methodological and
theoretical debates surrounding
migration and migrants,8 it responds to the need to bridge some
aspects of the contempo-
rary knowledge hierarchies that lead to fragmented theorization
of migration. To further
elucidate this approach, this monograph emphasizes two
interrelated issues: the need to
shift the conversation to migration and migrants’ experiences
within the glocal terrains
of migration, and the need to investigate migrants’ ability to
build secure lives free of
threats to their survival and well-being.
63. Moving the conversation from nation-states to glocal
terrains
While nation-states continue to wield significant power to shape
migration flows and
migrants’ lives, a growing strand of scholarship recognizes the
porosity of national
174 Current Sociology Monograph 1 66(2)
boundaries and the contemporary transnational context produced
by flows of people,
finances, ideas, media images and technologies (Appadurai,
1990; Urry, 2000) within
which migrants build lives across nation-states (e.g. Levitt,
2001; Portes et al., 2005;
Vertovec, 1999). The rapid economic development in areas
outside the Global North, as
well as the ease of movement and communications, has lead to
transnational migration,
return migration to homelands of origin, as well as circular
migrations in earlier and later
stages of life (Jain, 2013; UN, 2015; Xiang et al., 2013). Many
studies of immigrant
transnationalism, developed within the dominant international
migration frame, assume
that the boundaries of nation-states are sufficiently porous to
enable migrants to maintain
ties with homelands. Different mechanisms operate – between
migrants, communities,
institutions – to maintain transnational connections (Faist,
2013; Levitt, 2009). Scholars
who are critical of the dominant approach point out that politics
64. and power inequalities
between nation-states shape different possibilities and
impediments to transnational
migration. Many groups of migrants do not enjoy easy passage
between nation-states.
For instance, Kibria (2011) and Guevarra (2009) have examined
the cases of Muslim
migrants and Filipina migrants to analyze the global and
national structures that interrupt
or promote transnationalism for these groups. International
migrants also find it hard to
maintain ties with family if the host country designates the
nation-state-of-origin as
politically problematic and maintaining ties to people in those
places as suspicious-anti-
national-practice (also see Purkayastha, 2005). Analyses of
forced migration reveal other
significant impediments to building transnational lives. In sum,
a focus on the array of
migrants reveals different ways in which migrants have to
contend with dynamic struc-
tures of a transnational context, including the transnational
structures that remain less
visible in the shaping of everyday lives.
Samaddar (2008) and Dirlik (2005), among others, point out
that nation-states in the
Global North have relied on streams of immigration and
emigration for their develop-
ment. At the same time, these nation-states were organized to
uphold the hegemony of
dominant groups within the nation-states and global empires.
International and internal
migrants were essential to this scheme of nation-hood in order
to define a nation’s iden-
tity and its borders. Focusing on the ways in which these
65. hierarchies were embedded
within nations, some scholars argued that these earlier streams
of European-origin settler
colonialists in the United States or Australia benefitted from
porous international bound-
aries as they migrated; at the same time, their migrations led to
the forced migration of
the indigenous groups (e.g. Das Gupta, 2008, 2015; and Glenn’s
[2015] work on the US).
Ortiz and Pombo (2014) also argue that forced migrations and
displacements in Mexico
and Latin America require analyses of de-territorialization and
re-territorialization to
fully understand the dimensions of these internal migrations.
The Migration Policy
Institute has pointed out that the migration of indigenous groups
in the Americas, Africa,
Asia, Europe and Australia was not even linked to the issue of
their rights till very
recently (Yescas, 2010). The continuing popularity of the
frameworks based on nation-
states, modernity and development, whether these are used in
the Global North or South,
is based on the selective erasures of these histories of
migration.
The scholars who have discussed multiple modernities as a basis
for understanding
global theories (e.g. Eisenstadt, 2000; Patel, 2000) offer a
useful reminder that the Global
North models of histories do not apply across the world.
Applying this insight to
Purkayastha 175
67. 2014; UNHCR
2015a). The refugee situation caused by the Syrian conflict is
dire, and it
has placed enormous strain on neighboring countries. Lebanon,
Jordan,
Iraq, Egypt, and Turkey host massive numbers of Syrian
refugees, and
Syrians have been seeking protection beyond these countries in
increasing
numbers since 2011.
This paper looks at the burdens and costs of the Syrian refugee
crisis and
considers how they have, or have not, been shared by the
international
community at large, and in particular by Germany, Sweden, the
United
Kingdom, and the United States. It also considers to what
degree Syrians
have been able to find protection in states outside the region.
Germany
and Sweden, by the end of 2014, had provided protection to the
largest
number of Syrian refugees outside the region. Although
Germany, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and the United States differ in the level of
protection
provided to Syrians, all four states have increased protection to
Syrians via
resettlement and asylum (and in the case of the US temporary
protected
status) since 2012. Despite this, the degree of protection
provided by the
four states is modest in relation to that provided by neighboring
countries
to Syria, and far more could be done. This paper also argues
68. that the
international community as a whole has not sufficiently
contributed toward
alleviating the burden caused by the Syrian refugee influx, in
terms of both
financial assistance and refugee resettlement.
1 Nicole Ostrand graduated with a master’s degree in human
rights from Mahidol University, Thailand in
2013. She will begin her tenure as a doctoral student in
migration studies at the University of Sussex in
September 2015.
http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F23315024
1500300301&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2018-11-02
Journal on Migration and Human Security
256
The paper puts forward two general recommendations to reduce
the
strain on neighboring countries: increase the level of burden
sharing by
the international community as a whole and more evenly
distribute the
burden among industrialized states in Europe, North America,
and the
Asia Pacific. In terms of enhancing the level of protection for
Syrians in
countries beyond the region, it proposes three recommendations
for states:
namely, increase refugee resettlement, facilitate family
reunification
and other forms of legal admission, and allow refugees to seek
69. protection
through embassies in the region.
Introduction
The conflict in Syria between the government of Bashar al-
Assad and various other forces,
which started in the spring of 2011, continues to cause
displacement within the country
and across the region. By the end of 2014, an estimated 7.6
million people were internally
displaced and 3.7 million Syrians had fled the country since the
conflict began (OCHA
2014; UNHCR 2015a). During 2014, more than one million
Syrians were newly registered
as refugees in neighboring countries, bringing the total number
of registered refugees in the
region to 3,688,402 by year-end (UNHCR 2014a; UNHCR
2015a).2 As large as the number
of newly registered refugees is, in a sense it underestimates the
current crisis as it excludes
the 117,590 Syrians who were awaiting registration at the end
of 2014 (UNHCR 2015a),
and de facto Syrian refugees who were residing in the region
but who were not formally
registered or awaiting registration.3
The Syrian conflict has placed enormous strain on its
neighboring countries, with Jordan,
Lebanon, and Turkey shouldering the largest burden. By the end
of 2014, Lebanon, a
country of approximately 4.8 million people before the onset of
the Syrian refugee crisis,
hosted 1,146,405 registered Syrian refugees, meaning that
nearly one in every five people
now living in Lebanon is a Syrian refugee (UNHCR 2015a). As
of December 31, 2014,
70. Turkey hosted the largest Syrian population, with 1,552,839
registered refugees; Jordan
housed the third largest population with 622,865 registered
refugees (ibid.). In comparison,
Iraq and Egypt accommodated a smaller yet substantial number
of Syrians, hosting 228,484
and 137,812 registered refugees, respectively (ibid.).
María Eugenia Casar, under secretary general and associate
administrator of the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has reported that
“countries hosting Syrian
refugees are struggling with the massive impact on their
economies, societies, and
infrastructure threatening not only their stability but the
stability of the entire region”
(cited in UNHCR 2014b). The scope and protracted nature of
the Syrian conflict has made
2 On January 1, 2014, there were 2,301,533 registered Syrian
refugees (UNHCR 2014a). Estimates include
24,055 Syrian refugees registered in North Africa (UNHCR
2015a).
3 The number of newly registered Syrian refugees also
excludes refugees who are not Syrian nationals
but who were residing as refugees in Syria prior to the conflict
and who have fled due to the fighting. Such
populations include Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. For example,
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees estimates that 65,000 Palestinian
refugees have left Syria and are now residing in
Lebanon, Jordan, Gaza, and Egypt (UNRWA 2015). Similarly,
early reports had estimated that “more than
50,000 Iraqi refugees” living in Syria returned to Iraq (see
http://www.unhcr.org/51c0399c9.html).
71. The Syrian Refugee Crisis
257
the situation for Syrian refugees and their host communities
exceedingly difficult. Syrian
refugees face tension among host community populations and
struggle to secure basic
needs like security, food, and shelter (Orhan 2014). With the
humanitarian situation caused
by the Syrian conflict continuing to deteriorate, Syrians are
increasingly seeking asylum in
states outside the region.
In 2013, Syria became for the first time the main country of
origin of asylum seekers in 44
industrialized countries in Europe, North America, and the Asia
Pacific region (UNHCR
2014d).4 An estimated 56,400 Syrians requested refugee status
in the 44 industrialized
countries in 2013, more than double the number of Syrian
asylum claims in 2012 (25,200)
and six times the number in 2011 (8,500) (ibid.). In 2014, the
number of Syrian asylum
seekers in the 44 industrialized countries reached 149,600, the
highest number recorded by
a single group since 1992 (UNHCR 2015h).5
The refugee situation caused by the Syrian conflict is dire.
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt,
and Turkey host massive numbers of Syrian refugees, and
Syrians are increasingly seeking
protection outside these countries as well. This paper looks at
the burdens and costs of
72. the Syrian refugee crisis and considers how they have, or have
not, been shared by the
international community at large, and in particular by Germany,
Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
These four states were chosen as a focal point because they
accommodate relatively
large numbers of asylum seekers annually and enjoy a positive
reputation for providing
refuge to those in need in times of crisis.6 According to
UNHCR’s annual asylum trends
reports of 44 industrialized states, between 2009 and 2013,
Germany, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States ranked among the top five
states receiving asylum claims
(UNHCR 2014d, 13).7 Each country has also demonstrated a
significant commitment to
alleviating the Syrian refugee crisis. The United States and the
United Kingdom are the
4 The 44 countries are the 28 member states of the European
Union (EU), Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia,
Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, and Turkey, as well as Australia, Canada, Japan,
New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and
the United States (UNHCR 2014d, 5). Note: even though Turkey
is included in the 44 countries, the vast
majority of Syrians who are registered in the country (and who
are covered by the Turkish government’s
temporary protection regime) are not included in UNHCR’s
estimates of asylum seekers in the country. The
Syrian asylum seekers included in UNHCR’s estimates cover
only those “who for specific reasons have been
referred to UNHCR for further evaluation of their international
73. protection needs” (UNHCR 2015h, 21).
5 In 1992, 223,000 people originating from Serbia and
Montenegro lodged asylum claims in the 44
industrialized countries included in UNHCR’s annual asylum
trends reports (UNHCR 2015h).
6 For instance, the United States is well-known for being the
world’s top refugee resettlement country and
generally resettles at least 50 percent of all refugees referred by
UNHCR annually worldwide (see, e.g.,
UNHCR 2015c and US PRM 2014). In 2014 the British deputy
prime minister, Nick Clegg, said: “…[w]e are
one of the most open-hearted countries in the world and I
believe we have a moral responsibility to help…
Britain has a long and proud tradition of providing refuge at
times of crisis” (cited in Wintour 2014, emphasis
added). Sweden has a reputation for being particularly open and
receptive toward Syrian refugees (see, e.g.,
Brennen 2013; Evans 2014; and Rothschild 2014). Germany
views the fundamental right of asylum as a high
priority that expresses the country’s willingness to fulfill its
historical and humanitarian obligation to admit
refugees (German Federal Ministry of the Interior 2014a).
7 The United States had the most asylum claims submitted
during this period, followed by Germany. Sweden
and the United Kingdom received the fourth and fifth largest
number of asylum claims. France, which ranked
third, is not considered in this report due to the minimal number
of Syrian asylum claims made in the country
in 2012, 2013, and 2014.
Journal on Migration and Human Security
258
74. largest single-state bilateral donors of humanitarian aid for the
Syrian crisis (Pierce 2014),
and Germany and Sweden have admitted the largest number of
Syrian refugees among
industrialized states outside the region.8 Through a comparison
of these four countries, this
paper illustrates how some industrialized states have responded
to the Syrian refugee influx
and draws attention to differences and similarities in their
responses.
After comparing the contributions and responses of
industrialized states to each other and
to the contributions and responses of Syria’s neighboring states,
this paper puts forward
two types of recommendations. First, to reduce the strain on
neighboring countries, it
recommends increasing the level of burden sharing by the
international community as
a whole as well as increasing the distribution of this burden
among industrialized states.
Second, to enhance the level of protection available for Syrians
in states beyond the region,
this paper recommends that states: (1) increase refugee
resettlement; (2) allow refugees
to seek protection through embassies in the region; and (3)
facilitate family reunification
and other legal avenues for admission, such as private
sponsorship, medical evacuation,
humanitarian visas, academic scholarships, and labor mobility
schemes.
I. Asylum, Refugee Resettlement, and Temporary
Protection
There are two primary avenues for Syrians to access protection
in industrialized states
75. beyond the region: (1) traveling (legally or illegally) to a state
and claiming asylum there,
or (2) being recognized as a refugee for resettlement selection
from a country of first
asylum. These avenues are complementary, and the main
difference is the location of the
person at the time of application. Refugee determinations and
resettlement decisions are
made while the person is outside the destination country
(UNHCR 2011, 3).9 In contrast, a
person seeking asylum submits an application while they are
physically present in or at a
port of entry in the territory where they are requesting refuge.10
No country is legally obliged to resettle refugees, and only a
few states offer resettlement
on a regular basis (UNHCR 2011). Less than 1 percent of the
world’s refugees are resettled
to a third country (UNHCR 2015c). Asylum is a form of
protection based on the principle
of non-refoulement and internationally or nationally recognized
refugee rights (Eurostat
8 See analysis below for the number of Syrians provided
protection in Germany and Sweden compared
to the United States and United Kingdom. See Bitoulas 2013,
2014, and 2015 for the number of Syrians
provided asylum in Germany and Sweden compared to other EU
member states. Additionally, Canada and
Australia have only offered resettlement and other forms of
admission to around 11,000 and 5,600 Syrians,
respectively (UNHCR 2015b), and they have received a very
small number of Syrian asylum seekers (see
UNHCR 2014d).
9 UNHCR defines refugee resettlement as “the selection and
transfer of refugees from a [s]tate in which
76. they have sought protection to a third [s]tate which has agreed
to admit them, as refugees, for permanent
resettlement” (UNHCR 2011, 3). The status and rights given to
resettled refugees vary depending on the
country, and some states (e.g., Germany) initially grant
temporary residence with the possibility to receive
permanent residence after a specified length of time.
10 EU Directive 2013/32/EU, article 3; US Immigration and
Nationality Act (US INA), section 101(a)(42)
(A) and section 208(b).
The Syrian Refugee Crisis
259
2014a). States have an obligation to provide protection. A
positive asylum decision can
lead to refugee status11 (referred to as asylum in the United
States), subsidiary protection
status,12 or withholding of removal.13
Temporary protection, which grants the right to enter or remain
in a country for a limited
time due to risk of serious harm in a person’s home country, is
another possible means for
providing protection.14 It is usually granted to large groups of
people based on extraordinary
and temporary conditions in their country of origin (Miller and
Orchard 2014). Temporary
protection is not intended to displace asylum, but rather to
provide an intermediary,
immediate measure of protection, and persons granted
temporary protection should be able
to apply for and be granted asylum if eligible (Kerwin 2014).15
77. In the EU, temporary protection generally refers to a procedure
to provide, “in the event
of a mass influx or imminent mass influx,” immediate and
temporary protection to persons
fleeing their country who are unable to return home (European
Commission 2015b).16 Since
2001, the EU has had a regional temporary protection
mechanism which is triggered by the
adoption of a decision by the Council of the European Union
(following a recommendation
by the European Commission) establishing a mass influx of
displaced persons and stating
the groups of persons to whom the protection applies.17 In the
United States, temporary
11 EU Directive 2011/95/EU, article 2(e); US INA, section
101(a)(42)(A), section 208(a), and section 208(b).
12 EU Directive 2011/95/EU, article 2(g). In the EU,
subsidiary protection status is granted to a third country
national (or a stateless person) who does not qualify as a
refugee but for whom substantial grounds have
been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned
to his or her country of origin, would face
a real risk of suffering serious harm. A positive asylum decision
in the EU can also grant authorization
to stay for humanitarian reasons. This includes individuals who
are not eligible for refugee or subsidiary
protection, but are nonetheless protected against removal under
obligations imposed on all EU member states
by international refugee or human rights law. Examples of such
categories are persons who are not removable
on ill health grounds and unaccompanied minors (Bitoulas 2014,
24). No Syrians were granted authorization
to stay for humanitarian reasons by Germany, Sweden, or the
United Kingdom in 2013 through 2014 (see
78. Bitoulas 2014 and Bitoulas 2015).
13 US INA, section 241(b)(3) and section 241(c). Withholding
of removal is a form of protection in the
United States that is considered once an asylum seeker is
determined not to meet the refugee definition. It is
granted to individuals who show that they would either be
tortured or they would face persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion if returned to their
country of origin. In the United States, withholding applicants
face higher standards of proof than asylum
seekers (Kerwin 2012).
14 EU Directive 2001/55/EC; US INA, section 244(b)(1). For
more on temporary protection in general, see
Edwards 2012.
15 See also EU Directive 2001/55/EC, paragraph 10 and
articles 4 and 19.
16 See also the Council of the European Union directive on
minimum standards for giving temporary
protection (EU Directive 2001/55/EC).
17 EU Directive 2001/55/EC. It should be noted that there are
other forms of temporary protection and some
EU member states, in addition to being part of the regional
temporary protection regime, offer distinct forms
of temporary protection at the national level. For example,
Germany and the United Kingdom technically
grant temporary protection for Syrians admitted through their
resettlement programs. However, this is not
discussed in the section on temporary protection because it is
covered in the resettlement portion of the paper.
In the United Kingdom, Syrians receive temporary residency for
five years; following this period, individuals
may apply for permanent settlement (UK Home Office 2013;
UK Home Office 2014a). Syrians admitted
under Germany’s resettlement program receive two-year,
potentially renewable residence permits (Miller
79. and Orchard 2014). Additionally, Syrians granted asylum in
Germany (both subsidiary and refugee status)
receive a three-year residency permit, after which they are
granted permanent residency provided that they
Journal on Migration and Human Security
260
protection is often associated with temporary protected status,
which offers group protection
to non-citizens in the United States from designated
countries.18 Temporary protected status
is not necessarily a response to a mass influx, but is granted to
individuals of designated
states when an armed conflict, a natural disaster, or other
extraordinary and temporary
conditions prevent them from returning.19
II. Limitations
Comparing refugee and asylum numbers across states can be
challenging because states
have different laws, systems, and procedures for admitting
refugees.20 Also, the information
available varies by state and there is inconsistency in
definitions and terms. There are
three important limitations pertinent to the evaluation of Syrian
refugees across Germany,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
First, there is a disparity in how the number of submitted
asylum applications is calculated
by states. Statistics on asylum applications in Germany,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom
80. refer to the number of individuals applying for asylum,
irrespective of the type of procedure
in which the application was lodged (Eurostat 2014b). In the
United States, data on asylum
applications are broken down by type: affirmative and
defensive. Affirmative claims refer
to applications by persons who are not in removal proceedings
and who come forward
affirmatively to request protection. Defensive claims, on the
other hand, are submitted
for the first time as a defense to removal by persons who are in
removal proceedings
(Kerwin 2012). Information on affirmative claims are reported
by the US Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) and refer to the number of
cases, which may include
several individuals from the same family. In contrast, statistics
on defensive applications
are reported by the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR) and count the number
of individuals.
As a result of differences in the way US asylum applications are
reported, it is difficult
to establish the actual number of Syrians requesting asylum
annually (including both
affirmative and defensive claims). This makes it challenging to
compare the United States
with Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. According to
UNHCR, on average one
affirmative asylum case in the United States involves 1.356
individuals (UNHCR 2014d,
do not meet the conditions for revocation or withdrawal
(German Residence Act, section 26[1] and 26[3]).
18 The United States also has other mechanisms that can offer
81. temporary protection. For example, the
Department of Homeland Security can use “parole” to grant
entry to non-citizens, who would otherwise be
inadmissible, based on a “compelling emergency” or “urgent
humanitarian” reason (USCIS 2014b; US INA
212(d)(5)(A)). For more on temporary protection programs in
the United States see Kerwin 2014.
19 US INA, section 244(b)(1). For more on temporary
protected status in the United States, see Bergeron
2014.
20 As members of the EU, Germany, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom, in theory, have a more harmonized
system of procedures and legislation on asylum. Since 1999, EU
member states have worked to establish a
Common European Asylum System, or a set of common asylum
policies and standards at the EU level. (It
should be noted that the United Kingdom is not fully part of the
Common European Asylum System. For
more information, see Costello and Hancox 2014, 4-5). This
system is intended to bring unified standards and
to strengthen practical cooperation between member states. It
consists of several directives and regulations
that detail the responsibilities of EU member states in receiving
asylum seekers, processing their claims, and
providing protection.
The Syrian Refugee Crisis
261
5). To produce an estimate of the number of individuals who
submitted asylum applications
in the United States, this paper will therefore multiply by 1.356
the reported number of
82. US affirmative applications and add to that product the number
of defensive asylum
applications submitted annually.
A second limitation relates to who is included in statistics on
individuals granted asylum
in each state. In the EU, a person granted asylum (referred to as
a recipient of international
protection), means an individual who has received refugee or
subsidiary protection status
(Bitoulas 2015, 23).21 Subsidiary protection (known as
humanitarian protection in the
United Kingdom) is provided to a person who does not qualify
as a refugee but for whom
there are substantial grounds to believe they would face a risk
of serious harm if returned to
his or her country of origin.22 Throughout this paper, a Syrian
granted asylum in Germany,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom refers to a recipient of
international protection23 and
includes those who have received refugee or subsidiary
protection status.
In the United States, a person granted asylum (an asylee)
generally refers to persons who
received protection based on the refugee standard and does not
include related forms of
protection such as withholding of removal (Martin and Yankay
2014).24 Withholding of
removal claims are considered after an individual has been
denied asylum. Withholding is
granted to individuals who show that they would either be
tortured if returned to his or her
country of origin or “it is more likely than not” that they would
face persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
83. group, or political opinion.25
Due to the limitations of available information, data relating to
Syrians granted asylum in
the United States includes only individuals who received
protection based on the refugee
standard. While statistics are available on the number of
individuals granted withholding of
removal under the US Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
and under the UN Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT),
they do not distinguish individuals granted this status by
nationality. However, because the
number of withholding grants annually is small in comparison
to the number of asylum
grants, it is assumed the absence of withholding statistics for
Syrian nationals will not
make a substantial difference in the overall picture of Syrians
provided protection in the
United States.26
21 EU Directive 2011/95/EU, article 2(b).
22 For subsidiary protection status see EU Directive
2011/95/EU, article 2(g); for refugee status see EU
Directive 2011/95/EU, article 2(e). Humanitarian protection is
UK’s equivalent to subsidiary protection
(European Database of Asylum Law 2015).
23 This paper uses the meaning of “international protection”
as defined in the 2011 EU directive on the
standards for qualification of beneficiaries of international
protection. See EU Directive 2011/95/EU, article
2(b).
24 To be eligible for asylum status, an applicant must meet the
definition of a refugee set forth in US INA,
section 101(a)(42); see also US INA, section 208.
84. 25 US INA, section 241(b)(3) and section 241(c).
26 For example, in FY 2013, 25,199 individuals received
asylum in the United States (15,266 were granted
asylum by the USCIS Asylum Office and 9,933 were granted
asylum by immigration courts) compared to
1,893 individuals who were granted withholding of removal
(1,518 who received withholding under US
INA, section 241(b)(3) and 375 who received withholding under
CAT). See EOIR 2014, K5 and M1; Martin
and Yankay 2014, table 6.
Journal on Migration and Human Security
262
The last limitation concerns the time period states use for
reporting statistics. Statistics on
the number of asylum applications and individuals granted
asylum in the United States are
based on its fiscal year (October 1 through September 30) while
statistics from the three
European countries are based on the calendar year. This and the
other limitations discussed
make some of the numbers in this paper approximate but
nonetheless sufficient to show
trends across the four states.
III. The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Neighboring Countries
The neighboring countries of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq,
and Egypt have provided
valuable protection to Syrian refugees since the conflict began
in 2011. They have generally
allowed Syrians access to their territories and have dedicated
significant financial resources
