CASCADING DISASTERS AND COMPOUND, INTERCONNECTED RISKS
•
0 likes•336 views
A framework for understanding, analysing and managing cascading disasters, with notes on complexity, compound risks, interacting risks and interconnected risks.
![Objective:
to provide a [relatively]
simple means of
understanding,
classifying and
analysing the complexity
of disaster impacts
in a modern, networked
society]()
Recommended
More Related Content
What's hot
What's hot (20)
Similar to CASCADING DISASTERS AND COMPOUND, INTERCONNECTED RISKS
Similar to CASCADING DISASTERS AND COMPOUND, INTERCONNECTED RISKS (20)
More from Prof. David E. Alexander (UCL)
More from Prof. David E. Alexander (UCL) (15)
Recently uploaded
Recently uploaded (20)
CASCADING DISASTERS AND COMPOUND, INTERCONNECTED RISKS
- 1. CASCADING DISASTERS AND COMPOUND, INTERCONNECTED AND INTERACTING RISKS Prof. David Alexander and Dr Gianluca Pescaroli
- 2. Objective: to provide a [relatively] simple means of understanding, classifying and analysing the complexity of disaster impacts in a modern, networked society
- 3. Caesar Augustus (63 BC –AD 14) "The more complex a problem, the simpler the solution should be."
- 4. H.L. Mencken (1880-1956) "For every complex problem, there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong."
- 5. Warning: there are an awful lot of box diagrams and flow-charts in this presentation....
- 6. known knowns - things we know Modified "Rumsfeld" Classification unknown knowns - things we don't realise we know known unknowns - things we know we don't know unknown unknowns - things we don't know we don't know Research and applications Intensify search Broaden our culture We can do nothing 12-2-2002
- 7. DETERMINISM Cause Effect PROBABILITY (constrained uncertainty) Cause Single, multiple or cascading effects THE KNOWN THE UNKNOWN PURE UNCERTAINTY Causal relationship unknown Grey area
- 8. Climate change Terrorism Displacement and migration Pandemics and epidemics Population increase Environmental change Conflict Technological disasters and major incidents 'Natural' disasters
- 9. MODELS
- 10. DISASTER RISK HAZARD EXPOSURE VULNERABILITY RESILIENCE • probability • magnitude or severity • recurrence interval • physical assets (structures) • population (individuals) • economy (livelihoods) • physical • ecological • economic • social • psychological • cultural • institutional • physical planning • social and psychological coping • economic capacity
- 11. Vulnerability Total: life is generally precarious Economic: people lack adequate occupation Technological/technocratic: due to the riskiness of technology Delinquent: caused by corruption, negligence, etc. Residual: caused by lack of modernisation Newly generated: caused by changes in circumstances
- 12. Balancing vulnerability and resilience • current knowledge about the concepts of vulnerability, threat and risk • current knowledge about the concept of resilience • human organisation in crisis situations • gap analysis and resilience matrix • interactions between resilience and vulnerability: theoretical model
- 13. 'PRESSURE-AND-RELEASE' MODEL PROGRESSION OF VULNERABILITY ROOT CAUSES DYNAMIC PRESSURES UNSAFE CONDITIONS HAZARDS DISASTER Theoretical and conceptual framework for analysis Source: Wisner et al. At Risk (2004 edn)
- 14. 'PRESSURE-AND-RELEASE' MODEL PROGRESSION OF VULNERABILITY ROOT CAUSES DYNAMIC PRESSURES UNSAFE CONDITIONS HAZARDS DISASTER Theoretical and conceptual framework for analysis Source: Wisner et al. At Risk (2004 edn)
- 15. The "egg hypothesis" Disaster • prima facie causes • root causes • vulnerabilities • dynamic pressures Context • general vulnerability • poverty • deprivation • marginalisation
- 16. HAZARD or THREAT SPECIFIC VULNERABILITY HUMAN CONSEQUENCES The 'hazardscape' or the 'risk landscape' WEAKENING of the SOCIAL FABRIC GENERAL VULNERABILITY HUMAN CONSEQUENCES The 'wreckage economy' Health Employment Services • reduced • rationed • overpriced
- 19. Cascading disasters:- • topping dominoes, knock-on effects • compound and interconnected risks • linked physical and social vulnerabilities • non-linear progress • amplification of risks • multiple scales • secondary risks
- 20. C E E E E C E/C E E E E E E E E E/C (a) (b) C – cause E – effect Escalation points (a) (b)
- 21. Escalation Vulnerability scenarios Risk scenario Primary impact Secondary impacts Cascade path Cascade path Hazard event(s) After Nones & Pescaroli 2016, Pescaroli & Nones 2016 Interaction between vulnerabilities Legislation Management Time-space transitions
- 22. Time Short/fast Long/slow Space Restricted Extensive Critical infrastructure Macro-level socio- technical systems, e.g. globalisation Local & regional socio- technical systems, e.g. policies Environmental triggers (if any) Impact and feedback Source: Pescaroli and Alexander, 2016 Vulnerability loops
- 23. Primary cause of disaster Impact on critical infrastructure Impact on housing Impact on productive capacity Direct impacts Indirect impacts Impact on activities Secondary impacts Impact on livelihoods Impact on revenue Secondary cause of disaster Impact on well-being Impact on safety Impact on recovery
- 24. A magnitude scale for cascading disaster
- 25. Critical infrastructure complex, multi-dimensional networks: chain effects with escalation points
- 27. Water treatment works Railway station Fire station Electricity sub-station Broadband antenna Hospital Supermarket Power station Waste water treatment works FLOOD SITUATION
- 28. Electricity failure Water and sewerage failure Refrigeration failure (food toxicity) Banking failure Food and fuel supply failure Transportation failure Social success or failure? Communications failure
- 29. Knock-on effects of electricity failure:- • water: no pumping, no wastewater discharge or treatment • energy: heat and air conditioning down, gas unusable • food: no refrigeration; quick contamination • health: reliance on hospital generators • transport: no traffic control, no fuel pumping • communications: no mass-communications at all • finance: no money supply • government: cannot communicate with the people • emergency services: hampered and over-stretched.
- 30. Eyjafjallajökull volcano, April 2010
- 31. Eyjafjallajökull eruption affected: • the cut rose industry • symphony orchestras • bone-marrow transplants • aviation company share prices • hotel room availability • atmospheric modelling • overcrowding levels at railway stations • hotel room prices • modal split (use of various transportation modes) • taxi fares • battle training • atmospheric CO2 and SO2 levels - and much more
- 32. COMPLEXITY
- 33. Source: Pescaroli and Alexander, 2018
- 34. Earthquakes Central Italy, January 2017: Connected Events Snowfall isolation Avalanche Helicopter crash
- 35. Covid-19:- • global disaster • 'wave' disaster • multiple hot-spots • physical distancing • no property damage • huge economic damage Earthquake:- • regional-local disaster • sudden impact • localised hot-spots • physical closeness • huge property damage • big economic damage Hiatus of strategy
- 36. Disease and infection • transmissibility • infection rate Exposure • front line workers • Lock-down, shielding, isolation Morbidity and mortality • vulnerable categories • environmental factors Economic effects • reduced commerce • loss of employment • business failure • reduction in tax revenue Social effects • solidarity and voluntarism • social tension • protest, crime, 'deviant' behaviour • social polarisation Psychological effects • increased mental illness • depression • family conflict Policies, legislation, communication Recovery • a new normal • legacy The environment in which a pandemic occurs
- 37. PATIENT WITHOUT SYMPTOMS PATIENT WITH SYMPTOMS LOCKDOWN - CLOSURES - RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT TEST CONFIRMED FALSE POSITIVE FREE RETEST NOT TRACED TRACED CLOSE CONTACTS ISOLATION PRECAUTIONARY QUARANTINE TEST HYGIENE - PHYSICAL DISTANCING LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE - POLICING OF MEASURES TRUST IN AUTHORITY
- 39. Strategies for managing cascades • do not focus only on the trigger of the event • consider the strategic and tactic levels • encourage dialogue between professional fields • policies and plans must take account of possible ascades
- 40. Strategies for managing cascades • broaden impact analysis • use impact trees • identify escalation points • subject them to 'stress tests'
- 41. We need to analyse:- • context of hazards and threats • total risk environment • interaction between hazards • different pathways of simultaneous hazard impacts • how to manage complex impacts with foresight
- 42. SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY
- 43. Herbert Simon's homo Ĺ“conomus Bounded rationality Satisficer Optimiser Ideologue racist suprematist oligarch Evolution Protest Revolution Internet and social media 1950s 2020s
- 44. Cyber crime (illegal activity) deception theft Digital terrorism (sabotage) computer viruses ransomware Digital influence (subversion) spreading false information Digital extremism (on-line intervention) conspiracy theories character assassination incitement to violence MISUSE OF THE INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA
- 45. INTERSECTIONALITY SOVEREIGNTY DEMOCRACY MOBILITY IDENTITY HUMAN RIGHTS LEGALITY ENTITLEMENT CORRUPTION WELFARE COMPLEX DISASTERS
- 47. Politics in the service of economics DISASTER POLITICS ECONOMICS SOCIAL CONDITIONS PHYSICAL IMPACT VULNERABILITY Knowledge is ideology Underlying risk drivers Complexity Ideology • extremism • separatism • isolationism • exclusion Conflict Climate change Demographic change • human mobility Culture Technology
- 48. LOSS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROXY WAR, CONFLICT & POLARISATION POVERTY & MARGINALISATION 'WRECKAGE ECONOMY' & RISE OF THE PRECARIAT LACK OF DISASTER GOVERNANCE CORRUPTION & LOSS OF TRUST ANOMIE NIHILISM constraints upon life and safety Anomie (Durkheim 1893) is a condition of instability resulting from a breakdown of standards and values or from a lack of purpose or ideals.
- 49. CONCLUSIONS
- 50. Conclusions:- • all medium and large disasters involve cascades • major network failures will have long-term effects • six months with no electricity grid or no civil aviation is not impossible • network and complex failure can lead to a geometric increase in the complexity of the recovery process
- 51. Conclusions:- • society is complex: all disasters of a certain size will involve cascades • more investigation of operational components is needed • we need to understand how people behave in cascading crises • we need to investigate more case studies
- 52. Direct causes: practical problems contributing to disaster Long-term causes (dynamic pressures): predisposition to create disaster Root causes: motivating and underlying factors Local cascading effects National cascading effects International cascading effects Escalation factors Context