For a Reliable Civil Protection System That Keeps Citizens Safe
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Diagnosis of the relative failure of disaster risk reduction in the modern world and proposal for a cure - at least regarding disaster response, if not also prevention.
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For a Reliable Civil Protection System That Keeps Citizens Safe
- 1. Prof. David Alexander FOR A RELIABLE CIVIL PROTECTION SYSTEM THAT KEEPS CITIZENS SAFE
- 2. Bologna station bomb 2 August 1980 85 dead, 200 injured
- 3. Campania-Basilicata earthquake 3000 dead, 9000 injured, 280,000 homeless 23 November 1980
- 4. In disaster risk reduction the past is no longer a reliable guide to the future.
- 5. The world may be a very different place in one week's time:- • a different agenda • a different priorities • a different balance of threats and hazards CHANGE IS NOW OCCURRING VERY RAPIDLY
- 6. Analysis • registered • archived • forgotten • ignored Vulnerability maintained - • utilised • adopted • learned Disaster risk reduced + Lessons Past events If lessons are learned there will be measurable positive change
- 7. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED Are the lessons sustainable? What lessons? Are the decision makers interested? Whose interests: public or private? Culturally acceptable? Effect of uncertainty, unpredictability?
- 8. Toscana, November 2023 ‘Unprecedented’ it was not.
- 9. Report of the Midterm Review of the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 "However, at the midpoint of the implementation of the 2015 agreements, progress has stalled and, in some cases, reversed. This has resulted not only from the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, but also from short- versus long-termism, weakened multilateralism, disconnects between the real and the financial economies, rising inequality, and barriers between risk science, perception and risk-informed decision-making." Mami Mizutori Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction Head of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
- 10. “…our societal resilience is the lowest I have ever perceived…” Nigel Furlong, Emergency Planner, UK Atomic Energy Authority 9 November 2023
- 11. DIAGNOSIS
- 13. In the modern world, disaster risks are:- • cascading • cross-sectoral • concurrent • compound, • interconnected • interacting • systemic
- 15. Some possible high-impact, low-probability events • VEI7 volcanic eruption - 'volcanic winter', collapse of agriculture* • magnitude 9 earthquake and tsunami in Tokyo-to- Kobe region • major nuclear radiation emission - with or without blast • proliferating technological failure - toppling dominoes • Carrington space-weather event (or larger) *a return to the concept of Earth's ‘carrying capacity’
- 16. DISASTER RISK HAZARD EXPOSURE VULNERABILITY RESILIENCE • probability • magnitude or severity • recurrence interval • physical assets (structures) • population (individuals) • economy (livelihoods) • physical • ecological • economic • social • psychological • cultural • institutional • physical planning • social and psychological coping • economic capacity
- 19. The "egg hypothesis" Disaster • vulnerabilities • prima facie causes • dynamic pressures • root causes Context • general vulnerability • poverty • deprivation • marginalisation • discrimination
- 20. HAZARD or THREAT SPECIFIC VULNERABILITY HUMAN CONSEQUENCES The 'hazardscape' or the 'risk landscape' WEAKENING of the SOCIAL FABRIC GENERAL VULNERABILITY HUMAN CONSEQUENCES The 'wreckage economy' Health Employment Services • reduced • rationed • overpriced
- 22. Self-esteem Achievement, mastery, recognition Self-actualisation Talent, creativity, fulfilment Connection Physical participation, cyber-participation Belonging Identity, family, communities, workplace Threat and hazard abatement Safety, security, protection Welfare Reconsidering Abraham Maslow's pyramid of needs Food, water, sanitation, shelter, warmth, healthcare
- 23. C E E E E C E/C E E E E E E E E E/C (a) (b) C – cause E – effect Escalation points (a) (b)
- 25. If you want to understand the risks to critical infrastructure, you need to understand all four of its dimensions: physical, technological, cyber and social. Critical infrastructure is the main vehicle by which disasters produce cascading impacts. To a greater or lesser extent, all modern disasters are cascading events.
- 26. Direct causes: practical problems contributing to disaster Long-term causes (dynamic pressures): predisposition to create disaster Root causes: motivating and underlying factors Local cascading effects National cascading effects International cascading effects Escalation factors Context
- 27. INTERSECTIONALITY SOVEREIGNTY DEMOCRACY MOBILITY IDENTITY HUMAN RIGHTS LEGALITY ENTITLEMENT ANTI- CORRUPTION WELFARE COMPLEX DISASTERS
- 28. Intersectionality - borrowed (with apologies) from studies of gender, race and culture Intersection of: • forms of disaster causality • different kinds of disaster and crisis • disaster and its context • disaster and social circumstances
- 29. The approach must be holistic [inclusive, wide- ranging] and realistic [feet on the ground].
- 31. Perceived reality Objective reality "Manufactured" reality* perceptions, leading to opinions and actions *the collective result of the public's choices
- 33. Politics in the service of economics DISASTER POLITICS ECONOMICS SOCIAL CONDITIONS PHYSICAL IMPACT VULNERABILITY Knowledge is ideology Underlying risk drivers Complexity Ideology • extremism • separatism • isolationism • exclusion Conflict Climate change Demographic change • human mobility Culture Technology
- 34. LOSS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROXY WAR, CONFLICT & POLARISATION POVERTY & MARGINALISATION 'WRECKAGE ECONOMY' & RISE OF THE PRECARIAT LACK OF DISASTER GOVERNANCE CORRUPTION & LOSS OF TRUST ANOMIE NIHILISM constraints upon life and safety Anomie (Durkheim 1893) is a condition of instability resulting from a breakdown of standards and values or from a lack of purpose or ideals.
- 35. CURE
- 36. EVOLVING STRATEGIC SITUATION EVOLVING CLIMATE CHANGE LARGE TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS MAJOR GEOPHYSICAL EVENTS CIVIL DEFENCE CIVIL PROTECTION Instability threats Enhanced natural hazards Complex hazards Natural hazards 'NA-TECH' (HYBRID) HAZARDS Top-down Bottom-up The emergency environment
- 37. MUTUAL DEPENDENCIES CAPACITY AND CAPABILITIES THE PUBLIC'S EXPECTATIONS OFFICIAL DECISIONS EMERGENCY PROCEDURES SPONTANEOUS IMPROVISATION EMERGENCY COOR- DINATION PLANS CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN REAL TIME THE EMERGENCY ENVIRONMENT
- 38. Strategic coordination operations centre conference room Tactical coordination operations centre operations room Tactical coordination operations centre operations room Task force site of incident Task force site of incident Task force site of incident Mutual assistance agreements Communications protocols Communications protocols Communications protocols Management system Operations direction coordination post Operations direction coordination post Operations direction coordination post Bidirectional communication
- 39. Operational Locally generated needs International liaison Locally generated needs Global monitoring and coordination Local response capacity Local response capacity Local response capacity Regional harmonisation Local response capacity Regional harmonisation National coordination CIVIL PROTECTION SYSTEM
- 40. LIFE SAVING RESPONSE • search and rescue • crisis evacuation • medical surge capacity • intensive care capacity • epidemiology and disease prevention DAMAGE LIMITATION • infrastructure protection • impact reduction measures • bracing of damaged structures LAUNCHING RECOVERY • route clearance • infrastructure repair • debris management EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY
- 41. EVENT THAT IS NOT ANTICIPATED BY THE GOVERNMENT INITIAL RESPONSE: INCOMPREHENSION AND INERTIA SECOND RESPONSE: INEFFECTIVE OVER-REACTION HASTY, ILL-CONSIDERED IMPROVISATION SUBSEQUENT RESPONSE: A MORE CONSIDERED APPROACH? THE PUBLIC AS ADVERSARY: PROTEST AND LEGAL CASES RESORT TO SECRECY
- 42. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT Worst case Envelope of outcomes Best case 'upward' counter-factual analysis 'downward' counter-factual analysis EMERGENCY PLAN incorporation of scenario into plan stress test of plan systems methodology data and basic information emergency simulation - desktop - command post - field exercise consider practicalities
- 43. Recovery and reconstruction planning Strategic, tactical & operational planning Aftermath Disaster Monitoring prediction & warning Permanent emergency plan Business continuity plan Emergency
- 44. Integration through planning and training Plans for critical facilities:- • airports • utilities • lifelines • industrial sites • emergency medical Regional and national plans Business continuity plans Other plans Local authority general plan
- 45. WHAT ROLE FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN DISASTER RISK REDUCTION?
- 46. Perception: cultural filter Decision making: risk- management practices Benign Malignant Technology as a source of risk reduction Technology as an inadvertent source of risk Technology as a deliberate source of risk Ceaseless development of technology
- 47. Why algorithms fail:- • lack of knowledge of the conditions on the ground • lack of understanding of the dynamics of emergencies • lack of understanding of the role of situational awareness and the shared common operating picture • over-reliance on hindsight, which is not present during an emergency • field commanders would not rely on algorithms
- 48. CONCLUSIONS
- 49. The reality of life in modern Europe:- • an flourishing ultra-violent, out-of-control drug-related black economy • a constantly increasing wealth differential • poorly functioning democracies seriously under threat • massive, highly unstable external threats • weak organisation against threats and hazards
- 50. We need to exercise foresight:- • greater magnitude and frequency of meteorological events (climate change) • proliferating technological failure • unplanned mass migration • exceptionally large geophysical events • intersection of conflict (or other agents) and disasters • emerging hazards and threats
- 51. Thank you for listening! david.alexander@ucl.ac.uk