1) India did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) because the conditions of these treaties unfairly restricted developing countries like India while benefiting larger nuclear powers. 2) India's 1974 "Smiling Buddha" nuclear test, conducted for security reasons against threats from Pakistan and China, inadvertently strengthened the global non-proliferation regime and motivated more countries to sign the NPT. 3) India's decision to develop nuclear weapons was driven by its need to maintain political autonomy in a threatening security environment, as relinquishing its nuclear options would have constrained its foreign policy choices according to its leaders at the

1. NON – PROLIFERATION
TREATY & INDIA’S STAND
GRADE – 9
POLITICAL SCIENCE

2. India’s nuclear policy is an important part of India’s foreign policy. You
must have studied the meaning of nuclear energy and its uses in subjects like
History, Geography or Chemistry. Having understood the importance of nuclear
power, India undertook the nuclear energy program immediately after
independence. For this we established the Department of Atomic Energy and
the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. The first Chairman of the Indian
Atomic Energy Commission was Dr Homi Bhabha.
NUCLEAR POLICY IN INDIA

4. Even through electricity generation was the main purpose behind the
program, it also aimed at creating military capability. As a consequence of this,
India conducted her first nuclear tests in 1974. India built nuclear weapons and
conducted nuclear tests in 1998. We have also made missiles carrying nuclear
weapons and the Air Force and the Navy have been enabled for carrying them.
USAGE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN INDIA

5. Nuclear Weapons are extremely destructive. Hence, it is necessary to make
consistent efforts so that they are never used. Two treaties have been made to stop
the spread of nuclear weapons. (1) Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) (2)
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The conditions of both these treaties are
of benefit to big nuclear powers and they put unfair restrictions on developing
countries, hence India has not signed either of these treaties.
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATIES

7. The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete
disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of
disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force
in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the
Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other
arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s significance. The Treaty is
regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation
for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. It was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to
further the goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, and to promote
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
NON PROLIFERATION TREATY

9. First, India’s decision to not join the NPT needs to be understood in the context of decisions
taken by countries that chose to sign and ratify the NPT. Today, India is one of the only five countries
that either did not sign the NPT or signed but withdrew, thus becoming part of a list that includes
Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan. This might make New Delhi seem like an outlier but
persuading and/or coercing sovereign states to be part of the NPT was a Herculean effort for U.S.
policymakers with no clear guarantee of success. This is because the “grand bargain” of the treaty —
enshrined in Articles II and IV — requires countries to give up any present or future plans to build
nuclear weapons in return for access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
PRIMARY REASON FOR IGNORANCE
OF NPT BY INDIA

10. Second, it is worth exploring a counterfactual question: without India’s underground nuclear
explosion in May 1974, how likely is it that the Watergate-smeared Nixon administration and
subsequently the Ford administration would have done much to reinforce the NPT? The Nixon/Ford
administrations did that in two key ways: first, the formation of a nuclear exporters’ grouping
irrespective of NPT membership (later known as the NSG), and second, persuading as many countries
as possible to sign and ratify the Treaty. The goal was to ensure that the 1975 NPT Review Conference
saved face for the United States and the incipient nonproliferation regime. Without the Indian explosion,
it is improbable that a realpolitik-driven Nixon-Kissinger team, which was preoccupied with redrawing
the terrain of the Cold War international system through a rapprochement with Beijing and détente with
Moscow, would have spent much diplomatic capital on the global ratification of the NPT. This is not to
claim that the Nixon administration was uncommitted to nonproliferation but instead it is to argue that
without the 1974 Indian test, the administration might not have undertaken tangible actions toward
nonproliferation notwithstanding an overarching and general commitment. The 1974 Indian nuclear
explosion, therefore, inadvertently strengthened the NPT and the fledgling nonproliferation regime —
the global atomic marketplace needed to be regulated such that “another India” could be prevented at all
costs.
SECONDARY REASON FOR IGNORANCE
OF NPT BY INDIA

11. Third and finally, in order to understand India’s decision to not sign the NPT in 1968,
the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion codenamed the “Smiling Buddha” needs to be foregrounded.
The 1974 explosion is one of the most misunderstood and perhaps misrepresented events in
India’s nuclear history. New Delhi called it a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE), indicating
that it was an experiment to investigate civilian uses of nuclear explosions, for example the
construction of harbors or oil exploration — even though PNEs are technically
indistinguishable from a nuclear weapon test. More importantly, no crash program was
launched to develop delivery vehicles, thereby befuddling security experts in Washington and
elsewhere, who were used to expecting a swift linear movement from nuclear testing to further
testing to the development of precise or near-precise delivery systems. In the absence of an
extensive resource allocation for nuclear weapons delivery systems, security experts and scholars
shied away (and still continue to do so) from a security-based explanation to analyze
the “Smiling Buddha.”
THE SMILING BUDDHA

13. Perceived security threats from Pakistan and Pakistan’s ally China, on the one
hand, and from the United States, on the other (U.S. inaction in 1965 war and active
support for Pakistan in the 1971 war are cases in point) provide a strong security-
driven rationale for the 1974 PNE. Security threats are not always existential
necessitating an immediate response, like a crash program on missiles, or a massive
allocation of resources for military ends. This is more so in resource-scarce
democracies where non-military needs are more often pressing and public support for
high-cost military projects are low. Hence, policymakers need to prioritize effectively
and act accordingly.
NEED OF NUCLEAR POWER FOR
THREATENING CONTROL

14. Maintaining a degree of political autonomy has driven independent India’s
foreign policy choices. Major decisions that New Delhi took in the nuclear realm are
representative of that. The grand bargain of NPT — Article II for Article IV — was
certainly going to restrict India’s policy options. Given the security environment at the
international and regional levels, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her advisers could
not consent to it.
INDIA’S RESPONSIBLE WITH
NUCLEAR POWER

16. Content Compiled by,
D. B. Naga Muruga