This document discusses public sector reform (PSR) efforts in Africa and analyzes case studies of PSR in Ghana, Uganda, and Rwanda. It finds that the adoption and implementation of PSR depends on the ruling elite's time horizons and the fit between reform policies and the regime's governing ideology. In Uganda, PSR has had disparate results due to donor initiation and funding but lack of political will. Rwanda has seen more success with PSR due to its alignment with the regime's developmental vision. Ghana has struggled with PSR due to short-term elite time horizons and use of reforms for partisan purposes rather than long-term goals.

1. The Regime-Reform Struggle
Elite politics, policy ideas, and public
sector effectiveness in Africa
Pablo Yanguas
ESID, University of Manchester
PSA – 10 April 2017

2. PSR: An epistemic agenda
• 1990s-2000s: “New” political economy of development
focusing on the state and public institutions:
1. World Development Report 1997, “The State in a Changing World”
2. World Development Report 2002, “Building Institutions for Markets”
3. World Development Report 2004, “Making Services Work for the
Poor”
• Rise of PSR: civil service and administrative reform; public
expenditure and financial management; anti-corruption and
transparency; tax administration; participation and co-
production; decentralization

3. Africa’s governance woes

4. Africa’s governance woes

5. PSR: A policy minefield
• World Bank 2008 evaluation: Some success in PFM and tax
administration, much lower in civil service and anti-
corruption, “as they often lacked the necessary support from
political elites and the judicial system.”
• Of 80 countries receiving PSR support between 2007 and
2009, fewer than 40% registered improved institutional
indicators; a third stayed the same; and a quarter actually
declined (Andrews 2013)

6. Alternative explanations
• Isomorphic mimicry (Andrews et al.)
– Echoes of neopatrimonialism: Weberian façade with patrimonial politics
– Medard 1982, Callaghy 1984, Van de Walle 2001
• Collective action (Rothstein et al.)
– Echoes of social norms and moral economy
– Olivier de Sardan 1999
• Political settlement (Khan, Hickey)
– Echoes of state-society relations, public goods
– Migdal 1988, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003

7. Cross-case variation
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
WGI - Government Effectiveness
-2.5 to +2.5
Ghana
Rwanda
Uganda

8. Cross-case variation
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0
0.4
0.8
WGI - Control of Corruption
-2.5 to +2.5
Ghana
Rwanda
Uganda

9. Analytical framework (ESID)
1. Policy domain
2. Regime/elite settlement
3. Ideational fit

10. 1. The PSR policy domain
• Policy domain: “A policy domain is a subsystem identified by specifying a
substantively defined criterion of mutual relevance or common
orientation among a set of consequential actors concerned with
formulating, advocating, and selecting courses of action (i.e., policy
options) that are intended to resolve the delimited substantive problems
in question” (Laumann and Knoke 1987, 10).
• Key interaction (features):
– Policy actors (coordination, framing, identity)
– Regime/elite actors (salience, dependence, settlement)
– Aid donors usually big players at the domain level

11. 2. Regime/elite settlement
• Elite time horizons: “Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by
"roving bandits" destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little
for either the population or the bandits. Both can be better off if a bandit
sets himself up as a dictator-a "stationary bandit" who monopolizes and
rationalizes theft in the form of taxes.” (Olson 1993, 10).
• Political settlement (Khan, Hickey):
– Dominant: Long-time horizons
– Competitive: Short time horizons
– (Boundary condition of clientelism/neopatrimonialism)

12. 3. Ideational fit
• The conceptual prior: “one cannot distinguish objective interests from
ideas; all interests are ideas, and ideas constitute interests, so all interests
are subjective” (Schmidt 2008, 317). Cognitive turn, constructivism…
• Types/levels of ideas:
– Policy models: solutions to specific technical problems
– Regime ideology: (normative) programmatic worldview

13. A basic theoretical proposition
The adoption (and implementation) of public sector reforms in clientelist
political regimes depends on
the time horizons of the ruling elite
and
the fit between policy models and governing ideologies.

14. Three case studies
Structured-focused comparison
• Same policy agenda – PSR – with broadly same transnational actors
• Different political contexts: Ghana-competitive clientelism; Uganda-weak
dominant party; Rwanda-dominant party
Reform areas
• Management (coordination, CSR, PFM): guiding and developing the
capacity of the public sector to pursue and achieve policy goals
• Compliance (auditing, anti-corruption): ensuring that the pursuit of those
goals is held accountable to the administrative rules that the public sector
sets for itself

15. Uganda: Regime
• National Resistance Movement since 1986, led by Yoweri Museveni.
• Non-party elections until 2005
• 2016 general election: NRM 293/426 seats, Museveni 60.02% vote
• Political settlement:
– “Weakly Dominant Party” (Hickey et al.)
– Early revolutionary ideology
– State as patronage to manage regime survival
– Aid dependency vs Corruption scandals

16. Uganda: Reform
• MANAGEMENT
– Coordination: shared between PO, MoF, NPA: regime control
– PFM: top formal standards (WB 2001-15), low implementation; key
political offices have supplementary budgets
– PSM: rising meritocracy trumped by seniority and political affiliation
• COMPLIANCE
– Auditing: Strong policy coalition
– AC: Comprehensive legal framework (IG), highest implementation gap in
Africa. Scandals solved through “publicly orchestrated rituals”
• Why the disparity?
– Donor initiation, sponsoring, funding
– Regime complied with formal demands to attract funds
– Opening political space has led to more partisan use of PS

17. Rwanda: Regime
• Rwandan Patriotic Front since 1994, led by Paul Kagame.
• Multi-party democracy since 2003
• 2010 presidential election: Kagame 93.08%
• 2013 parliamentary election: RPF 41/80 seats (but only 53 elected)
• Political settlement:
– “Dominant Party” (Hickey et al.)
– “Developmental patrimonialism” (Booth & Kelsall)
– Existential threat due to ethnic dynamics

18. Rwanda: Reform
• MANAGEMENT
– Coordination: coherent results-oriented system, performance contracts and
imihigo overseen by OPM
– PFM: compliant with best practices, PEFA scores
– PSM: fair and transparent recruitment
• COMPLIANCE
– Auditing: Strong OAG and powerful PAC, “value chain” of compliance
– AC: Ombudsman investigating and (since 2013) prosecuting corruption to avert the
original causes of the genocide
• Why the success?
– Planning is part of a broader political vision
– A clean state forestalls accusations of ethnic favouritism
– PEFA became an ideology for the RPF
– ‘Corruption in the RPF is not only an illegal deed, it is also a serious moral flaw’

19. Ghana: Regime
• Competitive multiparty elections since 1992.
– National Democratic Congress (92-00, 08-16)
– National Patriotic Party (00-08, 16-)
• 2016 general election: NPP/NDC 171/104 seats, Akufo-Addo 53.85% vote
• Political settlement:
– “Competitive clientelism” (Hickey et al.)
– Nominally social-democrat vs market-liberal, actually indistinguishable
– State as the chief instrument of patronage

20. Ghana: Reform
• MANAGEMENT
– Coordination: successive coordinating units within presidency, while NDPC
is neglected
– PFM: “essentially ritualistic’ budget process”, procurement with no teeth
– PSM: decentralization, stalled reforms (e.g. performance contracts)
• COMPLIANCE
– Auditing: Auditing reports, but implementation within MDAs
– AC: fragmentation – CHRAJ, EOCO, CID, BNI
• Why the failure?
– Reforms as a signal after taking office
– Patronage as a tool of partisan competition
– Open political and civic space, but no long-term vision or sustainability

21. Back to the framework
• Elite time horizons as a necessary but not sufficient condition
– The Uganda / Rwanda (or NRM / RPF) puzzle is enough to justify this
– But it is clear that Ghanaian elites do not launch the types of reform
seen in the other two countries
• Ideas inform elite strategies and constrain reforms
– Elite ideas helps to lengthen or shorten time horizons
– Policy solutions live or die by their resonance with elite ideologies

22. Varieties of PSR?
PSR is not one but several political processes
• “Programmatic”
– PSR as an end in itself
– E.g. Rwanda PFM
• “Opportunistic”
– PSR as a means to coalition maintenance/survival
– E.g. Ghana anti-corruption
• “Reputational”
– PSR as a way to manage audience costs/popular perception
– E.g. Uganda PFM, (Rwanda corruption?)

23. WWW.EFFECTIVE-STATES.ORG
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