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Social Protection: At the Intersection of Transnational Ideas and Domestic Politics
- 1. Social protection: at the intersection of transnational ideas and domestic politics Tom Lavers and Sam Hickey Global Development Institute (GDI), University of Manchester 10th April 2017
- 2. Case selection Coverage of main social assistance programme Coverage of health insurance (population) Ethiopia 8% (popn) 28% (nat. poverty line) 7% Kenya 3% (popn) 7% (nat. poverty line) 11% Rwanda 6% (popn) 13% (nat. poverty line) 75% Uganda 0.3% (popn) 2% (nat. poverty line) 2% Zambia 5% (popn) 9% (nat. poverty line) 1%
- 3. Social assistance: Ethiopia and Rwanda • Commitment to rapid socioeconomic progress • Perceived existential crises – Food / distributional crisis in Ethiopia – Poverty and inequality in Rwanda • ‘Social protection’ – Donor ideas and finance – Integrated into existing strategies – Strong ‘productivist’ orientation
- 4. • Stronger donor-driven agenda • Initial resistance from key political elites • Bottom-up pressures for expansion of pilot projects, incl elections • Tendency to prioritise visibility • Standalone programmes Social assistance: Kenya, Uganda, Zambia
- 5. • Strength of potential opponents key barrier – Private sector, employers, trade unions, medical associations, MoF • In tension with past electoral giveaways – removal of user fees (Uganda) • Poor fit with expectations of a patronage- based political system (Kenya) • Absence of strong donor coalition in favour Health insurance: Kenya, Uganda, Zambia
- 6. • Ideas – Commitment to rapid development – Necessity of ‘productivist’ social policy – Self-reliance – national and individual • Political settlement dynamics – Long-term vision – Opponents are politically weak – ‘Infrastructural power’ key to high enrolment rates Health insurance: Ethiopia and Rwanda
- 7. • Donors matter, but are not enough • Elections haven’t (yet) generated strong commitment to SP • Political settlement dynamics key • ‘Ideational fit’ vital determinate of policy adoption Conclusions
- 8. All papers available at: http://www.effective-states.org/publications/ Ethiopia • Tom Lavers (2016). ‘Social protection in an aspiring ‘developmental state’: The political drivers of community-based health insurance in Ethiopia‘, ESID Working Paper 71. • Tom Lavers (2016). ‘Social protection in an aspiring ‘developmental state’: The political drivers of Ethiopia’s PSNP‘, ESID Working Paper 73. Kenya • Fredrick Wanyama and Anna McCord (forthcoming) ‘The politics of scaling up social protection in Kenya’, ESID Working Paper. Rwanda • Tom Lavers (2016). ‘Understanding elite commitment to social protection: Rwanda’s Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme‘, ESID Working Paper 68. • Benjamin Chemouni (2016). ‘The political path to universal health coverage: Elite commitment to community-based health insurance in Rwanda‘, ESID Working Paper 72. Uganda • Sam Hickey and Badru Bukenya (2016). ‘The politics of promoting social cash transfers in Uganda‘, ESID Working Paper 69. Zambia • Kate Pruce and Sam Hickey (2017). ‘The politics of promoting social protection in Zambia‘. ESID Working Paper 75.
Editor's Notes
- Rise of SP since late 1990s – culminating in ILO recommendation 202, SDGs, policy priorities by all main donors But huge variation in the extent to which countries have pursued SP Question is why?
- Two policies that have been widely promoted – cash transfers / PW and health insurance Both have – to some degree – been promoted by transnational actors Slightly out of date – Ethiopia SA now 10%, HI around 20% Very different PS – Ethiopia and Rwanda vs Kenya, Uganda, Zambia
- Delete countries as appropriate