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Public Sector Reform: Challenges and Prospects in Ghana and Beyond

  1. 1. Public Sector Reform CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS IN GHANA AND BEYOND David Hulme | Pablo Yanguas | Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai | Daniel Appiah Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre [ GIMPA | 4 April 2016 ]
  2. 2. An Introduction to the Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) David Hulme Chief Executive Officer Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) Professor of Development Studies Global Development Institute, University of Manchester
  3. 3. About ESID  The Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre is an international partnership of researchers working in Africa, Asia, Europe and North America  It is based at the Global Development Institute (GDI), University of Manchester  ESID is funded by the UK’s Department for International Development.
  4. 4. Partners  The ESID consortium includes:  Institute for Economic Growth, India  BRAC Development Institute, Bangladesh  Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana  Centre for International Development, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University  …as well as research associates in Malawi, Uganda, Rwanda, the UK and other countries.
  5. 5. ESID’s overarching question  What kinds of politics can help to secure inclusive development and how can these be promoted?  ESID aims to deepen the understanding of the political dimension of development and offer strategic and operational guidance to development partners.
  6. 6. ESID Research Framework - Key questions  What capacities enable states to help deliver inclusive development?  What shapes elite commitment to delivering inclusive development and state effectiveness?  Under what conditions do developmental forms of state capacity and elite commitment emerge and become sustained? In particular, what role do power relations and ideas play?
  7. 7. “New” approaches meet “old” challenges in African public sector reform Dr Pablo Yanguas University of Manchester
  8. 8. [ 1 ] The failure of PSR
  9. 9. 1. The failure of PSR Worldwide Governance Indicators  Africa trailing the world in Government Effectiveness & Control of Corruption  Average score for SSA actually worsened 1996-2014  Any good performers?  Significant improvement: Rwanda  Mixed trajectory: Ethiopia & Mozambique  Too optimistic: Liberia
  10. 10. 1. The failure of PSR Matt Andrews (2013) Of 80 countries receiving PSR support between 2007 and 2009, fewer than 40% registered improved institutional indicators; a third stayed the same; and a quarter actually declined
  11. 11. 1. The failure of PSR World Bank 2008 evaluation Some success in PFM and tax administration, much lower in civil service and anti-corruption:  CS: “lack of a coherent strategy”, “inherent political difficulty”  AC: “direct measures … rarely succeeded, as they often lacked the necessary support from political elites and the judicial system.”
  12. 12. [ 2 ] “Old” challenges
  13. 13. 2. “Old” challenges World Bank 2008 evaluation “Most developing countries today (such as Western Europe and the United States 150 years ago) have political systems that depend fundamentally on patronage. Some countries have progressed more quickly in recent years, but an open dialogue about the realistic expectations has been missing.”
  14. 14. 2. “Old” challenges Africa: A history of “persistent failure”  “Juridical statehood” vs “empirical statehood” (Jackson & Rosberg 1982)  Neo-Patrimonialism (van de Walle 2001)  A Weberian façade  A patrimonial structure
  15. 15. 2. “Old” challenges Political and moral economy of anti-reform Challenges Pathologies ADMINISTRATIVE PATRIMONIALISM Isolated reform efforts, persistent informal practices, personal disincentives to enforcement. PUBLIC CORRUPTION Disempowered reporting, social sanction of corruption, political interference. POLITICAL CAPTURE Regime-state confusion, merging of the public and private, lack of bureaucratic autonomy.
  16. 16. [ 3 ] “New” approaches
  17. 17. 3. “New” approaches Leadership  Premise: Political commitment and capacity at the top is the key to reform  Sample reform strategies:  Delivery units  Performance contracts  Executive communications and agenda management  Typical case: Tony Blair’s Africa Governance Initiative  Challenge: Vulnerable to electoral cycles and “quick wins”
  18. 18. 3. “New” approaches Social accountability  Premise: Citizen participation and government transparency can increase demand for public sector effectiveness  Sample reform strategies:  Participatory planning and budgeting  Open government  Co-production  Typical case: Open Government Partnership  Challenge: It assumes electoral accountability to work
  19. 19. 3. “New” approaches Policy experimentation  Basic claim: Diffusion of foreign templates results in copying the form but the substance remains the same  Sample reform strategies:  Problem identification through dialogue  Central-local collective action (APPP)  Iterative design  Typical case: Problem-driven iterative adaptation (PDIA)  Challenge: It requires political will to experiment
  20. 20. [ 4 ] Back to politics?
  21. 21. 4. Back to politics? “New” approaches feel like short-term fixes to donor problems “Old” politics call for a clear analysis of the challenges faced by reformers
  22. 22. 4. Back to politics? ESID’s theoretical framework  Political settlement: elite coalitions and bargaining, underlying distribution of power in the polity  Competitive vs dominant  Policy entrepreneurs and coalitions  Elite and policy ideas: normative paradigms (ideologies of the public sector), policy models  Transnational influences: donor technical assistance, global norms, international standards
  23. 23. 4. Back to politics? Our comparative project  Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda  C.2000-2015  Management functions  Coordination, Public service management, Public financial management (budget, procurement)  Compliance functions  Auditing, Anti-corruption
  24. 24. The Politics of Core Public Sector Reform in Ghana Researchers Daniel Appiah – University of Ghana Business School Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai – University of Ghana Business School 25
  25. 25. Research Approach  Competitive-Clientelist Political Settlement (CCPS) in Ghana  Analysis: What is the impact of the CCPS on PSR processes and outcomes: Public/Civil Service Management, Coordination of policy-making & delivery, anti-corruption, procurement, and auditing?  Data collection: Interviews, surveys, parliamentary Hansards, newspaper reports and other secondary sources. 26 57.4 44.8 43.1 44.64 47.76 50.47 50.7 39.6 48.4 56.9 52.45 49.32 49.53 47.74 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1996 2000a 2000b 2004 2008a 2008b 2012 PERCENTAGEOFVOTES Ghana's Competitive-Clientelist Political Settlement NDC NPP 57.4 44.8 43.1 44.64 47.76 50.47 50.7 39.6 48.4 56.9 52.45 49.32 49.53 47.74 0 20 40 60 80 100 1996 2000a 2000b 2004 2008a 2008b 2012 PERCENTAGEOFVOTES NDC NPP
  26. 26. Public Service Management Focus of Research & Analysis  Weberian Administration: In law and practice, are public/civil servants recruited in a meritocratic process and promoted according to a performance monitoring and evaluation system? Nature and Size of the Public Service  Public Services (includes the Civil Service) (Article 190(1) of 92 Constitution  About 428,000 public servants in MDAs MMDAs (CAGD, 2009, KPMG, 2012) Public Services Management Reform • Civil Service Act, 1993 (PNDCL 327) • Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme: 1997-2001 • Fair Wages and Salaries Commission Act, 2007 (Act 737) • 2014 HRMIS project led by the Public Services Commission • Chief Directors Performance Agreement Contracts, 1997-2000, 2013-present 27
  27. 27. Public Service Management . 13.3 6.9 9.7 12.6 10.7 0 3.4 15.5 36.1 22.4 0 0 0.6 0.5 0.5 86.7 89.7 74.2 50.8 66.4 1980-1990 1991-2000 2001-2008 2009-2014 TOTAL MODE OF PUBLIC SERVICE RECRUITMENT (450 SURVEY RESP) Family/Friend Network National Service Political Party Interview/Examination i. Meritocratic recruitment in the Ghana public service is generally high (66.4%) ii. 2011 Global Integrity Initiative (GII) survey reported that 50% of public servants are appointed by merit and professional criteria. iii. Effect of competitive politics on public service recruitment appears to be very low. iv. 2015 Supreme Court ruling on politicisation of Public Service could be damaging 28
  28. 28. Public Service Management  Performance-based promotion: Do the ‘jobs-for-life’ public servants care? 63.7 36.4 34.1 31.9 32.6 43.1 20.6 25.2 29.2 31.9 34.7 26 9.3 19.9 21.2 17.5 17.6 14.9 6.5 18.5 15.5 18.6 15.2 16 PUBLIC SECTOR JOB SECURITY PRIVATE SECTOR JOB SECURITY BE PART OF PUBLIC SECTOR BE PART OF PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR GIVES GOOD SALARY & BENEFITS PRIVATE SECTOR GIVES GOOD SALARY & BENEFITS REASONS WHY GHANAIANS JOIN THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE SECTOR Very important Important but not very important Not important Not important at all Major problem in the public sector: Largely staffed with “a special breed of persons who perhaps have the contentment of security of a job.” 29
  29. 29. Public Sector Coordination  Focus of Research & Analysis i. In law and practice, is there a central agency to coordinate public policy-making, tracking & delivery of sector targets? ii. In law and practice, do public sector bodies report their targets to a central coordination department?  Key policy-making and service delivery coordination agencies: • The Cabinet (President, Vice-President & not less than 11 Ministers and not more than 19 Ministers) • National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) • Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS) 30
  30. 30.  Policy Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (PCMEU) headed by Prof. K. Appiah –Adu  Policy Delivery Unit (PDU) headed by Mrs. Chinery-Hesse Whylackofreformsustainability? The Presidency: Office of the President/Cabinet  Policy Unit headed by Dr. Christine Amoako- Nuamah  Policy Monitoring & Evaluation Unit (PMEU) headed by Dr. Tony Aidoo  Policy Unit headed by Dr. Sulley Gariba  PMEU dismantled  Presidential Delivery Unit headed by Dr. Valerie Sawyerr  2014-Present: PDU at Cabinet Secretariat Public Sector Coordination: Policy-making & Delivery National Development Planning Commission: Policy Coordination, M&E Office of the Head of Civil Service: Policy coordination, M&E at the level of MDAs NPP Gov’t (under Pres. Kufour 2001-8) NDC Gov’t 1 (under Pres. Mills: 2009-12) NDC Gov’t 2 under Pres. Mahama (2013-) 31
  31. 31. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 R2 (2002) R3 (2005) R4 (2008) R5 (2012) R6 (2014) Afrobarometer: Trends in perceived corruption (%) Presidency corrupt Legislature corrupt Gov't Officials corrupt Assembly Rep corrupt Tax Officials corrupt Police corrupt Judiciary corrupt Public Sector Anti-corruption . 32 Mr. Martin Amidu & Anas
  32. 32. Public Sector Anti-corruption Comprehensive anti-corruption laws & institutions • Comprehensive definition of corruption: attempted corruption, extortion, offering & receiving a bribe etc. all illegal in Ghana (GII, 2012) • High levels of commitment to anti-corruption expressed (e.g. ‘Zero tolerance for corruption’ policy) • Several recent anticorruption reforms (e.g. Whistles Blowers Act, 2007; Public Procurement Act, 2003; Public Officers Asset Declaration Law, 1998) • Key formal anti-corruption institutions: CHRAJ, EOCO, Auditor-General, Attorney-General & Minister of Justice etc. • GII has consistently hailed Ghana for having a ‘comprehensive anti- corruption legislation framework’ 33
  33. 33. Public Sector Anti-corruption Weak enforcements is the problem • In law, CHRAJ is constitutionally mandated to “investigate all instances of alleged or suspected corruption and misappropriation of public moneys…” [Article 218, 1992 Constitution] • But in practice, its effectiveness is undermined by several factors: – CHRAJ’s Commissioners are presidential appointees who are often left in ‘acting positions’ for long. – Can’t initiate an investigation without an identifiable complainant – a real limitation (Richard Anane’s case – CRC Whitepaper accepts the need for change.) – Financially autonomous? A big no! Government Whitepaper rejected the CRC’s recommendation to change the status quo (see p.28 of White paper on CRC) – Lack of prosecutorial powers: only the A-G & MoJ can initiate prosecution 34 So through constitutional designs, Ghana operates a system that allows for independent investigations of corruption, but permits politicians to to decide which cases they deem worth prosecuting
  34. 34. PFM: Public Procurement • In law, there is a framework for ensuring fairness and transparency in procurement processes (Public Procurement Act, 2003). • But in practice, procurement processes are still subject to several forms of malfeasances – PPA sometimes completely bypassed (e.g. Arthur Kennedy’s ₵335million contract in 2008) – contracts awarded through sole source to help finance ruling parties – Require some informal payments or kickbacks Compared to the regional average of 36.34%, 61.23% of companies in Ghana said they were expected to give a gift to secure government contract
  35. 35. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly DisAgree PFM Reform Outcomes: Competition, Transparency, Accountability and Politics in the award of Public Procurement Contracts? (survey of 60 ‘budget end-users’ across 18 Ministries) Procurement awarded through competitive tendering Procurement awarded through single source Procurement awarded through political and personal connections Public Procurement Authority is effective in checking corruption PFM: Public Procurement 36
  36. 36. PFM: Public Procurement The PPA partly to blame for the politicisation of procurement processes • Political appointment of a 10-member Public Procurement Board (PPB) by the President to “ensure that public procurement is carried out in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.” (Public Procurement Act, 2003, Act 663, Section 2) • Tender Committees, Tender Review Boards, and Public Procurement Authority are chaired by government Ministers & District Chief Executives – all presidential appointees. “Once you have a political master who can influence your hiring, transfer, promotion and firing then you should know your hands are tied sometimes. Politics plays a role in all aspects of public sector delivery” (Procurement Officer) 37
  37. 37. Public Sector Auditing 38 Regional Coordinating Councils (RCC) Attorney-General (A-G): Give legal advice to the President; Prosecute civil/criminal cases of corruption in Auditor-General’s report Parliament (Public Accounts Committee): Examine reports of the Auditor-General and make recommendations for action. Internal Audit Agency: Co-ordinate, facilitate & supervise internal audit activities; appoints ARIC external members; submit audit reports to Presidency Auditor-General: Conduct external audits of MDAs/MMDAs; surcharges and disallowances where necessary; monitor performance of ARICS MDAs/MMDAs: Create & resource Internal Audit Units (IAUs) ARICs: Implements audits recommendations & promote effectiveness of IAUs Presidency: Take action on public officials cited in internal/external audit reports; Give directions to the A- G on cases in audit reports ARICS most crucial: by law, they are to ensure that the head of an institution, body or organization pursues the implementation of all audit reports, both internal & external
  38. 38. Public Sector Auditing The political challenge of implementation lies mainly in the composition of ARICs • Serious conflict of interests: ARICs are dominated and are chaired by people from the same agency whose audit reports are to be discussed by the ARIC – What happens if the head of an agency is the subject of corruption in an audit report, who is also the chair of the ARIC? – “The Audit Report Implementation Committee is made up of the senior officers of the institutions that were audited and the institutions committed all these financial indiscipline. So, in effect, we are asking them to punish themselves. The result is that, on all the reports that we have had, we make all the right noises in this House and yet nothing happens” (MP, Parliamentary Debates June 28, 2012, Col 2085). • Auditor-General only produces audit reports for Public Accounts Committee and ARICs, but can’t prosecute: only Attorney-General can 39
  39. 39. Conclusions (Tentative) o Political incentives in Ghana’s competitive clientelist settlements results in institutional designs that undermine the effectiveness of PSR: e.g. Public procurement, auditing, coordination and anti-corruption. o Partly facilitated by constitutional designs that concentrate vast appointive powers in the hands of the president, while weakening institutions of accountability o Effective reforms have been difficult because the two dominant parties benefit from the status quo when in power. So change is unlikely to occur without sustained efforts from external actors, particularly donors. o But problem appears so pervasive that donor reforms that focus on system-wide changes are unlikely to succeed. Focus on building pockets of effectiveness (PoEs)? o Lessons from donors’ efforts in strengthening Senegal’s bureaucracy may be useful: donors’ impact was greatest where efforts focused on “generating political incentives for governments to create pockets of effectiveness” (Johnson, 2015) 40
  40. 40. Thank you

Editor's Notes

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