The “opacity” of language is not less important than its “transparency” for the understanding and philosophy of language The “opacity” is not any disadvantage of language but the fundamental property of it allowing of it to be constituted, and to function That opacity addresses indivisible units, ontological “quanta”, which are “atoms” of being, both reality and meaning The derivative concept of ontological quanta offers a base for a not-Saussure “semiology”, i.e. for a non-classical semantics referring to the being itself rather than to the representation of reality

1. Language in terms of disagreements,
conflicts, contradictions, and messes
Consisting of Quanta of “Logos”

2. Vasil Penchev
• Bulgarian Academy of Sciences: Institute for
the Study of Societies of Knowledge
• vasildinev@gmail.com
Thursday, September 25th, 15:00
Institute of Philosophy and Semiotics of
the University of Tartu, 25-27 September 2014
“Disagreements”, Tenth Estonian Annual
Philosophy Conference - EFAK X

3. The thesis
• The “opacity” of language is not less important than
its “transparency” for the understanding and
philosophy of language
• The “opacity” is not any disadvantage of language
but the fundamental property of it allowing of it to
be constituted, and to function
• That opacity addresses indivisible units, ontological
“quanta”, which are “atoms” of being, both reality
and meaning
• The derivative concept of ontological quanta offers
a base for a not-Saussure “semiology”, i.e. for a
non-classical semantics referring to the being itself
rather than to the representation of reality

4. Language and reality
• Language is often described as a mean of the
representation of reality and the meditation
between human beings for actions in reality
• That modern understanding of language culminates
in the constitution of semiotics after Pierce and
Saussure
• The “slogan” of that semiotics might be “Sign
Represents!”, and any “good” sign should represent
reality
• In fact, that conception can relate semiotics to
mathematics as an interpretation of set theory

5. Emancipating literature
• Furthermore, the language can emancipate from
that function of representing and even
communicating in fictions and literature or
in linguistics
• The “good” sign, which represents, suggests a “bad”
and “egoistic brother”, which does not want to
work, i.e. to represent
• The deeds of the “bad sign” creates fiction and
literature, which is something whether less or more,
but never equal to the deeds of the sign truly
representing reality

6. The good sign and the bad sign
• Obviously if that is the case, fiction and literature as
well as the egoistic signs are secondary and
derivatively definable by representation as
deviation from it
• The mathematical concept of function corresponds
to the “good sign”:
• The ideal is the bijective function of sign where
exactly a piece of reality is mapped in a single word
(= scientific notion)
• Then science “corrects” language according to that
ideal of absolutely precise and adequate and thus
absolutely transparent representation

7. Opacity versus transparency
• Therefor one can offer another viewpoint to the
language, according to which the language should
maintain an optimal degree of opacity rather than
transparency
• Furthermore, that opacity implies special
ontological quanta of being, which is neither
“subjective” nor “objective” but both
• In terms of the Saussure semantics, those
ontological quanta of “opacity” can be hinted by
“entangled” signs, in which the signified and
signifier are not absolutely independent of each
other: They might even coincide

8. Replacing reality by an image
• Thus the main function of language is to replace
reality by an image of it, which should not
correspond to reality exactly but more or less
approximately and even fussy and foggy
• That fussy and foggy opacity of language is fruitful:
It can be described as “linguistic uncertainty”
analogical in essence to the Heisenberg uncertainty
in quantum mechanics
• Indeed as quantum measurement chooses a value
among all possible ones as language serves to
replace reality by a randomly chosen image of it
among all possible ones

9. Fictions and literature as the goal of
language
• Consequently, the main function of language is to
create fictions and literature rather than
representations. Indeed:
• Reality is too rich, various, and diverse to be able to
be singly represented in a consistent way in general
• Instead of this, language creates a set of possible
images of reality inconsistent to each other
• No one of those image can represent reality but
only their collection. Any separate image singly is
not more than fiction (literature): Language is the
tool for them to be created

10. The particular case of representing
• Furthermore, a very important, but only a particular
and borderline case is that of representing reality in
a single way alleged to be absolutely transparent
• This particular case is the ideal of classical science
and even of realistic literature
• It can be reduced to that approximation where the
piece of depicted reality is much and much “bigger”
than the cells of ontological quanta
• That realistic painting is “pointilistic”: the single
quant is so tinny that it seems as a point

11. About defining language
• However this particular case should not serve for
researching and defining the language in general
• It replaces language by big enough ensembles of
linguistic images such as words, propositions or
any other units of meaning
• The main property of them is distinguishability:
Then their ensemble can be accepted as
statistical in ideality
• The disagreements, conflicts, contradictions, and
messes between those units of meaning are
considered as “defects” removable at least in
principle or in average

12. On defining the language in terms of
ontological quanta
• That definition should relate language and time
• It should include the past, future, and present of
language:
• The well-ordered language of “good signs”, i.e. the
language as past
• The indistinguishable or hardly distinguishable
language of “bad signs”, i.e. the language as future
• The transformation of “bad” into “good” signs by
distinguishing choices, i.e. the language as present
• The uniform description of the above three stages
in an invariant way

13. Main arguments “pro” the thesis:
• Reality is combined from many fragments more or
less consistent internally and rather inconsistent to
each other
• Even if the hypothesis of one single reality is
granted, any human being perceives and interprets
it radically differently from anyone other
• The process of appearing of any meaning darkens
gradually all contradictions both between different
aspects of the meaning and between its
interpretations by different human beings: The
sense of any meaning consists in the optimal
proportion between its unclearness and exactness

14. On the formulation of the first argument
• The hypothesis of a single reality underlies the
possibility for the language to be understood
as an exact representation of reality
• In fact, reality is combined from many
fragments more or less consistent internally
and rather inconsistent to each other
• The even partial agreement even of a little
part of them is too complicated and
redundant puzzle, the resolving of which is
one task, considerably exceeding the
intellectual capabilities of any human being,
even of a genius

15. More on the first argument
• Fortunately, the language has been evolved in
another way, “bracketing” the question about the
absolutely exact representation of reality either
single or plural
• Therefor it has gradually and historically grounded
tools such as words, which are fussy, foggy,
imprecise, but which are apt to omit all immaterial
contradictions between eventual parts of reality
and clearing more or less only a few essential and
consensual properties
• Consequently any unit of meaning outlines some
area of consensus either between parts of reality or
between many realities

16. Is reality single?
• The hypothesis of a single reality underlies the
possibility for the language to be understood as
an exact representation of reality
• However this is not more an axiom
• That axiom is not assertable both deductively and
experimentally
• Even more, the conception of many worlds and
thus of many realities is well-established in
philosophy, logic, and quantum mechanics, etc.
• At least, after Lobachevski, one is free to postulate
its negation in order to see whether any
contradictions appear deductively after that

17. The kaleidoscopic reality
• In fact, reality is combined from many fragments
more or less consistent internally and rather
inconsistent to each other
• Thus the words of real language should be adequate
to that kaleidoscopic, “many-fragments” reality
• This means that any shake of the “kaleidoscope of
reality” should not change the separate words as the
beads, pebbles and bits of colored glass as in a real
kaleidoscope
• The constant “shake” of that kaleidoscopic reality
addresses the little pieces in it as ontological quanta

18. The intellectual limit of an average human
• The even partial agreement even of a little part of
reality is too complicated and redundant puzzle,
the resolving of which is one task, considerably
exceeding the intellectual capabilities of any
human being, even of a genius
• Language is undoubtedly the assets of mankind as
well as of any human being singly rather than only
of genii
• Any average human being should use it successfully
at least as a “black box”: Indeed the language as a
“device” is maximally “user-friendly”

19. “Bracketing” the representation of
reality
• Fortunately, the language has evolved in another
way, “bracketing” the question about the absolutely
exact representation of reality whether single or
plural
• In fact, Husserl’s phenomenology suggests and
develops that “bracketing” of reality in order to be
able to be acquired the pure phenomenon of the
thing in consciousness
• In semiotic terms, that “bracketing” leads to “pure”
signs, in which the signified and signifier would
coincide absolutely showing themselves in the
themselves by themselves (after Heidegger)

20. The fussy, foggy, imprecise words
• Therefor language has gradually and historically
grounded tools such as words, which are fussy,
foggy, imprecise
• However the words are apt to omit all immaterial
contradictions between eventual parts of reality
and clearing more or less only a few essential and
consensual properties
• The words can be considered as ontological quanta
rather than as units of meaning: Then their
fussiness, fogginess, impreciseness would be not
defects but fruitful uncertainty being due to their
nature

21. The meaning as an area of consensus
• Any unit of meaning outlines some area of
consensus whether between parts of reality or
between many realities
• One can say that meaning is invariant to
the choice of a certain reality therefore creating the
illusion of a single reality
• Nevertheless the meaning should refer only to
a huge sets of uses rather than to a single use of
a linguistic unit without any considerable context
• Consequently, the invariance of meaning can
produce the illusion of a single reality only under
these two conditions: many and many uses in a
considerable context

22. On the formulation of the second
argument
• Even if the hypothesis of one single reality is
granted, any human being perceives and interprets
it radically differently from anyone other
• The consistency of perceptions ant interpretations
might be achieved exceptionally difficultly by the
scientific picture of reality
• That picture is so sophisticated that no human
being can understand it as a whole
• Only a few genii can embrace even that tiny piece of
it, which is contained in a single scientific theory or
discipline

23. More about the second argument
• The language has created tools relevant to the
intellectual potential of an average human
being for anyone to communicate and interact
jointly and rather successfully
• Those tools abandon and darken absolutely all
dividing human beings including the different
intellect and experience and concentrating
only on a few unifying features of reality as
the meaning of the corresponding linguistic
item

24. About the interpretations of reality
• Even if the hypothesis of one single reality is granted,
any human being perceives and interprets it radically
differently from anyone other
• In fact, any given perception of reality is being
embedded in a huge picture both of physical reality
and of individual and cultural experience as a coherent
whole
• Even if the picture of the physical reality is
approximately the same, the individual and cultural
experience can be quite different therefore allowing of
absolutely different interpretations of the perceived

25. About the consistency of scientific
interpretations
• The consistency of perceptions and interpretations
might be achieved exceptionally difficultly by the
scientific picture of reality
• Indeed any scientific theory is much more
consistent than the same piece of reality in the
language
• However at the cost of this, the ruptures and gaps
between different scientific theories and especially
between different scientific areas are so grandiose
that they address the myth of the Babylon tower

26. About the too sophisticated
scientific picture of the world
• The scientific picture of the world is so
sophisticated that no human being can
understand it as a whole
• As in the myth of the Babylon tower, the
scientists in different sciences speak
absolutely different languages of notions
• They are not able to understand each other
even when speak about one and the same for
any given science interprets it in a quite
different context

27. Genii versus crowd
• Only a few genii can embrace even that tiny piece of
the alleged Great Unified Scientific Picture of the
World: that microscopic piece which is contained in a
single scientific theory or discipline
• What is offered to the “crowd” and even to the
scientists and still even to the genii working in different
scientific fields is an infinitely simplified picture apt to
be adopted by an average human being without any
special schooling
• Of course, that “scientific” and popular representation
of one or more theories use a natural language and
replace the scientific notions and conceptions by
analogies, metaphors and comparisons

28. The language of an average human
• Indeed the language has created tools relevant to
the intellectual potential of an average human
being for anyone to communicate and interact
jointly and rather successfully
• One can suggest that the “black box” of language
contains a extremely developed and finely
tailored mechanism and wisdom hidden behind
the exceptionally user-friendly design
• The classical theories of semantics such as
Saussure’s semiology describe its action
phenomenally: without opening the “black box”

29. The language searching for consensus
• The tools of language abandon and darken
absolutely all dividing human beings
• They might be called invariant to the different
intellect and experience of the humans
• The linguistic “atoms” are able to concentrate only
on a few unifying features of reality as their
meaning
• Those linguistic units are live beings fed by
consensus and therefore created to search for it
and find its “deposits”
• Consequently the language is a map of treasures of
consensus elaborated by living linguistic “cells”

30. On the formulation of the third
argument
• The process of appearing of any meaning darkens
gradually all contradictions both between different
aspects of the meaning and between its
interpretations by different human beings
• Consequently, the sense of any meaning consists in
the optimal proportion between its unclearness and
exactness: Even more, the exactness of any
meaning in a language is secondary
• This is the little rest after removing all
disagreements or contradictions both between
different fragments of knowledge and between
people’s interpretations

31. More about the third argument
• Science hides this process alleging the words in the
language as imprecise in comparison to any
scientific notion possessing ostensibly in advance an
exact definition
• In fact, the scientific definitions have many
disadvantages in relation to the words in a language
• The concepts in science only continue the same
process in a community of scientists creating an
artificial language just for this community therefore
excluding the rest people and even a part of their
colleagues from this newly-made language as
ignoramuses

32. The meaning as consensus
• The process of appearing of any meaning darkens
gradually all contradictions both between
different aspects of the meaning and between its
interpretations by different human beings
• In fact, ontological quanta do not distinguish
reality from interpretation as well as reality from
language: Ontology consisting of those quanta is
that reality, which is language, or that language,
which is reality
• Consequently the ontological quanta are those
“living words” fed by consensus creating the map
of reality as the locations of its deposits

33. The fruitful proportion of opacity
and transparency
• The sense of any meaning consists in the optimal
proportion between its unclearness and exactness
• The existence of ontological quanta forces the
picture to be granular in principle
• The indivisibility of the ontological quanta is
necessary and fruitful condition for them to
behavior as living searching for deposits of
consensus
• The ontological quanta are bigger, the picture is
grainier, but the attraction between the quanta is
stronger and the deposits of consensus are more
visible

34. The effective exactness
• Even more, the exactness of any meaning in a
language is secondary
• It originates from the gathering the granules of
ontological quanta being absolutely opaque,
impenetrable, and indivisible
• The outlines of any gathering of that kind
constitutes a meaning
• Even still more, the single meanings attract each
other constituting propositions, paragraphs, texts,
articles, books, discourses, etc.: Each of them is a
map of consensus in a different scale

35. The meaning as a “residuum”
• The meaning is the little rest after removing all
disagreements or contradictions both between
different fragments of knowledge and/ or between
people’s interpretations
• However in fact, the above is a description of the
way for any meaning to “crystallize” or to
“precipitate” as a “sediment” in terms of classical
semantics categorically distinguishing reality from
interpretation as well as the signified and signifier
• The concept of ontological quanta addresses the
constitution of a meaning as gathering rather than
as precipitating

36. Words versus notions
• Science hides this process alleging the words in the
language as imprecise in comparison to any
scientific notion possessing ostensibly in advance
an exact definition
• In fact, this is not more than a possible synchronic
idealization of language outlining a map of reality
seeming ostensibly constant
• Unlike the dead notions killed in order to be
immovable and thus precise, the words are living
and moving thus re-outlining new deposits of
consensus, i.e. new meanings, which science will
kill again and again and prepared them as new and
new notions and conceptions

37. About the disadvantages of notion
• In fact, the scientific definitions and notions have
many disadvantages in relation to the words in a
language
• First of all, they are not alive, living, i.e. self-organizing:
They cannot move by themselves
requiring to be reordered by the scientists as pieces
of dead matter, stuff
• Consequently, the language of science is not able to
think by itself:
• Unlike it, the living language thinks outlining new
and new meanings again and again and thus new
thoughts, conceptions, theories, which the
scientists only kill and prepare in their treatises

38. The concepts as residua
• The concepts in science only continue the
same process in a community of scientists
• Thus an artificial language is created just for
this community only
• The rest people and even a part of their
colleagues are excluded from this newly-made
language as ignoramuses
• In a sense, the scientific notions live as usual
words in those closed communities outlining
the map of the scientific reality as to a given
discipline

39. Some arguments “contra” might be:
• Science is one of the most successful areas of
human activity: The thesis should explain the
way of science to be so successful after it has
used a maximally exact and artificial language
contra the thesis
• All contradictions in the unified scientific
picture of the world are removable. This
picture has guaranteed the progress during
the last centuries. What can the thesis offer to
mankind?

40. On the first counterargument
• Science is one of the most successful areas of
human activity
• It is the base both of the contemporary global
society and technics
• The scientific notions possess exact definitions even
when the used terms are the same as certain words
in most languages
• Any scientific notion should be as exact as possible
• The logical and deductive method is fundamental
for science
• It requires maximally precious definitions to be
applied

41. More about the first counterargument
• An essential part of the contemporary science
including thoroughly physics, informatics and
chemistry is mathematized
• The mathematizing is impossible in any other base
than that of absolutely precise definitions of all
concepts
• The mathematics itself is built axiomatically and
deductively
• The properties of all notions are rigorously fixed by
axioms
• The thesis should explain the way of science to be
so successful after it has used a maximally exact and
artificial language contra the thesis

42. The success of science and scientific
notion
• Science is one of the most successful areas of
human activity
My retort:
The success of science should not link necessarily to
the classical semiotic pattern of scientific notion
One can suggest that the future science can invent
other or alternative models both of notions and
their semiotics

43. The globalizing science
• It is the base both of the contemporary global
society and technics
My retort:
The global society and technics contain and
generate various contradictions and conflicts:
One can suggest that a considerable part of
them are due to the too dogmatic and inflexible
fundament of science
Science should develop as the global universal
language rather than a set of theories about
reality

44. The notion as the exact definition of words
• The scientific notions possess exact definitions
even when the used terms are the same as
certain words in most languages
My retort:
The diachronic approach to scientific language
shows that all definitions of scientific notions
change too much in too short historical periods
Even more: The scientific area develops faster, its
notions change quicker
Consequently, the constancy of the notions is the
evidence of stagnation

45. The exactness as a supreme value
• Any scientific notion should be as exact as
possible
My retort:
The absolute exactness is harmful: It would mean
that notions are dead and incapable to
development
The notions should be heuristic and possess, first
of all, the maximal potential of self-development
The disagreements generated by the notions are
not less important than that consensus, which
they fix

46. Logical and deductive method
• The logical and deductive method is fundamental
for science
My retort:
A non-classical semantics based on the
complementarity of the signified and signifier does
not exclude logical and deductive method, neither
axiomatic and deductive method
Quantum mechanics offers a rigorous mathematical
model of a theory grounded on complementarity

47. The importance of being precise
• Logical and deductive method requires maximally
precious definitions to be applied
My retort:
Logical and deductive method can be also applied to a
whole collection of alternative definitions (e.g. each in
a different world)
That collection can outline a fussy or foggy definition
similar to real “ meaning” of a word
The logical and deductive method can represent the
constant use of that word, which plays options
transforming the entire collection of possible
definitions

48. The direction to mathematization
• An essential part of the contemporary science
including thoroughly physics, informatics and
chemistry is mathematized
My retort:
The non-classical semiotics suggesting e.g.
complementarity of the signified and signifies in
the sign is also very well mathematizable
So any scientific language based on that non-standard
semiotics can be mathematized in
a not less degree

49. Mathematizing as preciseness
• The mathematizing is impossible in any other base
than that of absolutely precise definitions of all
concepts
My retort:
It is not true:
Mathematization is not less possible on the imprecise
definitions represented as collections of more or less
exact definitions
For example, Wittgenstein’s concept about “family
resemblance” can be a ground for mathematization,
too

50. The axiomatic and deductive
method of mathematics
• The mathematics itself is built axiomatically and
deductively
My retort:
After Gödel (1931), arithmetic is not a sufficient base
for the foundation of set theory containing infinities
That base might be Hilbert space (representing a
synthesis of arithmetic and geometry in a sense),
though
Mathematics corresponding to the semiotics of
ontological quanta (“ontological signs”) might be self-grounding
in the base of Hilbert space

51. Notions by axioms
• The properties of all notions are rigorously fixed by
axioms
My retort:
In fact, the axioms define only contextually the
mathematical notions, e.g. such as “point”, “straight
line”, “plane”, etc. by the Euclid or Hilbert axioms of
geometry
Furthermore, they define any other notions satisfying
the axioms: Those notions are always infinitely many
Consequently, the axioms can determine only
contextually an infinite class of notions

52. About the exact and artificial language
of science
• The thesis should explain the way of science to be
so successful after it has used a maximally exact
and artificial language contra the thesis
My retort:
In fact, the precise scientific notions are not more
than a synchronic “photo-shot” of living language
processed in order to be improved its quality
Science should be considered as a technic of
language allowing of “sharpening” the picture
However the real base of that technic is the live
language itself

53. On the second counterargument
• All contradictions in the unified scientific
picture of the world are removable
• This picture has guaranteed the progress
during the last centuries
• What can the thesis offer to mankind?

54. About the temporariness of all
contradictions
• All contradictions in the unified scientific picture
of the world are removable
My retort:
In fact, this is only an inductive hypothesis at the
best
No one has ever created a general picture of the
world perhaps besides in philosophy, but this is not
a scientific picture though it can pretend to be
general
No one has ever tried to remove the contradictions
between different scientific areas

55. Progress and science
• This picture has guaranteed the progress during
the last centuries
My retort:
The progress has been accomplished mainly for the
mass technical applications and deployments of a
few scientific theories first of all in physics and
chemistry
Neither the experimental confirmations of scientific
theories nor the general scientific picture do refer
immediately to the progress of mankind in the last
centuries

56. The meaning of the thesis
• What can the thesis offer to mankind?
My answer:
Not more than still one hypothesis in the field of
semantics and philosophy, less or more already
formulated many times
The essence is the transformation of the Pierce and
Saussure semiotic scheme in a way the signified and
signifier to be complementary in the sign:
That transformation leads to the concept of
ontological quanta and thus to ontology instead of
the twins of language and reality

57. Conclusions:
1. The opacity of language is not less important
than its transparency. The opacity means its
ability to create fictions and literature and to
replace reality by them
2. The base of that opacity are ontological
quanta: They allow of any average human being
to use the language successfully
3. The Saussure semiology considers language as
a “black box” averaged to huge ensembles of
uses and only in terms of the past: the language
as an well-ordering in ideality

58. More conclusions:
• The semiotics of ontological quanta is
temporal: It can refer both to the past and
future of language as well as to its present
• It describes how the indistinguishable signs of
the future are transformed in the well-ordered
signs of the past by means of choices in the
present
• The semiotics of ontological quanta can be
represented as that modification of the
classical semiotic scheme where the signified
and signifier are complementary

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‚phenomenon‘)
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62. Thank you for your kind attention!
Tänan teid teie
lahke tähelepanu
eest!

63. I welcome your questions and look
forward to them with pleasure!
Ootam teie
küsimustele ja
ootan rõõmuga!