PIM Webinar with Dr. Hosaena Ghebru (IFPRI) presenting findings from a recent set of studies in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, and Nigeria that examined land access and perceived tenure security across various market, ecological, demographic, and cultural dynamics. More information about the webinar, including recording and presentation, at http://bit.ly/31NeMzp PIM Webinars aim to share findings of research undertaken as part of the CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), discuss their application, and get feedback and suggestions from participants. Recordings and presentations of the webinars are freely available on the PIM website: http://bit.ly/PIM-Webinars

1. PIM Webinar
Land tenure and perceived
tenure security in the era of
social and economic
transformation in Africa
Hosaena Ghebru
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
July 2, 2019
Photo: Mitchell Maher / IFPRI

2. Introduction
2
Changes that affect customary land tenure systems were witnessed in many parts of the
developing world (Cotula and Neves 2007).
African countries undertook land tenure programs to safeguard land rights of smallholders
and enhance investment and agricultural productivity through:
• Improving land administration
• Enhancing land tenure security
Mixed results with regard to success:
• Potential economic and social impacts (enhancing tenure security, investment, credit access and land market
participation)
• Low uptake rate of reform programs (e.g., registration and certification)
• Sustainability issues

3. Introduction (Why?)
3
Consensus on the need to enhance tenure security but existing knowledge gap on how to
measure it and the level of disaggregation required
Formalization of individual land rights has long been seen as a silver bullet to address issues of
tenure insecurity; but for whom and at what level?
Many African countries implement programs to improve land tenure security
• to secure land rights of individuals/households/communities
The effectiveness and sustainability of these programs hinge on
• solid understanding of the derivers of tenure insecurity of individuals, households and communities
• proper implementation and targeting of the programs
Thus, this study aims at addressing the knowledge gap:
1. Assessing the potential regulatory and institutional challenges in maintaining good land governance
(focusing on 10 African countries using the LGAF framework)
2. Investigating the drivers of tenure insecurity and understand what works? Where? and why? (using
household survey data from four African countries including a unique gender-disaggregated data from
Mozambique)

4. The status quo: regulatory and institutional
challenges to good land governance
4
The analysis draws on the results from the LGAF framework, a
diagnostic land governance tool developed by the World Bank,
to examine challenges in the implementation and enforcement
of legal and institutional framework (Deininger et al., 2011) for
more on the LGAF methodology and process
Under the LGAF methodology: “A” represents the best option towards a good land
governance scenario; “B” represents the second-best set of options that make progress
towards good land governance; “C” represents a country struggling to meet the criteria for
good land governance; and “D” represents countries not actively improving land
governance.

5. Recognition of land rights of vulnerable
groups
5
NA: Data not available

6. Enforcement and implementation
challenges
6

7. Accessibility and sustainability of land
service delivery systems
7
NA NA NA NA

8. Drivers of perceived tenure insecurity
8

9. Data source
9
Country Ethiopia Malawi Ghana Mozambique Nigeria
Data Sources IFPRI’s Ethiopia FtF
Survey of 2015
LSMS-Integrated
Household
Survey IV (IHS4)
2016/17
EGC- ISSER
Ghana
Socioeconomic
Panel Survey
Mozambique TIA
survey 2014 and TIA
supplemental survey
2015
LSMS-ISA
General
Household
Survey
2012/13
Individuals 27543 53885 16158 19192 29315
Households 6693 12447 2238 3278 2977
Parcels 22161 14118 5982 10298 5893

10. Patterns and trends of tenure insecurity
To be integrated later

11. Results: Sources of tenure insecurity
11
Figure 4 Perceived tenure insecurity at household level

12. Drivers of perceived land tenure insecurity: role
of land market and economic vibrancy
12
Effect of land market vibrancy and economic vibrancy on perceived tenure insecurity
†community proportion of households who participate in the land market through land purchase, rent/sharecrop in/out, loan
†† 1 if community proportion of households who have house with modern roofing material
NIG MOZ ETH GHA MAL
Community-level prevalence of land market †
Proportion of households with latest land owned within 10 yrs
Community level economic vibrancy††
VARIABLES
• Prevalence of land markets is associated with eroding perceived tenure security
of households in all four countries.

13. Drivers of perceived land tenure insecurity:
role of social dynamics
13
Effect of social dynamics on perceived tenure insecurity
NIG MOZ ETH GHA MAL
Plot holder is immigrant/non-indigine
Community proportion of households where the head and
spouse are immigrants/non-indigine
Plot holder is female
VARIABLES
• Similarly, social dynamics is associated with higher prevalence of
perceived tenure security of households
indigene NA
NA

14. Drivers of perceived land tenure insecurity:
other factors
14
Other factors
NIG MOZ ETH GHA MAL
Social connectedness
Political connectedness
Legal literacy
VARIABLES
• Social and/or political connectedness is associated with enhancing perceived tenure
security of households
• Legal literacy (knowledge of land laws/procedures also enhances perceived tenure
security (especially, women)
NA NA
NA
NA
NA

15. In-depth gender-disaggregated analysis
from Mozambique
15

16. Data and method
16
Type
Gender
Total
Female Male
Head/Principal 928A 2350B 3278
Spouse 1798C 1798
Total 2726 2350 5076
Note: Sub sample A and B used for Inter household analysis- Type I household
Sub sample B and C used for Intra household analysis- Type II household

17. Empirical method & variables
17
Household level probit estimation using two proxy indicators for tenure insecurity:
Type 1 (collective tenure risk) (Tife)- takes the value 1 if the respondent perceived that it is likely
to lose land ownership/use right due to land expropriated/confiscated by the government/private
investor; and 0, otherwise.
Type 2 (individual tenure risk) (Tifp) takes the value 1 if the respondent perceived that it is likely
to lose land ownership/use right due to private land dispute (inheritance, border, divorce, etc); and
0, otherwise.
Gender disaggregated analysis:
• Inter household (male heads vs female head) and
• Intra household (male heads vs female spouses)
The explanatory variables represent household, individual and community
level characteristics

18. Econometric Results
Table1(cont…)
18
Explanatory Variables¥
Type-2
(individua
l tenure
risk)
Type-1
(collective
tenure risk)
Type-2
(individual
tenure risk)
Female head 0.042* -0.076*** 0.151****
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Female Spouse (married women) -0.217****
(0.02)
Pseudo R2 0.1962 0.2211 0.1422
Observations 3188 3172 4981
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pooled sample

19. 7/2/2019
19
Inter-household
Explanatory Variables¥ Pooled sample Intra-household
Female Spouse Male head Female head
Experience of dispute 0.092**** 0.043* 0.057** 0.081**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Age of the respondent 0.001* -0.001 0.001 0.003***
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Political connectedness -0.019 -0.036 -0.056** 0.05
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Social connectedness -0.141**** -0.125*** -0.142**** -0.101**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Respondent is indigenous -0.064**** -0.027 -0.035 -0.042*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Respondent received legal advice on land related matters -0.004 -0.108** 0.182**** -0.112**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Respondent practice non-farm activity 0.117**** 0.180**** 0.075**** 0.105***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Community level land market vibrancy†† 0.142**** 0.239**** 0.097 0.033
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Community proportion of households where the head and/or spouse
are migrants
0.151**** 0.031 0.142**** 0.091*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Community level land abundance†††† -0.059** -0.057 -0.044 -0.099*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Plot is inherited -0.160**** -0.164**** -0.022 0.078
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Plot is purchased -0.057*** -0.038 -0.045 -0.076**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Plot cultivated with permanent crops (trees) -0.143**** -0.084*** -0.093**** -0.065*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)

20. 7/2/2019
20
Inter-household
Explanatory Variables¥ Pooled sample Intra-household
Female Spouse Male head Female head
Experience of dispute 0.092**** 0.043* 0.057** 0.081**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Age of the respondent 0.001* -0.001 0.001 0.003***
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Political connectedness -0.019 -0.036 -0.056** 0.05
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Social connectedness -0.141**** -0.125*** -0.142**** -0.101**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Respondent is indigenous -0.064**** -0.027 -0.035 -0.042*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Respondent received legal advice on land related matters -0.004 -0.108** 0.182**** -0.112**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Respondent practice non-farm activity 0.117**** 0.180**** 0.075**** 0.105***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Community level land market vibrancy†† 0.142**** 0.239**** 0.097 0.033
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Community proportion of households where the head and/or spouse
are migrants
0.151**** 0.031 0.142**** 0.091*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Community level land abundance†††† -0.059** -0.057 -0.044 -0.099*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Plot is inherited -0.160**** -0.164**** -0.022 0.078
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Plot is purchased -0.057*** -0.038 -0.045 -0.076**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Plot cultivated with permanent crops (trees) -0.143**** -0.084*** -0.093**** -0.065*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)

21. Land market vibrancy on women land
access
21
37.8
47.5 49.1 51.2
28.6
31
41.9
56.7
vibrant less vibrant vibrant less vibrant vibrant less vibrant vibrant less vibrant
Ethiopia Mozambique Nigeria Malawi
Proportion of parcels with women land holders

22. Land market vibrancy on youth land access
22
42.9
51.2 50.9 49.1
39.9
37.2
44.1
56
vibrant less vibrant vibrant less vibrant vibrant less vibrant vibrant less vibrant
Ethiopia Mozambique Nigeria Malawi
Proportion of parcels with land holders in the age group of [15-35]

23. Policy implications
23
Customary tenure system under more scrutiny/pressure in areas with commercial agriculture or more
vibrant land markets, and, hence:
• Interventions should focus on institutional support to tackle capacity issues with the traditional system (overlapping
land rights)
• Traditional leaders acting as managers of rural (even urban land) instead of as custodians of the land (due to the
increase in land values)
• Information asymmetry (communities/traditional leaders’ lack of comprehensive knowledge of the potential market
value of their land)
Legal literacy programs seems to enhance tenure security of women (both female heads and spouses)
and can be considered as less costly and sustainable policy measure towards safeguarding land rights
Results also imply that land rights registration/documentation programs should:
• Consider intra-household dimensions (parcel based and systematic to avoid scenario of intra-household land grabbing)
• Better results if packaged with legal literacy programs to avoid elite capture situations
• Be deemed sufficient if implemented at community level in areas that are less commercialized (traditional agriculture)
Ensure sufficient local resourcing (minimizing donor dependence) → sustainability of interventions
Overall, programs which aim to enhance land tenure security should take into consideration the context
and peculiar characteristics of communities and groups of households during program formulation and
implementation phases.

24. Thank You!
Q&A
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