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Nikhil Mittal (SamratAshok)
   SamratAshok
   Twitter - @nikhil_mitt
   I am interested in Offensive Information
    Security, new attack vectors and
    methodologies to pwn systems.
   Previous Talks
    ◦ Compromising a highly secure environment
      Clubhack’10
    ◦ Here are your keystrokes Hackfest’11
    ◦ Compromising a highly secure environment part 2
      Clubhack’11
   Teensy
   Current usage of Teensy
   What else can be done using Teensy
   Kautilya
   Payloads in Kautilya
   Current state of pentesting
   Pen Test Stories
   Limitations
   Future
   Conclusion
   A USB Micro-controller device.
   Storage of about 130 KB.
   We will use Teensy ++ which is a better
    version of Teensy.
   Available for $24 from pjrc.com
   http://www.pjrc.com/teensy/projects.html
   Really cool projects.
   Please do not compare my code with any of
    the above. I am a new kid in the town 
   Arduino-Based Attack Vector in Social
    Engineering Toolkit (SET) by ReL1K.
   Contains really awesome payloads.
   Great for popping shells.
   Homemade Hardware keylogger by Irongeek
   Teensy can be used for many tasks in a
    Penetration Test.
   It can be used for information gathering, pre-
    exploitation, exploitation and post-
    exploitation tasks.
   If you know victim OS well, almost anything
    can be done using Teensy.
   It’s a toolkit which aims to make Teensy more
    useful in Penetration Tests.
   Named after Chanakya a.k.a. Kautilya, an
    Indian Teacher and Politician (370-283 BC)
   Written in Ruby.
   It’s a menu drive program which let users
    select and customize payloads.
   Aims to make Teensy part of every
    Penetration tester’s tool chest.
   Payloads are written for teensy without SD
    Card.
   Pastebin is extensively used. Both for uploads
    and downloads.
   Payloads are commands, powershell scripts
    or combination of both.
   Payload execution of course depends on
    privilege of user logged in when Teensy is
    plugged in.
   Payloads are mostly for Windows as the victim
    of choice generally is a Windows machine. 
People
everywhere
   love
 Windows.
   Adds a user with Administrative privileges on
    the victim.
   Uses net user command.
   Changes the default DNS for a connection.
   Utilizes the netsh command.
   Edit hosts file to resolve a domain locally.
   Enables RDP on victim machine.
   Starts the service.
   Adds exception to Windows firewall.
   Adds a user to Administrators group.
   Installs Telnet on victim machine.
   Starts the service.
   Adds exception to Windows firewall.
   Adds a user to Administrators group and
    Telnetclients group..
   Adds user defined website as secondary
    home page to Internet Explorer.
   As an attempt to keep it stealthy, the home
    page is set to Microsoft website.
   Downloads an exe in text format from
    pastebin, converts it back to exe and
    executes it.
   Using registry hacks, calls user defined
    executable or command when Shift is pressed
    5 times or Win + U is pressed.
   When the system is locked, the called exe is
    executed in System context.
   Uninstalls an msiexec application silently.
   Dumps valuable information from
    registry, net command and hosts file.
   Tweets a text using user define Twitter
    username and password.
   This payload is visible i.e. it works on browser
    windows not on command line.
   This payload pulls powerdump script of msf
    from pastebin, schedules it as taks to run in
    system context and upload the hashes to
    pastebin.
   This payload pulls the code execution script
    (as on exploit-Monday blog) and executes it
    on the victim.
   This payload logs keys and pastes it to
    pastebin every twenty seconds.
   There is a separate script to parse the output.
   This payload pulls the sniffer (as by Robbie
    Fost) and executes it on the victim.
   The output is compressed and uploaded to
    ftp.
   This payload uses opens up chrome, launches
    Remote Desktop plugin, enters credentials
    and copies the access key to pastebin.
   This payload operates on browser window.
   This payload creates a hosted network with
    user define SSID and key.
   It also adds a user to Administrators and
    TelnetClients group.
   It installs and starts telnet and adds it to
    windows firewall exception.
   A client engagement comes with IP
    addresses.
   We need to complete the assignment in very
    restrictive time frame.
   Pressure is on us to deliver a “good” report
    with some high severity findings. (That “High”
    return inside a red colored box)
Vuln
       Exploit   Report
Scan
   This is a best case scenario.
   Only lucky ones find that.
   Generally legacy Enterprise Applications or
    Business Critical applications are not
    upgraded.
   There is almost no fun doing it that way.
Enum   Scan   Exploit   Report
Enum
 +      Scan   Exploit   Post Exp   Report
Intel
   To gain access to the systems.
   This shows the real threat to clients that we
    can actually make an impact on their
    business. No more “so-what” 
   We can create reports with “High” Severity
    findings.
   Memory Corruption bugs.
    ◦ Server side
    ◦ Client Side
   Humans
   Mis-configurations
   Many times we get some vulnerabilities but
    can’t exploit.
    ◦   No public exploits available.
    ◦   Not allowed on the system.
    ◦   Countermeasure blocking it.
    ◦   Exploit completed but no session was generated :P
   Hardened Systems
   Patches in place
   Countermeasures blocking scans and exploits
   Security incident monitoring and blocking
   No network access
   Open file shares.
   Sticky slips.
   Social Engineering attacks.
   Man In The Middle (many types)
   SMB Relay
   Dumpster Diving
   We were doing internal PT for a large media
    house.
    The access to network was quite restrictive.
   The desktops at Library were left unattended
    many times.
   Teensy was plugged into one system with a
    sethc and utilman backdoor.
   Later in the evening the system was accessed
    and pwnage ensued.
   A telecom company.
    We had to do perimeter check for the firm.
   The Wireless rogue AP payload was used and
    teensy was sold to the clients employees
    during lunch hours.
   Within couple of hours, we got a wireless
    network with a administrative user and telnet
    ready.
   A pharma company.
   We replaced a user’s data card with a Teensy
    inside the data card’s cover.
   The payload selected was Keylogger.
   “Data card” obviously didn’t worked and we
    got multiple keylogging for the user and the
    helpdesk.
   Helpdesk guys had access to almost
    everything in the environment and over a
    workday, it was over.
   Limited storage in Teensy. Resolved if you
    attach a SD card with Teensy.
   Inability to “read” from the system. You have
    to assume the responses of victim OS and
    there is only one way traffic.
   Many payloads need Administrative privilege.
   Lots of traffic to and from pastebin.
   Inability to clear itself after a single run.
   Not very reliable as it is a new tool and has
    not gone through user tests.
   For payloads which use executables you
    manually need to convert and paste them to
    pastebin.
   Improvement in current payloads.
   Implementation of SD card.
   Use some payloads as libraries so that they
    can be reused.
   Implementation of payloads from SET.
   Support for Non-English keyboards.
   Maybe more Linux payloads.
   Implementation of some new payloads which
    are under development.
   Irongeek for introducing this device at Defcon
    18
   David Kennedy for implementing this in Social
    Engineering Toolkit.
   Stackoverflow and MSDN for code samples
    and answers.
   Matt from Exploit-Monday for really useful
    blog.
   pjrc.com for this great device.
   Questions?
   Insults?
   Feedback?

   Kautilya will be available at
    http://code.google.com/p/kautilya/
   Follow me @nikhil_mitt
   http://labofapenetrationtester.blogspot.com/

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Kautilya: Teensy beyond shell

  • 2. SamratAshok  Twitter - @nikhil_mitt  I am interested in Offensive Information Security, new attack vectors and methodologies to pwn systems.  Previous Talks ◦ Compromising a highly secure environment Clubhack’10 ◦ Here are your keystrokes Hackfest’11 ◦ Compromising a highly secure environment part 2 Clubhack’11
  • 3. Teensy  Current usage of Teensy  What else can be done using Teensy  Kautilya  Payloads in Kautilya  Current state of pentesting  Pen Test Stories  Limitations  Future  Conclusion
  • 4. A USB Micro-controller device.  Storage of about 130 KB.  We will use Teensy ++ which is a better version of Teensy.  Available for $24 from pjrc.com
  • 5.
  • 6. http://www.pjrc.com/teensy/projects.html  Really cool projects.  Please do not compare my code with any of the above. I am a new kid in the town 
  • 7. Arduino-Based Attack Vector in Social Engineering Toolkit (SET) by ReL1K.  Contains really awesome payloads.  Great for popping shells.  Homemade Hardware keylogger by Irongeek
  • 8. Teensy can be used for many tasks in a Penetration Test.  It can be used for information gathering, pre- exploitation, exploitation and post- exploitation tasks.  If you know victim OS well, almost anything can be done using Teensy.
  • 9. It’s a toolkit which aims to make Teensy more useful in Penetration Tests.  Named after Chanakya a.k.a. Kautilya, an Indian Teacher and Politician (370-283 BC)  Written in Ruby.  It’s a menu drive program which let users select and customize payloads.  Aims to make Teensy part of every Penetration tester’s tool chest.
  • 10. Payloads are written for teensy without SD Card.  Pastebin is extensively used. Both for uploads and downloads.  Payloads are commands, powershell scripts or combination of both.  Payload execution of course depends on privilege of user logged in when Teensy is plugged in.  Payloads are mostly for Windows as the victim of choice generally is a Windows machine. 
  • 11. People everywhere love Windows.
  • 12. Adds a user with Administrative privileges on the victim.  Uses net user command.
  • 13. Changes the default DNS for a connection.  Utilizes the netsh command.
  • 14. Edit hosts file to resolve a domain locally.
  • 15. Enables RDP on victim machine.  Starts the service.  Adds exception to Windows firewall.  Adds a user to Administrators group.
  • 16. Installs Telnet on victim machine.  Starts the service.  Adds exception to Windows firewall.  Adds a user to Administrators group and Telnetclients group..
  • 17. Adds user defined website as secondary home page to Internet Explorer.  As an attempt to keep it stealthy, the home page is set to Microsoft website.
  • 18. Downloads an exe in text format from pastebin, converts it back to exe and executes it.
  • 19. Using registry hacks, calls user defined executable or command when Shift is pressed 5 times or Win + U is pressed.  When the system is locked, the called exe is executed in System context.
  • 20. Uninstalls an msiexec application silently.
  • 21. Dumps valuable information from registry, net command and hosts file.
  • 22. Tweets a text using user define Twitter username and password.  This payload is visible i.e. it works on browser windows not on command line.
  • 23. This payload pulls powerdump script of msf from pastebin, schedules it as taks to run in system context and upload the hashes to pastebin.
  • 24. This payload pulls the code execution script (as on exploit-Monday blog) and executes it on the victim.
  • 25. This payload logs keys and pastes it to pastebin every twenty seconds.  There is a separate script to parse the output.
  • 26. This payload pulls the sniffer (as by Robbie Fost) and executes it on the victim.  The output is compressed and uploaded to ftp.
  • 27. This payload uses opens up chrome, launches Remote Desktop plugin, enters credentials and copies the access key to pastebin.  This payload operates on browser window.
  • 28. This payload creates a hosted network with user define SSID and key.  It also adds a user to Administrators and TelnetClients group.  It installs and starts telnet and adds it to windows firewall exception.
  • 29. A client engagement comes with IP addresses.  We need to complete the assignment in very restrictive time frame.  Pressure is on us to deliver a “good” report with some high severity findings. (That “High” return inside a red colored box)
  • 30. Vuln Exploit Report Scan
  • 31. This is a best case scenario.  Only lucky ones find that.  Generally legacy Enterprise Applications or Business Critical applications are not upgraded.  There is almost no fun doing it that way.
  • 32. Enum Scan Exploit Report
  • 33. Enum + Scan Exploit Post Exp Report Intel
  • 34. To gain access to the systems.  This shows the real threat to clients that we can actually make an impact on their business. No more “so-what”   We can create reports with “High” Severity findings.
  • 35. Memory Corruption bugs. ◦ Server side ◦ Client Side  Humans  Mis-configurations
  • 36. Many times we get some vulnerabilities but can’t exploit. ◦ No public exploits available. ◦ Not allowed on the system. ◦ Countermeasure blocking it. ◦ Exploit completed but no session was generated :P
  • 37. Hardened Systems  Patches in place  Countermeasures blocking scans and exploits  Security incident monitoring and blocking  No network access
  • 38. Open file shares.  Sticky slips.  Social Engineering attacks.  Man In The Middle (many types)  SMB Relay  Dumpster Diving
  • 39.
  • 40.
  • 41. We were doing internal PT for a large media house.  The access to network was quite restrictive.  The desktops at Library were left unattended many times.  Teensy was plugged into one system with a sethc and utilman backdoor.  Later in the evening the system was accessed and pwnage ensued.
  • 42. A telecom company.  We had to do perimeter check for the firm.  The Wireless rogue AP payload was used and teensy was sold to the clients employees during lunch hours.  Within couple of hours, we got a wireless network with a administrative user and telnet ready.
  • 43. A pharma company.  We replaced a user’s data card with a Teensy inside the data card’s cover.  The payload selected was Keylogger.  “Data card” obviously didn’t worked and we got multiple keylogging for the user and the helpdesk.  Helpdesk guys had access to almost everything in the environment and over a workday, it was over.
  • 44. Limited storage in Teensy. Resolved if you attach a SD card with Teensy.  Inability to “read” from the system. You have to assume the responses of victim OS and there is only one way traffic.
  • 45. Many payloads need Administrative privilege.  Lots of traffic to and from pastebin.  Inability to clear itself after a single run.  Not very reliable as it is a new tool and has not gone through user tests.  For payloads which use executables you manually need to convert and paste them to pastebin.
  • 46. Improvement in current payloads.  Implementation of SD card.  Use some payloads as libraries so that they can be reused.  Implementation of payloads from SET.  Support for Non-English keyboards.  Maybe more Linux payloads.  Implementation of some new payloads which are under development.
  • 47. Irongeek for introducing this device at Defcon 18  David Kennedy for implementing this in Social Engineering Toolkit.  Stackoverflow and MSDN for code samples and answers.  Matt from Exploit-Monday for really useful blog.  pjrc.com for this great device.
  • 48. Questions?  Insults?  Feedback?  Kautilya will be available at http://code.google.com/p/kautilya/  Follow me @nikhil_mitt  http://labofapenetrationtester.blogspot.com/