I examine descriptivist theories and causal-historical theories of reference in light of empirical findings by experimental philosophers (namely Papineau, Mallon, Machery, Nichols, Stich, Devitt) which appear to fundamentally undermine them.
Date: 2018-10-19
Location: University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
Grammaticalization and Lexical Expression of Tropative from a Typological Perspective
Roman Tarasov,
Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
The Fifth Annual International Conference on Languages, Linguistics, Translation and Literature
2-3 February 2021, Ahwaz
For more information, please visit the conference website:
WWW.LLLD.IR
Grammaticalization and Lexical Expression of Tropative from a Typological Perspective
Roman Tarasov,
Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
The Fifth Annual International Conference on Languages, Linguistics, Translation and Literature
2-3 February 2021, Ahwaz
For more information, please visit the conference website:
WWW.LLLD.IR
Goals:
Define categorical proposition and identify its parts;
Discuss the matter and form of a proposition;
Learn the distinctions among the four types of categorical propositions; and
Learn how to reduce a proposition to its logical form.
Logic, Categorical Propositions.
All of the used themes from above presentation was from Microsoft, likewise I do not own the said themes.
Goals:
Define categorical proposition and identify its parts;
Discuss the matter and form of a proposition;
Learn the distinctions among the four types of categorical propositions; and
Learn how to reduce a proposition to its logical form.
Logic, Categorical Propositions.
All of the used themes from above presentation was from Microsoft, likewise I do not own the said themes.
Causal theories of reference describe how terms acquire specific references (especially logical terms, proper names, and natural terms) based on evidence. In the case of names, a causal theory of reference assumes that 1) the referent of the name is fixed by an original designation (called by Saul Kripke "initial baptism"), after which the name becomes a rigid designator of that object; 2) the name is subsequently transmitted by communication through a causal chain. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam proposed the extension of causal theory to natural terms.
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.35625.75364
when one communicates, he or she does not give any special attention to how he or she communicates. As a result, communication between parties is either diminished or lost altogether. Scholars have spent countless years analyzing human communication and have spent the same amount of time formulating theories that attempt to answer questions pertaining to how we communicate and why we choose the methods we do. One such scholar, I.A. Richards analyzed human communication and co-formulated a theory known as the “Theory of Meaning”. Ogden and Richards’ theory attempts to not only describe the approaches humans take when communicating, but also to understand how communication is “lost” when not done correctly.
Seminar of U.V. Spectroscopy by SAMIR PANDASAMIR PANDA
Spectroscopy is a branch of science dealing the study of interaction of electromagnetic radiation with matter.
Ultraviolet-visible spectroscopy refers to absorption spectroscopy or reflect spectroscopy in the UV-VIS spectral region.
Ultraviolet-visible spectroscopy is an analytical method that can measure the amount of light received by the analyte.
This presentation explores a brief idea about the structural and functional attributes of nucleotides, the structure and function of genetic materials along with the impact of UV rays and pH upon them.
Cancer cell metabolism: special Reference to Lactate PathwayAADYARAJPANDEY1
Normal Cell Metabolism:
Cellular respiration describes the series of steps that cells use to break down sugar and other chemicals to get the energy we need to function.
Energy is stored in the bonds of glucose and when glucose is broken down, much of that energy is released.
Cell utilize energy in the form of ATP.
The first step of respiration is called glycolysis. In a series of steps, glycolysis breaks glucose into two smaller molecules - a chemical called pyruvate. A small amount of ATP is formed during this process.
Most healthy cells continue the breakdown in a second process, called the Kreb's cycle. The Kreb's cycle allows cells to “burn” the pyruvates made in glycolysis to get more ATP.
The last step in the breakdown of glucose is called oxidative phosphorylation (Ox-Phos).
It takes place in specialized cell structures called mitochondria. This process produces a large amount of ATP. Importantly, cells need oxygen to complete oxidative phosphorylation.
If a cell completes only glycolysis, only 2 molecules of ATP are made per glucose. However, if the cell completes the entire respiration process (glycolysis - Kreb's - oxidative phosphorylation), about 36 molecules of ATP are created, giving it much more energy to use.
IN CANCER CELL:
Unlike healthy cells that "burn" the entire molecule of sugar to capture a large amount of energy as ATP, cancer cells are wasteful.
Cancer cells only partially break down sugar molecules. They overuse the first step of respiration, glycolysis. They frequently do not complete the second step, oxidative phosphorylation.
This results in only 2 molecules of ATP per each glucose molecule instead of the 36 or so ATPs healthy cells gain. As a result, cancer cells need to use a lot more sugar molecules to get enough energy to survive.
Unlike healthy cells that "burn" the entire molecule of sugar to capture a large amount of energy as ATP, cancer cells are wasteful.
Cancer cells only partially break down sugar molecules. They overuse the first step of respiration, glycolysis. They frequently do not complete the second step, oxidative phosphorylation.
This results in only 2 molecules of ATP per each glucose molecule instead of the 36 or so ATPs healthy cells gain. As a result, cancer cells need to use a lot more sugar molecules to get enough energy to survive.
introduction to WARBERG PHENOMENA:
WARBURG EFFECT Usually, cancer cells are highly glycolytic (glucose addiction) and take up more glucose than do normal cells from outside.
Otto Heinrich Warburg (; 8 October 1883 – 1 August 1970) In 1931 was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology for his "discovery of the nature and mode of action of the respiratory enzyme.
WARNBURG EFFECT : cancer cells under aerobic (well-oxygenated) conditions to metabolize glucose to lactate (aerobic glycolysis) is known as the Warburg effect. Warburg made the observation that tumor slices consume glucose and secrete lactate at a higher rate than normal tissues.
Richard's entangled aventures in wonderlandRichard Gill
Since the loophole-free Bell experiments of 2020 and the Nobel prizes in physics of 2022, critics of Bell's work have retreated to the fortress of super-determinism. Now, super-determinism is a derogatory word - it just means "determinism". Palmer, Hance and Hossenfelder argue that quantum mechanics and determinism are not incompatible, using a sophisticated mathematical construction based on a subtle thinning of allowed states and measurements in quantum mechanics, such that what is left appears to make Bell's argument fail, without altering the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. I think however that it is a smoke screen, and the slogan "lost in math" comes to my mind. I will discuss some other recent disproofs of Bell's theorem using the language of causality based on causal graphs. Causal thinking is also central to law and justice. I will mention surprising connections to my work on serial killer nurse cases, in particular the Dutch case of Lucia de Berk and the current UK case of Lucy Letby.
This pdf is about the Schizophrenia.
For more details visit on YouTube; @SELF-EXPLANATORY;
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCAiarMZDNhe1A3Rnpr_WkzA/videos
Thanks...!
Slide 1: Title Slide
Extrachromosomal Inheritance
Slide 2: Introduction to Extrachromosomal Inheritance
Definition: Extrachromosomal inheritance refers to the transmission of genetic material that is not found within the nucleus.
Key Components: Involves genes located in mitochondria, chloroplasts, and plasmids.
Slide 3: Mitochondrial Inheritance
Mitochondria: Organelles responsible for energy production.
Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA): Circular DNA molecule found in mitochondria.
Inheritance Pattern: Maternally inherited, meaning it is passed from mothers to all their offspring.
Diseases: Examples include Leber’s hereditary optic neuropathy (LHON) and mitochondrial myopathy.
Slide 4: Chloroplast Inheritance
Chloroplasts: Organelles responsible for photosynthesis in plants.
Chloroplast DNA (cpDNA): Circular DNA molecule found in chloroplasts.
Inheritance Pattern: Often maternally inherited in most plants, but can vary in some species.
Examples: Variegation in plants, where leaf color patterns are determined by chloroplast DNA.
Slide 5: Plasmid Inheritance
Plasmids: Small, circular DNA molecules found in bacteria and some eukaryotes.
Features: Can carry antibiotic resistance genes and can be transferred between cells through processes like conjugation.
Significance: Important in biotechnology for gene cloning and genetic engineering.
Slide 6: Mechanisms of Extrachromosomal Inheritance
Non-Mendelian Patterns: Do not follow Mendel’s laws of inheritance.
Cytoplasmic Segregation: During cell division, organelles like mitochondria and chloroplasts are randomly distributed to daughter cells.
Heteroplasmy: Presence of more than one type of organellar genome within a cell, leading to variation in expression.
Slide 7: Examples of Extrachromosomal Inheritance
Four O’clock Plant (Mirabilis jalapa): Shows variegated leaves due to different cpDNA in leaf cells.
Petite Mutants in Yeast: Result from mutations in mitochondrial DNA affecting respiration.
Slide 8: Importance of Extrachromosomal Inheritance
Evolution: Provides insight into the evolution of eukaryotic cells.
Medicine: Understanding mitochondrial inheritance helps in diagnosing and treating mitochondrial diseases.
Agriculture: Chloroplast inheritance can be used in plant breeding and genetic modification.
Slide 9: Recent Research and Advances
Gene Editing: Techniques like CRISPR-Cas9 are being used to edit mitochondrial and chloroplast DNA.
Therapies: Development of mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT) for preventing mitochondrial diseases.
Slide 10: Conclusion
Summary: Extrachromosomal inheritance involves the transmission of genetic material outside the nucleus and plays a crucial role in genetics, medicine, and biotechnology.
Future Directions: Continued research and technological advancements hold promise for new treatments and applications.
Slide 11: Questions and Discussion
Invite Audience: Open the floor for any questions or further discussion on the topic.
Richard's aventures in two entangled wonderlandsRichard Gill
Since the loophole-free Bell experiments of 2020 and the Nobel prizes in physics of 2022, critics of Bell's work have retreated to the fortress of super-determinism. Now, super-determinism is a derogatory word - it just means "determinism". Palmer, Hance and Hossenfelder argue that quantum mechanics and determinism are not incompatible, using a sophisticated mathematical construction based on a subtle thinning of allowed states and measurements in quantum mechanics, such that what is left appears to make Bell's argument fail, without altering the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. I think however that it is a smoke screen, and the slogan "lost in math" comes to my mind. I will discuss some other recent disproofs of Bell's theorem using the language of causality based on causal graphs. Causal thinking is also central to law and justice. I will mention surprising connections to my work on serial killer nurse cases, in particular the Dutch case of Lucia de Berk and the current UK case of Lucy Letby.
Introduction:
RNA interference (RNAi) or Post-Transcriptional Gene Silencing (PTGS) is an important biological process for modulating eukaryotic gene expression.
It is highly conserved process of posttranscriptional gene silencing by which double stranded RNA (dsRNA) causes sequence-specific degradation of mRNA sequences.
dsRNA-induced gene silencing (RNAi) is reported in a wide range of eukaryotes ranging from worms, insects, mammals and plants.
This process mediates resistance to both endogenous parasitic and exogenous pathogenic nucleic acids, and regulates the expression of protein-coding genes.
What are small ncRNAs?
micro RNA (miRNA)
short interfering RNA (siRNA)
Properties of small non-coding RNA:
Involved in silencing mRNA transcripts.
Called “small” because they are usually only about 21-24 nucleotides long.
Synthesized by first cutting up longer precursor sequences (like the 61nt one that Lee discovered).
Silence an mRNA by base pairing with some sequence on the mRNA.
Discovery of siRNA?
The first small RNA:
In 1993 Rosalind Lee (Victor Ambros lab) was studying a non- coding gene in C. elegans, lin-4, that was involved in silencing of another gene, lin-14, at the appropriate time in the
development of the worm C. elegans.
Two small transcripts of lin-4 (22nt and 61nt) were found to be complementary to a sequence in the 3' UTR of lin-14.
Because lin-4 encoded no protein, she deduced that it must be these transcripts that are causing the silencing by RNA-RNA interactions.
Types of RNAi ( non coding RNA)
MiRNA
Length (23-25 nt)
Trans acting
Binds with target MRNA in mismatch
Translation inhibition
Si RNA
Length 21 nt.
Cis acting
Bind with target Mrna in perfect complementary sequence
Piwi-RNA
Length ; 25 to 36 nt.
Expressed in Germ Cells
Regulates trnasposomes activity
MECHANISM OF RNAI:
First the double-stranded RNA teams up with a protein complex named Dicer, which cuts the long RNA into short pieces.
Then another protein complex called RISC (RNA-induced silencing complex) discards one of the two RNA strands.
The RISC-docked, single-stranded RNA then pairs with the homologous mRNA and destroys it.
THE RISC COMPLEX:
RISC is large(>500kD) RNA multi- protein Binding complex which triggers MRNA degradation in response to MRNA
Unwinding of double stranded Si RNA by ATP independent Helicase
Active component of RISC is Ago proteins( ENDONUCLEASE) which cleave target MRNA.
DICER: endonuclease (RNase Family III)
Argonaute: Central Component of the RNA-Induced Silencing Complex (RISC)
One strand of the dsRNA produced by Dicer is retained in the RISC complex in association with Argonaute
ARGONAUTE PROTEIN :
1.PAZ(PIWI/Argonaute/ Zwille)- Recognition of target MRNA
2.PIWI (p-element induced wimpy Testis)- breaks Phosphodiester bond of mRNA.)RNAse H activity.
MiRNA:
The Double-stranded RNAs are naturally produced in eukaryotic cells during development, and they have a key role in regulating gene expression .
2. Arguments from Reference
● Arguments that depend on the particularities of a term and its reference or
lack thereof
○ E.g. the eliminativist argument against the existence of belief based on the fact that the term
‘belief’ does not seem to refer
3. Arguments from Reference
1. ‘Philosophers implicitly or explicitly adopt a substantive theory of the
reference of a term t (or of a class of terms T, such as theoretical terms)’
4. Arguments from Reference
1. ‘Philosophers implicitly or explicitly adopt a substantive theory of the
reference of a term t (or of a class of terms T, such as theoretical terms)’
2. They claim that the reference of t or of members of T has some specific
properties
5. Arguments from Reference
1. ‘Philosophers implicitly or explicitly adopt a substantive theory of the
reference of a term t (or of a class of terms T, such as theoretical terms)’
2. They claim that the reference of t or of members of T has some specific
properties
○ E.g. success or failure of reference
6. Arguments from Reference
1. ‘Philosophers implicitly or explicitly adopt a substantive theory of the
reference of a term t (or of a class of terms T, such as theoretical terms)’
2. They claim that the reference of t or of members of T has some specific
properties
○ E.g. success or failure of reference
■ On some accounts, ‘empty’ reference implies the absence of the would-be referent
entities
7. Arguments from Reference
1. ‘Philosophers implicitly or explicitly adopt a substantive theory of the
reference of a term t (or of a class of terms T, such as theoretical terms)’
2. They claim that the reference of t or of members of T has some specific
properties
○ E.g. success or failure of reference
■ On some accounts, ‘empty’ reference implies the absence of the would-be referent
entities
3. Philosophically significant conclusion is drawn
(Mallon et al., 2009)
8. ‘Philosophically Significant Conclusions’
● Ontological debates about what exists
○ E.g. does t really exist?
● Metaphysical debates about the nature of what exists
● Epistemological debates about what we do, or can, know
○ E.g. what can be known about t given its reference?
9. The Two Dominant Theories of Reference
● Descriptivist Theories
● Causal-Historical Theories
10. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
“Descriptivist theories are naturally construed strongly as theories of meaning: the
meaning of a proper name is expressed by the description that competent
speakers associate with the name, a description that identifies the referent...”
(Devitt, 2011)
11. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
“Descriptivist theories are naturally construed strongly as theories of meaning: the
meaning of a proper name is expressed by the description that competent
speakers associate with the name, a description that identifies the referent [or
weaker: a name identifies the referent]” (Devitt, 2011)
12. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● A strong theory of descriptivism: competent speakers determine the meaning
of a name by associating it with description and a referent
13. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● A strong theory of descriptivism: competent speakers determine the meaning
of a name by associating it with description and a referent
● A weak theory of descriptivism: competent speakers determine the referent of
a name
14. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
D1. Competent speakers associate a description with every proper name. This
description specifies a set of properties.
15. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
D1. Competent speakers associate a description with every proper name. This
description specifies a set of properties.
D2. An individual is the referent of a proper name if and only if it uniquely or best
satisfies the description associated with it. An individual uniquely satisfies a
description when the description is true of it and only it. If no individual entirely
satisfies the description, many philosophers claim that the proper name refers to
the individual that best satisfies the description. If the description is not satisfied at
all or if many individuals satisfy it to the same extent, the name does not refer.
(Machery, 2011)
16. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
D1. Competent speakers associate a description with every proper name. This
description specifies a set of properties.
D2. An individual is the referent of a proper name if and only if it uniquely or best
satisfies the description associated with it. An individual uniquely satisfies a
description when the description is true of it and only it. If no individual entirely
satisfies the description, many philosophers claim that the proper name refers to
the individual that best satisfies the description. If the description is not satisfied at
all or if many individuals satisfy it to the same extent, the name does not refer.
(Machery, 2011)
17. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● According to descriptivism, a term is empty if no entity satisfying the
description exists
18. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● According to descriptivism, a term is empty if no entity satisfying the
description exists
○ E.g. eliminativists reject that beliefs and desires exist since no entity satisfying the
(folkpsychological) description of either exist
19. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● According to descriptivism, a term is empty if no entity satisfying the
description exists
○ E.g. eliminativists reject that beliefs and desires exist since no entity satisfying the
(folkpsychological) description of either exist
■ The terms ‘belief’ and ‘desires’ do not refer (i.e. are empty)
20. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● According to descriptivism, a term is empty if no entity satisfying the
description exists
○ E.g. eliminativists reject that beliefs and desires exist since no entity satisfying the
(folkpsychological) description of either exist
■ The terms ‘belief’ and ‘desires’ do not refer (i.e. are empty)
■ Therefore, beliefs and desires do not exist
21. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● According to descriptivism, a term is empty if no entity satisfying the
description exists
○ E.g. eliminativists reject that beliefs and desires exist since no entity satisfying the
(folkpsychological) description of either exist
■ The terms ‘belief’ and ‘desires’ do not refer (i.e. are empty)
■ Therefore, beliefs and desires do not exist
○ Seems reasonable and commonsensical
22. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● According to descriptivism, a term is empty if no entity satisfying the
description exists
○ E.g. eliminativists reject that beliefs and desires exist since no entity satisfying the
(folkpsychological) description of either exist
■ The terms ‘belief’ and ‘desires’ do not refer (i.e. are empty)
■ Therefore, beliefs and desires do not exist
○ Seems reasonable and commonsensical
■ Are there any issues with it?
23. Kripke’s Critique of Descriptivist Theories
● Why did Kripke identify a need for an alternative theory of reference in the
first place, when philosophers were fairly content with the descriptivist theory
before?
24. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
● Unwanted Necessity
● Lost Rigidity
26. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
○ Descriptivism requires that users provide descriptions of the referents alongside the terms they
use to refer to them with
27. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
○ Descriptivism requires that users provide descriptions of the referents alongside the terms they
use to refer to them with
○ Kripke points out that most users of names, such as ‘Einstein’ or ‘Columbus’, are ‘too ignorant
to give identifying descriptions’
28. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
○ Descriptivism requires that users provide descriptions of the referents alongside the terms they
use to refer to them with
○ Kripke points out that most users of names, such as ‘Einstein’ or ‘Columbus’, are ‘too ignorant
to give identifying descriptions’
○ Kripke's Gödel case: 'we simply are not [referring to Schmidt]'
29.
30. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
○ Descriptivism requires that users provide descriptions of the referents alongside the terms they
use to refer to them with
○ Kripke points out that most users of names, such as ‘Einstein’ or ‘Columbus’, are ‘too ignorant
to give identifying descriptions’
○ Kripke's Gödel case: 'we simply are not [referring to Schmidt]'
■ ‘We simply are not’: a paradigmatic example of an argument from intuition
31. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
○ Descriptivism requires that users provide descriptions of the referents alongside the terms they
use to refer to them with
○ Kripke points out that most users of names, such as ‘Einstein’ or ‘Columbus’, are ‘too ignorant
to give identifying descriptions’
○ Kripke's Gödel case: 'we simply are not [referring to Schmidt]'
■ ‘We simply are not’: a paradigmatic example of an argument from intuition
■ Kripke’s intuitive conclusion is that insufficient and counterfactual descriptors
nonetheless successfully designate individuals being named
32. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
○ Descriptivism requires that users provide descriptions of the referents alongside the terms they
use to refer to them with
○ Kripke points out that most users of names, such as ‘Einstein’ or ‘Columbus’, are ‘too ignorant
to give identifying descriptions’
○ Kripke's Gödel case: 'we simply are not [referring to Schmidt]'
■ ‘We simply are not’: a paradigmatic example of an argument from intuition
■ Kripke’s intuitive conclusion is that insufficient and counterfactual descriptors
nonetheless successfully designate individuals being named
● Therefore, reference does not depend on description
34. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Unwanted Necessity
○ Searle: modern cluster version of descriptivist theory of reference has it that the descriptor of
an individual is the sum of the properties associated with him
35. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Unwanted Necessity
○ Searle: modern cluster version of descriptivist theory of reference has it that the descriptor of
an individual is the sum of the properties associated with him
■ ‘It is a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of
properties commonly attributed to him’ (Searle, 1958)
36. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Unwanted Necessity
○ Searle: modern cluster version of descriptivist theory of reference has it that the descriptor of
an individual is the sum of the properties associated with him
■ ‘It is a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of
properties commonly attributed to him’ (Searle, 1958)
● Kripkean response: there are too many things commonly attributed to Aristotle that
are things that Aristotle might not have done
37. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Unwanted Necessity
○ Searle: modern cluster version of descriptivist theory of reference has it that the descriptor of
an individual is the sum of the properties associated with him
■ ‘It is a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of
properties commonly attributed to him’ (Searle, 1958)
● Kripkean response: there are too many things commonly attributed to Aristotle that
are things that Aristotle might not have done
● According to Kripke, even if Aristotle would still be Aristotle even if he were missing
any number of such properties
39. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
40. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not
41. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not: descriptivist theories of meaning do not hold, since
descriptions do not refer invariantly in all possible worlds
42. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not: descriptivist theories of meaning do not hold, since
descriptions do not refer invariantly in all possible worlds
○ (A) ‘no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon’ is true
43. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not: descriptivist theories of meaning do not hold, since
descriptions do not refer invariantly in all possible worlds
○ (A) ‘no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon’ is true
○ (B) ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true, but ‘the planet seen in the evening is the planet seen in
the morning’ is false
44. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not: descriptivist theories of meaning do not hold, since
descriptions do not refer invariantly in all possible worlds
○ (A) ‘no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon’ is true
○ (B) ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true, but ‘the planet seen in the evening is the planet seen in
the morning’ is false
○ (C) Scope ambiguity in modal sentences
45. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not: descriptivist theories of meaning do not hold, since
descriptions do not refer invariantly in all possible worlds
○ (A) ‘no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon’ is true
○ (B) ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true, but ‘the planet seen in the evening is the planet seen in
the morning’ is false
○ (C) Scope ambiguity in modal sentences
46. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
● Unwanted Necessity
● Lost Rigidity
47. Scope ambiguity in modal sentences
● (a) it might have been the case that the last great philosopher of antiquity was
not a philosopher
● (b) it might have been the case that Aristotle was not a philosopher
48. Scope ambiguity in modal sentences
● (a) it might have been the case that the last great philosopher of antiquity was
not a philosopher
● (b) it might have been the case that Aristotle was not a philosopher
● Had Aristotle not been the last great philosopher of antiquity, Aristotle could
not replace the last great philosopher of antiquity without changing the
meaning of the sentence
49. Scope ambiguity in modal sentences
● (a) it might have been the case that the last great philosopher of antiquity was
not a philosopher
● (b) it might have been the case that Aristotle was not a philosopher
● Had Aristotle not been the last great philosopher of antiquity, Aristotle could
not replace the last great philosopher of antiquity without changing the
meaning of the sentence
● The same is not the case in (b)
50. Scope ambiguity in modal sentences
● (a) it might have been the case that the last great philosopher of antiquity was
not a philosopher
● (b) it might have been the case that Aristotle was not a philosopher
● Had Aristotle not been the last great philosopher of antiquity, Aristotle could
not replace the last great philosopher of antiquity without changing the
meaning of the sentence
● The same is not the case in (b): thus, Aristotle is rigid unlike his description
51. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not: descriptivist theories of meaning do not hold, since
descriptions do not refer invariantly in all possible worlds
○ (A) ‘no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon’ is true
○ (B) ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true, but ‘the planet seen in the evening is the planet seen in
the morning’ is false
○ (C) Scope ambiguity in modal sentences
○ (D) ‘Aristotle was fond of dogs’
52. ‘Aristotle was fond of dogs’
● The statement is only true if and only if Aristotle was the one to have liked
dogs
53. ‘Aristotle was fond of dogs’
● The statement is only true if and only if Aristotle was the one to have liked
dogs
○ Even had Aristotle not liked dogs, if he might have, it is the fact of Aristotle liking dogs that
makes the counterfactual statement true or false
54. ‘Aristotle was fond of dogs’
● The statement is only true if and only if Aristotle was the one to have liked
dogs
○ Even had Aristotle not liked dogs, if he might have, it is the fact of Aristotle liking dogs that
makes the counterfactual statement true or false
○ The important thing is that it is Aristotle who liked dogs in the counterfactual, and the fact of
liking or not liking dogs does not alter the reference of the name ‘Aristotle’ either way
55. Descriptivism In Trouble
● Even contradictory descriptions do not reliably modify the reference of a term
56. Descriptivism In Trouble
● Even contradictory descriptions do not reliably modify the reference of a term
● What is a viable alternative to descriptivism?
57. The Two Dominant Theories of Reference
● Descriptivist Theories
● Causal-Historical Theories
58. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● C1. A name is introduced into a linguistic community for the purpose of
referring to an individual. It continues to refer to that individual as long as its
uses are linked to the individual via a causal chain of successive users: Every
user of the name acquired it from another user, who acquired it in turn from
someone else, and so on, up to the first user who introduced the name to
refer to a specific individual.
59. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● C1. A name is introduced into a linguistic community for the purpose of
referring to an individual. It continues to refer to that individual as long as its
uses are linked to the individual via a causal chain of successive users: Every
user of the name acquired it from another user, who acquired it in turn from
someone else, and so on, up to the first user who introduced the name to
refer to a specific individual.
● C2. Speakers may associate descriptions with names. After a name is
introduced, the associated description does not play any role in the fixation of
the referent. The referent may entirely fail to satisfy the description.
(Machery, 2011)
61. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Why prefer the causal-historical alternative?
○ Allows us to avoid the unsettling conclusion that familiar folkpsychological terms are empty
and therefore their referents do not exist
62. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Why prefer the causal-historical alternative?
○ Allows us to avoid the unsettling conclusion that familiar folkpsychological terms are empty
and therefore their referents do not exist
○ Allows us to evade scientific antirealist attacks on the notion of scientific progress, based on
the fact that scientific terms undergo fundamental, descriptive modifications over time
63. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Reference is determined by the history of a term as it is passed from one
person to another after initial introduction to a linguistic community
64. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Reference is determined by the history of a term as it is passed from one
person to another after initial introduction to a linguistic community
● Descriptive associations may deviate from the original usage without effect on
the reference of the term
65. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Reference is determined by the history of a term as it is passed from one
person to another after initial introduction to a linguistic community
● Descriptive associations may deviate from the original usage without effect on
the reference of the term
66. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Reference is determined by the history of a term as it is passed from one
person to another after initial introduction to a linguistic community
● Descriptive associations may deviate from the original usage without effect on
the reference of the term
● Descriptive fit may likewise deviate without effect on the reference of the term
67. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Reference is determined by the history of a term as it is passed from one
person to another after initial introduction to a linguistic community
● Descriptive associations may deviate from the original usage without effect on
the reference of the term
● Descriptive fit may likewise deviate without effect on the reference of the term
● Foolproof replacement for descriptivism?
68. Is That How Language Works?
‘Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a
completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly
and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory
limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or
characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.’
(Chomsky, 1965)
70. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Swampman
○ if representational contents derive from past history, the lack of past history implies the lack of
representational contents
71. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Swampman
○ if representational contents derive from past history, the lack of past history implies the lack of
representational contents
○ 'Swampman poses a challenge specifically to those accounts of representation that make
contents depend on history'
72. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Swampman
○ if representational contents derive from past history, the lack of past history implies the lack of
representational contents
○ 'Swampman poses a challenge specifically to those accounts of representation that make
contents depend on history'
○ 'What Swampman lacks is his normal doppelganger's history. So he challenges any view that
makes the possession of certain kinds of contentful states depend on certain kinds of history.'
73. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Swampman
○ if representational contents derive from past history, the lack of past history implies the lack of
representational contents
○ 'Swampman poses a challenge specifically to those accounts of representation that make
contents depend on history'
○ 'What Swampman lacks is his normal doppelganger's history. So he challenges any view that
makes the possession of certain kinds of contentful states depend on certain kinds of history.'
○ 'I see no reason to suppose that there is any timeless theory-independent set of intuitions
about Swampman... [intuitions in cases] are nearly always manifestations of implicit but
contestable philosophical assumptions'
(Papineau, 1996)
76. Empirical Findings from Experimental Philosophy
● Machery et al.: Kripke’s Gödel case doesn’t reliably evoke the same intuitive
responses as Kripke presumes in his arguments against descriptivism
77. Empirical Findings from Experimental Philosophy
● Machery et al.: Kripke’s Gödel case doesn’t reliably evoke the same intuitive
responses as Kripke presumes in his arguments against descriptivism
○ The intuitions that Kripke relies on to refute descriptivism are not uniform across and within
cultures
78. Empirical Findings from Experimental Philosophy
● Machery et al.: Kripke’s Gödel case doesn’t reliably evoke the same intuitive
responses as Kripke presumes in his arguments against descriptivism
○ The intuitions that Kripke relies on to refute descriptivism are not uniform across and within
cultures
○ Referential uniformity is threatened by the findings
79. Empirical Findings from Experimental Philosophy
● Machery et al.: Kripke’s Gödel case doesn’t reliably evoke the same intuitive
responses as Kripke presumes in his arguments against descriptivism
○ The intuitions that Kripke relies on to refute descriptivism are not uniform across and within
cultures
○ Referential uniformity is threatened by the findings
■ Some terms such as proper names and natural kind terms do not appear to be
definitively rigid
80. Empirical Findings from Experimental Philosophy
● Machery et al.: Kripke’s Gödel case doesn’t reliably evoke the same intuitive
responses as Kripke presumes in his arguments against descriptivism
○ The intuitions that Kripke relies on to refute descriptivism are not uniform across and within
cultures
○ Referential uniformity is threatened by the findings
■ Some terms such as proper names and natural kind terms do not appear to be
definitively rigid
● Intuitions cannot be relied upon to decide between descriptivism and
causalism-historicalism
81. Empirical Findings from Experimental Philosophy
● Machery et al.: Kripke’s Gödel case doesn’t reliably evoke the same intuitive
responses as Kripke presumes in his arguments against descriptivism
○ The intuitions that Kripke relies on to refute descriptivism are not uniform across and within
cultures
○ Referential uniformity is threatened by the findings
■ Some terms such as proper names and natural kind terms do not appear to be
definitively rigid
● Intuitions cannot be relied upon to decide between descriptivism and
causalism-historicalism
○ particular intuitions based on method of cases are not robust foundations for a theory of
reference
82.
83.
84. ‘Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style’
(I) Philosophical views about reference 'are assessed by consulting one's
intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations' (p. B1).
85. ‘Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style’
(I) Philosophical views about reference 'are assessed by consulting one's
intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations' (p. B1).
(II) Those particular cases are 'central' to Kripke's refutation (p. B1).
86. ‘Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style’
(I) Philosophical views about reference 'are assessed by consulting one's
intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations' (p. B1).
(II) Those particular cases are 'central' to Kripke's refutation (p. B1).
(III) These results [from the study of people's intuitions] raise serious doubts about
Kripke's refutation, which relies solely on the intuitions of Westerners
87. ‘Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style’
(I) Philosophical views about reference 'are assessed by consulting one's
intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations' (p. B1).
(II) Those particular cases are 'central' to Kripke's refutation (p. B1).
(III) These results [from the study of people's intuitions] raise serious doubts about
Kripke's refutation, which relies solely on the intuitions of Westerners
(IV) The fact of these cultural differences 'raises questions about the nature of the
philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference' (p. B1); it points to
'significant philosophical conclusions' (p. B8).
(Devitt, 2010)
91. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Kripke’s Gödel case did not evoke the same intuitions uniformly
○ Majority of westerners had causal-historical intuitions while majority of East-Asians had
descriptivist intuitions
92. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Kripke’s Gödel case did not evoke the same intuitions uniformly
○ Majority of westerners had causal-historical intuitions while majority of East-Asians had
descriptivist intuitions
■ Large minority of either group had atypical intuitions
93. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Kripke’s Gödel case did not evoke the same intuitions uniformly
○ Majority of westerners had causal-historical intuitions while majority of East-Asians had
descriptivist intuitions
■ Large minority of either group had atypical intuitions
○ Kripke’s refutation of descriptivism is based on faulty assumptions about intuitions
94. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Kripke’s Gödel case did not evoke the same intuitions uniformly
○ Majority of westerners had causal-historical intuitions while majority of East-Asians had
descriptivist intuitions
■ Large minority of either group had atypical intuitions
○ Kripke’s refutation of descriptivism is based on faulty assumptions about intuitions
● The situation can be defused by accepting a pluralism about referential
intuitions
95. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Kripke’s Gödel case did not evoke the same intuitions uniformly
○ Majority of westerners had causal-historical intuitions while majority of East-Asians had
descriptivist intuitions
■ Large minority of either group had atypical intuitions
○ Kripke’s refutation of descriptivism is based on faulty assumptions about intuitions
● The situation can be defused by accepting a pluralism about referential
intuitions
○ 'Alternatively, one could hold that words do not refer and that it is thus a mistake to attempt to
develop theories of reference' (Machery, 2011; Mallon et al., 2009)
97. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely
98. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely
○ Therefore, no arguments from reference either
99. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely
○ Therefore, no arguments from reference either
○ 'Arguments from reference begin with a theory of reference that is independently motivated,
and proceed to philosophically significant conclusions'
100. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely
○ Therefore, no arguments from reference either
○ 'Arguments from reference begin with a theory of reference that is independently motivated,
and proceed to philosophically significant conclusions'
■ Intuitions are the dominant independent motivator for a theory of reference in philosophy
101. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely
○ Therefore, no arguments from reference either
○ 'Arguments from reference begin with a theory of reference that is independently motivated,
and proceed to philosophically significant conclusions'
■ Intuitions are the dominant independent motivator for a theory of reference in philosophy
● This means the method of cases
102. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely
○ Therefore, no arguments from reference either
○ 'Arguments from reference begin with a theory of reference that is independently motivated,
and proceed to philosophically significant conclusions'
■ Intuitions are the dominant independent motivator for a theory of reference in philosophy
● This means the method of cases
■ But what alternatives do philosophers of language have?
103. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely
○ Therefore, no arguments from reference either
○ 'Arguments from reference begin with a theory of reference that is independently motivated,
and proceed to philosophically significant conclusions'
■ Intuitions are the dominant independent motivator for a theory of reference in philosophy
● This means the method of cases
■ But what alternatives do philosophers of language have?
● Linguistics, most likely
105. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Referential pluralism leads to referential relativism
○ Intuition groups
106. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Referential pluralism leads to referential relativism
○ Intuition groups
■ Assuming universally acceptable intuitions is equivalent to assuming the existence of
only one intuition group
107. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Referential pluralism leads to referential relativism
○ Intuition groups
■ Assuming universally acceptable intuitions is equivalent to assuming the existence of
only one intuition group
● The empirical findings from experimental philosophers suggest otherwise
108. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Referential pluralism leads to referential relativism
○ Intuition groups
■ Assuming universally acceptable intuitions is equivalent to assuming the existence of
only one intuition group
● The empirical findings from experimental philosophers suggest otherwise
○ 'The pluralist method of cases: The correct theory of reference for a class of terms T employed
by members of intuition group G is the theory which is best supported by the intuitions that
competent members of G have about the reference of members of T across actual and
possible cases.
109. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Referential pluralism leads to referential relativism
○ Intuition groups
■ Assuming universally acceptable intuitions is equivalent to assuming the existence of
only one intuition group
● The empirical findings from experimental philosophers suggest otherwise
○ 'The pluralist method of cases: The correct theory of reference for a class of terms T employed
by members of intuition group G is the theory which is best supported by the intuitions that
competent members of G have about the reference of members of T across actual and
possible cases.
■ seems like a plausible and neat solution that saves both arguments from reference and
methods of cases by giving up referential uniformity
110. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Referential pluralism leads to referential relativism
○ Intuition groups
■ Assuming universally acceptable intuitions is equivalent to assuming the existence of
only one intuition group
● The empirical findings from experimental philosophers suggest otherwise
○ 'The pluralist method of cases: The correct theory of reference for a class of terms T employed
by members of intuition group G is the theory which is best supported by the intuitions that
competent members of G have about the reference of members of T across actual and
possible cases.
■ seems like a plausible and neat solution that saves both arguments from reference and
methods of cases by giving up referential uniformity
112. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ A descriptivist saying 'beliefs do not exist' VS a causalist-historicalist saying 'beliefs exist': no
contradictions
113. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ A descriptivist saying 'beliefs do not exist' VS a causalist-historicalist saying 'beliefs exist': no
contradictions
■ genuine agreement or disagreement is only possible when the individuals in question
belong to the same intuition group
114. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ A descriptivist saying 'beliefs do not exist' VS a causalist-historicalist saying 'beliefs exist': no
contradictions
■ Genuine agreement or disagreement is only possible when the individuals in question
belong to the same intuition group
● But how can this be verified?
115. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ A descriptivist saying 'beliefs do not exist' VS a causalist-historicalist saying 'beliefs exist': no
contradictions
■ Genuine agreement or disagreement is only possible when the individuals in question
belong to the same intuition group
● But how can this be verified?
● It would seem that it's impossible to know for certain whether there are
disagreements or agreements
116. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ A descriptivist saying 'beliefs do not exist' VS a causalist-historicalist saying 'beliefs exist': no
contradictions
■ Genuine agreement or disagreement is only possible when the individuals in question
belong to the same intuition group
● But how can this be verified?
● It would seem that it's impossible to know for certain whether there are
disagreements or agreements
■ Ubiquity of Variation: such variation of intuitions is widespread and unpredictable
118. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Auxiliary Assumptions
■ For example, causal-historical theorists must decide exactly what individual or thing is
picked out by the historical introduction of a term, and whether any ‘‘switching’’ to
another individual or thing has occurred along the way (Evans 1973).
119. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Auxiliary Assumptions
■ For example, causal-historical theorists must decide exactly what individual or thing is
picked out by the historical introduction of a term, and whether any ‘‘switching’’ to
another individual or thing has occurred along the way (Evans 1973).
■ And descriptivists must decide on what the reference-fixing description is, and how
closely a thing must satisfy it in order to qualify as a referent.
120. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Auxiliary Assumptions
■ For example, causal-historical theorists must decide exactly what individual or thing is
picked out by the historical introduction of a term, and whether any ‘‘switching’’ to
another individual or thing has occurred along the way (Evans 1973).
■ And descriptivists must decide on what the reference-fixing description is, and how
closely a thing must satisfy it in order to qualify as a referent. (Mallon et al., 2009)
■ both examples show intuitive assumptions being used to support theories of intuition
about reference
122. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Limpidity Assumption
■ The referential pluralist would presumably demand philosophers clarify their positions
through numerous cases
123. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Limpidity Assumption
■ The referential pluralist would presumably demand philosophers clarify their positions
through numerous cases
■ The referential pluralist would presumably assume that such self-identification reliably
demonstrates the actual intuitions of the philosophers
124. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Limpidity Assumption
■ The referential pluralist would presumably demand philosophers clarify their positions
through numerous cases
■ The referential pluralist would presumably assume that such self-identification reliably
demonstrates the actual intuitions of the philosophers
■ The fact that philosophers seem to exhibit demographic variation of intuition group
membership without necessarily making their membership explicit seems to suggest that
this is unlikely
125. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Limpidity Assumption
■ The referential pluralist would presumably demand philosophers clarify their positions
through numerous cases
■ The referential pluralist would presumably assume that such self-identification reliably
demonstrates the actual intuitions of the philosophers
■ The fact that philosophers seem to exhibit demographic variation of intuition group
membership without necessarily making their membership explicit seems to suggest that
this is unlikely
● The fact that philosophers guard their own intuitions and attempt to convince
others is an active denial of the limpidity assumption
126. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● We ought to give up reference altogether in order to avoid the consequences
of referential relativism
127. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● We ought to give up reference altogether in order to avoid the consequences
of referential relativism
○ What’s left?
128. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● We ought to give up reference altogether in order to avoid the consequences
of referential relativism
○ What’s left?
○ Might the repugnant consequences of referential pluralism just a reflection of the absurdity of
communication and meaning?
129. Articles reviewed
Papineau (1996) - Doubtful Intuition
Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich (2009) - Against
Arguments from Reference
Michael Devitt (2011) - Experimental Semantics
Edouard Machery (2011) - Variations in Intuitions about Reference and
Ontological Disagreements
130. Final Thoughts
‘Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a
completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly
and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory
limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or
characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.’
(Chomsky, 1965)
131. Final Thoughts
‘Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a
completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly
and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory
limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or
characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.’
(Chomsky, 1965)
'A theory that diverges totally from everyday thinking in its ascriptions of content
could scarcely be said to be a theory about everyday psychological states'
(Papineau, 1996)
Editor's Notes
- move through block quotes in pieces. Weaker form should be its own slide
- highlight key words to emphasise
- examples should be depicted (get cartoons or something and fragment them across slides)
-
- move through block quotes in pieces. Weaker form should be its own slide
- highlight key words to emphasise
- examples should be depicted (get cartoons or something and fragment them across slides)
-
- what does the quote even refer to?
-
- worth noting as an aside that Chomsky himself has reformulated from grounding principles [whatever the right way to say it] has restated his fundamental theoretical views on language over several iterations
- worth noting as an aside that Chomsky himself has reformulated from grounding principles [whatever the right way to say it] has restated his fundamental theoretical views on language over several iterations
- worth noting as an aside that Chomsky himself has reformulated from grounding principles [whatever the right way to say it] has restated his fundamental theoretical views on language over several iterations