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    The motivations for security in cellular
    telecommunications systems are :
   To secure conversations
   Signaling data from interception
   To prevent cellular telephone fraud.
   The security and authentication mechanisms
    incorporated in GSM make it the most secure mobile
    communication standard currently available,
    particularly in comparison to the analog systems.
   To intercept and reconstruct this signal would require
    more highly specialized and expensive equipment to
    perform the reception, synchronization, and decoding
    of the signal.
   GSM (group special mobile or general system for
    mobile communications) is the Pan-European
    standard for digital cellular communications.
   The Group Special Mobile was established in 1982
    within the European Conference of Post and
    Telecommunication Administrations (CEPT).
   In 1991 the first GSM based networks commenced
    operations.
    GSM provides enhanced features over older
    analog-based systems, which are summarized
    below:
   Total Mobility: The subscriber has the
    advantage of a Pan-European system allowing
    him to communicate from everywhere and to
    be called in any area served by a GSM cellular
    network using the same assigned telephone
    number, even outside his home location. The
    calling party does not need to be informed
    about the called person's location because the
    GSM networks are responsible for the location
    tasks. This mobility feature is preferred by
    many business people who constantly need to
    be in touch with their headquarters.
   High Capacity and Optimal Spectrum Allocation:
    The former analog-based cellular networks had to
    combat capacity problems, particularly in
    metropolitan areas. Through a more efficient
    utilization of the assigned frequency bandwidth
    and smaller cell sizes, the GSM System is capable
    of serving a greater number of subscribers. The
    optimal use of the available spectrum is achieved
    through the application Frequency Division
    Multiple Access (FDMA),Time Division Multiple
    Access (TDMA), efficient half-rate and full-rate
    speech coding, and the Gaussian Minimum Shift
    Keying (GMSK) modulation scheme.
   Security: The security methods standardized for
    the GSM System make it the most secure cellular
    telecommunications standard currently available.
    Although the confidentiality of a call and
    anonymity of the GSM subscriber is only
    guaranteed on the radio channel, this is a major
    step in achieving end-to- end security. The
    subscriber’s anonymity is ensured through the use
    of temporary identification numbers. The
    confidentiality of the communication itself on the
    radio link is performed by the application of
    encryption algorithms and frequency hopping
    which could only be realized using digital systems
    and signaling.
   Services: The list of services available to GSM
    subscribers typically includes the following:
•   Voice communication
•   Voice mail
•   Short message transmission
•   Data transmission
•   Supplemental services such as call forwarding.
GSM Network consists of:
 The Mobile Station(MS)

 The Base Station Subsystem (BSS)

 The Network Switching Subsystem (NSS)

 The Operation and Maintenance Centre(OMC)
Mobile Stations   Base Station            Network     Subscriber and terminal
                   Subsystem             Management    equipment databases

                                            OMC
                  BTS
                                       Exchange
                                        System
                                                           VLR
                  BTS            BSC        MSC
                                                           HLR       AUC

                  BTS                                      EIR

 9
   The security mechanisms of GSM are
    implemented in three different system
    elements:
    The Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)
    The GSM handset
    The GSM network.
   SIM: The SIM contains the IMSI, the individual
    subscriber authentication key (Ki), the
    ciphering key generating algorithm (A8), the
    authentication algorithm (A3), as well as a
    Personal Identification Number(PIN).
   GSM handset: The GSM handset contains the
    ciphering algorithm (A5).
   The GSM network: The encryption algorithms
    (A3,A5, A8) are present in the GSM network
Mobile Station            Radio Link                  GSM Operator

                              Challenge RAND
SIM
     Ki                                                                    Ki
                 A3                                            A3
                           Signed response (SRES)
          SRES                                                     SRES

                 A8             Authentication: are SRES       A8
                                     values equal?
          Fn          Kc                                      Kc     Fn

     mi                       Encrypted Data                              mi
                 A5                                            A5



12
   GSM networks utilize encryption for three
    purposes:
   Authentication
   Encryption
   Key generation
   The GSM network authenticates the identity of the subscriber
    through the use of a challenge-response mechanism. A 128-bit
    random number (RAND) is sent to the MS. The MS computes the
    32-bit signed response (SRES) based on the encryption of the
    random number (RAND) with the authentication algorithm (A3)
    using the individual subscriber authentication key (Ki). Upon
    receiving the signed response (SRES) from the subscriber, the
    GSM network repeats the calculation to verify the identity of the
    subscriber. Note that the individual subscriber authentication key
    (Ki) is never transmitted over the radio channel. It is present in the
    subscriber's SIM, as well as the AUC, HLR, and VLR databases as
    previously described. If the received SRES agrees with the
    calculated value, the MS has been successfully authenticated and
    may continue. If the values do not match, the connection is
    terminated and an authentication failure indicated to the MS.
•   A5 is a stream cipher consisting of three clock-
    controlled LFSRs of degree 19, 22, and 23.
•   The clock control is a threshold function of the middle
    bits of each of the three shift registers.
•   The sum of the degrees of the three shift registers is 64.
    The 64-bit session key is used to initialize the contents
    of the shift registers.
•   The 22-bit TDMA frame number is fed into the shift
    registers.
•   Two 114-bit keystreams are produced for each TDMA
    frame, which are XOR-ed with the uplink and
    downlink traffic channels.
•   It is rumored that the A5 algorithm has an "effective"
    key length of 40 bits.
   This section focuses on key length as a figure of
    merit of an encryption algorithm. Assuming a
    brute-force search of every possible key is the
    most efficient method of cracking an encrypted
    message (a big assumption), Table 1 shown
    below summarizes how long it would take to
    decrypt a message with a given key length,
    assuming a cracking machine capable of one
    million encryptions per second.
Brute-force
key search
times for
various
key sizes
Key length    32      40     56      64        128
in bits
Time          1.19    12.7   2,291   584,542   10.8 x
required to   hours   days   years   years     10^24
test all                                       years
possible
keys
   A machine capable of testing one million keys per
    second is possible by today’s standards. In considering
    the strength of an encryption algorithm, the value of
    the information being protected should be taken into
    account. It is generally accepted that DES with its 56-bit
    key will have reached the end of its useful lifetime by
    the turn of the century for protecting data such as
    banking transactions. Assuming that the A5 algorithm
    has an effective key length of 40 bits (instead of 64), it
    currently provides adequate protection for information
    with a short lifetime. A common observation is that the
    "tactical lifetime" of cellular telephone conversations is
    on the order of weeks.
Number of
machines
required to
search a key
space in a given
time


Key length in bits 1 day       1 week      1 year
40                 13          2           -
56                 836,788     119,132     2,291
64                 2.14x10^8   3.04x10^6   584,542
128                3.9x10^27   5.6x10^26   10.8x10^24
   The security mechanisms specified in the GSM
    standard make it the most secure cellular
    telecommunications system available. The use of
    authentication, encryption, and temporary
    identification numbers ensures the privacy and
    anonymity of the system's users, as well as
    safeguarding the system against fraudulent use.
    Even GSM systems with the A5/2 encryption
    algorithm, or even with no encryption are
    inherently more secure than analog systems due to
    their use of speech coding, digital modulation, and
    TDMA channel access.

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Gsm security and encryption

  • 1.
  • 2. The motivations for security in cellular telecommunications systems are :  To secure conversations  Signaling data from interception  To prevent cellular telephone fraud.  The security and authentication mechanisms incorporated in GSM make it the most secure mobile communication standard currently available, particularly in comparison to the analog systems.  To intercept and reconstruct this signal would require more highly specialized and expensive equipment to perform the reception, synchronization, and decoding of the signal.
  • 3. GSM (group special mobile or general system for mobile communications) is the Pan-European standard for digital cellular communications.  The Group Special Mobile was established in 1982 within the European Conference of Post and Telecommunication Administrations (CEPT).  In 1991 the first GSM based networks commenced operations.  GSM provides enhanced features over older analog-based systems, which are summarized below:
  • 4. Total Mobility: The subscriber has the advantage of a Pan-European system allowing him to communicate from everywhere and to be called in any area served by a GSM cellular network using the same assigned telephone number, even outside his home location. The calling party does not need to be informed about the called person's location because the GSM networks are responsible for the location tasks. This mobility feature is preferred by many business people who constantly need to be in touch with their headquarters.
  • 5. High Capacity and Optimal Spectrum Allocation: The former analog-based cellular networks had to combat capacity problems, particularly in metropolitan areas. Through a more efficient utilization of the assigned frequency bandwidth and smaller cell sizes, the GSM System is capable of serving a greater number of subscribers. The optimal use of the available spectrum is achieved through the application Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA),Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), efficient half-rate and full-rate speech coding, and the Gaussian Minimum Shift Keying (GMSK) modulation scheme.
  • 6. Security: The security methods standardized for the GSM System make it the most secure cellular telecommunications standard currently available. Although the confidentiality of a call and anonymity of the GSM subscriber is only guaranteed on the radio channel, this is a major step in achieving end-to- end security. The subscriber’s anonymity is ensured through the use of temporary identification numbers. The confidentiality of the communication itself on the radio link is performed by the application of encryption algorithms and frequency hopping which could only be realized using digital systems and signaling.
  • 7. Services: The list of services available to GSM subscribers typically includes the following: • Voice communication • Voice mail • Short message transmission • Data transmission • Supplemental services such as call forwarding.
  • 8. GSM Network consists of:  The Mobile Station(MS)  The Base Station Subsystem (BSS)  The Network Switching Subsystem (NSS)  The Operation and Maintenance Centre(OMC)
  • 9. Mobile Stations Base Station Network Subscriber and terminal Subsystem Management equipment databases OMC BTS Exchange System VLR BTS BSC MSC HLR AUC BTS EIR 9
  • 10. The security mechanisms of GSM are implemented in three different system elements:  The Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)  The GSM handset  The GSM network.
  • 11. SIM: The SIM contains the IMSI, the individual subscriber authentication key (Ki), the ciphering key generating algorithm (A8), the authentication algorithm (A3), as well as a Personal Identification Number(PIN).  GSM handset: The GSM handset contains the ciphering algorithm (A5).  The GSM network: The encryption algorithms (A3,A5, A8) are present in the GSM network
  • 12. Mobile Station Radio Link GSM Operator Challenge RAND SIM Ki Ki A3 A3 Signed response (SRES) SRES SRES A8 Authentication: are SRES A8 values equal? Fn Kc Kc Fn mi Encrypted Data mi A5 A5 12
  • 13. GSM networks utilize encryption for three purposes:  Authentication  Encryption  Key generation
  • 14. The GSM network authenticates the identity of the subscriber through the use of a challenge-response mechanism. A 128-bit random number (RAND) is sent to the MS. The MS computes the 32-bit signed response (SRES) based on the encryption of the random number (RAND) with the authentication algorithm (A3) using the individual subscriber authentication key (Ki). Upon receiving the signed response (SRES) from the subscriber, the GSM network repeats the calculation to verify the identity of the subscriber. Note that the individual subscriber authentication key (Ki) is never transmitted over the radio channel. It is present in the subscriber's SIM, as well as the AUC, HLR, and VLR databases as previously described. If the received SRES agrees with the calculated value, the MS has been successfully authenticated and may continue. If the values do not match, the connection is terminated and an authentication failure indicated to the MS.
  • 15. A5 is a stream cipher consisting of three clock- controlled LFSRs of degree 19, 22, and 23. • The clock control is a threshold function of the middle bits of each of the three shift registers. • The sum of the degrees of the three shift registers is 64. The 64-bit session key is used to initialize the contents of the shift registers. • The 22-bit TDMA frame number is fed into the shift registers. • Two 114-bit keystreams are produced for each TDMA frame, which are XOR-ed with the uplink and downlink traffic channels. • It is rumored that the A5 algorithm has an "effective" key length of 40 bits.
  • 16. This section focuses on key length as a figure of merit of an encryption algorithm. Assuming a brute-force search of every possible key is the most efficient method of cracking an encrypted message (a big assumption), Table 1 shown below summarizes how long it would take to decrypt a message with a given key length, assuming a cracking machine capable of one million encryptions per second.
  • 17. Brute-force key search times for various key sizes Key length 32 40 56 64 128 in bits Time 1.19 12.7 2,291 584,542 10.8 x required to hours days years years 10^24 test all years possible keys
  • 18. A machine capable of testing one million keys per second is possible by today’s standards. In considering the strength of an encryption algorithm, the value of the information being protected should be taken into account. It is generally accepted that DES with its 56-bit key will have reached the end of its useful lifetime by the turn of the century for protecting data such as banking transactions. Assuming that the A5 algorithm has an effective key length of 40 bits (instead of 64), it currently provides adequate protection for information with a short lifetime. A common observation is that the "tactical lifetime" of cellular telephone conversations is on the order of weeks.
  • 19. Number of machines required to search a key space in a given time Key length in bits 1 day 1 week 1 year 40 13 2 - 56 836,788 119,132 2,291 64 2.14x10^8 3.04x10^6 584,542 128 3.9x10^27 5.6x10^26 10.8x10^24
  • 20. The security mechanisms specified in the GSM standard make it the most secure cellular telecommunications system available. The use of authentication, encryption, and temporary identification numbers ensures the privacy and anonymity of the system's users, as well as safeguarding the system against fraudulent use. Even GSM systems with the A5/2 encryption algorithm, or even with no encryption are inherently more secure than analog systems due to their use of speech coding, digital modulation, and TDMA channel access.