Combating Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Corruption Perceptions of Public Administration University Students in Eritrea

Combating Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Corruption Perceptions of Public Administration University Students in Eritrea
Combating Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Corruption
Perceptions of Public Administration University Students in
Eritrea
Dr. Yemane Desta
Department of Public Administration, College of Business and Social Sciences, University of Asmara, P.O.BOX 1220
Asmara, Eritrea
E-mail: mosazgiy@yahoo.com, yemane008@gmail.com; Tel: 291-1-7645753
This article presents an analysis of data from a corruption perception survey administered to 90
Public Administration University of Asmara students in the month of June 2018. Respondents
were asked for their opinions regarding the pervasiveness, causes, and potential remedies for
corruption in Eritrea. The majority of the surveyed university students believe corruption in Eritrea
is a serious problem that needs to be addressed by its leaders. The findings clearly indicate that
the respondents believe the primary drivers of corruption in the Eritrean public sector include
lack of adequate public sector pay, lack of meritocratic personnel policies, the self-serving
behavior of public officials and lack of accountable/transparent political process. An
overwhelming majority of the respondents recommended the urgent design and implementation
of anti-corruption initiatives in Eritrea focusing on civil service reforms (improved public sector
pay, heavy penalties and meritocratic personnel policies), accountability reforms (anti-corruption
commission, anti-corruption legislation and the Auditor-General office) and political reforms
(respect for rule of law, visible leadership commitment and legislative oversight).
Keywords: anti-corruption, corruption, corruption perception, Sub-Saharan Africa, transparency, university students
INTRODUCTION
The term ‘Corruption’ originates from the Latin word–
corrumpere, which means ‘bribe, mar or destroy’ Much
evidence suggests that it has been around the world from
time immemorial, and, in recent times, it has occupied a
front seat in global discussions (Bechem, 2018).
Corruption, broadly defined as the abuse of public office
for private gain by the World- Bank, has been
acknowledged as a universal problem. Cited in (Genemo
(2014) Faniel (2009) asserts that corruption, the worst
social evil on earth, has, no doubt, become a major global
threat to the stability and security of societies and the
flourishing of values of democracy, expansion of ethical
values, and enhancing sustainable development. Iyada
(2012) observes that corruption is a universal problem,
which is not a restricted preserve to any nation race or
section but rather transcends states’ borders and
symbolizes a universal phenomenon. While several
instances of corruption have been witnessed in the
developing countries, corruption seems to be an inherent
feature of all societies including those of the developed
world (Iyada, 2012).
Quoted by Thompson (2013) in his foreword to the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003,
the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that:
Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide
range of corrosive effects on societies. It
undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads
to violations of human rights, distorts markets,
erodes the quality of human life, and allows
organized crime, terrorism and other threats to
human security to flourish. This evil phenomenon
is found in all countries – big and small, rich and
poor – but it is in the developing world that its
effects are most destructive.
Research Article
Vol. 4(2), pp. 031-044, September, 2019. © www.premierpublishers.org. ISSN: 0615-3011
International Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research

Desta Y. 032
Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by
diverting funds intended for development,
undermining a Government’s ability to provide
basic services, feeding inequality and injustice
and discouraging foreign aid and investment.
Corruption is a key element in economic
underperformance and a major obstacle to
poverty alleviation and development.
When examining the nature of corruption, it is important to
note that there are three theoretical explanations -
personalistic, institutional and systemic are used to put the
study of corruption in perspective. Personalistic or
individual explanations associate corruption with
individuals, who provided with enough opportunities, will
act corruptly and as such the phenomenon of corruption is
reduced to personalities. (Osei-Hwedie & Osei-Hwedie,
2000). According Institutional explanations, on the other
hand, regard corruption as deep-seated consequence of
loopholes, hidden dynamics, or unintended side effects
inherent in a country’s institutions and laws, rather than
merely the wrong doings of few bad individuals. (Kupedeh,
1995; Johnston, 2000). Lastly, Systemic explanations,
originating in the interaction between government and the
public, are the most comprehensive explanation as
corruption is regarded as a form of influence within the
political system, rather than the failing of individuals and
institutions. (Kupendeh, 1995). The systemic explanation
includes economic, social, political and administrative
factors that contribute to the emergence and growth of
corruption in a given setting. For the purpose this study
the conceptual framework centered on systemic
explanations was used to bear on the analysis of
corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa in general an in Eritrea in
particular. Recognizing corruption is complex
phenomenon having multiple causes, this article utilized a
holistic approach to examine the sum total of the
institutions and practices within a given country that
address aspects of maintaining the honesty and integrity
of government and private sector institutions.
Because of the limited previous research on corruption in
sub-Saharan Africa countries and the likelihood of the
differences among these countries, there is a need for
conducting studies of corruption at the country-level in
order to fully account for unique contextual factors.
Accordingly, this study started by reviewing the overall
corruption levels and the range of ant-corruption strategies
available for preventing and combating corruption in the
context of Sub-Saharan Africa. Then, data was analyzed
and presented by canvasing the opinions of 90 graduating
public administration University of Asmara students
regarding the extent, causes and possible cures of
corruption in Eritrea drawing on close-ended questionnaire
survey.
The findings of the indicate the majority of the respondents
regarded corruption as a serious problem in Eritrea
requiring the urgent attention of its leaders. A significant
majority of the respondents considered corruption in
Eritrea to be primarily driven by lack of adequate public
sector, pay, lack of meritocratic personnel policies, the
self-serving behavior of public officials and lack of
accountable/transparent political process. Moreover, the
surveyed University of Asmara students indicated strong
preference for civil service reforms (improved public sector
pay, heavy penalties and meritocratic personnel policies),
accountability reforms (anticorruption commission,
anticorruption legislation and the Auditor-General office)
and political reforms (respect for rule of law, visible
leadership and legislative oversight) to prevent emergence
of corruption at a grand scale in the country. Thus, the
study was designed to serve as diagnostic tool for
identifying and hopefully designing and implementing anti-
corruption measures that fit the specific environment of the
newly independent state of Eritrea. The survey evidence
gathered from prospective public administration university
students (destined to become the future public servants in
the government of Eritrea) was used as basis for
recommendations and further debate.
PURPOSE OF STUDY
This research upon which this article is based was
undertaken to achieve the following objectives:
• To explore the nature of corruption in Sub-Saharan in
Africa and the alternative anti-corruption reforms
available to fight corrupt practices in the region
• To assess the perception of Eritrean public
administration students regarding the extent or
pervasiveness of corruption in Eritrea
• To discover the views of Eritrean public administration
students on the main causes of corruption in Eritrea
• To discover the views of Eritrean public administration
students on the potential remedies for corruption in
Eritrea
• To identify anti-corruption reform priorities among
alternatives derived from anti-corruption theory as well
as local realities
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research methodology relied on research questions
aimed at gauging Eritrean public administration students’
perceptions about the extent, causes and anti-corruption
reform priorities of corruption in the context of Eritrea. They
were as follows:
1. What is the prevalence of corruption in Eritrea as
perceived by Eritrean public administration students?
2. What are the causes of corruption in Eritrea as
perceived by Eritrean public administration students?
3. What are the perceptions of Eritrean public
administration students regarding anti-corruption
strategies that can be effective in curbing corruption in
Eritrea?

Int. J. Public Admin. and Pol. Res. 033
4. What are the initiatives and concrete steps that need
to be taken on lesser and greater scales in Eritrea as
part of a sweeping public sector reforms according to
Eritrean public administration students?
5. What are the implications of the findings for Eritrea for
Sub-Saharan Africa in general?
Significance of the Study
Conducting survey research aimed at gauging the
perceptions of citizens, business people and public
officials regarding corruption in a country is important, not
only to contribute to understanding corruption, but to
reveal valuable insights to guide strategies and policy
frameworks to mitigate corruption (Kaluya and Elliot,
2018). Therefore, the primary purpose of the study was
to examine the perceptions of university students
regarding the pervasiveness, causes and remedies of
corruption in Eritrea. From the theoretical perspective the
study’s significance is two-fold: first, it makes a timely
contribution to the knowledge we have about corruption
and the ways of preventing/fighting corruption in
developing Sub-Saharan Africa with view of drawing
valuable lessons for the newly independent African
country of Eritrea. Second, the study provides an
important perspective from Eritrea that can be used in a
cross-country study of corruption that would be undertaken
in the near future. From the practical perspective the
study’s significance rests on its contribution to efforts
aimed at designing and implementing the relevant reforms
in the Eritrean public sector in the fight against corruption
in the country. Our knowledge about corruption in Eritrea
so far has been largely anecdotal. This empirical study of
corruption in Eritrea offers evidence for proposing concrete
policies that can be taken by Eritrean leaders to address
the problem of corruption.
Limitations of the Study
The limitations of the study are centered on two grounds.
First, the respondents were young university students
being trained for entry level government positions. Hence,
their experience with actual acts of corruption might be
minimum. There is greater likelihood their perceptions
regarding corruption in terms of its forms, pervasiveness
and causes might be impacted by the experiences of other
older people (family members, neighbors, friends and
classmates) in their surroundings. Second, the full picture
of corruption in a country can be presented only when the
surveys embrace the perceptions of business people, the
general public, public officials and country analysts. This
empirical study undertaken drawing on the perceptions of
university students is only a positive step in assessing the
state of corruption in Eritrea.
Portrait of Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa
The most widely used definition of corruption is provided
by the World Bank. Corruption is defined as corruption
“as the abuse of power for private gain” (World Bank,
1997a). The definition covers various forms of interaction
between public sector officials and other agents.
Sometimes, money is involved, such as in bribery or
kickbacks for public procurement contracts. In other cases,
private gain can be non-monetary, as in cases of
patronage or nepotism. (Kolstad et al, 2008). Corruption
is a problem for all countries; however, Africa is regarded
as least able to bear the heavy costs in view of the
continent’s debilitating poverty (Olowu,1999). The attempt
by Sub-Saharan countries to break the cycle of
underdevelopment has subverted by the high levels of
corruption in the region. (Nathniel, 2014). Sub-Saharan
Africa is very rich in resources but the sub-continent has
paradoxically remained the poorest due to unstable,
corrupt governments and dishonest leaders. (Kimaro,
2014). Nathniel (2014) asserts that Africa is rich in natural
resources, however the proceeds from the sales of these
natural resources to other countries are mismanaged by
African leaders through corrupt process citing for instance
that Nigerian leaders had stolen more than 400 Billion US
dollars from oil revenue alone between in the country’s
independence in October of 1960 and 2006. According to
one official of the Word Bank corruption has been dubbed
as the “Aids of democracy” for developing countries
including the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Empirical research to measure corruption is quite a new
undertaking that only began in earnest in 1993 with the
establishment of Transparency International, a civil society
organization dedicated to curbing both national and
international corruption and the widespread application of
corruption indices developed by Transparency
International (TI).The Corruption Perception Index (CPI),
which was introduced in 1995 by Transparency
International, is a composite index, drawing on 16 surveys
from 8 independent institutions. The surveys embrace the
perceptions of business people, the general public and
country analysts. The CPI ranks countries in terms of the
degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among
politicians and bureaucrats. The Berlin-based
Transparency International annually develops the global
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) based on a score of
zero to 100 (zero being highly “corrupt” and 100 being
highly “clean”). The 2018 CPI depicts a disturbing picture
about the pervasiveness of corruption in the world and
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.
• Two out of three countries score less than 50 out of a
clean score of 100 in the CPI 2018, which reflects
perceived level of corruption among politicians and
public officials in 120 countries.
• Five out of ten developing countries scored less than
30 out of 100, indicating a high level of corruption
• Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest scoring region on the
index with average score 32 out of a clean score of
100
• Only eight out of forty-nine countries in the Sub-
Saharan Africa region scored above the global
average score of 43. Simply translated 88% of the

Desta Y. 034
Sub-Saharan African countries score below the global
average score of 43.
• Five out of the ten bottom scoring with highest
perceived corruption are found in Sub-Saharan Africa
Table 1: A partial profile of corruption around the world
(2018 rankings)
Least Corrupt (in
descending order)
Most Corrupt (in
descending order)
New Zealand Somalia
Denmark South Sudan
Norway Syria
Finland Afghanistan
Switzerland Yemen
Singapore Sudan
Sweden Libya
Canada Guinea Bissau
Luxemburg Equatorial Guinea
Netherlands North Korea
United Kingdom Venezuela
Germany Iraq
Source: (Transparency International, 2018).
Corruption is perceived to be pervasive Somalia, South
Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Guinea
Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, North Korea, Venezuela and
Iraq with a score of less than 20 in the current index.
(Transparency International, 2018). Denmark and New
Zealand top the index with 88 and 87 points respectively.
Somalia and South Sudan and Syria are at the bottom of
index, with 10, 13 and 13 points, respectively. The highest
scoring region is Western Europe, with an average score
of 66, while the lowest scoring region is Sub-Saharan
Africa with an average score of 32. Forty Sub-Saharan
African countries of the total forty-nine (that is more than
80% of countries) scored below the global average of 43.
However, all is not doom and gloom in the region as
Seychelles (score=66), Botswana (score=66), Cape Verde
(score=61), Ruanda (score=57), Namibia (score=53),
Mauritius (score=51), Sao Tome and Principe (score=46),
and Senegal (score=45) have registered above the global
average of 43. South Africa considered one of the
powerhouses in the region managed to score 43 the same
as the global average.
The brazen theft of the much-needed resources in Sub-
Saharan African countries is well-documented. According
to Ayitttey (2000) the massive amount of the region’s
resources looted by its unscrupulous heads of the state
are presented below:
Table 2: Looting of National Wealth in Sub-Saharan Africa
Name Country Fortune in
USD
General Sani Abacha (Late) Nigeria $20 billion
President H. Boigny (Late) Ivory Cost $6 billion
General Ibrahim Babangida Nigeria $5 billion
President Mobutu Sese Seko Zaire $ 4 billion
President Mousa Traore Mali $ 2 billion
President Henri Bedie Ivory Cost $300 million
President Dennis N’guesso Congo $200 million
President Omar Bongo (Late) Gabon $ 80 million
President Paul Biya Cameroon $70 million
President Haile Mariam
(Deposed)
Ethiopia $30 million
President Hissene Habre
(Late)
Chad $3 million
Source: Ayittey (2000).
Thus, a large number of Sub-Saharan Africa governments
have designed and implemented various anti-corruption
reforms in recognition of the pervasiveness and the
destructive consequences of corruption albeit with dismal
record of success. This article identified and discussed the
main anti-corruption reforms available in the fight against
corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa with the aim of prioritizing
those reforms that fit the country-specific conditions in
Eritrea.
Alternative Anti-Corruption Strategies
At the outset the study underlined that corruption has
various causes, manifestations, and consequently the
tools for combating corruption are also numerous.
Moreover, curbing corruption is exceedingly complex
because it is not practiced by trespassers and outsiders.
(Asea, 2018). Instead, it is often institutionalized within
government agencies that ensure that corrupt activities are
continued and reinforced. Individuals with good intentions
cannot easily revoke the system. (Asea, 2018).
Transparency International (2000) argues that there is no
one sure approach to preventing/combating corruption,
rather anti-corruption initiatives that are multi-pronged and
inclusive are needed. To address the problem of
corruption effectively a holistic approach is needed that
includes each of the institutions (pillars) from the
executive, legislative, and judiciary, to the private sector,
the media and civil society organizations, the various
institutional inter-relationships and the equilibrium of the
system as a whole. (World Bank, 1997b). The National
Integrity System (NIS) comprises the principle governance
institutions in a country that are responsible for the fight

against corruption. (Transparency International, 2000).
These institutions – or ‘pillars’ –comprise the executive,
legislature, judiciary, the public sector, the main public
watchdog institutions (e.g. supreme audit institution, law
enforcement agencies), as well as political parties, the
media, civil society and business as the primary social
forces which are active in the governance arena.
(Transparency International, 2000). Thus, this study
applied twenty-nine types of anticorruption reforms
grouped into four broad categories. The four categories of
anticorruption reforms are: Market/Economic Reforms,
Administrative/Bureaucratic Reforms, Accountability/
Transparency Enhancing Reforms, and Democratic
Accountability Enhancing Reforms. While not claiming
to present an exhaustive list of the tools for fighting
corruption, the article discussed the main strategies at the
heart of a credible, effective corruption fighting effort.
1. Economic/Market Reforms
These reforms involve economic liberalization designed to
promote a vibrant private sector and reduce public sector
waste. The principal aims economic/market reforms are to
attack the influence of powerful elites in the decisions and
policymaking of the state, the so-called “state capture” and
promote the creation of fair, competitive, honest and
transparent private sector. (World Bank, 2010). Under
economic/market reforms there are five approaches:
Program Elimination – By reducing or eliminating
government programs which present opportunities for
corruption and are a source of waste, corruption can be
minimized (USAID Handbook, 2002). Rose-Ackerman
(1997) points that the most obvious economic approach is
simply to eliminate government programs that are
permeated with corruption. If the state has no authority to
restrict export or license businesses, no one will pay bribes
in those areas. If a subsidy program is eliminated, the
bribes that accompanied it will disappear. If price controls
are lifted, market prices will express scarcity values, not
bribes. (Rose-Ackerman, 1997).
Privatization – Privatization of state-run enterprises and
services can curb corruption because private sector
accounting methods and competitive market pressures
reduce the opportunities for wrongdoing and make it more
difficult to hide. (Pope, 1999). By removing the
government from economic activities, privatization
eliminates opportunities for recurrent corrupt dealing in
employment, procurement, and financing contracts
(USAID Handbook, 2002). However, Pope (1999) argues
that the benefits of privatization must be weighed against
the possible adverse effects of privatization:
unemployment of civil servants and the risk of private
sector monopolies.
Deregulation - It offers a more straightforward means to
limit state authority by eliminating tariffs, quotas, exchange
rate controls, and permit requirements thereby stripping
officials of the power to extract bribes. Deregulation can
help reduce the discretionary power of politicians, but only
if this reform is undertaken in a transparent and non-
discriminatory way; otherwise we run the risk that the
deregulation reform process itself will be corrupted.
(Mollah & Uddin, 2002).
Tax Reforms – Mollah & Uddin (2002) point that
corruption in customs and tax administration lowers
government revenues, creates a distorted private sector
environment and is often is linked with smuggling and
organized crime. By simplifying and streamlining the tax
code of a country, corruption is minimized as the tax laws
become uncomplicated and predictable. The World Bank
(2010) argues that in most cases tax reforms that eliminate
multiple rates and exemptions and limit the discretionary
powers of tax officials help reduce corruption. However,
the World Bank warns that tax rates that exceed taxpayer’s
view as legitimate or what the tax office can administer
encourage the growth of the informal economy and
induce tax evasion and the corruption of tax officials.
Competitive Service Provision – Competition in public
service reduces opportunity for corruption by removing the
monopoly power of any on government office. In so doing,
it discourages extortion since customers can take their
business to a competing office when confronted with
irregular demands or service. (USAID Handbook, 2002).
Accordingly overlapping jurisdictions, in the case of motor
vehicle bureaus or passport agencies, or private and
public provision of service, in the case of mail delivery or
trash removal, are two ways of instituting competition in
public service.
2. Administrative/Bureaucratic Reforms
These reforms encompass civil service reforms designed
to enhance the performance of the government
bureaucracy. They include:
Codes of Ethics–Codes of ethics generally refer to rules
and regulations designed to achieve a type of public
servant who is vigilant, upright, honest and just. (Hope et
al., 2000). These rules and regulations governing ethical
behavior on the part of public servants are concerned with
prohibiting conflict of interest and self-dealing,
encouraging political and other forms of partiality, and
(increasingly) service to the community
Public Procurement Reform – Few activities create great
temptation or offer more opportunities than public
procurement where every level of government and every
kind of government organization purchase goods and
services, often in quantities and monetary amounts that
defy comprehension. (TI Source Book, 2000). Competitive
public procurement limits the authority of the government
officials thereby guarding against corruption. Competitive
procurement removes personal discretion from the
selection of government suppliers and contractors by
prescribing an open bidding process.

Desta Y. 036
Meritocratic Personnel Policy– A key part of
administrative reforms is the institution of meritocratic
system for appointment, promotion, and evaluation of civil
service personnel and when feasible, establish an
independent civil service oversight body. (Mollah & Uddin,
2002). Hiring decisions should be based on merit and
qualification, and senior positions should be awarded only
to candidates who have distinguished themselves and
possess the ability and expertise to perform the duties
assigned to them (Mbaku, 1998). Mbaku (1998) asserts
that civil service positions should not be used as rewards
for political support or swapped for bribes, or used to meet
obligations to one’s ethnic cleavage. The practice of
political patronage in public administration continues to be
a source of corruption in many developing countries for
political patronage undermines continuity development
standards, institutional values, and institutional memory in
the public sector. (Mollah & Uddin, 2002).
Improved Public Sector Pay– Long term anti-corruption
initiatives should incorporate the review of public sector
salaries with view to increasing them. (Mullinge &
Lesetedi, 2002). In the majority of Sub-Saharan African
countries civil servant are poorly paid opening the door for
corrupt practices presumably to augment insufficient
wages.
Administrative Efficiency–Improving work methods and
procedures to reduce delay help minimize the
opportunities for corrupt practices. (Stapenhurst and
Langseth, 1997). Public officials may raise a firm’s costs
by introducing delays and unnecessary requirements as a
way of inducing payoffs, for instance, in contracting and
auctioning or in administering regulatory and tax laws.
(Rosen-Ackerman, 1999).
Decentralized Decision Making – Decentralization
assigns decision making authority to local government that
can evaluate the needs of local citizens and their
satisfaction with the services delivered, it removes the
information asymmetry between bureaucrats and the
politicians that appoint them. (Bardahan & Mookherjee,
2000). Bardahan and Mookherjee (2000) point that
decentralization can reduce corruption in the service
delivery system inherent in traditionally centralized
systems, particularly in developing countries, where
central government lack information necessary to monitor
the performance of bureaucrats entrusted with local
service delivery. However, in countries where the capacity
and accountability of sub-national government is weak and
where there are no safeguards against the manipulation of
municipal assets and enterprises for the private gain of
local officials, decentralization can actually increase
corruption. (Mollah & Uddin, 2002). Thus, the success of
decentralized decision making in the fight against
corruption will depend on how responsive and answerable
local-level structures are to the populations they serve.
(Ruzindawa, 1999).
Financial Management System – The scope of financial
management responsibilities in government or business
include funding, custodial, analytical, and reporting
function among other elements. The following tasks
characterize financial management systems in both
sectors:
• analyzing and assessing the financial management
decision both prior and subsequent to implementation
• ensuring the necessary cash flow to finance planned
activities and operations
• safeguarding resources through appropriate financial
controls
• providing financial framework for planning future
• managing transaction processing systems which
produce information for the control of planned
• paying attention to the concepts of efficiency and
effectiveness and
• reporting and interpreting the results of activities and
operation measures in financial terms and thereafter
ex post audit and evaluation
Heavy Penalties for Corrupt Behavior –Applying
sanctions to corrupt acts is an important step towards
establishing accountability. In large part, sanctions are
centered on legislation that criminalizes corruption. The
whole aim of imposing stiff penalties is to make corruption
a high-risk activity. The absence of stiffer penalty corrupt
culprits in Africa has failed to produce the deterrence
needed to discourage those looking for to corruption as a
“lucrative venture”. Hence, heavy penalties are
recommended especially for the high-profile cases of
corruption, including longer prison sentences, confiscation
and forfeiture of all the assets and payment for
compensations for indulging in corruption to the state in
proportion to the offence committed. (Memo, 2016).
3. Accountability/Transparency Enhancing Reforms
These reforms include measure designed to open up the
work of government to public scrutiny as way of holding
public officials answerable for their actions. They include:
Auditor-General Office – The Supreme Audit institution
is responsible for auditing the state’s income and
expenditure, and a watch-dog over its financial integrity.
As an external auditor acting on behalf of the tax-payer and
his/her representatives in parliament, it essential that the
Auditor-General is not appointed by the government and
that he/she enjoys appropriate tenure of office.
Anti-Corruption Legislation –Anti-corruption laws work
to deter corrupt actions, prosecute and resurrect a sense
of justice, which has become a rare commodity in
endemically corrupt countries. (Mollah & Uddin, 2002).
Laws to fight corruption should not only embrace the

criminal law but should include laws governing access to
information, freedom of expression and a free media.
Honest/Effective Police – Hope et al. (1999) point out
that independent mechanisms should be implemented to
increase the likelihood of corruption being detected and
punished. Investigators, prosecutors, and adjudicators
must be able to perform their professional duties in a
transparently independent fashion and enforce the rule of
law against al who breach it, whatever their position.
(Hope et al.1999)
Anti-Corruption Commission – As corrupt practices
become even more sophisticated, conventional law
enforcement agencies are less placed to detect and
prosecute corruption cases. Specialized and independent
anti-corruption agencies present the advantage of being
exclusively devoted to fighting corruption. Such
commission should have preventive and educational
components, as well as the ability to gather intelligence,
process complaints, and advise government and private
agencies. (Kupendeh, 1995).
Independent/Free Judiciary – An independent, impartial
and informed judiciary holds a central place in the
realization of just, honest, open and accountable
government. (TI Source Book, 2000) In order to hold
public officials accountable to anti-corruption laws,
judiciaries need independence from the executive branch
as well as institutional capacity. Langeth et al., (1999)
argue that the judiciary itself must be subject to high ethical
standards.
Independent/Free Media – Availability of information is a
prerequisite for the creation of an informed public,
empowered to participate meaningfully in public debate
and to hold those who govern accountable. A free and
independents media, accountable and ethical media
whose status is protected by the law and who is not
susceptible to political or otherwise opportunistic
leadership can assume an important watchdog function
and act as agent of awareness. (TI Source Book, 2000).
Whistleblowing Protection Laws –Pope (1999) argues
that efficient channels for complaints should be
established for both whistleblowers within government and
members of the public, because it is essential that neither
feels unnecessarily exposed to reprisals. In addition, that
when necessary, physical protection of key informants
should be provided, whether inside or outside the country
(Pope, 1999)
Asset/Income Disclosure - Financial disclosure laws
improve accountability by enhancing the transparency of
the officials’ finances. These laws require public officials
to declare their assets and incomes and so act as a
deterrent to profiting through corruption. Laws on
obligatory disclosure of should be enacted and enforced
covering all public servants including the president, vice
president, ministers, members of parliaments and other
high-ranking civil servants when entering into office, while
in office (annually) and when leaving office. (Mulinge &
Lesetedi, 2002). Provisions requiring disclosure of officials’
incomes and assets can contribute to anti-corruption
efforts both in the judicial realm and the court of public
opinion (Johnston, 2000).
4. Democratic accountability Enhancing Reforms
These reforms refer to constraints placed on the behavior
of public officials by organizations and constituencies with
the power to apply sanctions on them. As political
accountability increases, the costs of public officials taking
decisions that benefit their private interests at the expense
of broader public interest also increases, thus working as
a deterrent/incentive to corrupt practices. Democratic
accountability enhancing reforms include:
Political Competition – Free and fair elections provide an
important mechanism for holding public officials
accountable as citizens can withhold votes from
incumbents as a sanction against corruption, and elect
opposition candidates denouncing such dealings. Open
and competitive politics can be effective force supporting,
and rewarding, good public management or at least
penalizing those governments that fail to control
corruption. (Johnston, 2000). An increase in political and
electoral competition (i.e. democratization) has widely
been assumed to help reduce corruption. Countries that
have had democratic systems of government for a long
time do tend to have lower levels of corruption (but it is
difficult to distinguish clearly between greater prosperity
and longer histories of democratic regimes, as the two tend
to go hand in hand). (Kolstad et al., 2008).
Transparency in Party Financing–Many countries have
established partial public funding of political in order to
reduce the scope for private interests to “buy interest and
also to impose limits on spending, because of the
electorate’s resistance to excessive public expenditure.
((Mollah & Uddin, 2002). Mollah and Uddin (2002) also
point that setting up an authoritative and independent
electoral commission responsible for the integrity of all
issues regarding party financing can ensure oversight.
Campaign finance poses a particular challenge for fairness
regarding elections. For this reason, campaign reforms
that limit or regulate donations, require disclosure of funds,
provide free television time, and eliminate off-budget
government funding sources are an important component
of accountability.
Oversight by NGOs–The World Bank defines non-
government organizations or NGOs as the myriad of
organizations, some of them formally constituted, and
some of them informal that are largely independent of
government, that are characterized primarily by
humanitarian or cooperative, rather than commercial
objective, and that generally seek to relieve suffering,
promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment,

Desta Y. 038
provide basic social services, or undertake community
development. NGOs can play an important role in their
community level work in establishing norms in the way
elected officials should properly behave and illustrating the
difference between the ways the NGOs own officers
behave and the ways in which government officials
behave. (TI Source Book, 2000). NGOs have the potential
to extend citizen empowerment by reducing the economic
and political vulnerabilities of grassroots communities and
serving as watchdogs over corrupt officials. ((Mulinge &
Lesetedi, 2002)
Legislative Oversight – Legislative Oversight provides a
powerful check on executive authority, enhancing
accountability where a dominant executive branch might
otherwise operate with impunity. According to Robert
Williams (1987) corruption in Africa is primarily located in
the executive branch of the government for the obvious
reason that the legislative and judicial branches have
generally lost whatever power they may have once
possessed. To be effective legislatures require such
resources as a technically competent staff, strong
committees, budgetary independence, significant
oversight powers, and a constitutional role in approving
political appointments. (Mbaku, 1998).
Respect for Rule of Law–The term “rule of law” embodies
basic principle of equal treatment of all people before the
law, and both constitutional and actual guarantees for
basic human rights. In effect no public official however big
he/she may be should be above the law. A predictable
legal system with faire, transparent, and effective judicial
institutions is essential to the protection of citizens against
the arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts of both
organizations and individuals.
Disclosure of Election Results – Accurate and timely
disclosure of elections results at all levels of government
provides for the transparency of the election process, in
particular during counting and tabulating of the results to
ensure full accountability. An independent electoral
commission composed of commissioners drawn from
across spectrum of politics, civil society and gender should
be responsible for the conduct of the whole election
process.
The Ombudsman – The Ombudsman constitutes an
office which, independently of the executive, receives
complaints about maladministration. It gives individuals
the opportunity to have decisions which affect them to be
reviewed by an independent and expert body, without the
expenses and delays of court proceedings. The primary
function of the ombudsman is to examine two kinds of
matters. The first are decisions, processes,
recommendations, and acts of omission that are contrary
to law, rules and regulations; that depart from established
practice or procedure; or that are perverse, arbitrary,
unjust, biased, oppressive, discriminatory, or motivated by
bribery, jobbery, favoritism, nepotism, or administrative
excesses. The second are cases of neglect, inattention,
delay, or discharge of duties and responsibilities. (Langeth
et al., 1999).
Visible Leadership Commitment – Successful anti-
corruption initiative requires a visionary leader, or
“champion,” who recognizes the high costs of venal
bureaucracy.
While focusing on the causes and consequences of
corruption, the limited research so far undertaken does not
adequately address the effectiveness of anti-corruption
strategies. However, the role of anti-corruption agencies in
Singapore and Hong Kong, the role of merit-based
recruitment in Singapore, modest gains made by sweeping
public sector reforms in Botswana and Ghana towards
controlling corruption have been well-documented.
Moreover, the lessons learned from around the world and
especially from Africa are that well-publicized but, poorly
organized, and halfheartedly implemented anti-corruption
drives do not work. Presumably, successful campaigns
must also be based on approaches that reflect the values
and preference of leaders in the countries in question. The
fact remains the causes of corruption are multi-faceted, the
consequences manifold – so must be a strategy trying to
address it. Every effort should be made to match
corruption fighting strategies with the specific causes of
corruption rather than the symptoms of corruption.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The study used survey research as data collecting
strategy. The instrument used in collecting data for this
study was questionnaire method where close-ended
questions were asked in a questionnaire that was self-
administered by the respondents. A questionnaire was
administered to the sample of 102 respondents
(graduating Public Administration University students)
selected from the total population of 625 graduating
students at the College of Business and Economics,
University of Asmara in the year 2018. The response rate
was 90 out of 102 questionnaires distributed or 88%.
The researcher took a great deal of time and effort to
ensure the proper administration of the questionnaire by
handing the questionnaire to each respondent and
collecting it personally. To ensure anonymity and
confidentiality, each subject was represented by a coded
number, with no references to name or position and each
questionnaire was collected in a sealed envelope. Thus,
nobody can identify or make connection between the
identity of the subject and his/her responses. The
researcher personally distributed and collected the
questionnaire to ensure secure transport.
The questionnaire consists of seven sections covering the
following areas:
1. Demographic data (age, sex, and education)
2. Perceptions of the extent of corruption and attitudes
about the potential seriousness of corruption and the
importance of reform.

3. Views about the potential causes of corruption in
Eritrea
4. Attitudes towards market reforms as corruption
fighting tools
5. Attitudes towards administrative reforms as corruption
fighting tools
6. Attitudes towards accountability /transparency
measures as corruption fighting tools
7. Attitudes towards democratic accountability measures
as corruption fighting tools.
The population under consideration was all 625 graduating
students at the College of Business and Economics,
University of Asmara in the year 2018. Purposive
sampling technique was be used to ensure a desirable
group of respondents based on nature of the research
aims. Accordingly, care was taken to ensure that
respondents, in this case the Public Administration
graduating students, believed to contribute to the
understanding of anti-corruption strategies of the country
were included in the sample. This cohort of graduating
public administration students who would be occupying
entry level civil service jobs was considered valuable
source of corruption related knowledge relevant to the
objective of the study. Purposive sampling of the
homogenous type focuses on candidates who share
similar traits or specific characteristics. For example,
participants in homogenous sampling would be similar in
terms of ages, education, cultures, jobs or life experiences.
The idea is to focus on this precise similarity and how it
relates to the topic being researched. (Ilker et al, 2015)
The unit of analysis is the individual graduating public
administration student, more specifically, a total of 90
respondents that participated in the administration of the
questionnaire survey. Out of 102 sample of respondents
selected 90 were willing to fill the questionnaires.
Respondents’ Characteristics
The following table shows the characteristics of the 90
Public Administration graduating students that participated
in the study.
Table 3: Respondents Characteristics
Frequency Percent N = 90
Sex Male 57 63.3
Female 33 36.7
Age 17-20 20 22.2
21-24 38 42.2
25-28 13 14.4
29-32 13 14.4
33-36 6 6.7
>36 -
Education 2-Year College 49 54.4
4-Year College 41 43.6
Out of the 90 respondents 63.3% were males while 36.7
were females. 54.4% of the respondents (University of
Asmara students) were about to complete a two-year
Public Administration program, and 43.6% of the
respondents to finalize a four-year Public Administration
program. In terms of age the majority of respondents
(64.4%) were aged under 25 years old with the age bracket
21-24 years including 44.4% of the total surveyed. This is
reflective of the age for university students in Eritrea. The
data was collected in June of 2018 before the students
graduated from their respective programs.
The data analysis procedures consisted of frequency and
cross-tabs. Cross-tabs are utilized to present descriptive
statistics that can help us to answer many of the research
questions. The study employed the descriptive survey
method which, according to Ary and Razaviah (2010) lacks
predictive power since the research may discover and
describe “what is” and unable to predict “what would be.”
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Extent of corruption in Eritrea
Respondents were asked to rate government corruption
on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to “non-existent”
and 5 corresponds to “extremely prevalent” for the years
2015 and 2018 respectively.
The responses for 2015 and 2018 are shown in the table
below:
Table 4: Perception of government corruption for the
years 2015 and 2018
Non-
existent
Minimal Moderate Prevalent Extremely
Prevalent
Year
2015
6.7% 45% 38.9% 7.8% 1.1%
Year
2018
0% 24.2% 42.2% 26.7% 5.6%
For year 2015 more than half or 52.6% of the respondents
think that corruption in Eritrea ranges between none to
minimal. However, in 2018 only 24.2% the respondents
think that corruption in Eritrea ranges between none to
minimal. Again, 68.9% of the respondents perceive the
existence of corruption to be moderate/prevalent for the
year 2018 as opposed to the 46% of the respondents for
the year 2015. This may be as interpreted as a significant
increase in perceived corruption in Eritrea in the three
years according to the participants of the study.
Survey Results on the Causes of corruption in Eritrea
The respondents were asked to rate the causes of
corruption in Eritrea on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1
corresponds to “very unimportant cause” and 5
corresponds to “very important cause. The results are
shown in the table below:

Desta Y. 040
Table 5: Survey Results of Causes of Corruption
Causes of Corruption Average (Mean) Rank
1 Lack of meritocratic personnel policies 4.62 1
2 Low salary of public officials 4.49 2
3 Self-serving attitudes of public officials 4.31 3
4 Lack of accountable/transparent political system 3.94 4
5 lack of independent/free judiciary 3.67 5
6 Lack of effective corruption reporting system 3.64 6
7 Lack of independent/free media 3.54 7
8 Poor economic policies 3.20 8
9 Overloaded administrative agencies 2.41 9
10 Foreign interests 1.81 10
11 Customs that encourage corrupt behavior 1.40 11
The clearest finding is that the weaknesses in the civil
service personnel system are viewed as the most
important causes of corruption. Lack of meritocratic
personnel policies and lack of adequate pay and ranked
first and second ranked in the top five leading causes of
corruption in Eritrea. Lack of meritocratic personnel
policies that include politically motivated hiring, patronage,
and lack of clear rules on promotions and hiring can help
in explaining why some bureaucracies are more corrupt
than others. (Tanzi, 1998)
The third ranking factor is the self-serving aptitudes of
public officials indicating greedy and unscrupulous
individuals are contributing to the perceived corruption in
government. Hence, it refers to the personal
characteristics of some corrupt public officials serving in
the government of Eritrea.
The fourth ranking factor lack of accountable/transparent
political system can be explained in part by the infancy of
the political institutions in Eritrea. The legal framework for
the formation and finance of political parties is still nascent,
national elections are still pending (owing to the 1998-2000
war with Ethiopia,) and the media remains largely
government controlled. However, after the signing of
peace agreement between and Ethiopia in 2018 after 20
years of no war no peace the urgency for the heralding of
political competition or multi-party democracy, the
introduction of vibrant private media and the political
participation of citizenry through regular parliamentary and
presidential elections becomes much more felt than before
.Eritrea can learn valuable lessons from the small
comparable Sub-Saharan countries of Botswana and
Namibia characterized by dominant party led governments
that have consistently maintained a reputation for
cleanliness and democratization at the regional and global
stage. Strengthening democracy to enhance executive
accountability to the legislature, and independent judiciary
and decentralized government; nurturing a vibrant
opposition; allowing the free flow of public information and
introducing transparent procedures are all vital elements
for showing demonstrable political will and developing a
culture of honest government. (Geingob, 2004).
The fifth ranking factor is lack of effective corruption
reporting system. In the context of Eritrea this can be
seen as the absence of rules and regulations, procedures,
and stuff members who are trusted for reporting suspected
corruption on the part of public officials as well as absence
of fully-fledged anti-corruption body that can investigate
reports of corruption. The fact that customs/culture is seen
at the bottom of the list of the causes of corruption is a
testimony to the fact that the Eritrean culture is indeed
plays a discouraging role with respect to corruption.
Visiting journalists and diplomats frequently hail the “anti-
corruption culture” present in Eritrea.
In conclusion, according to the respondents the leading
factors that contribute to corruption are weakness in pay
and in personnel system, deficiencies in individual
attitudes and values, lack of transparency and
accountability in the larger political processes and lack of
corruption reporting system. The first and second factors
deal with public organizational systems – either the need
for incentives and supportive regulations or the need for
detection and presumably punishment. The third leading
factor deals with individual shortcomings while the fifth
leading factor applies to the political system as a whole.
Survey Results on Effectiveness of Economic/Market
Reforms
The effectiveness of reform strategies was measured by a
ten-point scale. One point indicated not at all effective
while ten points indicated the most effective strategy.
Overall, the results presented in the table below show that
officials perceive weak to moderate effectiveness of
economic/market reforms in fighting corruption. If a score
of 8.0 or higher is chosen as a standard for highly effective
approaches, then none of these strategies meets the test.
Table 6: Survey Results on Effectiveness of Economic/
Market Reforms
Economic/Market Strategy Mean Rank
1 Competitive Service provision 7.71 1
2 Privatization 7.46 2
3 Deregulation 5.75 3
4 Tax reforms 5.61 4
5 Program elimination 5.33 5

The findings shown below clearly indicate that officials rate
the effectiveness of administrative/bureaucratic reforms in
fighting corruption in Eritrea to be very high. The ranking
of improved public pays in the top three is indicative about
the role of adequate salary in maintaining a clean civil
service. Four of these strategies meet the high
effectiveness test average score of 8.
Table 7: Survey Results on Effectiveness of
Administrative/Bureaucratic Reforms
Administrative/Bureaucratic Strategy Mean Rank
1 Improved public sector pay 8.89 1
2 Heavy penalties for corrupt behavior 8.70 2
3 Meritocratic personnel policy 8.69 3
4 Code of ethics 8.19 4
5 Financial management system 7.24 5
6 Public procurement 6.62 6
7 Administrative efficiency 6.0 7
8 Decentralized decision making 5.53 8
It seems clear that when Eritrean officials think about
measures to combat corruption, they focus much more on
public administration reform rather than reforms in the
economic or market area. This represents a traditional
public administration focus rather than a NPM focus. The
leading four administrative reforms recommended by the
respondent including improved public sector pay, heavy
penalties for corrupt behavior, meritocratic personnel
policy and code of ethics pass the threshold of average
score of 8. These findings clearly indicate that respondent
believe bureaucratic reforms in the Eritrean government
are past due.
Survey Results on Effectiveness of Accountability
/Transparency Enhancing Reforms:
The survey results indicate that officials the effectiveness
of accountability/transparency enhancing reforms in
fighting corruption to range from moderate to high. The
top three highly effective accountability/transparency
enhancing strategies are anti-corruption commission, anti-
corruption legislation, and the auditor-general office.
Table 8: Survey Results on Effectiveness of
Accountability/Transparency Enhancing Reforms
Accountability/Transparency Enhancing
Strategy
MeanRank
1 Anti-corruption commission 8.70 1
2 Anti-corruption legislation 8.47 2
3 Auditor-general office 8.0 3
4 Honest/effective police 7.49 4
5 Asset/income disclosure 7.07 5
6 Independent/free Judiciary 7.0 6
7 Independent/free media 6.45 7
8 Whistleblowing protection laws 6.15 8
The leading highly ranked corruption fighting tools aim at
enhancing accountability and transparency whose scores
exceed the acceptable average of 8 are the in government
are the legal framework criminalizing corrupt acts, strong
credible specialized agency to detect and punish corrupt
behavior, and auditing body that monitors the incomes and
expenditure of government bodies. Experience in
countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Botswana,
Chile, Poland, and Uganda suggest that institutions
dedicated to the fight against corruption (specialized
anticorruption commissions or agencies) have
demonstrated remarkable success in reducing corruption
in the public sector. (Geingob, 2004).
Survey Result on Effectiveness of Political
Accountability Enhancing Reforms:
The survey finding indicate that officials see the
effectiveness of political accountability enhancing reforms
ranges from weak to very high. Respect for rule of law,
visible leadership and legislative score very high on
effectiveness while oversight by NGOs is rated as having
the weakest effectiveness in fighting corruption.
Table 9: Survey Result on Effectiveness of Political
Reforms
Political Accountability Enhancing
Strategy
Mean Rank
1 Respect for rule of law 8.58 1
2 Visible leadership commitment 8.4 2
3 Legislative oversight 8.08 3
4 Political competition 7.65 4
5 Transparency in party financing 5.97 5
6 The Ombudsman 5.74 6
7 Disclosure of election results 5.11 7
8 Oversight by NGOs 3.52 8
The three leading political accountability enhancing
reforms respect for the rule of law, visible leadership
commitment and legislative oversight meeting the point
average 8. The graduating public administration students
believe not only laws criminalizing corrupt behavior should
be promulgated but also strictly enforced across that board
irrespective how high an individual position may be in the
government. In addition, the respondents see need for the
concrete commitment of the Eritrean leadership to fighting
corruption in terms of prosecuting their subordinates as
well as living a clean, ethical life themselves. The third high
ranking factor referring legislative oversight underscores
the belief that the power of executive branch should
checked and balanced by the legislators.
The leading strategies perceived to be most effective with
a rating greater equal or greater average score of 8 are
presented as follows:

Desta Y. 042
Table 10: Table Showing the leading Anti-Corruption Reforms
Administrative/
Bureaucratic Reforms
Accountability/Transparency
Reforms
Political Accountability Enhancing
Reforms
Improved pay (8.89) Anticorruption commission (8.37) Respect for the rule of law (9.11)
Heavy penalties (8.7) Anticorruption legislation (8.26) Visible leadership commitment (8.81)
Meritocracy (8.69) The Auditor-General office (8.16) Legislative oversight (8.08)
Code of ethics (8.19)
None of the economic/market strategy methods receive
high effectiveness rating from the respondent group as a
whole. The common themes of the leading anti-corruption
reforms/strategies listed above is focus on timely civil
service reforms, law-making and law-enforcement and the
political will to fight corruption on the part of Eritrean
government leaders.
CONCLUSION
The principal aim of the research was to assess the
perceptions public administration university students
regarding the extent, causes, and the remedies of
corruption in context of Eritrea. The study findings
contradict to a larger degree the reputation of Eritrea as
one of the least corrupt countries in Africa that is frequently
advanced by visiting diplomats and foreign journalists.
According Transparency International 2018 Corruption
Perception Index (CP1) Eritrea has a low score of 24 out
of 100 (clean) with a global ranking of 157 from 180
countries. This Eritrean CPI score is below the global
average score of 43 as well the Sub-Saharan regional
average score of 32. It is difficult to measure the actual
corruption that take place in the country, however the
perceptions of the respondents as well the perceptions
collected by Transparency International based on expert
and business people surveys portray the existence of the
challenging problem of corruption in the Eritrean public
sector.
Having a newly established state where corruption is not
embedded in society’s culture as evidenced by lowest
score given by respondents to Eritrean culture as a driver
of corruption is a welcome development in the future of
Eritrea. The survey evidence confirms Eritrea’s reputation
for possessing “anti-corruption culture”. The research
evidence also indicates that overwhelming number of
respondents do not think that foreign governments and
multinational companies contribute to the corruption in
Eritrea. This implies that corruption in Eritrea is driven by
internal factors presumably requiring internal remedies.
This is sharply contrasting to the rest of Sub-Saharan
Africa where corruption it attributed solely to external
interference as a way of escaping accountability by the
sub-continent’s corrupt leaders.
Finally, the research evidence suggested that if Eritrea is
to reduce corrupt behavior on the ground while at the
same time improving the outlook of internal and external
observers regarding the pervasiveness of corruption in
Eritrea, its leaders have the task of implementing civil
service reforms (such as increased pay, merit-based
personnel policies), accountability/transparency reforms
(including anti-corruption commission, anti-corruption
legislation, and Attorney-General office) and demonstrate
the political will to combat corruption wherever it takes
place. The fact that the top six least corrupt Sub-Saharan
African countries having score above the 50 from
100(clean) on the 2018 Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index (CPI 2018) Seychelles
(score=66), Botswana (score=66), Cape Verde(score=61),
Ruanda (score=57), Namibia (score=53) and Mauritius
(score=51) happen to be small manageable places bides
well for Eritrea. Moreover, the well-documented
remarkable successes in small countries and city states
(including Hong Kong, Singapore, Ruanda and Botswana)
in the fight against corruption spearheaded by
independent, well-funded, well-staffed and empowered
anti-corruption agencies should be carefully noted and
studied by the current Eritrean leaders.
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18.
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Results, and the Road Ahead. A World Bank Policy
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pp. 43-52.
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http://www.anti-corruption.info/corr_def_alt.htm.
Accessed Febraury12, 2019.
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Corruption: The Role of the World Bank Washington,
DC: World Bank Group, pp. 37-39.
Accepted 2 August 2019
Citation: Desta Y. (2019). Combating Corruption in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Corruption Perceptions of Public
Administration University Students in Eritrea. International
Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research,
4(2): 031-044.
Copyright: © 2019 Desta Y. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original author and source are cited.

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