The document outlines a new post-campaign military approach emphasizing a continuum of persistent engagement and a 'people-centric' strategy, where soft power is integrated to achieve objectives effectively. It highlights strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats faced by the British Army, particularly in a post-Afghanistan context, advocating for a scalable and integrated command structure. Additionally, it stresses the importance of understanding the complex nature of modern conflicts and the necessity for adaptability in military operations.

1. Realising a post-campaign
approach
Lieutenant General Sir Nicholas Carter
KCB CBE DSO

2. Strengths
• Resilient, combat hardened, and self confident
• Comfortable with mission command and
decentralization
• Accomplished COIN tactics / equipment
• Air / Land integration
• CIED skills
• Dismounted close combat and targeting
operations
• Influence operations
• Tactical bases and infrastructure
• Materiel and personnel exploitation
• Combat medicine
Weaknesses
• Combined Arms manoeuvre and mobile
operations
• Unfamiliar with general phases of war (e.g.
defence, offense, transitional phases), air
defence, suppression and CBRN
• Unaccustomed to having to take unlimited risk
in order to win – the ruthless streak?
• FOB bound and averse to austerity
• Unrealistic expectation of resources
• Ability to train one’s own organization
Opportunities
• Time to do things properly, to be educated, to
rebuild core skills and invest in people
• Freedom to train more broadly
• Challenge of innovation and imagination
• Public support
• Forward engagement – soft use of hard power
Threats
• Economic pressure
• Post COIN political and public appetite for
‘entanglements’ and interventions
• Legal challenge
• Ever rising equipment and personnel costs
The British Army post-Afghanistan

3. A new post-campaign approach
• A continuum of persistent engagement in which the soft
end of hard power is used to achieve effect, to establish
insight and understanding, and to allow one to act with
precision and agility

4. A new post-campaign approach
• A continuum of persistent engagement in which the soft
end of hard power is used to achieve effect, to establish
insight and understanding, and to allow one to act with
precision and agility
• A ‘people-centric’ approach that recognizes a changed
character of conflict

5. A new post-campaign approach
• A continuum of persistent engagement in which the soft
end of hard power is used to achieve effect, to establish
insight and understanding, and to allow one to act with
precision and agility
• A ‘people-centric’ approach that recognizes a changed
character of conflict
• A redefined divisional level of command that is
scalable, integrated and which underwrites the soft use
of hard power

6. The continuum of persistent engagement
Enduring
Stabilisation
(Phase 4)
Intervention
(Phase 2 & 3)
Forward
Engagement
(Phase Zero)
Deterrence
(Phase 1)
Post-Conflict
Capacity
Building
(Phase 5)

7. Insight and understanding
‘Every age has its follies, but the folly of our age has
been an irresistible desire to change the world without
first studying and understanding it.’
Antonio Giustozzi

9. “France has developed a deep understanding of Mali
and the region through historical ties, mature OGD
representation, and regionally based military forces;
this allowed them to intervene without detailed plans
but with a feel for what was possible.”
UK MOD Assessment
Generating precision and agility

10. A new post-campaign approach
• A continuum of persistent engagement in which the soft
end of hard power is used to achieve effect, to establish
insight and understanding, and to allow one to act with
precision and agility
• A ‘people-centric’ approach that recognizes a changed
character of conflict
• A redefined divisional level of command that is
scalable, integrated and which underwrites the soft use
of hard power

11. Manoeuvre is now multi-dimensional …

12. “The defeat of the insurgents in the military sense may
assist in, but does not translate into victory for the
coalition, because the interpretation of the conflict in
military metrics may well be a frame of reference to
which most audiences do not subscribe.”
Emile Simpson
... and perception is now the key

13. “The political fragmentation that characterises the
Afghan conflict is likely to point to the future of
contemporary conflict rather than prove an anomaly …
there are endless ‘actors’ and ‘audiences’, which often
overlap ... the conflict is far more of a game of musical
chairs than a two-way fight.”
Emile Simpson
... involving multiple audiences

14. A ‘people-centric’ approach
Objective

15. A ‘people-centric’ approach
Warlord
Clan / Tribe
Institution
Opponent
Ally
Audience
Objective

16. A ‘people-centric’ approach
Warlord
Clan / Tribe
Institution
Opponent
Ally
Audience
Destroy
Marginalize
Reconcile
Protect
Effect
Objective

17. A ‘people-centric’ approach
Kinetics
Cyber / EW
Dynamic narrative
Conversation
Deception
Coercion
Cash
Warlord
Clan / Tribe
Institution
Opponent
Ally
Audience
Method
Destroy
Marginalize
Reconcile
Protect
Effect
Objective

18. Less about kinetics – more about soft power

19. Responding to the information environment

20. “Contemporary warfare is a form of theatre, played out
by a small, separate group, orchestrated by a team of
unseen directors, stage managers and lighting
engineers, but watched by many more.”
Rupert Smith 2005
A form of theatre

21. A ‘people-centric’ approach
Kinetics
Cyber / EW
Dynamic narrative
Conversation
Deception
Coercion
Cash
Red
White
Green
Black
Information
Warlord
Clan / Tribe
Institution
Opponent
Ally
Audience
Method
Destroy
Marginalize
Reconcile
Protect
Effect
Objective

22. A new post-campaign approach
• A continuum of persistent engagement in which the soft
end of hard power is used to achieve effect, to establish
insight and understanding, and to allow one to act with
precision and agility
• A ‘people-centric’ approach that recognizes a changed
character of conflict
• A redefined divisional level of command that is
scalable, integrated and which underwrites the soft use
of hard power

23. A redefined divisional level of command
• It will continue to be the lowest level where:
– Operational art is practised
– We plan and execute simultaneous tactical engagements in a
conceptual framework of deep, close and rear
– We would be prepared to war fight

24. An illustrative division

25. A redefined divisional level of command
• It will continue to be the lowest level where:
– Operational art is practised
– We plan and execute simultaneous tactical engagements in a
conceptual framework of deep, close and rear
– We would be prepared to war fight
• Increasingly we should think about it being scalable and
integrated so that it can execute operations using the
full range of Joint, inter-agency and wider non kinetic
effects

26. A new post-campaign approach
• A continuum of persistent engagement in which the soft
end of hard power is used to achieve effect, to establish
insight and understanding, and to allow one to act with
precision and agility
• A ‘people-centric’ approach that recognizes a changed
character of conflict
• A redefined divisional level of command that is
scalable, integrated and which underwrites the soft use
of hard power