Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Janßen is a senior officer at the George C. Marshall Center in Germany who has over 32 years of military service. He has extensive experience in arms control, force planning, information operations, and strategic communications. At the Marshall Center, he teaches courses on applied strategic communications and military information operations. In his introduction, he discusses the challenges of behavioral conflict and how strategic communications can help shape audiences' perceptions to achieve desired effects and impact.
This document discusses the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) in combating current and future threats like terrorism and a nuclear Iran. It argues that while other intelligence methods provide useful information, only HUMINT can reveal an adversary's intentions and plans by directly gathering information from human sources. The document cites examples from the Cold War and hunt for Osama Bin Laden to show how HUMINT has proven effective over time in addressing major national security crises. It concludes that the US must make HUMINT a central part of its intelligence gathering efforts to gain an advantage in the war on terror and understand Iran's nuclear ambitions.
Integrating info ops in operational level planning (no backup slides)Ulrich Janßen
Presentation on Ensuring message Consistency (NATO StratCom and Military Info Ops in Comprehensive Operations Planning) provided at Information Operations Europe in June 2011
This document is a research paper presented to the Air Force 2025 study on the topic of information attack and information warfare in 2025. It argues that properly understanding and developing information attack, based on USAF competencies in information dominance, is key to achieving success in information warfare. However, definitions of terms related to information warfare currently used by the Joint Staff and military services are unclear and sometimes contradictory, failing to fully incorporate the USAF perspective on information attack, which poses an obstacle to future capabilities. The paper aims to rethink these definitions and envision how information attack could be used in 2025 to gain strategic advantage over adversaries through influencing their decision-making.
(1) The document discusses strategic intelligence and anticipatory self-defense decisions. It presents a theoretical framework analyzing how decision maker personality traits and strategic intelligence influence a nation's decision to engage in anticipatory self-defense and the outcomes of such decisions.
(2) The theory models decision maker traits like militarism and adventurism as independent variables, and outcomes like choosing anticipatory self-defense and the decision being viewed as lawful as dependent variables. It hypothesizes that strategic intelligence mediates the relationship between traits and outcomes.
(3) An analysis of historical case studies finds that militaristic decision makers tend to be satisfied with anticipatory self-defense, while non-militaristic ones
This document outlines a theory of strategic intelligence and its role in national security decision making. It discusses how nations pursue power and develop grand strategies to maximize their likelihood of survival against threats. Strategic intelligence involves collecting timely information about adversaries' capabilities, intentions, and plans to avoid strategic surprises and allow decision makers to shape outcomes. However, intelligence failures can occur for reasons such as cognitive biases, too much or too little information, underestimating threats, politicization of analysis, and neglecting long-term intelligence needs. The better the strategic intelligence, the more likely decision makers are to make choices that support national security, but good intelligence alone is not enough without capabilities to implement decisions.
The document summarizes the U.S. national security policy process and the role of intelligence in supporting policymakers. It describes the main components of the policy process including the president, national security departments and agencies, the National Security Council, Congress, and the intelligence community. It discusses how these groups have varying interests and perspectives. It also outlines the intelligence cycle of planning and directing collection needs, collecting information, processing and analyzing the data, and disseminating intelligence reports to policymakers. The document notes both the importance of intelligence in informing policies, and the limitations of intelligence in the policymaking process.
Chapter 5 collection and the collection disciplinesDoing What I Do
The United States uses multiple collection disciplines (INTs) including imagery, signals, measurement and signatures, and human intelligence to collect intelligence. These collection methods each have strengths and weaknesses and there are ongoing debates around resource prioritization and development of new collection systems. Additionally, greater emphasis on collection over analysis processing has also been an issue. The document then discusses various collection methods and issues around balancing collection capabilities with protecting sources and methods.
1) The document discusses leveraging counter improvised explosive device (C-IED) information to conduct targeting operations and information operations against insurgent networks in Afghanistan.
2) It emphasizes gaining an understanding of the operational environment through integrated planning processes like PMESII-PT in order to design effective counterinsurgency campaigns. C-IED information can help identify insurgent networks and recommend lethal and non-lethal targets.
3) Both insurgents and coalition forces conduct information operations to influence the population, which is critical in counterinsurgency. The document argues coalition forces should exploit C-IED information through biometric intelligence and evidence-based operations to build the credibility of the Afghan government and security forces and
This document discusses the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) in combating current and future threats like terrorism and a nuclear Iran. It argues that while other intelligence methods provide useful information, only HUMINT can reveal an adversary's intentions and plans by directly gathering information from human sources. The document cites examples from the Cold War and hunt for Osama Bin Laden to show how HUMINT has proven effective over time in addressing major national security crises. It concludes that the US must make HUMINT a central part of its intelligence gathering efforts to gain an advantage in the war on terror and understand Iran's nuclear ambitions.
Integrating info ops in operational level planning (no backup slides)Ulrich Janßen
Presentation on Ensuring message Consistency (NATO StratCom and Military Info Ops in Comprehensive Operations Planning) provided at Information Operations Europe in June 2011
This document is a research paper presented to the Air Force 2025 study on the topic of information attack and information warfare in 2025. It argues that properly understanding and developing information attack, based on USAF competencies in information dominance, is key to achieving success in information warfare. However, definitions of terms related to information warfare currently used by the Joint Staff and military services are unclear and sometimes contradictory, failing to fully incorporate the USAF perspective on information attack, which poses an obstacle to future capabilities. The paper aims to rethink these definitions and envision how information attack could be used in 2025 to gain strategic advantage over adversaries through influencing their decision-making.
(1) The document discusses strategic intelligence and anticipatory self-defense decisions. It presents a theoretical framework analyzing how decision maker personality traits and strategic intelligence influence a nation's decision to engage in anticipatory self-defense and the outcomes of such decisions.
(2) The theory models decision maker traits like militarism and adventurism as independent variables, and outcomes like choosing anticipatory self-defense and the decision being viewed as lawful as dependent variables. It hypothesizes that strategic intelligence mediates the relationship between traits and outcomes.
(3) An analysis of historical case studies finds that militaristic decision makers tend to be satisfied with anticipatory self-defense, while non-militaristic ones
This document outlines a theory of strategic intelligence and its role in national security decision making. It discusses how nations pursue power and develop grand strategies to maximize their likelihood of survival against threats. Strategic intelligence involves collecting timely information about adversaries' capabilities, intentions, and plans to avoid strategic surprises and allow decision makers to shape outcomes. However, intelligence failures can occur for reasons such as cognitive biases, too much or too little information, underestimating threats, politicization of analysis, and neglecting long-term intelligence needs. The better the strategic intelligence, the more likely decision makers are to make choices that support national security, but good intelligence alone is not enough without capabilities to implement decisions.
The document summarizes the U.S. national security policy process and the role of intelligence in supporting policymakers. It describes the main components of the policy process including the president, national security departments and agencies, the National Security Council, Congress, and the intelligence community. It discusses how these groups have varying interests and perspectives. It also outlines the intelligence cycle of planning and directing collection needs, collecting information, processing and analyzing the data, and disseminating intelligence reports to policymakers. The document notes both the importance of intelligence in informing policies, and the limitations of intelligence in the policymaking process.
Chapter 5 collection and the collection disciplinesDoing What I Do
The United States uses multiple collection disciplines (INTs) including imagery, signals, measurement and signatures, and human intelligence to collect intelligence. These collection methods each have strengths and weaknesses and there are ongoing debates around resource prioritization and development of new collection systems. Additionally, greater emphasis on collection over analysis processing has also been an issue. The document then discusses various collection methods and issues around balancing collection capabilities with protecting sources and methods.
1) The document discusses leveraging counter improvised explosive device (C-IED) information to conduct targeting operations and information operations against insurgent networks in Afghanistan.
2) It emphasizes gaining an understanding of the operational environment through integrated planning processes like PMESII-PT in order to design effective counterinsurgency campaigns. C-IED information can help identify insurgent networks and recommend lethal and non-lethal targets.
3) Both insurgents and coalition forces conduct information operations to influence the population, which is critical in counterinsurgency. The document argues coalition forces should exploit C-IED information through biometric intelligence and evidence-based operations to build the credibility of the Afghan government and security forces and
This document discusses challenges in modern conflicts and the importance of integrated crisis communications. It notes that conflicts are now characterized by asymmetric strategies, multiple actors, and the media serving as a battlefield. New technologies have also changed communications. To address these challenges, the document recommends planning considerations for integrated crisis communications, including focusing on inspiring people, understanding audiences, and implementing communications as part of narrative-led comprehensive operations. The goal is to turn visions into impacts by influencing mass behavior through an integrated approach.
Strategic Communication: A Department of Defense Perspective. Robert HastingsRobert T. Hastings
Presentation by Robert Hastings, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, at Leeds University for the European PR Education and Research Association annual congress.
Rebranding IO (Information Operations) June 2013Ulrich Janßen
This document discusses rebranding information operations (IO) and strategic communications. It notes the evolution of concepts from combat support to joint enabling functions. It addresses challenges in behavioral conflict like understanding people, motivation, and perception management. It proposes ensuring "C5" through transforming command and control, and refining planning and decision-making. The desired effect is to achieve integration in crisis management through a comprehensive approach.
This thesis examines the communication between the Dutch military and civil United Nations entities during the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Specifically, it analyzes the communication between the Dutch military's Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance company (ISR-coy) and various civil UN entities in the Gao region of Mali, including the UN peacekeeping forces and humanitarian agencies. Through interviews with Dutch military and UN personnel, the study finds that communication was most effective between the ISR-coy and civil MINUSMA entities located in Gao, but less effective with UN agencies located outside of Gao due to greater physical, organizational and linguistic barriers. Key factors in
Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Janßen is an instructor at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He has over 32 years of military service in the German Army, including command and staff functions as well as roles in arms control, force planning, and information operations. As an instructor, he lectures on topics including information operations, psychological operations, and strategic communication. The document provides biographical details on Janßen's education, career experience, areas of expertise, and current role at the Marshall Center, where he gives workshops on narratives as an influence factor.
This document discusses the evolution of misinformation and proposes a framework called AMITT (Attribution, Mitigation, Incident and Technique Taxonomy) to analyze misinformation campaigns and incidents. It suggests populating the AMITT framework by cataloging historical misinformation examples. Finally, it notes that further work is needed to develop mitigations and counters, refine techniques, and share intelligence using the framework.
The document discusses principles of strategic communication based on lessons learned from previous DoD efforts. It defines strategic communication as synchronizing words and deeds with consideration of how they will be perceived by audiences. It emphasizes that strategic communication must be leadership-driven, credible, based on deep understanding of audiences, involve dialogue to build relationships, be pervasive in all actions and words, achieve unity of effort, be results-based to achieve specific outcomes, be responsive to the right audience and timely, and be continuous through ongoing research, analysis, planning, execution and assessment.
MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) uses scientific and technical methods to collect strategic and tactical intelligence. It builds models to aid decision-making but can be complicated to apply quickly. In 2004, President Bush established the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities to review intelligence functions after 9/11. The commission found 74 areas needing reform, and 71 were addressed in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This act established a director of national intelligence and improved information sharing. MASINT now plays a role in countering global terrorism by tracking networks and using enemies' own technology against them.
Intelligence as a set of permanent institutions dates back only to the second half of the nineteenth century. But as information and news - in the dictionary meaning used in English since the middle of the fifteenth century, of 'knowledge as to events, communicated by or obtained from another, especially military' - it has always been collected as part of warfare
For a military, it can mean knowledge of the enemy and can distinguish between to defeat and to lose because information means knowledge and knowledge are power. Analysts see it as a package of information pending for clarification, and policymakers consider they should be informed so that they can meet the needs, stated or understood.
Intelligence gathers under the same umbrella the informational component of national security, internal and external policies, as well as certain aspects of international security in the case of global cross-entities (states, organizations).
This presentation is built up by gathering information from different references (Book, Articles, and Newspapers) by the author.
Captain Porter explained that US policy could benefit from a coherent strategic perspective that considers the interconnected complexity of the strategic environment. He advocated for a whole-of-nation approach to development, diplomacy and defense instead of treating them as separate stovepipes. Current proposals recognize this need to integrate functions. The document discusses improving intelligence, collaboration, education and changing mindsets to advance information operations capabilities.
Influencing Terrorists and Their Support Base Through Information Operations ...Vic Artiga
This document discusses how terrorists like al Qaeda and the US Army have used information operations and media against each other. It analyzes case studies in Iraq and Afghanistan to examine how effective their operations have been. While the US Army excels at conventional warfare, it has struggled with information operations against asymmetric threats. The document recommends that the Army improve its use of information operations offensively, through better media engagement, cultural understanding, and intelligence integration to counter terrorist propaganda and influence their support networks.
Strategic Communication and Multimodality 11.pptxEmmanuel Nzeaka
This document discusses strategic communication and its key elements. It defines strategic communication as communication that is systematically deployed to achieve objectives and goals. There must be a thorough understanding of target audiences and flexible tactics to adapt to changing circumstances. Effective strategic communication also requires multimodal channels to transmit clear messages tailored to specific audiences, and a feedback loop to evaluate audience reception and reaction. The impact of any message depends on how well the audience reaction meets the sender's intent and purpose.
Mac201 television constructing the publicRob Jewitt
This document discusses the role of media in shaping public opinion and functioning as a public sphere. It examines debates around the responsibilities of broadcasters to stakeholders versus audiences. The ideal role of news media is seen as disseminating accurate, politically relevant information to contribute to an informed civic society. However, contemporary media are argued to have become "re-feudalized" due to ownership, advertising, and spin. The document analyzes BBC and ITV news coverage of public opinion and finds they construct audiences as apathetic. It also discusses whether shows like Question Time truly represent public spheres or serve ratings.
This document summarizes the changing nature of foreign policy communications and crisis management in modern global politics. It notes that greater globalization, new communication technologies, and the rise of non-state actors have made international relations more complex and crisis-prone. States must now manage diverse risks like natural disasters, economic instability, and terrorism. Additionally, foreign policy involves more non-governmental stakeholders and issues beyond traditional geopolitics. As a result, modern crisis communications requires coordinating public messages and adapting foreign policy processes to be more flexible, transparent and participatory.
Russia is conducting information operations alongside its conventional military operations in the war with Ukraine. These operations include psychological operations, cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns using social media, telecommunications, mass media, and the internet. Russia views cyberspace as part of the broader information environment that must be controlled to gain information superiority. It has reorganized its cyber units into information operations forces capable of supporting information activities through cyberspace, and incorporated hacktivist groups to augment its technical capabilities and conduct influence operations. Russia's operations involve initial network penetration, data-deleting malware attacks, DDoS attacks, website defacement, and disinformation targeting Russian, Ukrainian, European, and American audiences.
Foreign policy communications in modern UkraineAnton Shynkaruk
The document discusses foreign policy communications and crisis management in Ukraine. It notes that Ukraine has experienced several unexpected events that attracted global attention, like Eurovision and the Orange Revolution. Effective crisis communications are important for foreign policy decision making to avoid negative impacts of unexpected events. However, communicating about crises in foreign policy can be controversial as some events need to be hidden from public view. Ukraine faces challenges in defining its foreign policy priorities between the EU and Russia. Social network analysis is discussed as a method to analyze events, their media coverage, and the effectiveness of communications in foreign policy.
CIA Stratergic Communication - September 2004Khairi Aiman
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a Federal
Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of
Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do
not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.
Main Java[All of the Base Concepts}.docxadhitya5119
This is part 1 of my Java Learning Journey. This Contains Custom methods, classes, constructors, packages, multithreading , try- catch block, finally block and more.
This document discusses challenges in modern conflicts and the importance of integrated crisis communications. It notes that conflicts are now characterized by asymmetric strategies, multiple actors, and the media serving as a battlefield. New technologies have also changed communications. To address these challenges, the document recommends planning considerations for integrated crisis communications, including focusing on inspiring people, understanding audiences, and implementing communications as part of narrative-led comprehensive operations. The goal is to turn visions into impacts by influencing mass behavior through an integrated approach.
Strategic Communication: A Department of Defense Perspective. Robert HastingsRobert T. Hastings
Presentation by Robert Hastings, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, at Leeds University for the European PR Education and Research Association annual congress.
Rebranding IO (Information Operations) June 2013Ulrich Janßen
This document discusses rebranding information operations (IO) and strategic communications. It notes the evolution of concepts from combat support to joint enabling functions. It addresses challenges in behavioral conflict like understanding people, motivation, and perception management. It proposes ensuring "C5" through transforming command and control, and refining planning and decision-making. The desired effect is to achieve integration in crisis management through a comprehensive approach.
This thesis examines the communication between the Dutch military and civil United Nations entities during the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Specifically, it analyzes the communication between the Dutch military's Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance company (ISR-coy) and various civil UN entities in the Gao region of Mali, including the UN peacekeeping forces and humanitarian agencies. Through interviews with Dutch military and UN personnel, the study finds that communication was most effective between the ISR-coy and civil MINUSMA entities located in Gao, but less effective with UN agencies located outside of Gao due to greater physical, organizational and linguistic barriers. Key factors in
Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Janßen is an instructor at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He has over 32 years of military service in the German Army, including command and staff functions as well as roles in arms control, force planning, and information operations. As an instructor, he lectures on topics including information operations, psychological operations, and strategic communication. The document provides biographical details on Janßen's education, career experience, areas of expertise, and current role at the Marshall Center, where he gives workshops on narratives as an influence factor.
This document discusses the evolution of misinformation and proposes a framework called AMITT (Attribution, Mitigation, Incident and Technique Taxonomy) to analyze misinformation campaigns and incidents. It suggests populating the AMITT framework by cataloging historical misinformation examples. Finally, it notes that further work is needed to develop mitigations and counters, refine techniques, and share intelligence using the framework.
The document discusses principles of strategic communication based on lessons learned from previous DoD efforts. It defines strategic communication as synchronizing words and deeds with consideration of how they will be perceived by audiences. It emphasizes that strategic communication must be leadership-driven, credible, based on deep understanding of audiences, involve dialogue to build relationships, be pervasive in all actions and words, achieve unity of effort, be results-based to achieve specific outcomes, be responsive to the right audience and timely, and be continuous through ongoing research, analysis, planning, execution and assessment.
MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) uses scientific and technical methods to collect strategic and tactical intelligence. It builds models to aid decision-making but can be complicated to apply quickly. In 2004, President Bush established the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities to review intelligence functions after 9/11. The commission found 74 areas needing reform, and 71 were addressed in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This act established a director of national intelligence and improved information sharing. MASINT now plays a role in countering global terrorism by tracking networks and using enemies' own technology against them.
Intelligence as a set of permanent institutions dates back only to the second half of the nineteenth century. But as information and news - in the dictionary meaning used in English since the middle of the fifteenth century, of 'knowledge as to events, communicated by or obtained from another, especially military' - it has always been collected as part of warfare
For a military, it can mean knowledge of the enemy and can distinguish between to defeat and to lose because information means knowledge and knowledge are power. Analysts see it as a package of information pending for clarification, and policymakers consider they should be informed so that they can meet the needs, stated or understood.
Intelligence gathers under the same umbrella the informational component of national security, internal and external policies, as well as certain aspects of international security in the case of global cross-entities (states, organizations).
This presentation is built up by gathering information from different references (Book, Articles, and Newspapers) by the author.
Captain Porter explained that US policy could benefit from a coherent strategic perspective that considers the interconnected complexity of the strategic environment. He advocated for a whole-of-nation approach to development, diplomacy and defense instead of treating them as separate stovepipes. Current proposals recognize this need to integrate functions. The document discusses improving intelligence, collaboration, education and changing mindsets to advance information operations capabilities.
Influencing Terrorists and Their Support Base Through Information Operations ...Vic Artiga
This document discusses how terrorists like al Qaeda and the US Army have used information operations and media against each other. It analyzes case studies in Iraq and Afghanistan to examine how effective their operations have been. While the US Army excels at conventional warfare, it has struggled with information operations against asymmetric threats. The document recommends that the Army improve its use of information operations offensively, through better media engagement, cultural understanding, and intelligence integration to counter terrorist propaganda and influence their support networks.
Strategic Communication and Multimodality 11.pptxEmmanuel Nzeaka
This document discusses strategic communication and its key elements. It defines strategic communication as communication that is systematically deployed to achieve objectives and goals. There must be a thorough understanding of target audiences and flexible tactics to adapt to changing circumstances. Effective strategic communication also requires multimodal channels to transmit clear messages tailored to specific audiences, and a feedback loop to evaluate audience reception and reaction. The impact of any message depends on how well the audience reaction meets the sender's intent and purpose.
Mac201 television constructing the publicRob Jewitt
This document discusses the role of media in shaping public opinion and functioning as a public sphere. It examines debates around the responsibilities of broadcasters to stakeholders versus audiences. The ideal role of news media is seen as disseminating accurate, politically relevant information to contribute to an informed civic society. However, contemporary media are argued to have become "re-feudalized" due to ownership, advertising, and spin. The document analyzes BBC and ITV news coverage of public opinion and finds they construct audiences as apathetic. It also discusses whether shows like Question Time truly represent public spheres or serve ratings.
This document summarizes the changing nature of foreign policy communications and crisis management in modern global politics. It notes that greater globalization, new communication technologies, and the rise of non-state actors have made international relations more complex and crisis-prone. States must now manage diverse risks like natural disasters, economic instability, and terrorism. Additionally, foreign policy involves more non-governmental stakeholders and issues beyond traditional geopolitics. As a result, modern crisis communications requires coordinating public messages and adapting foreign policy processes to be more flexible, transparent and participatory.
Russia is conducting information operations alongside its conventional military operations in the war with Ukraine. These operations include psychological operations, cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns using social media, telecommunications, mass media, and the internet. Russia views cyberspace as part of the broader information environment that must be controlled to gain information superiority. It has reorganized its cyber units into information operations forces capable of supporting information activities through cyberspace, and incorporated hacktivist groups to augment its technical capabilities and conduct influence operations. Russia's operations involve initial network penetration, data-deleting malware attacks, DDoS attacks, website defacement, and disinformation targeting Russian, Ukrainian, European, and American audiences.
Foreign policy communications in modern UkraineAnton Shynkaruk
The document discusses foreign policy communications and crisis management in Ukraine. It notes that Ukraine has experienced several unexpected events that attracted global attention, like Eurovision and the Orange Revolution. Effective crisis communications are important for foreign policy decision making to avoid negative impacts of unexpected events. However, communicating about crises in foreign policy can be controversial as some events need to be hidden from public view. Ukraine faces challenges in defining its foreign policy priorities between the EU and Russia. Social network analysis is discussed as a method to analyze events, their media coverage, and the effectiveness of communications in foreign policy.
CIA Stratergic Communication - September 2004Khairi Aiman
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a Federal
Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of
Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do
not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.
Similar to Turning vision into impact June 2013 (20)
Main Java[All of the Base Concepts}.docxadhitya5119
This is part 1 of my Java Learning Journey. This Contains Custom methods, classes, constructors, packages, multithreading , try- catch block, finally block and more.
How to Manage Your Lost Opportunities in Odoo 17 CRMCeline George
Odoo 17 CRM allows us to track why we lose sales opportunities with "Lost Reasons." This helps analyze our sales process and identify areas for improvement. Here's how to configure lost reasons in Odoo 17 CRM
How to Fix the Import Error in the Odoo 17Celine George
An import error occurs when a program fails to import a module or library, disrupting its execution. In languages like Python, this issue arises when the specified module cannot be found or accessed, hindering the program's functionality. Resolving import errors is crucial for maintaining smooth software operation and uninterrupted development processes.
A Strategic Approach: GenAI in EducationPeter Windle
Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies such as Generative AI, Image Generators and Large Language Models have had a dramatic impact on teaching, learning and assessment over the past 18 months. The most immediate threat AI posed was to Academic Integrity with Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) focusing their efforts on combating the use of GenAI in assessment. Guidelines were developed for staff and students, policies put in place too. Innovative educators have forged paths in the use of Generative AI for teaching, learning and assessments leading to pockets of transformation springing up across HEIs, often with little or no top-down guidance, support or direction.
This Gasta posits a strategic approach to integrating AI into HEIs to prepare staff, students and the curriculum for an evolving world and workplace. We will highlight the advantages of working with these technologies beyond the realm of teaching, learning and assessment by considering prompt engineering skills, industry impact, curriculum changes, and the need for staff upskilling. In contrast, not engaging strategically with Generative AI poses risks, including falling behind peers, missed opportunities and failing to ensure our graduates remain employable. The rapid evolution of AI technologies necessitates a proactive and strategic approach if we are to remain relevant.
Macroeconomics- Movie Location
This will be used as part of your Personal Professional Portfolio once graded.
Objective:
Prepare a presentation or a paper using research, basic comparative analysis, data organization and application of economic information. You will make an informed assessment of an economic climate outside of the United States to accomplish an entertainment industry objective.
it describes the bony anatomy including the femoral head , acetabulum, labrum . also discusses the capsule , ligaments . muscle that act on the hip joint and the range of motion are outlined. factors affecting hip joint stability and weight transmission through the joint are summarized.
This slide is special for master students (MIBS & MIFB) in UUM. Also useful for readers who are interested in the topic of contemporary Islamic banking.
বাংলাদেশের অর্থনৈতিক সমীক্ষা ২০২৪ [Bangladesh Economic Review 2024 Bangla.pdf] কম্পিউটার , ট্যাব ও স্মার্ট ফোন ভার্সন সহ সম্পূর্ণ বাংলা ই-বুক বা pdf বই " সুচিপত্র ...বুকমার্ক মেনু 🔖 ও হাইপার লিংক মেনু 📝👆 যুক্ত ..
আমাদের সবার জন্য খুব খুব গুরুত্বপূর্ণ একটি বই ..বিসিএস, ব্যাংক, ইউনিভার্সিটি ভর্তি ও যে কোন প্রতিযোগিতা মূলক পরীক্ষার জন্য এর খুব ইম্পরট্যান্ট একটি বিষয় ...তাছাড়া বাংলাদেশের সাম্প্রতিক যে কোন ডাটা বা তথ্য এই বইতে পাবেন ...
তাই একজন নাগরিক হিসাবে এই তথ্য গুলো আপনার জানা প্রয়োজন ...।
বিসিএস ও ব্যাংক এর লিখিত পরীক্ষা ...+এছাড়া মাধ্যমিক ও উচ্চমাধ্যমিকের স্টুডেন্টদের জন্য অনেক কাজে আসবে ...
ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, and GDPR: Best Practices for Implementation and...PECB
Denis is a dynamic and results-driven Chief Information Officer (CIO) with a distinguished career spanning information systems analysis and technical project management. With a proven track record of spearheading the design and delivery of cutting-edge Information Management solutions, he has consistently elevated business operations, streamlined reporting functions, and maximized process efficiency.
Certified as an ISO/IEC 27001: Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) Lead Implementer, Data Protection Officer, and Cyber Risks Analyst, Denis brings a heightened focus on data security, privacy, and cyber resilience to every endeavor.
His expertise extends across a diverse spectrum of reporting, database, and web development applications, underpinned by an exceptional grasp of data storage and virtualization technologies. His proficiency in application testing, database administration, and data cleansing ensures seamless execution of complex projects.
What sets Denis apart is his comprehensive understanding of Business and Systems Analysis technologies, honed through involvement in all phases of the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC). From meticulous requirements gathering to precise analysis, innovative design, rigorous development, thorough testing, and successful implementation, he has consistently delivered exceptional results.
Throughout his career, he has taken on multifaceted roles, from leading technical project management teams to owning solutions that drive operational excellence. His conscientious and proactive approach is unwavering, whether he is working independently or collaboratively within a team. His ability to connect with colleagues on a personal level underscores his commitment to fostering a harmonious and productive workplace environment.
Date: May 29, 2024
Tags: Information Security, ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, Artificial Intelligence, GDPR
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This presentation was provided by Steph Pollock of The American Psychological Association’s Journals Program, and Damita Snow, of The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), for the initial session of NISO's 2024 Training Series "DEIA in the Scholarly Landscape." Session One: 'Setting Expectations: a DEIA Primer,' was held June 6, 2024.
Pollock and Snow "DEIA in the Scholarly Landscape, Session One: Setting Expec...
Turning vision into impact June 2013
1. GEORGE C. MARSHALL CENTER
College of International Security Studies
Garmisch – Partenkirchen, Germany
LTC ULRICH M. JANSSEN
Email: ulrich.janssen@marshallcenter.org
LinkedIn: Ulrich Janßen
Twitter: @UliJanOgau
Phone: +49-8821-750-2658
2. Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich (“Uli”) M. JANSSEN (DEU Army)
18-Mar-22 2
Operating Environment
53 winters
1 daughter (23)
Engaged
Rhineland Oberammergau
Education
Hamburg University, Masters in Economics
Graduate of George C. Marshall European
Center for Security Studies, PASS 08-7
Information Operations Post-Graduate
Course in GBR
Strategic Communications Master Class,
University of Cambridge
> 32 years of military service
Command functions
Staff functions
Training & Education
Next to Military
Sports
Reading
Good food, red wine
Last appointments:
5 years Arms Control & Verification
CFE-Treaty, Vienna Document, Dayton Peace
Agreement
4 years JFC Brunssum
J5/9 Joint Plans - Force Planning
J2/CI - INFOSEC
2 years structure / PE review
4 years Joint Info Ops Branch
Concept Development, Plans, Requirements,
Education, Training & Exercise
1993-2007 supporting speaker
various courses
2008-2013 Course Director / Instructor
CD EW, INFO OPS, PSYOPS, STRATCOM
Instructor OPC, EW, PAO, CIMIC, CM, Orientation
Courses
Lecturer BDCOL, DEU General Staff College, UK NDA
/ Cranfield University, AUT NDA, SWE NDC, BGR
NDA, George C. Marshall Center
International conferences
June 2013 George C. Marshall Center
3. Applied Strategic Communications and Military
Information Operations
Introduction to Senior NCO Orientation Course M5-33-C
Oberammergau, 1-5 Jul 2013
TURNING VISION INTO IMPACT
4. Turning Vision Into Impact
What Vision?
Challenges in Behavioural Conflict
Strategic Communications – the proposed solution
NATO’s StratCom Framework
The desired effect … impact
Conclusion
18-Mar-22 4
5. NATO’s Vision
The Washington Treaty
“Keep the Germans down, the Americans in, and the Russians
out.” (Lord Ismay, 4 Apr 1949)
Collective Defence
Shared responsibility for security
Burden sharing
Strengthen the transatlantic link
Strategic Concept 2010
Active Engagement, Modern Defence
NATO Summit, Chicago, May 2012
5 declarations
Partnership
Smart Defence & Defence Capabilities
Countering Terrorism
Commitment in AFG post 2014
Mission specific
18-Mar-22 5
6. C2W
“Military Facts”
Peace Crisis/Conflict War Transition Post War Peace
“War is merely the continuation of politics by other means.”
Center of Gravity: enemy / enemy capabilities
Human Assistance
Civil Engagement
Reconstruction
(Marshall Plan)
IW(1970)
IO(1990)
Military Intervention in the Clausewitz’ian sense
18-Mar-22 6
8. Revolution in Technology and Enhanced Connectivity
18-Mar-22 8
"The extent, depth, and
speed of the new global
media have created a
new species of effects...
The military must understand, anticipate, and
plan for this new dynamic."
(Margaret H. Belknap, 2001)
10. “Military Facts”
Media
Social structures
Political / Civil
structures
Key Players/
Actors
Economy
Transportation
Finance
Culture
Communication
Grids
Peace Crisis/Conflict War Transition Post War Peace
People Tradition
Religion
Law
Emotions
Education
“War is merely the failure of communications by other means.” (Clausewitz adapted by UJ)
Center of Gravity: people’s perception
Info Ops(2000)
StratCom(2009)
Military Intervention in Operations other than War
18-Mar-22 10
11. People in the Focus
18-Mar-22 11
"An endless struggle will be
pursued between violence and
friendly persuasion...
And henceforth, the only
honourable course will be to stake
everything on a formidable
gamble - that WORDS are more
powerful than MUNITIONS."
Albert Camus (1913-1960)
15. Deterrence in the Social Age
18-Mar-22 15
UNCLASSIFIED
“For to win one hundred
victories in one hundred
battles is not the acme of
skill. To subdue the
enemy without fighting is
the acme of skill.”
16. Messaging and understanding right
18-Mar-22 16
…is all about getting out right messages right,
listen carefully and learn … understand!
– What’s a message?
– What’s a right message?
– What’s getting them out (and in) right ?
• Exchange of information by any
format and means
• One cannot NOT communicate!
• Translation: Whatever you do, and
how you do sends out messages.
• Understanding Perception of
your messages.
• Legality
• Legitimacy
• People’s perception of us
performing a legitimate mission.
• Right actor (sender / receiver)
• Right time
• Right place
• Right route / channel of
communication
• Right means to communicate
• Right purpose
Analysis
(Knowledge
Development)
Planning
Execution
Assessment
Comprehensive
Operations
Cycle
17. The Challenge
Did you ever try to explain to your best friend
how to play chess on your behalf?
We must replace the delusion of control by
reality of influence. (Mark Laity, CSC ACO)
Commanders, Planners, Units crash too often.
18-Mar-22 17
UNCLASSIFIED
18. The brutal simplicity of thought
Six fundamental principles for SUCCESs-ful
Communications
Simple
Unexpected
Concrete
Credible
Emotional
Stories
Building a better NATO School,
not just a bigger one.
Communication demands
18-Mar-22 18
Fit the purpose (vision / end-state)
Help … to crash less often
By better considering people’s perceptions, motivations and behaviour
They’ve got the watches, we’ve got the time!
You’re out – we’re in!
22. Managing Perception
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Influencing (deceiving) the perception of
information by all senses
…by better considering people’s perceptions, motivations
and behaviour in planning.
23. Communication by “other” means
SUCCESs
f (getting out right messages right, listen carefully and learn)
f(Ensuring Consistency and Credibility of Communications by ALL
means through Comprehensive Coordination)
f(Ensuring C powered by 5)
Military Actions speak louder than words.
… by other - potentially lethal - arguments.
Greater impact on people’s
perceptions, attitudes, behaviour.
18-Mar-22 23
23
23
23
23
24. Talking to Audiences (and Listening?)
Enemy, Conflicting Parties
Own Population,
International Community
Population
Theatre of Operations
PSYOPS
Corporate
Communication
Public
Affairs
Information
&
Persuasion
Own Troops
New Media
New Media
26. Transformation of C2 … doing our homework
Command & Control
Consult & Correct
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27. Transformation of C.. continuous improvement
18-Mar-22 27
Command &
Control
Command, Control &
Communications
Command, Control, Communications,
Computers & Intelligence Surveillance
and Reconnaissance
Consistency and
Credibility of
Communications by ALL means
through Comprehensive
Coordination
30. NATO UNCLASSIFIED
The Product powered by the Power of Information
18-Mar-22 30
P
Political
C
Civil
M
Military
E
Economic
UNCLASSIFIED
i = 0 1 i = 1 MPEC i > 1 exponentially adding value
32. Strategic Communications
Reference Documentation
NATO Strategic Communications Policy (Sep 09)
Military Concept for Strategic Communications (Aug 10)
Military Capabilities Implementation Plan (Jun 11)
Directive 95-1 on Public Affairs (May 08)
Directive 95-2 on Strategic Communications (May 12)
Directive 95-3 on Social Media (Dec 09)
ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (Dec 10)
MC 133 NATO’s Operations Planning Policy (Jan 11)
MC 402 Military Policy on Psychological Operations (Sep 12)
AJP 3.10.1 Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations (under review)
MC 422 Military Policy on Information Operations (MD Jul 12)
AJP 3.10 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (under review)
MC 457 Military Policy on Public Affairs (Jan 11)
18-Mar-22 32
33. Strategic Communications
Definition
The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO
communications activities and capabilities
• Public Diplomacy,
• Public Affairs,
• Military Public Affairs,
• Information Operations and
• Psychological Operations, as appropriate
in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and
in order to advance NATO’s aims.
PO(2009)0141, dated 29 Sep ‘09
18-Mar-22 33
34. The Vision – the Challenge
18-Mar-22 34
Public Affairs
Media Ops
Consistency and Credibility of
Communications by ALL means
through Comprehensive
Coordination.
35. Military Public
Affairs
Political
Public Diplomacy
Public Affairs
PSYOPS
EW
Operation
Security
Military
Deception
CIMIC
Computer
Network
Operations
Military
Key Leader
Engagement
Military
Information
Operations
Other
military
activities
Coordinated and appropriate use of NATO‘s
communications activities and capabilities
18-Mar-22 35
Economic
Civil
StratCom
Framework
All communication (activities) affecting people‘s perceptions, motivations, behavior.
Physical
Destruction
36. Two names, same aim
Information Operations
A staff function to
analyze,
plan,
assess and
integrate
Information Activities to create
desired effects on will,
understanding and capability of
adversaries, potential adversaries
and NAC approved audiences in
support of Alliance mission
objectives.
MC 422/4 (MD, Jun 2012)
18-Mar-22 40
M P E C
Strategic Communications
The coordinated and appropriate
use of NATO communications
activities and capabilities
Public Diplomacy,
Public Affairs,
Military Public Affairs,
Information Operations and
Psychological Operations, as
appropriate
in support of Alliance policies,
operations and activities, and in
order to advance NATO’s aims.
PO(2009)0141, dated 29 Sep ‘09
37. Strategic Communications
Aims
Implementation as a process
To ensure Consistency and Credibility of
Communications by ALL means through
Comprehensive Coordination
Linking policy with action
Avoid “Say-Do-Gap”
Perception Management at its best!
18-Mar-22 41
.gnikniht fo yaw tnereffid A
38. Mission specific strategic political guidance on information activities
NATO’s Military Approach to C5
… in just 1 graph
18-Mar-22 42
StratCom
Guidance
44. Summary
C5 in all phases of comprehensive operations
Analysis first … action last!
Understanding the Environment is a MUST!
Human Terrain Analysis and Assessment
Language of engagement
Planning for effects
Speed up own planning and decision-making
CoG is people’s perception of the legitimacy of our mission
Synchronization of effects
Execution - making the difference
Greater impact of military communications by ALL means
Target vulnerable relationships (+/-)
Assessment – are we doing right things … right?
Did actors change undesired behavior?
… because we did right things right?
Do we better understand unknown unknowns?
18-Mar-22 48
Talking on Turning Vision Into Impact the first question that comes into mind is, what vision? Why do we have NATO, and what is NATO aiming at? When NATO was founded in 1949 the vision, mission and values were pretty simple and clear.
Over more than 60 years of its existence the Alliance amended the military strategy from Deter Aggression via Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response to Active Engagement – Modern Defence. Please notice that beginning in 1949 up until 2010 the strategic concept could always be recognized and explained by just 2, now 4 simple words.
Last recent update on NATO’s vision and mission for the upcoming years has been agreed by the heads of state and governments at the Chicago Summit in May this year.
Beyond this kind of political agenda and overall strategy NATO had a vision also for a particular mission that went into people’s mind by just 4 words: Protecting Civilians in Libya.
So the vision is clear.
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Key to successful messaging, or successful communications, according to the Heath brothers in Made to Stick are these principles for SUCCESs
Simplicity
Unexpectedness
Concreteness
Credibility
Emotions
Stories
Following the principles of success will help
people pay attention,
They understand our messages right and understand why we do what we do the way we do.
They trust us being a right, i.e. authorized and legitimate messenger and agree with our motivations to act.
They care about the existing unsatisfactory situation, and agree on the need to change.
The people understand our approach to assist them in resolving the conflict.
Example from Delta Airlines adopted to NATO School… YES – it has to do with marketing, with selling our ideas! And you’ll remember the Taleban using the analogy of watches and time. – But I missed our response to it, like …
Implementing StratCom and Military Information Operations in comprehensive operations planning is challenging us, is challenging our planners, because
Our messages and the way we communicate them must fit the purpose!
So in StratCom and Military Info Ops we don't tell planners how to plan,
but we provide them with advice how to crash less often …
by considering psychological implications of what we do
on people’s perceptions, attitudes and behavior.
The ability to anticipate behavior.
The ability to anticipate what’s likely to happen next!
How does deception relate to ensuring message consistency, to StratCom and Military Info Ops? Well … it’s all about anticipating and influencing someone’s behavior by sending out right messages at the right time and place to the right people to take a desired decision, or to behave in an anticipated way.
18-Mar-22
24
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18-Mar-22
Now “clear” guidnace from political level, namly Public diplomacy division.
But still confusion on military level.
Note military puplic affairs, what did not excist before the policy
I don’t have much hope that this solves the problems, especially, because in current practice they added an additional layer
18-Mar-22
A process …
Linking the power of words with the power of military action (the military way of communicating our messages)
Ensuring message consistency from political – strategic levels, i.e. x-governmental as well as transnational through military – strategic and joint force or operational levels to the tactical level and beyond to the individual communicator.
Avoid the Say do Gap … not the gap between what we say and what we do, but between what NATO says and does vs. what AUDIENCES perceive we’re saying and doing.
A different way of thinking … a mental challenge … from planning an operation to kill (or capture) the enemy to planning for managing the risk to fail in messaging. From a situation when decisions for the future were made based on what we learned in the past, to decisions for the future made on what we don’t know, or what’s likely to happen next.
Simply speaking we’re still afraid of loosing control… and what’s needed is perception management at its best.