This document recommends an insight/oversight model for NASA's Commercial Crew Program. It suggests using technical expert engagement similar to other programs, with a focus on high-risk subsystems. The model includes discrete oversight at key decision points rather than continuous oversight. Insight teams would provide expertise and recommendations, while the Program Office makes oversight decisions.

1. Commercial Crew
Insight/Oversight Model
Recommendations
Frank H. Bauer
Project Management Challenge
February 9-10, 2011
www.nasa.gov

2. Overview
Objective
Develop an insight/oversight model that will contribute to the
safe flight and safe return of NASA crew members on
commercial space vehicles
Co-Leads
Wayne Hale/DAA SOMD-Strategic Partnerships
Frank Bauer/ESMD Chief Engineer
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3. Approach
Survey different insight/oversight models (Human Space
Flight, Launch Services Program, Robotic Spacecraft,
COTS, Commercial)
Factor in results from Constellation Insight/Oversight study
team and NESC Hybrid Team Model White Paper
Address Technical Authority Engagement, FAA
engagement and review team requirements
Develop insight/oversight engagement strategy proposal
Obtain feedback & advice on proposed strategy from
agency senior leaders, crew office, key stakeholders
Vet final product through HSF Mission Directorates, OCE,
OSMA, OCHMO, Crew Office, CxP Insight/Oversight team,
JSC Engineering
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4. Insight and Oversight Definitions
Insight
The capacity to discern the true nature of the project’s efforts to
design, develop, test and operate the vehicle system.
It is NASA’s ability to penetrate into the commercial crew
provider’s processes and their vehicle design, development, test
and operations in an effort to certify the vehicle for human
spaceflight operations and to improve the safety of operations
and mission success.
Oversight
The watchful and responsible care and management of the
commercial crew development, test and operations efforts. This
is accomplished through overseeing the performance of the
provider’s vehicle design, development and test efforts and their
ability to certify their vehicle for safe human transportation. As
such, there are elements of oversight which will require
government approval and/or direction.
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5. Spectrum of Insight/Oversight Models
Low/No In/Oversight Medium In/Oversight Intense In/Oversight
Human
Scientific & Commercial Spacecraft--Contracted
Spaceflight
~1:250-1:10 ~1:10-1:4
COTS & Launch Services
CRS Program
~1:17
~1:80-1:20
Key: 1:XX represents the approximate government/industry headcount ratio

6. Insight and Technical Engagement
Overview
Insight Model
Utilize technical expert engagement, and technical reach-back approach
similar to that used on the Launch Services Program, robotic spacecraft
projects and COTS Advisory Team
Use NESC approach to temporarily bring in experts to resolve major issues
and ramp down expertise when complete—results in a more efficient use
of NASA’s technical resources
Government/industry partnership—must have Civil Servants on contractor
floor
• Facilitates much better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of vehicle
design, build, test & operations--in line with NASA insight on Mercury, Gemini and
Apollo
In-depth government subsystem penetration which varies temporally and
based on historic failure risk, contractor subsystem expertise, and design
challenges
• Core team follows design, development, test and verification
• Assigns right experts at the right time
• More experts assigned on challenging, high risk areas (e.g. abort systems,
etc)
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7. Commercial Crew
Temporal Insight Support Recommendation
Insight
Support Problem Resolution Team Example
Sustaining
Insight
Mission Preliminary Critical Mate Launch
Concept Design Design Review
Review Review Review
Key Decision Points
In addition to Sustaining Engineering Expertise, Cadre of Agency Experts
Brought in at Key Decision Points to Thoroughly Review and Critique Design 7

8. Risk-Informed Subsystem Engagement
Based on perceived vehicle risk and historic failures,
concentrate/augment insight in key areas:
Risk-informed Concentration Propulsion
54% Pneumatics and
Propulsion hydraulics
3%
GN&C
Operational
ordnance
6%
Avionics Structures
6%
Software Electrical systems
Guidance and
9% Software and
Electrical navigation systems
13% computing systems
1980 -2007 9%
Crew Systems
Worldwide Launch Failure Causes
Separation Systems Reference: FAA Launch Vehicle Failure Mode Database, May 2007
Nominal Concentration
(e.g. Power Thermal, Structures, Mission Operations, Ground
Operations, PRA Experts, ECLS, Suit)
These Experts and the Systems Engineering Team
Comprise the Government Sustaining Insight Team
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9. Clarifications
Contractors supporting government employees, program
management, and programmatic administration personnel all
book-kept under government side of insight/oversight models
Ramp-up and Ramp-down of agency experts to support key
milestone reviews and problem resolution teams is an essential
component of this model
• Will require good coordination between program office and agency
institutional expert pool; work prioritization
• NASA has many good examples of this approach working for Human
Spaceflight, Launch Services and Robotic Spacecraft
• NESC represents the best example of this model working for NASA’s better
good
Government lab independent testing not included at this time
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10. Oversight Decision Strategy
Oversight Model
NASA Oversight Decisions and Direction performed only when absolutely
necessary---discrete oversight vs. current near-continuous oversight
Follow well defined and documented design rules and processes—(e.g.
GSFC Golden Rules, mandatory design and fabrication requirements)
Requires Strong NASA Leadership that will implement discrete oversight
strategy—Project Manager, Chief Engineer, Chief Safety Officer & Systems
Engineering
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11. Government Oversight Models
Oversight Decisions
& Direction
Current (Near -Continuous) Oversight Model
MCR PDR CDR Mate Launch
Oversight Decisions Review Lifecycle Timeline
& Direction
Commercial Crew (Discrete) Oversight Model
MCR PDR CDR Mate Launch
Review Lifecycle Timeline
Development Production & Ops
Oversight Decisions and Direction Substantially Less
and More Focused in Commercial Crew Model 11

12. Commercial Crew Program and Projects
Government Insight/Oversight Teams
Commercial Crew
Role: Makes Government
Program Office Oversight Decisions
Oversight Team
Project A Project B Project C Project D
Insight Team Insight Team Insight Team Insight Team
Role: Expert Insight, Early Issue Identification & Oversight Recommendations
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13. Government-Commercial
Insight/Oversight Interactions
Program Office Commercial Crew
Oversight Team Discrete Provider
Oversight
Decisions &
Understanding & Direction
Oversight
Recommendations
Insight
Project
Embedded
Insight Team Penetration, Team
Collaboration,
& Influence
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14. Technical Authority Engagement
Technical Authorities, ISS Rep, Crew Office Rep and FAA Rep are
embedded, matrixed from home organizations as the Systems
Engineering Team leaders
Leadership roles include Chief Engineer (OCE TA), Chief Safety
Officer (OSMA TA), Chief Health/Medical (OCHMO TA), ISS Rep
(ensures ISS Safety and Requirements Compliance), Crew Office
Rep (ensures crew safety, vehicle compatibility with crew, and
crew training approach) and FAA Rep (ensures FAA requirements
compliance)
Additional cadre of senior systems experts support systems
engineering leadership team and perform SE oversight
TAs will work with Program and Agency to appropriately tailor
7120/7123 and NASA requirements and standards to support the
commercial crew model
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15. NASA Participation in Major Reviews
Civil Servant Sustaining Insight/Oversight Team, consisting of
systems engineers, relevant subsystem experts, and cognizant
FAA experts, serve as members of NASA Review Team (NRT)
NASA Review Team is augmented with other independent
experts from NASA, FAA or industry as appropriate
Technical, Cost, Schedule presented to NASA Review Team at
Key Decision Points, in-line with NPR 7120.5 and NPR 7123
requirements
NRT review products include key findings, concerns, actions and
recommendations, similar to Key Decision Point (KDP) milestone
decision products
NRT contract reach-in primarily limited to supporting major
reviews, as compared to current, more continuous Standing
Review Board (SRB) model
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16. Insight/Oversight Model Recommendation
Low/No In/Oversight Medium In/Oversight Intense In/Oversight
Human
Scientific & Commercial Spacecraft--Contracted
Spaceflight
~1:250-1:10 ~1:10-1:4
Commercial
Crew
Insight-
Oversight
COTS & Launch Services “Sweet
CRS
~1:17
Program Spot”
~1:80-1:20
Key: 1:XX represents the approximate government/industry headcount ratio

17. Summary
Overall Summary
Examined NASA’s safety and mission reliability role in the commercial
spaceflight market and explored and recommended an insight/oversight
model for commercial crew systems
Provides recommendations for the right balance of civil servant workforce
insight/oversight that will contribute to the safe flight & return of NASA crew
members on commercial vehicles
Key Message
Recommendations represent a Huge Culture Shift in NASA’s development of
Human Spaceflight Vehicles
Culture changes require outstanding, effective culture change leadership
within the commercial crew leadership team to move the agency on the right
course
To be successful, team must simultaneously embrace criticality of safe,
reliable flight and adopt insight/oversight changes necessary to accomplish
in a commercial crew environment
Crucial for agency senior leadership to invest time---early and often—to
guide and mentor the NASA commercial crew teams to be successful in this
culture change endeavor. Culture change inertia can only be overcome
through actively engaged senior leadership setting the proper course 17

18. Backup

19. Acknowledgements
Ralph Roe/NESC
Alan Lindenmoyer/C3PO
Geoff Yoder/ESMD
Marc Timm/ESMD
Mike Ryschkewitsch/OCE
Bryan O’Connor/OSMA
Engineering Management Board (EMB) and Safety and Mission
Assurance team members
Mark Geyer and Mark Kirasich/Orion Project
Kathy Leuders and Amy Stencil/ISS CRS Project
CxP Insight/Oversight Assessment Subteam
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20. Forward Work
1) NASA needs to develop a well defined decision authority with
clearly defined roles and responsibilities (ESMD, SOMD, program,
project, agency institution, other)
2) NASA Governance Model has potential for being an
insight/oversight driver
• Need to tailor NPR 7120/7123/8705.2 early in program formulation
• Full complement of design, fabrication and test standards, processes and
requirements need to be defined and negotiated between the project and the
institution
• Direct or Perceived role of Technical Authorities critical in option development
3) Certification of Flight Readiness Process a critical driver
• CoFR signatories will require more or less insight depending on how this
process is structured.
• Need to define CoFR process early-on to guide assignment of accountability
• This should be a high priority effort
• Factor in lessons learned from OSP
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21. Forward Work (Continued)
4) Procurement must be structured to enable badge-less government
“in-reach” by the insight team and strong financial incentives
which shift mission success to the provider and their suppliers as
an accountable deliverable
5) Crucial to identify clear goals, objectives, requirements, and
vehicle operability (ground and flight operations) constraints early
6) Once the vendor is selected, the early identification of risks (cost,
schedule, technical, safety) will drive oversight model FTE
requirements
7) Development, prior to provider selection, of a compiled list of pre-
declared independent analyses to be performed by the insight
team and test verifications that will be reviewed by the insight
team.
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