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S. EDGARDO AND NATIVIDAD FIDEL,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF THE LATE
PRIMITIVO ESPINELI, namely, JOSEFINA, PATRICIO and
LEONARDO, all surnamed ESPINELI,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 168263
Present:
QUISUMBING,J.
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO MORALES
TINGA,and
VELASCO, JR.,
Promulgated:
July 21, 2008
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- - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks to reverse the Decision
[1]
dated November 22,
2004 and the Resolution
[2]
dated May 27, 2005of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71996. The appellate court had affirmed with modification the
Decision
[3]
datedFebruary 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 15,
Naic, Cavite in Civil Case No. NC-652-95, annulling the sale in favor of the
petitioners Edgardo and Natividad Fidel of a 150-square meter parcel of unregistered
land located at San Miguel Street, Indang, Cavite and owned by the late Vicente
Espineli.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On February 21, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint
[4]
for Annulment of
Sale, Tax Declaration, Reconveyance with Damages against the
petitioners Edgardo and Natividad Fidel and Guadalupe Espineli-Cruz before the
RTC, Branch 15, Naic,Cavite. In their complaint, respondents alleged that they are
compulsory heirs of Primitivo Espineli, the only child of Vicente and his first wife,
Juliana Asas. Respondents further alleged that they discovered that the
abovementioned parcel of land owned by the late Vicente was sold on October 7,
1994 to the petitioners despite the fact that Vicente died intestate on June 4, 1941.
They argue that the sale is void and simulated because Vicente’s signature appearing
on the deed of sale is a forgery.
In her Answer,
[5]
Guadalupe, the only surviving child of Vicente and his
second wife, Pacencia Romea, denied any knowledge of the deed of sale allegedly
signed by Vicente. She, however, admitted selling the property but by virtue of
another deed of sale signed by her as heir of Vicente and in representation of her
nephews and nieces who are children of her deceased siblings, all children of Vicente
and Pacencia. She further denied knowledge of Vicente’s alleged first marriage with
Juliana Asas. She argues that the heirs of Primitivo must first establish their filiation
from Vicente, prior to instituting the complaint for annulment of sale. Guadalupe
further stresses that the petitioners Fidel have been able to register the sale of the
property and to obtain Tax Declaration No. 16304
[6]
in their name.
On February 20, 2001, the RTC ruled in respondents’ favor. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows:
1. Ordering the annulment of the sale in favor of the
defendants spouses Edgardo and Natividad Fidel
of the property in litigation;
2. Ordering the Regis[ter] of Deeds and/or the
Provincial Assessor of Cavite to cancel the
registration and/or Tax Declaration No. 16304,
Series of 1995;
3. Ordering the defendants spouses Edgardo and
Natividad Fidel to cause the reconveyance of the
property to Vicente Espineli and/or his heirs for
disposition subject to the laws of intestacy;
4. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally, to
pay the plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
5. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally, to
reimburse the plaintiffs their expenses for litigation
in the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
6. And to pay costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[7]
On November 22, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
RTC Decision as follows:
Accordingly, the subject property should be reconveyed
to the Estate of the late Vicente Espineli but the proper
proceedings should be instituted to determine the latter’s heirs,
and if appropriate, to partition the subject property.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
DECISION is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the foregoing
MODIFICATION. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[8]
Thus, the instant petition by the spouses Edgardo and Natividad Fidel,
alleging that the appellate court:
I.
… ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT, CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
HAVE NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO INSTITUTE THE
ACTION. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MUST FIRST ESTABLISH
THE SAME IN PROPER ACTION TO PROVE THEIR
FILIATION. LACK OF SUCH DETERMINATION ON THE ISSUE
OF FILIATION ON SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT ACTION,
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NO LEGAL PERSONALITY
TO INSTITUTE THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF SALE,
CONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES.
II.
… LIKEWISE COMMITTED ERROR IN RECOGNIZING AND/OR
ADMITTING THE BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE OF PRIMITIVO
ESPINELI AS PROOF OF FILIATION THAT [VICENTE ESPINELI
IS HIS FATHER].
III.
… ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S
FEES, CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MUST
FIRST INSTITUTE A SEPARATE ACTION TO PROVE THEIR
FILIATION.
[9]
Respondents for their part raise the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE
SUFFICIENTLY CLOTHED WITH LEGAL PERSONALITY TO
FILE THE PRESENT ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF SALE,
RECONVEYANCE WITH DAMAGES WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO
INSTITUTING A SEPARATE ACTION TO ESTABLISH
FILIATION AND HEIRSHIP IN A SEPARATE [PROCEEDING].
II.

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ASSUMING PETITIONERS HAVE PERSONALITY TO RAISE
THE ISSUE OF FILIATION, WHETHER OR NOT THE
BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE OF PRIMITIVO ESPINELI IS VALID
AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF HIS FILIATION AS CHILD
OF VICENTE ESPINELI.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY BY
GUADALUPE TO PETITIONERS FIDEL IS VALID UNDER THE
PRINCIPLE OF BUYER IN GOOD FAITH.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAS NO
BASIS SINCE A [SEPARATE] ACTION TO PROVE THEIR
FILIATION SHOULD FIRST BE FILED.
[10]
Briefly stated, the issues for our resolution are: (1) Do respondents have
the legal personality to file the complaint for annulment of title? (2) Is the baptismal
certificate of Primitivo valid and competent evidence to prove his filiation by Vicente?
(3) Are petitioners buyers in good faith? and (4) Is the award of attorney’s fees and
damages to respondents proper?
At the outset, we entertain no doubt that the first deed of sale, allegedly
signed by Vicente, is void because his signature therein is a patent forgery. Records
show he died in 1941, but the deed of sale was allegedly signed on October 7,
1994. Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and
void from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy;
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or
fictitious;
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the
time of the transaction;
(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of
men;
(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;
(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative
to the principal object of the contract cannot be ascertained;
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by
law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the
right to set up the defense of illegality be waived. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As for the deed of sale signed by Guadalupe as heir of Vicente and in
representation of her nephews and nieces, petitioners insist that the sale is valid
because respondents have no legal personality to file the complaint, the latter not
having established their filiation by Vicente. They argue that respondents first need to
establish their filiation by Vicente prior to instituting a complaint in a separate action,
and not in the present action. On the other hand, respondents contend that their
filiation was established by the baptismal certificate of their father, Primitivo, showing
that Primitivo is the son of Vicente.
On this point we rule in favor of respondents.
While respondents’ principal action was for the annulment of the sale and
not an action to impugn one’s legitimacy and that one’s legitimacy can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, it is necessary to pass
upon the relationship of respondents to the deceased Vicente for the purpose of
determining what legal rights respondents have in the property. In fact, the issue of
whether or not respondents are heirs of Vicente was squarely raised by petitioners in
their Pre-Trial Brief
[11]
filed on April 26, 1995, before the trial court, hence they are now
estopped from assailing the trial court’s ruling on respondents’ status. In the similar
case of Fernandez v. Fernandez,
[12]
the Supreme Court held:
It must be noted that the respondents’ principal action
was for the declaration of absolute nullity of two documents,
namely: deed of extra-judicial partition and deed of absolute sale,
and not an action to impugn one’s legitimacy. The respondent
court ruled on the filiation of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez in order
to determine Rodolfo’s right to the deed of extra-judicial partition
as the alleged legitimate heir of the spouses Fernandez. While

4. 4 | P a g e
we are aware that one’s legitimacy can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, this doctrine has no application in the instant
case considering that respondents’ claim was that
petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased
spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez; we do not have a
situation wherein they (respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a
child of their uncle’s wife. . . .
x x x x
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the
relationship of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez to the
deceased spouses Fernandez for the purpose of
determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the property
subject of the extra-judicial partition. In fact, the issue of
whether or not Rodolfo Fernandez was the son of the deceased
spouses Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was squarely
raised by petitioners in their pre-trial brief filed before the trial
court, hence they are now estopped from assailing the trial court’s
ruling on Rodolfo’s status.
[13]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners nonetheless contend that Primitivo’s baptismal certificate is
neither a public document nor a conclusive proof of the legitimate filiation by Vicente
of Primitivo, the respondents’ father. We find petitioners’ contention lacking in merit,
hence we reject it.
Records show that Primitivo was born in 1895. At that time, the only
records of birth are those which appear in parochial records. This Court has held that
as to the nature and character of the entries contained in the parochial books and the
certificates thereof issued by a parish priest, the same have not lost their character of
being public documents for the purpose of proving acts referred to therein, inasmuch
as from the time of the change of sovereignty in the Philippines to the present day, no
law has been enacted abolishing the official and public character of parochial books
and entries made therein. Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of the
parochial books kept during the former sovereignty, and as such they may issue
certified copies of the entries contained therein in the same manner as do keepers of
archives.
[14]
The baptismal certificate of Primitivo is, therefore, a valid and competent
evidence to prove his filiation by Vicente.
Accordingly, we uphold the Court of Appeals ruling that the subject property
should be reconveyed to the Estate of the late Vicente Espineli and proper
proceedings be instituted to determine the latter’s heirs, and, if appropriate, to partition
the subject property.
Anent the third issue, can petitioners be considered buyers in good
faith? Our ruling on this point is: no, they cannot be considered buyers in good faith.
For we find that petitioners were only able to register the sale of the property and Tax
Declaration No. 16304 in their name; they did not have a Torrens title. Unlike a title
registered under the Torrens System, a tax declaration does not constitute
constructive notice to the whole world. The issue of good faith or bad faith of a buyer
is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered land but not where the
property is an unregistered land.
[15]
However, on the issue of actual and moral damages and attorney’s fees
awarded by the trial court to respondents, we find the award bereft of factual basis. A
party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss or losses
actually suffered by him which he has duly proven. Such damages, to be recoverable,
must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. Attorney’s fees should
therefore be deleted for lack of factual basis and legal justification.
[16]
Moral damages
should likewise not be awarded since respondents did not show proof of moral
suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, nor wounded
feelings and social humiliation.
[17]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated November 22, 2004 and the Resolution dated May 27, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71996 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees
be DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

5. 5 | P a g e
______________________
ERNESTO L. SALAS, G.R. No. 157766
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
*
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
STA. MESA MARKET
CORPORATION and the HEIRS
OF PRIMITIVO E. DOMINGO,
**
Respondents. Promulgated:
July 12, 2007
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D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari
[1]
seeks to set aside the April 30, 2001
decision of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50888
[2]
and its April 3, 2003
resolution denying reconsideration.
In a letter-agreement
[3]
dated October 15, 1984, Primitivo E. Domingo handed the
management of his estate, including the respondent corporation Sta. Mesa Market
Corporation (SMMC), to petitioner Ernesto L. Salas.
[4]
As estate manager, petitioner
was primarily tasked to ensure SMMC's continued viability and profitability by
redeveloping the Sta. Mesa market and restructuring the corporation's finances.
[5]
Domingo, on the other hand, bound himself to transfer (on or before June 30, 1985)
[6]
30% of SMMC's subscribed and paid-up capital stock to petitioner as part of his
compensation. But, if petitioner failed to achieve a monthly market revenue of at
least P350,000, he would be obliged to return the shares of stock of SMMC to
Domingo.
[7]
On December 28, 1984, Domingo, as chairman of SMMC, and petitioner, in his
personal capacity and as chairman of Inter-Alia Management Corporation (Inter-Alia),
formalized their agreement under a property and financial management contract
(management contract).
[8]
Shortly after the execution of the contract, SMMC, under petitioner's
management, leased the Sta. Mesa market to Malaca Realty Corporation (Malaca).
[9]
But it became apparent soon thereafter that Malaca was financially incapable of
improving and expanding the existing facilities of the Sta. Mesa market.
[10]
In fact, it
was unable to pay the monthly rent.
[11]
Thus, SMMC terminated its lease contract with
Malaca.
[12]
As a result, its board of directors became dissatisfied with petitioner's
management of the corporation. Thereafter, it ended its management contract with
petitioner (and Inter-Alia).
[13]
On June 8, 1987, petitioner filed an action for specific performance and
damages
[14]
against SMMC and Domingo
[15]
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City.
[16]
He alleged that SMMC's monthly market revenue had
surpassed P350,000 yet Domingo refused to comply with his obligation to deliver 30%
of the subscribed and paid-up capital stock of SMMC to him.
[17]
In his answer,
[18]
Domingo argued that petitioner was not entitled to the shares of
SMMC. On the contrary, the corporation suffered additional losses and incurred new

6. 6 | P a g e
liabilities (which respondents consistently itemized in their pleadings) amounting
to P1,935,995.06 over the twenty-one (21) months petitioner was managing it.
[19]
On August 21, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
[20]
The
trial court considered copies of SMMC's audited financial statements which showed an
improvement in the corporation's monthly average gross income (from P251,790 in
1984 to P409,794 in 1985). It found that petitioner not only increased SMMC's monthly
gross income but also exceeded the target monthly gross income of P350,000.
[21]
Hence, it ordered respondent heirs to deliver the shares of SMMC (equivalent to
30% of its total subscribed and paid-up capital stocks) to petitioner.
[22]
Respondent heirs appealed the judgment of the RTC to the CA. On April 30,
2001, the appellate court rendered its decision. It found that the trial court erred in
admitting petitioner's documentary evidence. According to the CA, petitioner failed to
prove the authenticity of the audited financial statements. He did not present a
representative of SMMC's external auditor, Bejarin Jimenez & Co., to testify on the
genuineness and due execution of the audited financial statements of SMMC. Instead,
petitioner presented a memorandum prepared by a member of his management team
attesting to the increase in the corporation's monthly market revenue. For this reason,
the appellate court ruled that the audited financial statements were not only self-
serving but also hearsay.
[23]
Thus, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed
petitioner's complaint.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied.
[24]
Thus, this
petition.
Petitioner avers that Amado Domingo, a vice-president of SMMC and an heir of
the deceased Primitivo E. Domingo, testified that the audited financial statements
presented in court were copies of those submitted by SMMC to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for purposes of
tax payments and compliance with reportorial requirements, respectively.
[25]
Therefore,
Amado Domingo, in effect, admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
documents which made authentication unnecessary.
Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the audited financial statements
were inadmissible in evidence due to lack of proper authentication.
[26]
We agree with the CA.
The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial
statements of SMMC. Financial statements (which include the balance sheet, income
statement and statement of cash flow) show the fiscal condition of a particular entity
within a specified period. The financial statements prepared by external auditors who
are certified public accountants (like those presented by petitioner) are audited
financial statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as general
rule, private documents.
[27]
However, once financial statements are filed with a
government office pursuant to a provision of law,
[28]
they become public documents.
[29]
Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility
as evidence. Public documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof
of their due execution and genuineness.
[30]
On the other hand, private documents are
inadmissible in evidence unless they are properly authenticated.
[31]
Section 20, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
a. By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
b. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed
to be.

7. 7 | P a g e
Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as evidence were
mere copies of the audited financial statements submitted to the BIR and SEC.
Neither party claimed that copies presented were certified true copies
[32]
of audited
financial statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which under
Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have been public documents. Thus, the statements
presented were private documents. Consequently, authentication was a precondition
to their admissibility in evidence.
During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document
presented as evidence is genuine and has been duly executed
[33]
or that the document
is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under duress.
[34]
In this
case, petitioner merely presented a memorandum attesting to the increase in the
corporation's monthly market revenue, prepared by a member of his management
team. While there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to
establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof available must be
presented.
[35]
The best proof available, in this instance, would have been the
testimony of a representative of SMMC's external auditor who prepared the audited
financial statements. Inasmuch as there was none, the audited financial statements
were never authenticated.
Nevertheless, petitioner insists on the application of an exception to this rule:
authentication is not necessary where the adverse party has admitted the
genuineness and due execution of a document.
[36]
The fact, however, was that
nowhere in his testimony did Amado Domingo categorically admit the authenticity of
the copies of the audited financial statements. He only testified that SMMC regularly
submitted its audited financial statements to the BIR and SEC.
[37]
There was never any
admission that the documents presented by petitioner were true or faithful copies of
those submitted to the BIR and the SEC.
[38]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April 30, 2001 decision
and April 3, 2003 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50888 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
__________________
OTHER CASES 19-40
PHILIP S. YU, G.R. No. 154115
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Second Division, and VIVECA
LIM YU, Promulgated:
Respondents.
November 29, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
This treats of the petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’
Decision and Resolution in CA G.R. SP No. 66252 dated 30 April 2002
[1]
and 27 June

8. 8 | P a g e
2002,
[2]
respectively, which set aside theOrder of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City
[3]
dated 10 May 2001, declaring an application for insurance and an
insurance policy as inadmissible evidence.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
On 15 March 1994, Viveca Lim Yu (private respondent) brought against her husband,
Philip Sy Yu (petitioner), an action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal
partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse. The case was filed
before the RTC of Pasig and raffled to Branch 158, presided by Judge Jose R.
Hernandez.
During trial, private respondent moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum and ad testificandum
[4]
to certain officers of Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. to
compel production of the insurance policy and application of a person suspected to be
petitioner’s illegitimate child.
[5]
The trial court denied the motion.
[6]
It ruled that the
insurance contract is inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-2000,
issued by the Insurance Commission which presumably prevents insurance
companies/agents from divulging confidential and privileged information pertaining to
insurance policies.
[7]
It added that the production of the application and insurance
contract would violate Article 280
[8]
of the Civil Code and Section 5 of the Civil Registry
Law,
[9]
both of which prohibit the unauthorized identification of the parents of an
illegitimate child.
[10]
Private respondent sought reconsideration of the Order, but the
motion was denied by the trial court.
[11]
Aggrieved, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of Judge Hernandez in issuing the 10 May 2001 Order.
[12]
The Court of
Appeals summarized the issues as follows: (i) whether or not an insurance policy and
its corresponding application form can be admitted as evidence to prove a party’s
extra-marital affairs in an action for legal separation; and (ii) whether or not a trial
court has the discretion to deny a party’s motion to attach excluded evidence to the
record under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
[13]
According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent was merely seeking the
production of the insurance application and contract, and was not yet offering the
same as part of her evidence. Thus, it declared that petitioner’s objection to the
admission of the documents was premature, and the trial court’s pronouncement that
the documents are inadmissible, precipitate.
[14]
The contents of the insurance
application and insurance documents cannot be considered as privileged information,
the Court of Appeals added, in view of the opinion of the Insurance Commissioner
dated 4 April 2001 to the effect that Circular Letter No.11-2000 “was never intended to
be a legal impediment in complying with lawful orders”.
[15]
Lastly, the Court of Appeals
ruled that a trial court does not have the discretion to deny a party’s privilege to tender
excluded evidence, as this privilege allows said party to raise on appeal the exclusion
of such evidence.
[16]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but to no avail.
In the present petition, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals blundered in
delving into errors of judgment supposedly committed by the trial court as if the
petition filed therein was an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action. Further, he
claims that the Court of Appeals failed to show any specific instance of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the assailed Order. Additionally, he
posits that private respondent had already mooted her petition before the Court of
Appeals when she filed her formal offer of rebuttal exhibits, with tender of excluded
evidence before the trial court.
[17]
For her part, private respondent maintains that the details surrounding the
insurance policy are crucial to the issue of petitioner’s infidelity and his financial
capacity to provide support to her and their children. Further, she argues that she had
no choice but to make a tender of excluded evidence considering that she was left to
speculate on what the insurance application and policy ruled out by the trial court
would contain.
[18]
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to correct errors of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
committed by a lower court.
[19]
Where a respondent does not have the legal power to
determine the case and yet he does so, he acts without jurisdiction; where, “being

9. 9 | P a g e
clothed with power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by
law, he is performing a function in excess of jurisdiction.”
[20]
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals passed upon errors of judgment, not
errors of jurisdiction, since it delved into the propriety of the denial of the subpoena
duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum. The argument must fail.
While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is
exercised only when the evidence has been formally offered.
[21]
For a long time, the
Court has recognized that during the early stages of the development of proof, it is
impossible for a trial court judge to know with certainty whether evidence is relevant or
not, and thus the practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality should be avoided.
[22]
As well elucidated in the case of Prats & Co. v.
Phoenix Insurance Co.:
[23]
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he presides
a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof
where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made
and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds
itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without
returning the case for a new trial, — a step which this court is always very loath to
take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the
question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much
harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is its
duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from
the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to
the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the material before it
necessary to make a correct judgment.
In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy were yet to be
presented in court, much less formally offered before it. In fact, private respondent
was merely asking for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad
testificandum when the trial court issued the assailed Order. Even assuming that the
documents would eventually be declared inadmissible, the trial court was not then in a
position to make a declaration to that effect at that point. Thus, it barred the
production of the subject documents prior to the assessment of its probable worth. As
observed by petitioners, the assailed Order was not a mere ruling on the admissibility
of evidence; it was, more importantly, a ruling affecting the proper conduct of trial.
[24]
Excess of jurisdiction refers to any act which although falling within the general powers
of the judge is not authorized and is consequently void with respect to the particular
case because the conditions under which he was only authorized to exercise his
general power in that case did not exist and therefore, the judicial power was not
legally exercised.
[25]
Thus, in declaring that the documents are irrelevant and
inadmissible even before they were formally offered, much less presented before it,
the trial court acted in excess of its discretion.
Anent the issue of whether the information contained in the documents is privileged in
nature, the same was clarified and settled by the Insurance Commissioner’s opinion
that the circular on which the trial court based its ruling was not designed to obstruct
lawful court orders.
[26]
Hence, there is no more impediment to presenting the
insurance application and policy.
Petitioner additionally claims that by virtue of private respondent’s tender of
excluded evidence, she has rendered moot her petition before the Court of Appeals
since the move evinced that she had another speedy and adequate remedy under the
law. The Court holds otherwise.
Section 40, Rule 132 provides:
Sec.40. Tender of excluded evidence.—If documents or things offered in
evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or
made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the
record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance
of the proposed testimony.

10. 10 | P a g e
It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded evidence is made, the evidence
must have been formally offered before the court. And before formal offer of
evidence is made, the evidence must have been identified and presented before the
court. While private respondent made a “Tender of Excluded Evidence,” such is not
the tender contemplated by the above-quoted rule, for obviously, the insurance policy
and application were not formally offered much less presented before the trial court.
At most, said “Tender of Excluded Evidence” was a

11. 11 | P a g e
manifestation of an undisputed fact that the subject documents were declared
inadmissible by the trial court even before these were presented during trial. It was
not the kind of plain, speedy and adequate remedy which private respondent could
have resorted to instead of the petition for certiorari she filed before the Court of
Appeals. It did not in any way render the said petition moot.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 30
April 2002 andResolution dated 27 June 2002 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
______________
G.R. No. 151944. January 20, 2004]
ENGR. ERNESTO T. MATUGAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ROBERT LYNDON S. BARBERS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
The Local Government Code of 1991
[1]
requires that an elective local official be a
citizen of the Philippines.
[2]
Whether the incumbent Governor of Surigao del Norte is a
citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, qualified to hold such office is the issue in this
case.
On February 28, 2001, private respondent Robert Lyndon S. Barbers filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Surigao del Norte for the May
14, 2001 elections. On April 10, 2001, petitioner Ernesto T. Matugas, himself a
candidate for the same post, filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
a Petition to Disqualify private respondent as candidate. The Petition alleged, among
other grounds, that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
In support of this claim, petitioner offered in evidence a copy of a letter-request dated
August 25, 2000 from a certain Jesus Agana, a “confidential agent” of the Bureau of
Immigration, addressed to one George Clarke, purportedly of the United States
Embassy. Below the request was the reply of said George Clarke stating that the
“subject” was naturalized as an American citizen on October 11, 1991 in Los Angeles,
California. The document
[3]
reads:
Dear Mr. Clark [sic]:
Per our phone conversation, may I request for [sic] a certification from your Embassy
regarding the US citizenship of MR. ROBERT LYNDON S. BARBERS who was born
on July 15, 1968.
Kindly fax your reply, addressed to the undersigned at Tel. No. (02) 3384456.
Thank you and regards.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
JESUS AGANA
Confidential Agent
Jesus Agana:
SUBJECT was naturalized on October 11, 1991 in Los Angeles, CA.
(Sgd.)
G.R. Clarke, INS/Manila
Petitioner also presented a Certification
[4]
issued by the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) dated 1 September 2000 containing Barbers’ travel records and
indicating in certain entries that private respondent is an American
citizen. The Certification states:
CERTIFICATION
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT the name BARBERS, ROBERT LYNDON S,
American, appears in our available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM
listing on file as of September 1, 2000 10:27 am with the following travel records:
Date of Departure : 01/28/1997
Destination : OSA-Osaka
Flight No. : NWo26-Northwest Airlines
Passport No. : 034354245
Nationality : Filipino
Date of Birth : 07/15/1968
Phil. Address : 6 Hercules St. Bel Air II Makati
Immig. Status : RP
Immig. Officer : not stated

12. 12 | P a g e
Date of Arrival : 02/12/1998
Origin : LON-London
Flight No. : PR731-Phil. Airlines
Passport No. : 034354245
Nationality : American
Date of Birth : American
Phil. Address : 6 Hercules St. Bel Air II Makati
Immig. Status : BB365
Immig. Officer : REGALA
Date of Arrival : 07/31/1998
Origin : BKK-Bangkok
Flight No. : TG620-Thai Airways
Passport No. : OF006673
Nationality : American
Date of Birth : 07/15/1968
Phil. Address : 16 Hercules St. Bel Air II Makati
Immig. Status : BB365
Immig. Officer : SOR
FURTHER, THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT the name BARBERS, ROBERT
LYNDON SMITH, American, appears in our Computer Database/Passenger
manifest/IBM listing on file with the following travel records:
Date of Departure : 07/27/1998
Destination : not available
Flight No. : TG621-Thai Airways
Passport No. : not available
Nationality : Filipino
Date of Birth : 07/15/1968
Phil. Address : not available
Immig. Status : not available
Immig. Officer : RACHO
This certification is issued upon request of Mr. Bebot Pomoy for whatever legal
purpose it may serve.
Verified by : Edilberto Orbase Computer Section
Date & Time : September 1, 2000 10:27 am
(Sgd.)
ATTY. FELINO C. QUIRANTE, JR.
Acting Chief, Admin. Division
In addition, petitioner submitted a Certification
[5]
issued by the Special Committee on
Naturalization of the Office of the Solicitor General stating that, based on their records,
there is no pending petition by private respondent for repatriation. Neither has one
been granted in his favor.
In the meantime, private respondent garnered the highest number of votes in the
gubernatorial race. On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed aMotion for
Suspension/Annulment of Proclamation of private respondent. The Motion, however,
was overtaken by subsequent events when, on the following day, May 18, 2001,
private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected governor of Surigao del Norte.
On July 5, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued
a Resolution dismissing for lack of merit the Petition to Disqualify. The COMELEC
found “little or no probative value” in the notation of George Clarke to Agana’s letter-
request.
[6]
While noting that the BID certification involving the travel records of Robert
Lyndon S. Barbers stated that he was an American, the COMELEC held that “there is
no other independent evidence... to justify petitioner’s claim that respondent has
renounced his allegiance to the Philippines at any time.”
[7]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, which on
January 8, 2002 dismissed the Motion and affirmed the Resolution of the Second
Division.
Petitioner thus instituted these proceedings for certiorari, claiming that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying hisPetition to Disqualify.
[8]
He
maintains that private respondent was not a Filipino citizenship at the time of his
election.
Basic in the law of evidence is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
[9]
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence.
[10]
Petitioner did not overcome his burden. The documentary evidence he submitted
fails to establish that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
The document containing the notation of George Clarke does not prove that private
respondent is indeed a naturalized American citizen. For the purpose of their

13. 13 | P a g e
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private. Public documents
include the written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country.
[11]
The record of such public documents may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested copy should be
accompanied by a certificate that such officer has custody thereof.
[12]
The grant of United States citizenship by naturalization is an official act of the United
States. The document containing the record of this act is, therefore, a public
document and, following the rule cited above, this document can only be evidenced by
its official publication or a copy duly attested by the officer having legal custody
thereof.
The notation in the letter-inquiry of Jesus Agana is neither an official publication of the
document that contains the record of private respondent’s naturalization, nor a copy
attested by the officer who has legal custody of the record. Petitioner did not show if
Clarke, the notation’s alleged author, is the officer charged with the custody of such
record.
Furthermore, Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that when the original of
a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, as in
this case, the contents of said document may be proved by a certified copy issued by
the public officer in custody thereof. The subject letter-inquiry, which contains the
notation, appears to be a mere photocopy, not a certified copy.
The other document relied upon by petitioner is the Certification dated 1 September
2000 issued by the BID. Petitioner submits that private respondent has declared that
he is an American citizen as shown by said Certification and, under Section 26, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, such declaration may be given in evidence against him.
The rule cited by petitioner does not apply in this case because the rule pertains to the
admissibility of evidence. There is no issue here as to the admissibility of the
BID Certification; the COMELEC did not hold that the same was inadmissible. In any
case, the BID Certification suffers from the same defect as the notation from the
supposed US Embassy official. Said Certification is also a photocopy, not a certified
copy.
Moreover, the certification contains inconsistent entries regarding the “nationality” of
private respondent. While some entries indicate that he is “American,” other entries
state that he is “Filipino.”
Petitioner also attached in his Memorandum before this Court another document,
[13]
obviously a photocopy, which reads in full:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
U.S. COURTHOUSE
312 NORTH SPRING STREET, SUITE 329
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, 90012
August 1, 2001
The official Naturalization the United States District Court of California shows the
following:
Name: Robert Lyndon Barbers
Date of Birth: July 15, 1968
Petition No.: 890573
Alien No.: A40 460 660
Certificate No.: 14738741
Date of
Naturalization: October 11, 1991
(Sgd.)
Deputy Clerk Abel Martinez
The above document was attached to an “Authentication,”
[14]
also a photocopy, stating:
CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES)
CITY OF LOS ANGELES )S.S.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, U.S.A.
AUTHENTICATION
TO ALL WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, GREETINGS:
I, CRISTINA G. ORTEGA, CONSUL at Los Angeles, California, duly commissioned
and qualified, do hereby certify that ABEL MARTINEZ whose seal/signature appears
on the annexed certificate was, at the time he signed the annexed certificate, A
Deputy Clerk of the United States District Court, Central District of California and verily
believe that his seal/signature affixed thereto is genuine.

14. 14 | P a g e
For the contents of the annexed document, this Consulate General assumes no
responsibility.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines at Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., to affixed this day of 30 August 2001.
(Sgd.)
CRISTINA G. ORTEGA
Consul
of the Republic of the Philippines
The annexed document is an Information
of Naturalization Re: Robert Lyndon
Barbers executed by United States District
Court, Central District of California
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Admit Original
Documents, appending thereto the originals
[15]
of the above documents.
These new documents likewise cannot be admitted in evidence. To repeat, Section
24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that if the public document or the public
record is not kept in the Philippines, its official publication or its copy duly attested by
the officer in charge of the custody of the same must be accompanied by a certificate
that such officer has the custody. Said certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office. In this case,
the Authentication executed by Cristina G. Ortega, the Philippine Consul in Los
Angeles, California merely states that Abel Martinez is the Deputy Clerk of the United
States District Court, Central District of California. It does not state that said Deputy
Clerk has the custody of the above record.
There is another cogent reason that precludes the admission of these
documents. Petitioner calls upon this Court to consider alleged newevidence not
presented before the COMELEC, a course of action clearly beyond the courts’
certiorari powers. In Lovina and Montila v. Moreno and Yonzon,
[16]
the Court of First
Instance (CFI) conducted a trial de novo even though the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, in the exercise of his administrative powers, had made his own
independent findings of fact. This Court reversed the decision of the CFI because:
The findings of the Secretary can not be enervated by new evidence not laid before
him, for that would be tantamount to holding a new investigation, and to substitute for
the discretion and judgment of the Secretary the discretion and judgment of the court,
to whom the statute had not entrusted the case. It is immaterial that the present
action should be one for prohibition or injunction and not one for certiorari; in either
event the case must be resolved upon the evidence submitted to the Secretary, since
a judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de novo, but only an
ascertainment of whether the executive findings are not in violation of the Constitution
or of the laws, and are free from fraud or imposition, and whether they find reasonable
support in the evidence….
Similarly, petitioner in this case cannot “enervate” the COMELEC’s findings by
introducing new evidence before this Court, which in any case is not a trier of facts,
and then ask it to substitute its own judgment and discretion for that of the COMELEC.
The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the first
time on appeal,
[17]
and documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate
court will not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action.
[18]
This is true
whether the decision elevated for review originated from a regular court
[19]
or an
administrative agency or quasi-judicial body,
[20]
and whether it was rendered in a civil
case,
[21]
a special proceeding,
[22]
or a criminal case.
[23]
Piecemeal presentation of
evidence is simply not in accord with orderly justice.
[24]
The same rules apply with greater force in certiorari proceedings. Indeed, it would be
absurd to hold public respondent guilty of grave abuse of discretion for not considering
evidence not presented before it. The patent unfairness of petitioner’s plea,
prejudicing as it would public and private respondents alike, militates against the
admission and consideration of the subject documents.
Finally, petitioner in his Memorandum
[25]
invokes the case of Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,
[26]
holding that a naturalized Filipino citizen effectively renounces his Filipino
citizenship when he applies for and is issued a Portuguese passport, and declares his
nationality as a Portuguese in commercial documents he signed. That case, however,
has no relevance here because the documents submitted in this case, assuming that
they constitute substantial evidence that private respondent indeed renounced his

15. 15 | P a g e
Filipino citizenship, are inadmissible. In other words, there is no evidence in this case
of any renunciation.
There is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when the
respondent board, tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions exercised its
judgment in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner, as when the
assailed order has no basis both in fact and in law.
[27]
In this case, the Petition to
Disqualify is not supported by substantial evidence. Hence, the COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions dismissing
the Petition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
_________________
G.R. No. 162886 August 11, 2008
HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SPOUSES VICENTE S. ARCILLA and
JOSEFA ASUNCION ARCILLA, namely: Aida Arcilla Alandan, Rene A.
Arcilla, Oscar A. Arcilla, Sarah A. Arcilla, and Nora A. Arcilla, now
deceased and substituted by her son Sharmy Arcilla, represented by
their attorney-in-fact, SARAH A. ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES A. TEODORO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the September 12, 2003 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its
Resolution
2
dated March 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72032.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On December 19, 1995, Ma. Lourdes A. Teodoro (respondent) initially filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes an application for land registration
of two parcels of land located at Barangay San Pedro, Virac, Catanduanes. The lots,
with an aggregate area of 284 square meters, are denominated as Lot Nos. 525-A
and 525-B, Csd.-05-010483-D of the Virac Cadastre. Respondent alleged that, with
the exception of the commercial building constructed thereon, she purchased the
subject lots from her father, Pacifico Arcilla (Pacifico), as shown by a Deed of
Sale
3
dated December 9, 1966, and that, prior thereto, Pacifico acquired the said lots
by virtue of the partition of the estate of his father, Jose Arcilla evidenced by a
document entitled Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate.
4
Respondent also presented as
evidence an Affidavit of Quit-Claim
5
in favor of Pacifico, executed by herein petitioners
as Heirs of Vicente Arcilla (Vicente), brother of Pacifico.
On February 7, 1996, the case was transferred to the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Virac, Catanduanes in view of the expanded jurisdiction of said court as provided
under Republic Act No. 7691.
6
In their Opposition dated August 19, 1996, petitioners contended that they are the
owners pro-indiviso of the subject lots including the building and other improvements
constructed thereon by virtue of inheritance from their deceased parents, spouses
Vicente and Josefa Arcilla; contrary to the claim of respondent, the lots in question
were owned by their father, Vicente, having purchased the same from a certain
Manuel Sarmiento sometime in 1917; Vicente's ownership is evidenced by several tax
declarations attached to the record; petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the subject lots since 1906. Petitioners moved to dismiss the
application of respondent and sought their declaration as the true and absolute
owners pro-indiviso of the subject lots and the registration and issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title in their names.
Subsequently, trial of the case ensued.
On March 20, 1998, herein respondent filed a Motion for Admission
7
contending that
through oversight and inadvertence she failed to include in her application, the
verification and certificate against forum shopping required by Supreme Court (SC)
Revised Circular No. 28-91 in relation to SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Application
8
on the ground that respondent should
have filed the certificate against forum shopping simultaneously with the petition for
land registration which is a mandatory requirement of SC Administrative Circular No.
04-94 and that any violation of the said Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of
the application upon motion and after hearing.
Opposing the motion to dismiss, respondents asserted that the petitioners' Motion to
Dismiss Application was filed out of time; respondent's failure to comply with SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 was not willful, deliberate or intentional; and the

16. 16 | P a g e
Motion to Dismiss was deemed waived for failure of petitioners to file the same during
the earlier stages of the proceedings.
On July 19, 1999, the MTC issued an Order
9
denying petitioners' Motion to Dismiss
Application.
On June 25, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision
10
the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, and considering all the above premises, the Court finds and so
holds that Applicant MA. LOURDES A. TEODORO, having sufficient title over this land
applied for hereby renders judgment, which should be, as it is hereby CONFIRMED
and REGISTERED in her name.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
11
Herein petitioners then filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court of Virac,
Catanduanes. In its Decision
12
dated February 22, 2002, the RTC, Branch 43, of Virac,
Catanduanes dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the Decision
of the MTC. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the
RTC in its Order
13
of July 22, 2002.
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, petitioners filed a Petition for Review
14
with the CA.
On September 12, 2003, the CA promulgated its presently assailed Decision
dismissing the Petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same
was denied by the CA in its Resolution
15
dated March 24, 2004.
Hence, the herein petition based on the following grounds:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with the prevailing rules
and jurisprudence when it held that the belated filing, after more than two (2) years
and three (3) months from the initial application for land registration, of a sworn
certification against forum shopping in Respondent's application for land registration,
constituted substantial compliance with SC Admin. Circular No. 04-94.
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with prevailing laws and
jurisprudence when it held that the certification of non-forum shopping subsequently
submitted by respondent does not require a certification from an officer of the foreign
service of the Philippines as provided under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with prevailing laws and
jurisprudence when it upheld the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that the lots in question were not really owned by
Petitioners' father Vicente S. Arcilla, contrary to the evidence presented by both
parties.
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with prevailing laws and
jurisprudence when it sustained the decision of the RTC which affirmed in toto the
decision of the MTC and in not reversing the same and rendering judgment in favor of
Petitioners.
16
In their Memorandum, petitioners further raise the following issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire into conclusions of facts made by the
Honorable Court of Appeals in the instant Petition.
17
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The CA ruled correctly when it held that the belated filing of a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping was substantial compliance with SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
Under the attendant circumstances in the present case, the Court cannot uphold
petitioners’ contention that respondent's delay of more than two years and three
months in filing the required certificate of non-forum shopping may not be considered
substantial compliance with the requirements of SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94
and Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; that respondent's reasons of oversight
and inadvertence do not constitute a justifiable circumstance that could excuse her
non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of the above-mentioned Circular
and Rule; that subsequent compliance with the requirement does not serve as an
excuse for a party's failure to comply in the first instance.
Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is

17. 17 | P a g e
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to
the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
This Rule was preceded by Circular No. 28-91, which originally required the
certification of non-forum shopping for petitions filed with this Court and the CA; and
SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which extended the certification requirement for
civil complaints and other initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and other agencies.
In Gabionza v. Court of Appeals,
18
this Court has held that Circular No. 28-91 was
designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its
own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to
achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
19
The same guideline still
applies in interpreting what is now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
20
The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply
disregarded, for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.
21
However, it is equally settled that litigation is not merely a
game of technicalities.
22
Rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice.
23
Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed.
24
Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle.
25
Moreover, the emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the
constraints of technicalities.
26
It must be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirement must not be interpreted too
literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum
shopping.
27
In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
28
the Court ruled, thus:
The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is
not unprecedented. In those cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the
requirements, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons making the
strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits
of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a "special circumstance"
or "compelling reason" for the reinstatement of the petition. x x x
29
Citing De Guia v. De Guia
30
the Court, in Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian
Reform,
31
held that even if there was complete non-compliance with the rule on
certification against forum-shopping, the Court may still proceed to decide the case on
the merits pursuant to its inherent power to suspend its own rules on grounds of
substantial justice and apparent merit of the case.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the lower courts did not commit any error in
proceeding to decide the case on the merits, as herein respondent was able to submit
a certification of non-forum shopping. More importantly, the apparent merit of the
substantive aspect of the petition for land registration filed by respondent with the
MTC coupled with the showing that she had no intention to violate the Rules with
impunity, as she was the one who invited the attention of the court to the inadvertence
committed by her counsel, should be deemed as special circumstances or compelling
reasons to decide the case on the merits.
In addition, considering that a dismissal contemplated under Rule 7, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court is, as a rule, a dismissal without prejudice, and since there is no
showing that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, to dismiss respondent's petition
for registration would entail a tedious process of re-filing the petition, requiring the
parties to re-submit the pleadings which they have already filed with the trial court,
and conducting anew hearings which have already been done, not to mention the
expenses that will be incurred by the parties in re-filing of pleadings and in the re-
conduct of hearings. These would not be in keeping with the judicial policy of just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
32

18. 18 | P a g e
The certification of non-forum shopping executed in a foreign country is
not covered by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
There is no merit to petitioners’ contentions that the verification and certification
subsequently submitted by respondent did not state the country or city where the
notary public exercised her notarial functions; and that the MTC simply concluded,
without any basis, that said notary public was from Maryland, USA; that even granting
that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were notarized in the USA,
the same may not be deemed admissible for any purpose in the Philippines for failure
to comply with the requirement of Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that the
notarized document must be accompanied by a certificate issued by an officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines who is stationed in the country in which a record of
the subject document is kept, proving or authenticating that the person who notarized
the document is indeed authorized to do so and has custody of the same.
The Court agrees with the disquisition of the CA, to wit:
From the foregoing provision [referring to Section 24, Rule 132, Rules of Court], it can
be gathered that it does not include documents acknowledged before [a] notary public
abroad. For foreign public documents to be admissible for any purpose here in our
courts, the same must be certified by any officer of the Philippine legation stationed in
the country where the documents could be found or had been executed. However,
after judicious studies of the rule, Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court
basically pertains to written official acts, or records of the official of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines,
or of a foreign country. This is so, as Sec. 24, Rule 132 explicitly refers only to
paragraph (a) of Sec. 19. If the rule comprehends to cover notarial documents, the
rule could have included the same. Thus, petitioners-oppositors' contention that the
certificate of forum shopping that was submitted was defective, as it did not bear the
certification provided under Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, is devoid of any
merit. What is important is the fact that the respondent-applicant certified before a
commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer oath that [s]he has not and
will not commit forum shopping.
33
The ruling of the Court in Lopez v. Court of Appeals,
34
cited by petitioners, is
inapplicable to the present case because the Rules of Evidence which were in effect
at that time were the old Rules prior to their amendment in 1989. The rule applied
in Lopez, which was decided prior to the effectivity of the amended Rules of
Evidence,
35
was Section 25, Rule 132, to wit:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record – An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in
a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989, Section 25, Rule 132 became
Section 24, Rule 132; and the amendment consisted in the deletion of the introductory
phrase "An official record or an entry therein," which was substituted by the phrase
"The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19."
Thus, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court now reads as follows:
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents referred to
in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office
in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 19(a) of the same Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:

19. 19 | P a g e
(a) The written official acts or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;
and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.
All other writings are private.
It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the foreign
service under Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in Section 19(a), to
wit: written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines or of a foreign country. The
Court agrees with the CA that had the Court intended to include notarial documents as
one of the public documents contemplated by the provisions of Section 24, it should
not have specified only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19.
In Lopez, the requirements of then Section 25, Rule 132 were made applicable to all
public or official records without any distinction because the old rule did not
distinguish. However, in the present rule, it is clear under Section 24, Rule 132 that its
provisions shall be made applicable only to the documents referred to under
paragraph (a), Section 19, Rule 132.
The CA did not err in sustaining the findings of fact and conclusion of
law of the MTC and the RTC.
Settled is the rule that the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the
CA, are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.
36
There are recognized
exceptions to this rule, among which are: (1) the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation
of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence
of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the
CA are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case;
and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
37
However,
petitioners failed to show that any of the exceptions is present in the instant case to
warrant a review of the findings of fact of the lower courts.
Petitioners insist that the documents which were presented in evidence by respondent
to prove her ownership of the subject lot are rife with defects and inconsistencies.
Petitioners contend that the subject lot should not have been included in the
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Jose Arcilla, because he was no longer the
owner of the said property at the time of said settlement; the Deed of Sale should be
declared null and void because the seller, Pacifico Arcilla, was not the owner of the
subject lands at the time the said Deed was executed; the Affidavit of Quitclaim is not
valid and has no force and effect considering that the document indicates that the
signatures of petitioners were affixed in different places, none of which is in Virac,
Catanduanes where they supposedly acknowledged said document.
The only evidence of petitioners to prove their claim that the disputed property was
sold by Jose Arcilla to Manuel Sarmiento in 1908 is a single Tax Declaration in the
name of the latter, with a notation that the property was acquired by purchase.
The Court agrees with the CA in its finding that petitioners failed to present any
substantial evidence, such as a deed of sale, to prove their claim that their
predecessor, Vicente Arcilla, bought the disputed property from Sarmiento. Petitioners
were only able to present tax declarations in Vicente's name to prove their allegation
that Vicente became the owner of the subject property. The tax declarations
presented in evidence by petitioners are not supported by any other substantial
proofs.
The Court has ruled time and again that tax declarations do not prove ownership but
are at best anindicium of claims of ownership.
38
Payment of taxes is not proof of
ownership, any more than indicating possession in the concept of an owner.
39
Neither
a tax receipt nor a declaration of ownership for taxation purposes is evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess realty when not supported by other effective
proofs.
40
In addition, the Court agrees with the CA when it held that if Vicente, in fact, owned
the disputed properties, his widow, Josefa, would not have agreed to include said lots
among those partitioned in the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Jose.

20. 20 | P a g e
On the other hand, respondent's claim of ownership is not only backed up by tax
declarations but also by other pieces of evidence such as the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement, Affidavit of Quitclaim, and Deed of Sale.
Petitioners question the validity of the above-mentioned documents. However, as the
CA, RTC and MTC found, these documents are all notarized. It is settled that a
notarized document is executed to lend truth to the statements contained therein and
to the authenticity of the signatures.
41
Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of
regularity which can be overturned only by clear and convincing evidence.
42
Petitioners' bare denials of the contents of the subject documents will not suffice to
overcome the presumption of their regularity considering that they are all notarized. To
overthrow such presumption of regularity, the countervailing evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant, which petitioners failed to present.
43
An examination of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate clearly shows that the
disputed lot forms part of the properties adjudicated in favor of Pacifico Arcilla,
respondent’s predecessor-in-interest.
Moreover, petitioners themselves admit that the Extrajudicial Settlement being
referred to in the Affidavit of Quitclaim executed by petitioner and her co-heirs is the
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Jose Arcilla and not of Vicente Arcilla. An
examination of the Affidavit of Quitclaim shows that the reference made therein with
respect to the date of execution of the said Extrajudicial Settlement as well as the
notary public who acknowledged the same and the Document Number, Page Number,
Book Number and Series Number all coincide with those appearing in the document
evidencing the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Jose Arcilla. Hence, what has
been waived by petitioners is their right, if any, to the properties mentioned in the said
Affidavit of Quitclaim, which includes the presently disputed lot.
Petitioners posit that they are not bound by the subject Extrajudicial Settlement
because they did not participate in nor did they sign the document evidencing such
settlement and that their mother who signed on their behalf was not, in fact,
authorized to do so. However, the Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC that the
Extrajudicial Settlement is a public document, the same having been notarized; that
such document is entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of competent evidence
showing that its execution was tainted with defects and irregularities which would
warrant a declaration of nullity; that in the absence of evidence showing that the
person who signed in behalf of herein petitioners was, in fact, not authorized to do so,
the presumption that she had the authority, as stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement,
remains undisturbed.
Moreover, petitioners' execution of the subject Affidavit of Quitclaim is proof that they
have ratified the contents of the disputed Extrajudicial Settlement.
Petitioners' claim that the Affidavit of Quitclaim is null and void on the ground that the
signatories thereto are not residents of Virac, Catanduanes and that they affixed their
signature in places other than Virac, Catanduanes where they supposedly
acknowledged the said document, is not persuasive. The Court finds no error in the
finding of the MTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the execution of the subject Affidavit of
Quitclaim or the signatures of the affiants appearing therein were never contested nor
raised as an issue and that petitioner Sarah Arcilla herself acknowledged her own
signature in the said Affidavit.
In any event, the law does not require that parties to a document notarized by a notary
public should be residents of the place where the said document is acknowledged or
that they affix their signature in the presence of the notary public. What is necessary is
that the persons who signed a notarized document are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before the notary public in order to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein.
44
In the instant case, it is established that, with the exception of petitioner Rene Arcilla,
all of herein petitioners, including their now deceased mother Josefa and sister Nora,
executed and personally acknowledged before the notary public the subject Affidavit
of Quitclaim. Hence, aside from Rene, the said Affidavit of Quitclaim is valid and
binding on all the petitioners.
With respect to Rene, petitioner Oscar Arcilla, acting as his attorney-in-fact, signed the
document on the former’s behalf. However, settled is the rule that:
A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him. The acts of the affiants cannot be
delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts of which they have personal
knowledge. They should swear to the document personally and not through any
representative. Otherwise, their representative’s name should appear in the said
documents as the one who executed the same. That is the only time the

21. 21 | P a g e
representative can affix his signature and personally appear before the notary public
for notarization of the said document. Simply put, the party or parties who executed
the instrument must be the ones to personally appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the document.
45
Thus, the herein subject Affidavit of Quitclaim may not be binding on Rene.
Nonetheless, with or without Rene’s participation in the quitclaim, respondent’s
ownership of the subject lots has been established by preponderance of evidence, as
unanimously found by the MTC, the RTC and the CA.
Finally, petitioners' physical occupation of the commercial building which they erected
on the disputed property does not necessarily prove their ownership of the subject
lots.
This Court has held that:
ownership and possession are two entirely different legal concepts. Just as
possession is not a definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent
with ownership. The first paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that when
the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent
to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.Possession, along with
ownership, is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed
of conveyance. Thus, in light of the circumstances of the present case, it
is of no legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession
or occupation of the disputed lot after the execution of the deed of sale
in her favor because she was already able to perfect and complete her
ownership of and title over the subject property.
46
(Emphasis supplied)
The Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate in favor of Pacifico, respondent’s predecessor-
in-interest, the Affidavit of Quitclaim and the Deed of Sale in favor of respondent
establish respondent’s ownership over the disputed property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 12, 2003 and its Resolution of March 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72032
are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
______________
G.R. No. 177505 November 27, 2008
HEIRS OF GORGONIO MEDINA, namely: LEONOR T. MEDINA, RAMON
T. MEDINA, ABIEL T. MEDINA, ILUDIVINA M. ROSARI, CONCEPCION
DE LA CRUZ, LEONOR M. BAKKER, SAMUEL T. MEDINA, VICTOR T.
MEDINA, TERESITA M. SABADO, JOSEFINA M. CANAS and VERONICA
M. DE GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
BONIFACIO NATIVIDAD, represented by PHILIP M.
NATIVIDAD, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals dated
20 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 82160 affirming with modification the
Decision
2
of Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in
Civil Case No. 1165-G and its Resolution
3
dated 16 April 2007 denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On 16 May 1969, Tirso Medina, Pacifico M. Ruiz, Gorgonio D. Medina, Vivencio M.
Ruiz, and Dominica Medina, co-owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1199, Cad-162,
Guimba Cadastre, plan Ap-23418) situated in Poblacion, Municipality of Guimba,
Province of Nueva Ecija, containing an area of two thousand three hundred thirty nine
(2,339) square meters, agreed to divide and allot for themselves the said land. A
sketch
4
signed by the co-owners showed the respective portions of land allotted to
each. Gorgonio D. Medina received two portions of said land. One portion was allotted
to him alone, while the second portion was allotted to him together with Tirso Medina
and Pacifico M. Ruiz. This second portion is labeled as "Gorgonio Medina, Tirso
Medina and Pacifico M. Ruiz" which is adjacent to the portion labeled as "Dominica
Medina."
On 29 March 1972, Gorgonio D. Medina, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
5
whereby he sold to respondent Bonifacio Natividad
for P2,000.00 his share (1/3) in the second portion of land including the improvements
found therein.

22. 22 | P a g e
Subsequently, a case for Partition with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 781-G,
was filed before the RTC of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33, by Tirso Medina against
the co-owners of Lot 1199, among whom are Gorgonio Medina and Bonifacio
Natividad. Bonifacio Natividad had likewise already bought the share of Dominica
Medina in the land.
The parties entered into a compromise agreement which they submitted to the Court.
On 20 November 1989, the RTC approved the agreement and rendered its decision
based on the same.
6
The Compromise Agreement as quoted by the Court reads:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
COME NOW the parties, assisted by their respective counsel(s), and unto this
Honorable Court respectfully submit this Compromise Agreement in full and final
settlement of their differences, to wit:
1. The parties herein are the exclusive co-owners of that certain parcel of land located
at the Poblacion, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, known as Lot 1199, Guimba Cadastre and
more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 1199, of the Cadastral Survey of Guimba Cad. 162, plan Ap-
23418, L.R. Case No. G-51, L.R.C. Record No. N-40711), situated in the Poblacion,
Municipality of Guimba, Province of Nueva Ecija. x x x containing an area of TWO
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY NINE (2,339) SQUARE METERS,
more or less. x x x.
x x x x
2. The herein parties recognize and acknowledge that their respective shares in the
property aforementioned as appearing in the aforesaid Original Certificate of Title No.
130366 have been modified by agreement between them to allot a portion thereof to
their co-owner, Vivencio M. Ruiz, to compensate for valuable services rendered to the
parties vis-à-vis the said property, separate and apart from his rightful share therein as
participating heir of Maria Medina;
3. The plaintiff Tirso Medina hereby withdraws any/all statements appearing on record
which he may have made in said case in the course of his testimony therein, and
hereby asks the Honorable Court that said statements be expunged or withdrawn from
the record;
4. The foregoing considered, the parties have determined that it is to their mutual
convenience and advantage, and in accord with their common desire to preserve and
maintain the existing family harmony and solidarity to terminate their present
community of ownership in the property aforementioned by mutual agreement and
adjudication, in the manner appearing in the Sketch Plan of Partition attached as an
integral part hereof as Annex "A" where the property is subdivided into Lot 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, and 6 and adjudicated, as follows:
a. To Bonifacio Natividad, Lot No. 1, consisting of 480 square meters, more or less,
representing the interests of Dominica Medina which was sold to him per document of
"Sale of Rights, Waiver and Renunciation" appearing as Doc. No. 367; Page No. 75;
Book No. 10; Series of 1968 in the Notarial Register of Atty.
b. To VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, Lot No. 3 consisting of 370.21 square meters, more or less,
as compensation for valuable services rendered; free and clear from any/all liens or
encumbrances whatsoever or from the claims of any person whomsoever, except the
present tenant/s thereon;
c. To the heirs of MARIA MEDINA, Lot No. 2 consisting of 370.21 square meters,
more or less, without prejudice to sales and dispositions already made by the
respective heirs of their interests and participations therein;
d. To TIRSO MEDINA, Lot No. 4 consisting of 369.29 square meters, more or less;
e. To the heirs of PACIFICO M. RUIZ, Lot No. 5 consisting of 369.29 square meters,
more or less, and
f. To GORGONIA MEDINA, Lot No. 6, consisting of 369.29 square meters, more or
less.
7
On 8 October 1991, the trial court issued an order supplementing its decision dated 20
November 1989 which reads in part:
[T]hat the parties thereafter, engaged the services of one common geodetic engineer
in the person of Rolly Francisco to conduct the survey and effect the subdivision of Lot
1199, which was subdivided into Lots A, B, C, D, E, and F, the area of which appears,
thus:
Lot 1199-A with an area of 371 sq. ms., which lot now corresponds to Lot No. 4
adjudicated to Tirso Medina;
Lot 1199-B with an area of 371 sq. ms., which lot now corresponds to Lot No. 5
adjudicated to Pacifico Ruiz;
Lot 1199-C with an area of 371 sq. ms., which lot now corresponds to Lot No. 6
adjudicated to Gorgonio Medina;

23. 23 | P a g e
Lot 1199-D with an area of 482 sq. ms., which lot now corresponds to Lot No. 1
adjudicated to Bonifacio Natividad;
Lot 1199-E with an area of 372 sq. ms., which lot now corresponds to Lot No. 2
adjudicated to Heirs of Maria Medina; and
Lot 1199-F with an area of 372 sq. ms., which lot now corresponds to Lot No. 3
adjudicated to Vivencio M. Ruiz; that in this subdivision made by the geodetic
engineer, there was no change in the designation of the particular places adjudicated
to the parties, except the change in areas allotted after the actual survey made.
WHEREFORE, finding the motion to be in order, the Court resolves to grant the same
and hereby orders, that:
Lot 1199-A with an area of 371 sq. ms. is Lot 4, decision, adjudicated to Tirso Medina;
Lot 1199-B with an area of 371 sq. ms. is Lot 5, decision, adjudicated to Pacifico Ruiz;
Lot 1199-C with an area of 371 sq. ms. is Lot 6, decision, adjudicated to Gorgonio
Medina;
Lot 1199-D with an area of 482 sq. ms. is Lot 1, decision, adjudicated to Bonifacio
Natividad;
Lot 1199-E with an area of 372 sq. ms. is Lot 2, decision, adjudicated to Heirs of Maria
Medina;
Lot 1199-F with an area of 372 sq. ms. is Lot 3, decision, adjudicated to Vivencio M.
Ruiz.
This Order supplements the Decision dated November 20, 1989.
8
Pursuant to the court-approved partition, Lot 1199-C, measuring 371 square meters,
was registered in the name of Gorgonio Median for which Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. NT-230248 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija was
issued to him.
9
On 11 June 2001, Bonifacio Natividad, thru his alleged Attorney-In-Fact, Philip M.
Natividad, filed before the RTC of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 31, a Complaint for
Annulment of TCT No. NT-230248 and Damages.
10
It impleaded as respondents Abiel
Medina and Veronica de Guzman who are occupying the said land. Bonifacio asks,
among other things, that 1/3 of said land be surrendered to him because he had
bought the same from Gorgonio Medina. In the Answer
11
filed by Abiel Medina and
Veronica de Guzman, they argued, inter alia, that Philip Natividad had no legal
capacity to sue because the Special Power of Attorney annexed to the Complaint did
not grant him such authority. They further added that the Complaint failed to implead
all the parties-in-interest considering that the ownership of the land covered by TCT
No. NT-230248 had already passed to eleven heirs of Gorgonio Medina.
Bonifacio, thru Philip, filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars
12
praying that an order be
issued by the court directing Abiel Medina and Veronica de Guzman to give the
names and present addresses of all the heirs of Gorgonio Medina. Said motion was
opposed.
13
In an order dated 15 October 2001, the trial court granted the
motion.
14
Defendants complied with the court’s order and submitted the names and
addresses of all the heirs of Gorgonio Medina.
15
On 7 January 2002, Bonifacio filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint
with prayer that summons upon eight heirs be made through publication.
16
The
Amended Complaint impleaded all the heirs of Gorgonio Medina (petitioners herein).
In said amended complaint, a special power of attorney
17
dated 21 September 2001
allegedly executed by Bonifacio Natividad in the State of Washington, United States of
America, and acknowledged before Phyllis Perry, a Notary Public of the State of
Washington, USA, was attached authorizing Philip Natividad to:
1. To file all appropriate cases in court against the heirs of Gorgonio Medina for the
recovery of the lot that I purchased from said Gorgonio Medina by virtue of Deed of
Absolute Sale executed on March 29, 1972 and notarized by Atty. Inocencio B.
Garampil under Doc. No. 435, Page No. 87, Book No. 1, Series of 1972, which lot is
now titled in the name of Gorgonio Medina under Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-
230248;
2. To institute all legal actions/cases in court for the annulment of said Transfer
Certificate of Title No. NT -230248 which now covers the lot I bought from Gorgonio
Medina;
3. To represent me in all proceedings/hearings of the above-mentioned case/s up to
its termination;
4. To enter into a fair and reasonable compromise agreement and do all acts for the
protection and preservation of my rights and interest over the above-mentioned lot;
5. To negotiate/transact with all persons, secure and sign all necessary documents for
the attainment of the above purposes.
In an Order dated
18
30 January 2002, the trial court approved the motion and admitted
the Amended Complaint. It directed the issuance of the corresponding summons, the

24. 24 | P a g e
same to be published in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive
weeks. As to plaintiff’s authority to sue, the trial court ruled that said issue had been
settled by the special power of attorney attached to the Amended Complaint.
On 17 May 2002, the heirs of Gorgonio Medina filed a Motion to Dismiss
19
which the
trial court denied on 20 August 2002.
20
On 10 September 2002, the heirs filed their
Answer raising the following defenses: prescription, laches, lack of cause of action,
lack of legal capacity to sue by Attorney-in-Fact, indefeasibility of TCT No. NT-230248
and lack of jurisdiction over the case for failure of the plaintiff to comply with the
mandatory requirement of the Katarungang Pambarangay. Plaintiff filed his Reply
dated 18 September 2002 specifically denying the allegations contained in the Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim.
21
During the Pre-Trial, the parties stipulated the following facts and issues:
a. TCT No. N-230248 in the name of Gorgonio Medina covers 371 square meters.
This title was one of the titles issued as transfer from Original Certificate of Title No.
130366.
22
b. TCT No. 230248 came into being by virtue of the decision in Civil Case No. 781-G,
a case of partition among Gorgonio Medina and his co-heirs decided by RTC Branch
33.
c. The late Gorgonio Medina executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over 1/3 portion of his
share in a parcel of land (Lot 1199, CAD-162 Guimba Cadastre) owned in common by
him and his co-heirs.
d. The land subject of the deed of sale is not the one covered by TCT No. 230248.
Issues:
1. Whether the deed of sale of sale may be given effect notwithstanding the fact that
the subject thereof is different from the portion covered by TCT No. 230248.
2. Whether Mr. Philip Natividad is duly authorized to represent his father, Bonifacio
Natividad in this case.
23
The parties manifested that after they shall have filed their respective memoranda, the
case shall be submitted for decision.
In its decision dated 10 December 2003, the trial court ruled in favor of Bonifacio
Natividad. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff ordering the
defendants to convey to the plaintiff 1/3 portion of the lot covered by TCT No. 230248
together with the improvements thereon and to account for, and deliver to the plaintiff
the income derived therefrom from the institution of this case up to the execution of
this decision.
No pronouncement as to damages there being no reservation made by the plaintiff to
present evidence thereof.
24
On the issue of Philip Natividad’s authority to represent his father, the court ruled that
it was convinced that Philip was authorized to represent his father by virtue of a
notarized special power of attorney executed by Bonifacio attached to the amended
complaint. It explained that the document was a public document as defined under
Section 20, paragraph (a) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the same having been
notarized by a notary public for the State of Washington, USA. In the absence of any
evidence to show that said special power of attorney was falsified, it was sufficient
authority for Mr. Natividad to represent his father.
The trial court likewise ruled that the deed of absolute sale executed by Gorgonio
Medina in favor of Bonifacio Natividad may be given effect notwithstanding the fact
that the portion of Lot 1199 specified as its object was different from the portion
adjudicated to Gorgonio Medina. It declared that the 1/3 portion of the land covered by
TCT No. NT-230248 shall be deemed the object of the deed of sale. It agreed with
Bonifacio that what was sold by Gorgonio Medina to him (Bonifacio) was his share,
right and participation in the land known as Lot 1199. At the time of the sale, Lot 1199
was not yet divided. Gorgonio Medina specified a portion of Lot 1199, expecting that
portion to be adjudicated to him, but his expectation did not materialize because a
different portion was adjudicated to him during the partition. It added that justice
demanded that a portion of what was adjudicated to him be considered as the object
of the deed of sale.
The trial court further ruled that prescription and laches did not set in. Since there was
an express trust created between Gorgonio Medina and Bonifacio Natividad, the
action to compel the defendants to convey the property to Bonifacio did not prescribe.
It explained that it is only when the trustee repudiates the trust that the prescriptive
period of 10 years commences to run. In the instant case, Gorgonio Medina (trustee)
repudiated the trust on 5 July 1993 when TCT No. NT-230248 was issued in his
name. Thus, the filing of the complaint on 11 June 2001 was well within the ten-year
prescriptive period.

25. 25 | P a g e
On 22 December 2003, the petitioner-heirs of Gorgonio Medina filed a Notice of
Appeal informing the trail court that they were appealing the decision to the Court of
Appeals.
25
A Notice of Appeal having been seasonably filed by the petitioners, the
entire records of the case were forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
26
On 13 January 2004, Bonifacio Natividad filed a Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal
27
which the trial court denied, it having lost jurisdiction over the case because
the appeal was already perfected when the motion was filed.
28
On 20 November 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the RTC, Branch 33, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, dated
December 10, 2003, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION ordering the
defendants-appellants to convey to plaintiff-appellee an area equivalent to 90 square
meters of the land covered by TCT No. NT-230248.
29
The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court, but ruled that the trust
established between the parties was an implied or constructive trust, and not an
express trust. It added that what should be conveyed to Bonifacio Natividad was only
1/3 of 270 square meters or 90 square meters, and not 1/3 of 371 square meters
since what was sold to him was only a part of one of the two portions owned by
Gorgonio Medina in the entire lot. Finally, it declared that the contention that the
Complaint should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action, considering that
the Special Power of Attorney executed abroad by Bonifacio Natividad in favor of his
son was not properly authenticated before a consular officer, put a premium on
technicalities at the expense of substantial justice. Litigation, it said, should, as much
as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
30
which the Court of Appeals denied in a
resolution dated 16 April 2007.
31
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT
APPROVED IN CIVIL CASE NO. 781-G NOVATED THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE DATED 29 MARCH 1972 BETWEEN GORGONIO MEDINA AND BONIFACIO
NATIVIDAD.
WHETHER OR NOT BONIFACIO NATIVIDAD IS ESTOPPED BY LACHES.
WHETHER OR NOT THE REGISTRATION OF LOT NO. 1199-C IN THE NAME OF
GORGONIO MEDINA WAS IN FRAUD OF BONIFACIO NATIVIDAD.
WHETHER OR NOT A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST WAS CREATED BETWEEN
GORGONIO MEDINA AND BONIFACIO NATIVIDAD.
WHETHER OR NOT BONIFACIO NATIVIDAD’S CAUSE OF ACTION HAS ALREADY
PRESCRIBED.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION.
Among the issues raised by petitioners the last is what we shall first tackle. Petitioners
contend that the Court of Appeals committed a very grave error in not finding that the
respondent was without any cause of action. Petitioners argue:
The Complaint in this case was instituted by Philip M. Natividad in the name of
Bonifacio Natividad upon the strength of a Special Power of Attorney executed by the
latter in Washington, U.S.A. While the document appears to have been acknowledged
before Phyllis Perry, a Notary Public for the jurisdiction of the State of Washington,
U.S.A., it was not presented before a Philippine Consular Officer for the requisite
authentication.
The Revised Rules on Evidence require that a document acknowledged before a
notary public being a public document, such record if kept in a foreign country, should
be accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody thereof made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of his office. In the
absence of the requisite certification and authentication of the public document, the
same cannot be proved and, therefore, inadmissible as evidence.
Bonifacio Natividad’s Special Power of Attorney not having been duly certified and
authenticated, it cannot be duly proved. It is, therefore, deemed as not having been
executed for purposes of instituting an action on his behalf. Without any valid authority
to institute the action on behalf of his father, Philip Natividad is deemed to have
instituted it on his own. Philip Natividad not being a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Gorgonio Medina and Bonifacio Natividad, he is undoubtedly not the real
party in interest because he does not have any material interest in the contract which
is the source of Bonifacio Natividad’s cause of action. He does not stand to be