The document discusses various legal cases related to marriage, divorce, and family law in the Philippines, emphasizing that foreign divorces are generally not recognized under Philippine law. It outlines the legal principles governing the status of marriages and divorces among Filipino citizens, citing specific court rulings that reinforce the binding nature of Philippine laws on family rights and duties. Overall, the document highlights the complexities and limitations of divorce laws in the Philippines, emphasizing the necessity of abiding by local regulations despite foreign decrees.

1. 1
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Article 15: Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons re binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139
FACTS:Alice Reyes VanDorn, a FilipinoCitizen andprivate respondent, Richard Upton, a US
citizen, wasmarriedin Hong Kongin1979. Theyestablishedtheir residence inthe
Philippines andhad2 children. Theywere divorcedin Nevada, USA in1982 andpetitioner
remarried, thistime withTheodore VanDorn. A suit against petitioner was filedonJune 8,
1983, statingthat petitioner’s business inErmita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal
propertywithUpton and prayedtherein that Alice be ordered to render anaccountingof the
business andhe be declaredas the administrator of the saidproperty.
ISSUE:Whether or not the foreigndivorce between the petitioner andprivate respondent in
Nevada is bindinginthe Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:Private respondent is nolonger the husbandof the petitioner. He wouldhave no
standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estoppedbyhis own
representation before the court from asserting hisright over the allegedconjugal property.
Furthermore, aliens mayobtaindivorces abroad, which maybe recognizedinthe Philippines,
provided theyare validaccording to their national law. Petitioner is not boundto her marital
obligations to respondent byvirtue ofher nationalitylaws. She should not be discriminated
against her owncountryif the endof justice is to be served.
Tenchavezvs. Escano
15 SCRA 355
FACTS:27 years oldVicenta Escanowhobelongto a prominent FilipinoFamilyof Spanish
ancestrygot married onFeburary24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years oldengineer, and
ex-armyofficer before Catholic chaplainLt. MoisesLavares. The marriage was a culmination
of the love affair ofthe couple andwas dulyregistered inthe local civil registry. A certain
Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker andgo-betweenwhohadan amorous relationship
with Tenchavez as written bya San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are
studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposedto renew their vows/ marriage ina church as
suggestedbyVicenta’s parents. However after translatingthe said letter to Vicenta’s dad, he
disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continuedleaving withher parents inCebu while
Pastor went backto workinManila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicatingthat she was single and whenit was approvedshe
left for the UnitedStates andfileda complaint for divorce against Pastor whichwas later on
approved and issuedbythe SecondJudicial Court of the State ofNevada. She then sought
for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop ofCebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo
Moran, an American, in Nevada andhas begottenchildren. She acquiredcitizenship on
August 8, 1958. Petitioner fileda complaint against Vicenta andher parents whom he
allegedto have dissuadedVicenta fromjoining her husband.

2. 2
ISSUE:Whether the divorce sought byVicenta Escanois validandbindinguponcourts ofthe
Philippines.
HELD:Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give
recognition onforeign decrees ofabsolute divorce between Filipinocitizens because it would
be a violationof the Civil Code. Such grant wouldarise to discriminationin favor ofrich
citizens whocanafford divorce inforeigncountries. The adulterous relationshipof Escano
with her Americanhusbandis enough grounds for the legal separationprayedbyTenchavez.
In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escanoare still married. A foreigndivorce
betweenFilipinos sought anddecreed is not entitledto recognition neither is the marriage of
the divorcee entitledto validityin the Philippines. Thus, the desertionandsecuring of an
invaliddivorce decree byone spouse entitled the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decisionunder appeal is herebymodifiedas follows:
(1) Adjudgingplaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitledto a decree of legalseparation
from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escañoto payplaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to paythe appellee, MamertoEscañoandthe
estate of his wife, the deceasedMena Escaño, P5,000 bywayof damages andattorneys'
fees.
BARRETO GONZALES vs GONZALES
58 Phil 238March 7, 1933
FACTS:
• The plaintiff & defendant were bothcitizens of the Philippines, married& lived together
from January1919 until Springof 1926. After whichtheyvoluntaryseparated& have not
livedtogether as man& wife, theyhad4 minor childrentogether.
• After negotiations, both parties mutuallyagreedto allowManuela Barreto(plaintiff) for her
& her children’s support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthlywhichto be increasedincases
of necessity& illness, andthat the title of certainpropertiesbe put inher name.
• Shortlyafter the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), whento Reno, Nevada &
secured inthat jurisdictionanabsolute divorce onthe ground ofdesertion datedNovember
28, 1927. On that same date he went throughthe forms of marriage with another Filipino
citizen as well & had 3 children withher.
• When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreedto paymonthly
for the support of Manuela Barreto& her children & has not made the payments fixedinthe
Reno divorce as alimony.
• Gonzales came backto the Philippines inAugust 1928 and shortlyafter, Barretobrought an
actionat the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratifythe decree of divorce issuedbythe
courts of Nevada & invokedsec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, anddeliver
to the Guardianad litem the equivalent of what wouldhave beendue to their childrenas
their legal portion fromrespective estateshadtheir parents diedintestate onNovember 28,
1927, theyalsoprayed that the marriage existingbetweenBarreto & Gonzalesbe declared
dissolved& Gonzales be orderedto payBarretoP500 per month, counsel fees ofP5000 & all
the expenses incurredin educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the childrenalso filed
as intervenors inthe case.
• After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement infavor of the plaintiff &
intervenors, but reducedthe attorney’s fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the
actionagainst the defendant, Hence, thisappeal byGonzales sayingthat the lower court
erred intheir decision.
ISSUE:WON anyforeign divorce, relatingto citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be
recognizedinthis jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, andunder conditions for whichthe
courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce.
HELD:
NO. The lower court erredingrantingthe reliefas prayedfor ongranting the divorce,
because:
• The court said that securingthe jurisdictionof the courts to recognize & approve the
divorce done inReno, Nevada cannot be done accordingto the public policyin this
jurisdictionon the questionof divorce.
• It’s clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda that
the entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation untilthe case was
submittedpraying the ratificationof the Reno Divorce wasclearlya circumventionof the law
regarding divorce & will be done under conditions not authorized byour laws.
• The matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines& the residence
acquired bythe husbandin Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & didnot confer
jurisdictionuponthe court of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds inwhichhe had
entered in 1919.
• Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Lawof the Philippines does not allowsuchto
be done, the effect of foreigndivorce inthe Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the
courts to approve oftheir ownactions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the
Philippines to be affectedbydecrees ofdivorce of foreigncourts in manner whichout
government believes is contraryto public order & good morals.
SC RULING:The decisionof CFI-Manila was REVERSED & Defendant is absolvedfrom the
demands made against himinthis action.
CONNECTION TO PERSONS, FAMILY RELATION/ CIVIL CODE:

3. 3
• Article 9 of the Old CivilCode, nowinArt 15 says that “Laws relating to familyrights &
duties or to status, condition, and legal capacityof persons, are binding upon Spaniards even
though theyreside in a foreigncountry”
• The last part ofArt 11 of the Old CivilCode, nowinArt 17 alsostates “...the prohibitive
laws concerningpersons, their acts & their property, andthose intendedto promote public
order & good morals, shall not be rendered without effect byanyforeignlaws or judgements
or by anythingdone or anyagreements entered into ina foreign country.”
Divorce Laws of the Philippines—The hardships ofexistingdivorce laws ofthe Philippine
Islands are well known to the members ofthe Legislature. It is the dutyof the courts to
enforce the laws of divorce as writtenbythe Legislature if theyconstitutional. Courts have
no right to saysuchlaws are too strict or too liberal.
• At the time thisdecisionwas renderedthere was stillabsolute divorce inthe Philippines on
the groundof Adulteryon the part of the wife, andConcubinage on the part of the husband;
the divorce, however, couldbe grantedonlyuponshowing that the defendant hadbeen
convictedbyfinal judgement for the adulteryor concubinage as the case maybe. The new
Civil Code hasabolishedabsolute divorce, leaving onlylegalseparation, which is equivalent
to relative divorce.
Barnuevo vs Fuster
299 Phil 606
FACTS:
February7, 1875: GabrielFuster andConstanza Yanezwere married(Catholic/canonical)in
Malaga, Spain.
On February1892:Fuster went to the Philippines, settled, andacquired real andpersonal
property.
1896: Constanza came to Manila andlived withher husbandinconjugal relations until April
1899.
April 4, 1899:Theymade anagreement (public document):
• Theyresolved to separate andlive apart, bothconsentingto suchseparation, andbyvirtue
thereofthe husbandauthorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside insuch place as
the said ladypleases.” (B. of E., P.13)
Fuster acknowledgedthat he would send the sum of 300 pesetas monthly, payable in
Madrid, Spainto support hiswife starting June 1899. However, onthe month ofAugust of
the same year, he stopped to make further payments.
March 11, 1909: Constanza startedfiling divorce proceedings against Fuster, indicating
adulterycommittedbyher husbandinor about the year 1899 witha certain womanthat she
namedin the complaint andwith whomhe hadlivedandcohabitedandbywhom he had
two children.
Plaintiff prays that:
• she be granted a decree of divorce
• the court order the separationof propertiesbetweenthe plaintiff anddefendant
• the conjugal societybe therefore liquidatedandafter the amount of the conjugal property
had been determined, that one half thereofbe adjudicatedto her
• as to the amount of pensionowing for her support but not paidto her, that the defendant
be orderedto payher the sum of 36,000 Spanishpesetas, that is 7,220 Spanish dollars,
which, reducedto Philippine currencyat the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint,
amounted to P12,959.90
Court of First Instance ofthe cityof Manilaheld itself to have jurisdiction
• decreedthe suspension oflife incommonbetween the plaintiffand defendant
• ordered the latter to paythe former 5,010.17
• That the communal propertybe dividedbetweenthe partieswith costs against the
defendant
• And in event that the parties couldnot agree to the division, it was to be effected by
commissioners according to law
Both parties appealed, but notwithstanding the appeal, the partitionof the property, by
means of commissioners, wasproceeded with.
Defendant’s Appeal
• Lack of jurisdictionover the persons and over the subject matter of the litigation;andover
the persons ofthe contending parties, because neither of the spouses was a resident of the
Philippines onthe date of the complaint.
• The court erred in its findingthat he hadcommitted adulterywitha certain womanfrom
1899 until 1909.
• The court also erredinits findingthat the adulterywas accompaniedbypublic scandaland
injured the dignityof his wife. o In law, it is not necessarythat adultery, to be a cause for
divorce, shouldbe accompaniedbypublic scandaland contempt for the wife. There is nolaw
that requires this.
• For having decreedthe divorce, suspensionof the marriedlife, andthe separationof the
properties ofthe parties.
• Against the findingof the court that there exists conjugalproperty(appellant maintains
that it has nofoundation)
• the court erredin orderingthe defendant to payto the plaintiff P5,010.17, whereas the
plaintiff hadmade no demand inher complaint with respect to this sumand that the plaintiff
has allowedtenyears to elapse before claimingit, her actionprescribed in1904, that is to
say, after 5 years.
• the court erredin empowering the receiver to proceedto the separationof propertyandin
appointingcommissioners to make the partitionanddistributionbetweenspouses
• the whole ofthe propertyshouldbe adjudicatedto the defendant as being exclusivelyhis
Plaintiff’s Appeal

4. 4
• petitioner prays that the judgment be reversedand that inits place thiscourt order the
defendant to payto the plaintiff her claimof P12,959.90 (insteadof P5,010.17) plus the
additional sumwhichthe alimonyamounts to at the rate ofP107.70 per month, dating from
the 1st of August 1909 until the date of payment withlegal interest from the date ofthe
filing of the complaint until the date of payment.
• Findings of the court:
a. the total amount of the alimonyowing to the plaintiffamounted to 34,200
pesetaso the sum that the plaintiffhadcollectedinMadridwas 6,365.68 o
that the remainder was 27,834.32 andwas equivalent t 5,566.86 Mexican
currencyo Mexican peso wasworth 90 centavos Philippine currency.
b. Therefore, the sum was equivalent to P5,010 Phil currencyo There was no
evidence as to the kind ofpesetasagreedupon, it was to be presumedthat it
was that current at the time andplace where the agreement wasmade,
which was Mexicanpesetas • it does not appear that the defendant inhis
answer accepted the fact in the manner allegedinthe complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the partitionof propertydecreedin the judgment of the Court of First
Instance should be confirmed.
HELD:
The partitionof propertydecreedin the judgment appealedfrom of the 9th ofSeptember
1911, should be andis herebyconfirmed. The twojudgments appealed fromare hereby
affirmed, without special pronouncement ofcosts in thisinstance.
Paraphernalpropertyis that which the wife brigs to the marriage without being included in
the dowryandthat she mayacquire after the creationof the same without being added
thereto. But, it is a provisionof article 1384 that “the wife shall have the management ofthe
paraphernal propertyunlessshe has deliveredthe same to her husband, before a notary, in
order that he mayadminister said property. In suchcase the husbandis obligedto create a
mortgage for the value of the personal propertyhe mayreceive, or to secure saidproperty,
in the manner establishedfor the dowryproperty.”
Article 16: Real propertyas well as personal propertyis subject to the law ofthe country
where it is stipulated.
However, intestate andtestamentarysuccessions, both withrespect to the order of
successionandto the amount of successional rights andto the intrinsic validityof
testamentaryprovisions, shall be regulatedbythe national law of the personwhose
successionis under consideration, whatever maybe the nature of the propertyand
regardless of the countrywhereinsaidpropertymaybe found.
ARTICLE 16: Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of successionand to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Testate Estate of Bohanan vs Bohanan et al
106 phil 997
FACTS:
Testator was borninNebraska, therefore a citizenof Nebraska or at least a citizen of
California where some ofhis propertiesare located. Thiscontentionis untenable.
Notwithstanding the longresidence of the decedent inthe Philippines, his stayhere was
merelytemporary, andhe continued and remainedto be a citizenof the United Statesandof
the state of his particular choice, whichis Nevada, as statedin his will.
The court finds that the testator was at the time of hisdeatha citizenof the US andof the
State of Nevada and declares that hiswill andtestament is fullyin accordance with the laws
of the State andadmits the same to probate.
On April 24, 1950, CFI judge, Hon. Amparoadmittedto probate the last will and testament of
the testator Testator made a last will withthe ff. partitions:
• ½ of residuaryestate to the Framers and Merchant NationalBankof L.A., intrust onlyfor
the benefit of hisgrandson, EdwardGeorge Bohanan, whichconsists ofP90,81.67 in cash and
½ sharesinstockof several mining companies
• Other halfof the residuaryestate to testator’s brother andhis sister, share andshare alike
• P6,000 grandsonEdward Gilbert, andhis daughter MaryLydia
• P10,000 Clara Daen.
• P2,000 Katherine Woodward
• P4,000 Beulah Fox
• P2,000 ElizabethHastings
Ex-wife and childrenquestions the validityof the testamentaryprovisions disposingof the
estate inthe manner above indicated, claiming that theyhave been deprived ofthe legitime
that the laws ofthe forumconcede to them.
CFI dismissedthe objections filed.

5. 5
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testamentaryprovisions are valid.
HELD:
The order of the court approving the project of partitionmade inaccordance withthe
testamentaryprovisions is herebyaffirmed.
The Old Civil Code is applicable because testator died in1944.
Art. 10(2) of the Old Civil Code statesthat “Nevertheless, legal andtestamentarysuccessions,
in respect to the order of successionas well as to the extent ofthe successionalrights and
the intrinsic validityof their provisions, shall be regulated bythe national law ofthe person
whose succession is inquestion, whatever maybe the nature ofpropertyandthe countryin
which it is to be found”.
Testator was a citizenof the State of Nevada because he hadselectedthisas his domicile and
permanent residence.
Sec. 9905 of Nevada CompiledLaws of 1925:Every personover the age ofeighteenyears, of
soundmind, maybylast will dispose of all his or her estate, real andpersonal, the same
being chargeable with the payment of the testator’s debts.
The ex-wife has nolegal claim to anyportionof the estate left bythe testator since noright
to share in the inheritance in favor ofa divorcedwife exists in the State ofNevada andsince
the court a quohadalreadyfound that there wasno conjugal propertybetweenthe testator
and the ex-wife.
It does not appear that at the time of the hearingof the project of partition, Section9905 of
the Nevada CompiledLaws was introducedas evidence. The Law ofNevada can onlybe
proved inour courts inthe manner providedbyour Rules:• Sec 41. Proof of public or official
record:An official recordor anyentrytherein, when admissible for anypurpose maybe
evidencedbyanofficial publicationthereofor bya copyattestedbythe officer having the
legal custodyof the record, or byhis deputy, and accompanied, if the recordif not kept inthe
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer hadcustody.
Bellisvs Bellis
20 scra 358
FACTS:
Amos Bellis wasa citizenof the State of Texas, andof the United States. Byhis first wife
whom he divorcedhe hadfive legitimate children, byhis secondwife, who survived him, he
had three legitimate children, andthree illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two
wills, one disposingof his Texas propertiesandthe other disposinghis Philippine properties.
In both wills, his illegitimate children were not givenanything. The illegitimate children
opposedthe will onthe groundthat theyhave been deprived oftheir legitimesto whichthey
should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law ofthe deceasedshoulddetermine the successionalrights of
the illegitimate children.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said childrenare not entitledto their legitimes under the
Texas Law, beingthe national law ofthe deceased, there are nolegitimes.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizenof the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validityof the provisionof the will andthe amount of successional rights
are to be determinedunder Texas law, the Philippine law onlegitimes cannot be appliedto
the testacyof Amos G. Bellis.
Article 16, par. 2, andArt. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the nationallawof the
decedent, in intestate or testamentarysuccessions, withregardto four items:(a) the order
of succession;(b)the amount of successional rights;(e) the intrinsic validityof the provisions
of the will;and(d)the capacityto succeed.
Intestate andtestamentarysuccessions, bothwith respect to the order of succession andto
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validityof testamentaryprovisions,
shallbe regulatedbythe national law of the personwhose successionis under consideration,
whatever maybe the nature of the propertyandregardless of the countrywhereinsaid
propertymaybe found.
AZNAR vs. GARCIA
7 scra 95
FACTS:
Edward S. Christensen, thoughborninNew York, migratedto California where he resided
and consequentlywas considereda California Citizenfor a periodof nine years to 1913. He
came to the Philippineswhere he became a domiciliaryuntil the time of hisdeath. However,
during the entire periodof hisresidence inthiscountry, he hadalways consideredhimself as
a citizenof California.
In his will, executedonMarch 5, 1951, he institutedanacknowledgednatural daughter,
Maria LucyChristensen as hisonlyheir but left a legacyof some moneyinfavor of Helen
Christensen Garciawho, ina decision renderedbythe Supreme Court had beendeclaredas
an acknowledgednatural daughter of his. Counsel of Helenclaims that under Art. 16 (2) of
the civil code, California lawshould be applied, the matter is returnedbackto the lawof
domicile, that Philippine lawis ultimatelyapplicable, that the share of Helenmust be
increasedin viewof successional rights of illegitimate childrenunder Philippine laws. On the
other hand, counselfor daughter Maria , inas much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of

6. 6
the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceasedmust apply, our courts must applyinternal
law of California on the matter. Under Californialaw, there are nocompulsoryheirs and
consequentlya testator shoulddispose anypropertypossessedbyhim in absolute dominion.
ISSUE:
Whether Philippine Law or CaliforniaLawshould apply.
HELD:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen ChristensenGarcia
said ineffect that there are two rulesinCaliforniaon the matter.
1. The conflict rule which shouldapplyto Californian’s outside the California,
and
2. The internal Lawwhich shouldapply to California domiciles in California.
The California conflict rule found onArt. 946 of the California Civil code States that, “Ifthere
is no law to the contraryinthe place where personal propertyis situated, it is deemedto
followthe decree ofits owner and is governed bythe law of the domicile.”
Christensen beingdomiciledoutside California, the lawof hisdomicile, the Philippinesis
ought to be followed.
Wherefore, the decisionappealedis reversed and case is remandedto the lower court with
instructions that partitionbe made as that ofthe Philippine lawprovides.
HUMANRELATIONS:
Uypitchingvs Quiamco
510 scra 17
FACTS:
1982: respondent ErnestoC. Quiamcowas approachedbyJuanDavalan, Josefino Gabutero
and Raul Generoso to amicablysettle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robberyfiled by
Quiamco against them. Theysurrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle anda
photocopyof its certificate of registration. The motorcycle wasparkedinan openspace
inside respondent’s business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible
and accessible to the public.
October 1981:the motorcycle had beensold oninstallment basis to Gabutero bypetitioner
Ramas UypitchingSons, Inc., a family-ownedcorporation managed bypetitioner Atty.
ErnestoRamasUypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgagedto
petitioner corporation. WhenGabuterocould nolonger paythe installments, told petitioner
corporation’s collector, WilfredoVeraño, that the motorcycle hadallegedlybeen “takenby
respondent’s men.”
January26, 1991:petitioner Uypitching, accompaniedbypolicemen, went to Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back
to Avesco-AVNE Enterprisesand, on petitioner Uypitching’s instructionandover the clerk’s
objection, took the motorcycle.
February18, 1991: petitioner Uypitchingfileda criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or
violationof the Anti-FencingLawagainst respondent inthe Office ofthe CityProsecutor of
Dumaguete City.
July30, 1994: the trial court rendereda decision finding that petitioner Uypitchingwas
motivatedwith malice andill will when he calledrespondent a thief, took the motorcycle in
an abusive manner andfileda baseless complaint for qualifiedtheft and/or violationof the
Anti- Fencing Law. Petitioners appealedthe RTCdecisionbut the CA affirmedthe trial court’s
decision.
Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages?
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petitionis herebyDENIED.
As theynever questionedthe findings ofthe RTCandCA that malice andillwill attendednot
onlythe public imputationof a crime to respondent but alsothe taking of the motorcycle,
petitioners were deemed to have acceptedthe correctnessof suchfindings.
A mortgagee maytake steps to recover the mortgaged propertyto enable it to enforce or
protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the
recoveryof possession of mortgaged property:
• if a mortgagee is unable to obtainpossessionof a mortgagedpropertyfor its sale on
foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possessionas a preliminary
step to the sale, or to obtainjudicial foreclosure.
Petitioner corporationfailed to bring the proper civil actionnecessaryto acquire legal
possession ofthe motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitchingdescendedonrespondent’s
establishment with his policemen andorderedthe seizure of the motorcycle without a
search warrant or court order. Worse, inthe course ofthe illegal seizure of the motorcycle,
petitioner Uypitching evenmouthed a slanderous statement.
There is anabuse of right whenit is exercised solelyto prejudice or injure another. The
exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for whichit wasestablished and

7. 7
must not be excessive or undulyharsh;there must be nointentionto harm another.
Otherwise, liabilityfor damages to the injuredpartywillattach.
In this case, the manner bywhichthe motorcycle wastaken at petitioners’ instance wasnot
onlyattendedbybad faithbut also contraryto the procedure laiddown bylaw. Considered
in conjunctionwiththe defamatorystatement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover
the mortgagedvehicle was utterlyprejudicialandinjurious to respondent.
On the other hand, the precipitate act offiling an unfoundedcomplaint couldnot inanyway
be consideredto be in accordance with the purpose for whichthe right to prosecute a crime
was established. Thus, the totalityof petitioners’ actions showeda calculateddesign to
embarrass, humiliate andpubliclyridicule respondent. Petitioners actedinanexcessively
harshfashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contraryto law, petitioners willfullycaused
damage to respondent. Hence, theyshould indemnifyhim.
Liwayway Vinzons-Chatovs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.
G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filedbyFortune against
Liwaywayas CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enactedRA 7654, whichprovidedthat locallymanufactured
cigarettes which are currentlyclassified and taxed at 55% shall be charged anadvalorem tax
of “55% provided that the maximumtax shall not be less thanFive Pesos per pack.” Prior to
effectivityof RA 7654, Liwaywayissueda rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and“More”
(all manufacturedbyFortune)as locallymanufacturedcigarettes bearingforeignbrand
subject to the 55% ad valoremtax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands
were alreadycovered.
In a case filedagainst Liwaywaywiththe RTC, Fortune contendedthat the issuance ofthe
rule violatedits constitutional right against deprivation ofpropertywithout due processof
law andthe right to equal protection ofthe laws.
For her part, Liwaywaycontended inher motion to dismiss that respondent hasno cause of
actionagainst her because she issuedRMC37-93 in the performance of her official function
and withinthe scope of her authority. She claimedthat she actedmerelyas anagent of the
Republic andtherefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She alsocontendedthat
the complaint states nocause ofactionfor lack of allegationof malice or badfaith.
The order denyingthe motionto dismiss waselevatedto the CA, who dismissedthe case on
the groundthat under Article 32, liabilitymayarise evenif the defendant did not act with
malice or badfaith.
Hence thisappeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a public officer maybe validlysuedinhis/her private capacityfor acts done
in connectionwith the discharge of the functions of his/her office.
Whether or not Article32, NCC, shouldbe appliedinsteadof Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative
Code.
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages whicha
person maysuffer arisingfrom the just performance of his official duties andwithinthe
scope of his assigned tasks. An officer whoacts within hisauthorityto administer the affairs
of the office whichhe/she heads is not liable for damages that mayhave beencaused to
another, as it would virtuallybe a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to
judgment for monetaryclaims without its consent. However, a public officer is bylawnot
immune from damagesinhis/her personal capacityfor acts done inbadfaith which, being
outside the scope ofhis authority, are nolonger protectedbythe mantle of immunityfor
official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, BookI, Administrative Code, civil liabilitymayarise where there is
bad faith, malice, or gross negligence onthe part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec.
39 of the same Book, civilliabilitymayarise where the subordinate public officer’s act is
characterizedbywillfulness or negligence. InCojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who
directlyor indirectlyviolatesthe constitutional rights of another, maybe validlysued for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code evenif his acts were not sotainted withmalice or
bad faith.
Thus, the rule inthisjurisdictionis that a public officer maybe validlysuedin his/her private
capacityfor acts done in the course of the performance of the functions ofthe office, where
said public officer:(1) actedwith malice, badfaith, or negligence; or (2) where the public
officer violated a constitutionalright of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SCruled that the decisive provisionis Article 32, it being a special law,
which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patternedafter the “tort” inAmerican law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act
which hasbeen defined as the commission or omissionof an act byone, without right,
wherebyanother receives some injury, directlyor indirectly, in person, propertyor
reputation. There are cases inwhichit has beenstated that civil liabilityintort is determined
bythe conduct andnot bythe mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances
under which the motive ofthe defendant has beenrenderedimmaterial. The reason
sometimes givenfor the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the allegedwrongdoer,
and not the act itself, woulddetermine whether the act was wrongful. Presence ofgood
motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, doesnot render lawful an act which is

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otherwise an invasion ofanother’s legal right;that is, liabilityintort innot precludedbythe
fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
Estrada vs. Escritor
492 SCRA 1. 22 JUN2006
FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTCof Las Pinas City. She hasbeen
living withQuilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years andhad
a son withhim as well. Respondent’s husbanddieda year before she enteredintothe
judiciarywhile Quilapiois still legallymarriedto another woman.
Complainant Estrada requestedthe Judge of said RTCto investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent shouldnot be allowedto remainemployed thereinfor it will
appear as if the court allows suchact.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permittedbyher religion—the
Jehovah’s Witnesses andthe Watch Tower andthe Bible Trace Society. Theyallegedlyhave a
‘Declarationof PledgingFaithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a
declarationis effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize
their union.
ISSUE:Whether or Not the State couldpenalize respondent for such conjugalarrangement.
RULING:No. The State couldnot penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
freedom of religion. The free exercise of religionis specificallyarticulated as one of the
fundamental rights inour Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and
sacredof human rights. The State’s interest inenforcing its prohibitioncannot be merely
abstract or symbolic inorder to be sufficientlycompelling to outweigha free exercise claim.
In the case at bar, the State hasnot evincedanyconcrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamycharges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest
onlyamounts to the symbolic preservationof anunenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinctionbetweenpublic andsecular moralityandreligious moralityshould
be kept in mind. The jurisdictionof the Court extends onlyto public andsecular morality.
The Court further statesthat our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutralityapproach
that gives roomfor accommodationof religious exercisesas requiredbythe Free Exercise
Clause. Thisbenevolent neutralitycouldallow for accommodation ofmoralitybased on
religion, providedit does not offend compelling state interests. Assumingarguendothat the
OSG has proved a compellingstate interest, it hasto further demonstrate that the state has
usedthe least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed anymore
than necessaryto achieve the legitimate goalof the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalizedfor it constitutes anexemption to the law basedon her right to freedom
of religion.
Star Paper Corp. vs. Simbol
[G.R. No.164774. April 12, 2006]
FACTS:
Star Paper Corporationis engaged in tradingof paper products. The companypolicies stated
that:
• New applicants will not be allowed to be hiredif in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the]
3rddegree of relationship, alreadyemployedbythe company
• In case of two ofour employees (bothsingle, one male andanother female) developed a
friendlyrelationshipduringthe course oftheir employment and thendecidedto get married,
one of them shouldresign to preserve the policystatedabove.
The complainants allegedthat whentheymarriedco-employees, theywere compelledto
resign because of the companypolicy. Arguing that said policyis illegal, theylodged a
complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.
ISSUE:
Whether the policyof the employer banning spouses fromworking in the same company
violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid
exercise of management prerogative.
HELD:
The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
It shall be unlawful for anemployer to require as a conditionof employment or continuation
of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expresslyor
tacitlythat upon getting marrieda womanemployee shall be deemed resignedor separated,
or to actuallydismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merelybyreasonof her marriage.
Two types of employment policies involve spouses:
1. no-spouse employment policies - policies banning onlyspouses from working inthe
same company;
2. anti-nepotismemployment policies- those banning all immediate familymembers,
includingspouses, fromworkinginthe same company Inthe US, there is what they
call as bona fide occupational qualification exception, that is, unless the employer
can prove that the reasonable demands of the businessrequire a distinctionbased
on marital status andthere is nobetter available or acceptable policywhichwould
better accomplishthe businesspurpose, anemployer maynot discriminate against
an employee basedonthe identityof the employee’s spouse.
And to justifya bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove twofactors:
(1) That the employment qualificationis reasonablyrelatedto the essential operation ofthe
job involved;and

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(2) That there is a factual basis for believingthat all or substantiallyall persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties ofthe job.
In the Philippines we employthe standard ofreasonableness ofthe companypolicywhichis
parallel to the bona fide occupational qualificationrequirement. This wasillustrated inthe
cases of Duncan Associationof Detailmanvs. GaxoWellcome (2004) and PT&Tv. NLRC(1997).
These cases instruct us that the requirement ofreasonableness must be clearlyestablished
to upholdthe questioned employment policy. The employer has the burdento prove the
existence of a reasonable businessnecessity.
In the case at bar, there is no a reasonable businessnecessity. The employees were hired
after theywere foundfit for the job, but were askedto resignwhentheymarrieda co-
employee. Star Paper failed to showhowthe marriages ofthe employees could
bedetrimental to its business operations.
The policyis premisedon the mere fear that employees marriedto eachother willbe less
efficient.