238097308 envi-cases-full

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G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997
ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO, ROMUALDO TANO, TEOCENES MIDELLO, ANGEL
DE MESA, EULOGIO TREMOCHA, FELIPE ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN, ROBERT LIM, VIRGINIA LIM,
FELIMON DE MESA, GENEROSO ARAGON, TEODORICO ANDRE, ROMULO DEL ROSARIO, CHOLITO
ANDRE, ERICK MONTANO, ANDRES OLIVA, VITTORIO SALVADOR, LEOPOLDO ARAGON, RAFAEL RIBA,
ALEJANDRO LEONILA, JOSE DAMACINTO, RAMIRO MANAEG, RUBEN MARGATE, ROBERTO REYES,
DANILO PANGARUTAN, NOE GOLPAN, ESTANISLAO ROMERO, NICANOR DOMINGO, ROLDAN TABANG,
ADRIANO TABANG, FREDDIE SACAMAY, MIGUEL TRIMOCHA, PACENCIO LABABIT, PABLO H. OMPAD,
CELESTINO A. ABANO, ALLAN ALMODAI, BILLY D. BARTOLAY, ALBINO D. LIQUE, MECHOR J. LAYSON,
MELANIE AMANTE, CLARO E. YATOC, MERGELDO B. BALDEO, EDGAR M. ALMASETA, JOSELITO
MANAEG, LIBERATO ANDRADA, JR., ROBERTO BERRY, RONALD VILLANUEVA, EDUARDO VALMORIA,
WILFREDO MENDOZA, NAPOLEON BABANGGA, ROBERTO TADEPA, RUBEN ASINGUA, SILVERIO GABO,
JERRY ROMERO, DAVID PANGGARUTAN, DANIEL PANGGARUTAN, ROMEO AGAWIN, FERNANDO EQUIZ,
DITO LEQUIZ, RONILO MODERABLE, BENEDICTO TORRES, ROSITO A. VALDEZ, CRESENCIO A. SAYANG,
NICOMEDES S. ACOSTA, ERENEO A. SEGARINO, JR., WILFREDO A. RAUTO, DIOSDADO A. ACOSTA,
BONIFACIO G. SISMO, TACIO ALUBA, DANIEL B. BATERZAL, ELISEO YBAÑEZ, DIOSDADO E. HANCHIC,
EDDIE ESCALICAS, ELEAZAR B. BATERZAL, DOMINADOR HALICHIC, ROOSEVELT RISMO-AN, ROBERT C.
MERCADER, TIRSO ARESGADO, DANIEL CHAVEZ, DANILO CHAVEZ, VICTOR VILLAROEL, ERNESTO C.
YBAÑEZ, ARMANDO T. SANTILLAN, RUDY S. SANTILLAN, JODJEN ILUSTRISIMO, NESTOR SALANGRON,
ALBERTO SALANGRON, ROGER L. ROXAS, FRANCISCO T. ANTICANO, PASTOR SALANGRON,
BIENVENIDO SANTILLAN, GILBUENA LADDY, FIDEL BENJAMIN, JOVELITO BELGANO, HONEY PARIOL,
ANTONIO SALANGRON, NICASIO SALANGRON, & AIRLINE SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION OF
PALAWAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN,
namely, VICE-GOVERNOR JOEL T. REYES, JOSE D. ZABALA, ROSALINO R. ACOSTA, JOSELITO A.
CADLAON, ANDRES R. BAACO, NELSON P. PENEYRA, CIPRIANO C. BARROMA, CLARO E. ORDINARIO,
ERNESTO A. LLACUNA, RODOLFO C. FLORDELIZA, GILBERT S. BAACO, WINSTON G. ARZAGA,
NAPOLEON F. ORDONEZ and GIL P. ACOSTA, CITY MAYOR EDWARD HAGEDORN, MEMBERS OF
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG PUERTO PRINCESA, ALL MEMBERS OF BANTAY DAGAT, MEMBERS
OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE OF PALAWAN, PROVINCIAL AND CITY PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN
and PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, and ALL JUDGES OF PALAWAN, REGIONAL, MUNICIPAL AND
METROPOLITAN, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioners caption their petition as one for "Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction, with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order" and pray that this Court: (1) declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No.
15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23,
Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and
(c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Palawan; (2) enjoin the enforcement thereof; and (3) restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts 1 and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation
of the Ordinances and of the Office Order.
More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be treated as, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
The following is petitioners' summary of the factual antecedents giving rise to the petition:
1. On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No.
15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF
ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF", the full text of which reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Title of the Ordinance. — This Ordinance is entitled: AN ORDINANCE
BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING
EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF.
Sec. 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. — To effectively free our City Sea Waters
from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance[s], and shall cover all persons and/or

entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto Princesa who is are (sic)
directly or indirectly in the business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the
City.
Sec. 3. Definition of terms. — For purpose of this Ordinance the following are hereby
defined:
A. SEA BASS — A kind of fish under the family of Centropomidae, better
known as APAHAP;
B. CATFISH — A kind of fish under the family of Plotosidae, better known
as HITO-HITO;
C. MUDFISH — A kind of fish under the family of Orphicaphalisae better
known as DALAG;
D. ALL LIVE FISH — All alive, breathing not necessarily moving of all
specie[s] use[d] for food and for aquarium purposes.
E. LIVE LOBSTER — Several relatively, large marine crusteceans [sic] of
the genus Homarus that are alive and breathing not necessarily moving.
Sec. 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise or company to
ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft or
seacraft of any live fish and lobster except SEA BASS, CATFISH, MUDFISH, AND
MILKFISH FRIES.
Sec. 5. Penalty Clause. — Any person/s and or business entity violating this
Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment
of not more than twelve (12) months, cancellation of their permit to do business in the
City of Puerto Princesa or all of the herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the
court.
Sec. 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment found violating the provisions
of this ordinance is a corporation or a partnership, the penalty prescribed in Section 5
hereof shall be imposed upon its president and/or General Manager or Managing
Partner and/or Manager, as the case maybe [sic].
Sec. 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any ordinance inconsistent to [sic]
this ordinance is deemed repealed.
Sec. 8. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1993.
SO ORDAINED.
xxx xxx xxx
2. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23,
Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:
In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD 426-14-74, otherwise known as
"AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY
BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION
ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A
MAYOR'S PERMIT" and "City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF
ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on
cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto
Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via
aircraft or seacraft.
The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit
issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with all other existing rules and
regulations on the matter.
Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as stated herein must be held
for proper disposition.
In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with the PAL Manager, the PPA
Manager, the local PNP Station and other offices concerned for the needed support and cooperation.
Further, that the usual courtesy and diplomacy must be observed at all times in the conduct of the
inspection.
Please be guided accordingly.
xxx xxx xxx
3. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted
Resolution No. 33 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING,
POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC
ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS
FASCIATUS (SUNO).CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200
GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRIDACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER
PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-
BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND
FAMILY:BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND
COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS", the full text of which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches [sic] and studies disclose that only five
(5) percent of the corals of our province remain to be in excellent condition as [a]
habitat of marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms;
WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and devastation of the corals of
our province were principally due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing,
sodium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances and other related
activities;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to protect and preserve the
existence of the remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to
reinvigorate and regenerate themselves into vitality within the span of five (5) years;
WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of the [sic] R.A. 7160 otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties [upon] acts which endanger

the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing,
among others.
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Kagawad Nelson P. Peneyra and upon unanimous
decision of all the members present;
Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to approve Resolution No. 33, Series of 1993 of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and to enact Ordinance No. 2 for the purpose, to wit:
ORDINANCE NO. 2
Series of 1993
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN IN SESSION ASSEMBLED:
Sec. 1. TITLE — This Ordinance shall be known as an "Ordinance Prohibiting the
catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral
dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus
Fasciatus (Suno) 3. Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200
grams and spawning), 4. Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera
(Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger
Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and
8. Family: Balistidae (T[r]opical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and
coming from Palawan Waters.
Sec. II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Sec. 2-A (Rep. Act 7160). It is hereby declared, the policy of the state that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for [a] more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities
and resources.
2. Sec. 5-A (R.A. 7160). Any provision on a power of [a] local Government Unit shall
be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower government units. "Any fair
and reasonable doubts as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of
the Local Government Unit concerned."
3. Sec. 5-C (R.A. 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.
4. Sec. 16 (R.A. 7160). General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Sec. III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
Province of Palawan to protect and conserve the marine resources of Palawan not
only for the greatest good of the majority of the present generation but with [the]
proper perspective and consideration of [sic] their prosperity, and to attain this end,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan henceforth declares that is (sic) shall be unlawful for
any person or any business entity to engage in catching, gathering, possessing,
buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms as
enumerated in Section 1 hereof in and coming out of Palawan Waters for a period of
five (5) years;
Sec. IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. — Any person and/or business entity violating this
Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, and/or imprisonment of six (6) months to twelve (12)
months and confiscation and forfeiture of paraphernalias [sic] and equipment in favor
of the government at the discretion of the Court;
Sec. V. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. — If for any reason, a Section or provision of this
Ordinance shall be held as unconditional [sic] or invalid, it shall not affect the other
provisions hereof.
Sec. VI. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Any existing Ordinance or a provision of any
ordinance inconsistent herewith is deemed modified, amended or repealed.
Sec. VII. EFFECTIVITY — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its
publication.
SO ORDAINED.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, Annexes "A" and "C" hereof thereby depriving all
the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of
livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from
performing their lawful occupation and trade;
5. Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, and
Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were even charged criminally under criminal case no. 93-05-C in the 1st Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay, an original carbon copy of the criminal complaint dated
April 12, 1993 is hereto attached as Annex "D"; while xerox copies are attached as Annex "D" to the copies
of the petition;
6. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other hand, were charged by the respondent PNP with
the respondent City Prosecutor of Puerto Princess City, a xerox copy of the complaint is hereto attached
as Annex "E";
Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutor's office and courts, petitioners
directly invoked our original jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June 1993. In sum, petitioners contend that:
First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor's permit could be granted
or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit.

Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan "altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession,
buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or
gathered through lawful fishing method," the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their
livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they
were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and
essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion."
Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon
against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed.
In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents to comment on the petition, and furnished the Office of
the Solicitor General with a copy thereof.
In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the
Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991
[hereafter, LGC]), and its specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1)
(vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. They claimed that in the exercise of such
powers, the Province of Palawan had "the right and responsibility . . . to insure that the remaining coral reefs, where
fish dwells [sic], within its territory remain healthy for the future generation." The Ordinance, they further asserted,
covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organismswhich were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded
other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five (5)
years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged to regenerate.
Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance
which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial
distinction existed "between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who
catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live," i.e., "the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does
not." Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class.
On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,
claiming that despite the pendency of this case, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan was bent on
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha,
Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Andres Linijan and Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, we issued on 11 November 1993 a temporary
restraining order directing Judge Angel Miclat of said court to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment
and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 11223.
On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the Solicitor General from filing a comment, considering that as claimed
by said office in its Manifestation of 28 June 1994, respondents were already represented by counsel.
The rest of the respondents did not file any comment on the petition.
In the resolution of 15 September 1994, we resolved to consider the comment on the petition as the Answer, gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 2
On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party respondents the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on their behalf. But in
light of the latter's motion of 9 July 1997 for an extension of time to file the comment which would only result in
further delay, we dispensed with said comment.
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved to dismiss this petition for want of merit, and on 22 July
1997, assigned it to the ponente to write the opinion of the Court.
I
There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The first is composed of Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano,
Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Andres
Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No.
33 and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal Case No. 93-05-C of the 1st
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Palawan; 3 and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim who were charged with violating
City Ordinance No. 15-92 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa. 4 All of them, with the exception of Teocenes Midello,
Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Felimon de Mesa, Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, are likewise the accused in Criminal Case No.
11223 for the violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, pending before Branch 50
of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. 5
The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners numbering seventy-seven (77), all of whom,
except the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan — an alleged private association of several marine merchants —
are natural persons who claim to be fishermen.
The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination of
the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been
resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be
adversely affected by the ordinance's.
As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of prematurity amounting to a
lack of cause of action. There is no showing that said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have filed
motions to quash the informations therein and that the same were denied. The ground available for such motions is
that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are
unconstitutional. 6 It cannot then be said that the lower courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion to justify recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It must further be
stressed that even if petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith give rise to a cause
of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy
therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special
defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom
in the manner authorized by law. 7 And, even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial may be the subject
of a special civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the court concerned
an opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may be dispensed with because of existing exceptional
circumstances. 8 Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is
still unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof. 9 For obvious reasons, the
petition at bar does not, and could not have, alleged any of such grounds.
As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a
declaration that the Ordinances in question are a "nullity . . . for being unconstitutional." 10
As such, their petition must
likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved, 11
it being settled that the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such
petitions. 12
II
Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the extraordinary writ
ofcertiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or
exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to us should be allowed. While we
have concurrent jurisdiction with Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs ofcertiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, so we held in People v. Cuaresma. 13

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not . . . to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is
after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. . . .
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the
light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their
applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and
adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land. . . .
In Santiago v. Vasquez, 14
this Court forcefully expressed that the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the
hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court, but
also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often
has to be remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We reiterated "the judicial policy that this Court
will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its]
primary jurisdiction."
III
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of petitioners, we opt to resolve this case on
its merits considering that the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end. Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City
of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted
on 19 February 1993, is effective for only five (5) years. Besides, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the
exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment and are thus
novel and of paramount importance. No further delay then may be allowed in the resolution of the issues raised.
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality. 15
To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt. 16
Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality.
To doubt is to sustain. 17
After a scrutiny of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have been
violated, we find petitioners' contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both
under the Constitution and applicable laws.
Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as having
been transgressed by the Ordinances.
The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads:
Sec. 2. . . .
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:
Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland
and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and
research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The
State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to
offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall
receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is self-described as "a private
association composed of Marine Merchants;" petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as "merchants;"
while the rest of the petitioners claim to be "fishermen," without any qualification, however, as to their
status.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms "subsistence" or "marginal"
fishermen, 18
they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an
individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by
existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish, 19
while a
subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. 20
Section
131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as "an individual engaged in
subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or
marine products produced by himself and his immediate family." It bears repeating that nothing in the
record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay
stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes
is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons. Our survey of the statute books reveals that the only
provision of law which speaks of a preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC,
which pertinently provides:
Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. — . . .
(b) The sangguniang bayan may:
(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster,
mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas,
within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as

determined by it: Provided, however, That duly
registered organizations and cooperatives of marginal
fishermen shall have the preferential right to such
fishery privileges . . . .
In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3 dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture
and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government prescribed guidelines concerning
the preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right mentioned in Section 149. This
case, however, does not involve such fishery right.
Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources, but
of their protection, development and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are
meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment may be
guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come.
The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is
not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and,
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their "exploration, development
and utilization . . . shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Moreover, their mandated
protection, development and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution,
imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. Thus, as to the
curtailment of the preferential treatment of marginal fishermen, the following exchange between
Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo and Commissioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., took place at the plenary
session of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. RODRIGO:
Let us discuss the implementation of this because I would not raise the
hopes of our people, and afterwards fail in the implementation. How will this
be implemented? Will there be a licensing or giving of permits so that
government officials will know that one is really a marginal fisherman? Or if
policeman say that a person is not a marginal fisherman, he can show his
permit, to prove that indeed he is one.
MR. BENGZON:
Certainly, there will be some mode of licensing insofar as this is concerned
and this particular question could be tackled when we discuss the Article on
Local Governments — whether we will leave to the local governments or to
Congress on how these things will be implemented. But certainly, I think our
congressmen and our local officials will not be bereft of ideas on how to
implement this mandate.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO:
So, once one is licensed as a marginal fisherman, he can go anywhere in
the Philippines and fish in any fishing grounds.
MR. BENGZON:
Subject to whatever rules and regulations and local laws that may be
passed, may be existing or will be passed. 21
(emphasis supplied)
What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of
the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature. 22
On this score, in Oposa v. Factoran, 23
this Court declared:
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles the State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all
else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. . . .
The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this
right:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage
and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants. (emphasis supplied).
Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC
"shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community."
The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose
rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or
poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute
any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. 24
Further, the sangguniang bayan, the
sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that
"[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such
as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in
pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological
imbalance." 25

Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization 26
as expressly mandated by the
Constitution. 27
Indispensable to decentralization is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that "[a]ny
provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local
government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in
favor of the local government unit concerned." 28
Devolution refers to the act by which the National
Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific
functions and responsibilities. 29
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of
fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. 30
This necessarily includes the
enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.
The term "municipal waters," in turn, includes not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the
municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and not comprised within the national parks, public
forest, timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two
lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the
municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen
kilometers from
it. 31
Under P.D. No. 704, the marine waters included in municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles
from the general coastline using the above perpendicular lines and a third parallel line.
These "fishery laws" which local government units may enforce under Section 17(b)(2)(i) in municipal
waters include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D. No. 1015 which, inter alia, authorizes the establishment of a
"closed season" in any Philippine water if necessary for conservation or ecological purposes; (3) P.D. No.
1219 which provides for the exploration, exploitation, utilization and conservation of coral resources; (4)
R.A. No. 5474, as amended by B.P. Blg. 58, which makes it unlawful for any person, association or
corporation to catch or cause to be caught, sell, offer to sell, purchase, or have in possession any of the
fish specie called gobiidae or "ipon" during closed season; and (5) R.A. No. 6451 which prohibits and
punishes electrofishing, as well as various issuances of the BFAR.
To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation of fishing in municipal waters and the
protection of its marine environment are concerned, must be added the following:
1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within municipal waters;
2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium fishes within municipal waters;
3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells within municipal waters;
4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture shelled mollusks within municipal
waters;
5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed farms within municipal waters;
6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture pearls within municipal waters;
7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport fish and fishery products; and
8. Establishment of "closed season" in municipal waters.
These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers
granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under
Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise
of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise
known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 June 1992. This
statute adopts a "comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with
protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province," which
"shall serve to guide the local government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the
formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said province." 32
At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the relation between the assailed Ordinances and
the aforesaid powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan to protect the environment. To begin, we ascertain the purpose
of the Ordinances as set forth in the statement of purposes or declaration of policies quoted earlier.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a
"closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2)
to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from
further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in
municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The
devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994
between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government.
The realization of the second objective clearly falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and
the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment. 33
The destruction of coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable, ecological imbalance, for coral reefs are
among nature's life-support systems. 34
They collect, retain and recycle nutrients for adjacent nearshore
areas such as mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef flats; provide food for marine plants and animals; and
serve as a protective shelter for aquatic organisms. 35
It is said that "[e]cologically, the reefs are to the
oceans what forests are to continents: they are shelter and breeding grounds for fish and plant species
that will disappear without them." 36
The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part, from the modern phenomenon of live-fish trade
which entails the catching of so-called exotic species of tropical fish, not only for aquarium use in the West,
but also for "the market for live banquet fish [which] is virtually insatiable in ever more affluent
Asia.37
These exotic species are coral-dwellers, and fishermen catch them by "diving in shallow water with
corraline habitats and squirting sodium cyanide poison at passing fish directly or onto coral crevices; once
affected the fish are immobilized [merely stunned] and then scooped by hand." 38
The diver then surfaces
and dumps his catch into a submerged net attached to the skiff. Twenty minutes later, the fish can swim
normally. Back on shore, they are placed in holding pens, and within a few weeks, they expel the cyanide
from their system and are ready to be hauled. They are then placed in saltwater tanks or packaged in
plastic bags filled with seawater for shipment by air freight to major markets for live food fish. 39
While the
fish are meant to survive, the opposite holds true for their former home as "[a]fter the fisherman squirts the
cyanide, the first thing to perish is the reef algae, on which fish feed. Days later, the living coral starts to
expire. Soon the reef loses its function as habitat for the fish, which eat both the algae and invertebrates
that cling to the coral. The reef becomes an underwater graveyard, its skeletal remains brittle, bleached of
all color and vulnerable to erosion from the pounding of the waves." 40
It has been found that cyanide
fishing kills most hard and soft corals within three months of repeated application. 41
The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa and
the prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand,
and the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In sum, the public purpose and
reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be controverted.

As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of the City of
Puerto Princesa, we find nothing therein violative of any constitutional or statutory provision. The Order
refers to the implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not the Mayor's Permit.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the part of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1992, on the theory
that the subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources (BFAR) under P.D. No. 704, otherwise known as the Fisheries Decree of 1975; and that, in any
event, the Ordinance is unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Natural
Resources (DNR), likewise in accordance with P.D. No. 704.
The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The jurisdiction and responsibility of the BFAR under
P.D. No. 704, over the management, conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of
all fishery and aquatic resources of the country is not all-encompassing. First, Section 4 thereof excludes
from such jurisdiction and responsibility municipal waters, which shall be under the municipal or city
government concerned, except insofar as fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal centers are
concerned. This section provides, however, that all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting
fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Department
of Natural Resources for appropriate action and shall have full force and effect only upon his approval. 42
Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under the Department of Natural
Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural Resources). Executive Order No. 967 of 30 June
1984 transferred the BFAR from the control and supervision of the Minister (formerly Secretary) Of Natural
Resources to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) and converted it into a mere staff agency thereof,
integrating its functions with the regional offices of the MAF.
In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which reorganized the MAF, the BFAR was retained as an
attached agency of the MAF. And under the Administrative Code of 1987, 43
the BFAR is placed under the
Title concerning the Department of Agriculture. 44
Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or
unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that
should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. However, the
requirement of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal
ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the
following reasons:
(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends Sections 16 and 29 of P.D.
No. 704 45
insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the LGC.
(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the
power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise
specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose
rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or
poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute
any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. 46
Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang
bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to
"[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such
as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in
pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance." 47
In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed
legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing in the herculean task of
arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other local government units shall now be roused
from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to
future generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove
disastrous, if not, irreversible.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order
issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Romero, Melo, Vitug, Francisco Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., concurring:
I fully concur in the opinion of the Court written by Justice Davide. I write separately to emphasize two
points which I believe are important. The first is the need to uphold the presumption of validity of the
ordinances in this case in view of the total absence of evidence to undermine their factual basis. The
second is the need not to allow a shortcircuiting of the normal process of adjudication on the mere plea
that unless we take cognizance of petitions like this, by-passing the trial courts, alleged violations of
constitutional rights will be left unprotected, when the matter can very well be looked into by trial courts
and in fact should be brought there.
The ordinances in question in this case are conservation measures which the local governments of
Palawan have adopted in view of the widespread destruction caused by cyanide fishing of corals within
their territorial waters. At the very least, these ordinances must be presumed valid in the absence of
evidence to show that the necessary factual foundation for their enactment does not exist. Their
invalidation at this point can result in the untimely exoneration of otherwise guilty parties on the basis of
doubtful constitutional claims.
Ordinance No. 2-93, which the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan adopted in 1993, prohibits, for a
period of five years, the "catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment" of five fish and
lobsters. As originally enacted, the prohibition applied to eight species of fish and lobsters caught in the
waters of Palawan, namely, "1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3.
Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Señorita), lobster (below 200 grams and spawning), 4. Tridacna Gigas
(Giant Clams or Taklobo and other species), 5. Pinctada Margaritifera (Mother Pearl Oysters), 6. Penaeus
Monodon (Tiger Prawn — breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and 8.
Family: Balistidae (Tropical Aquarium Fishes)." 1 Later, however, the ordinance was amended to limit the
ban to three species only, namely: mameng (scaridae), panther or señorita (cromileptes altivelis) and
ornamental or aquarium fishes (balistidae). Violation of the ordinance is punishable by a fine of P5,000.00
and/or imprisonment of not less than 6 nor more than 12 months and confiscation of the paraphernalia and
equipment used in the commission of the offense. 2
Ordinance No. 2-93 was adopted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan on the basis of a 1992 study
submitted by the Department of Agriculture, 3 showing that, as a result of the use of cyanide and other
noxious substances for fishing, only 5% of the coral reefs in the Province of Palawan remained in excellent
condition as fish sanctuaries and habitats, while 75% was heavily damaged.

The rampant use of cyanide has been encouraged by the lucrative trade in live fishes which are shipped
not only to Manila but also abroad, principally to Hongkong, Taiwan and Malaysia. The fishes are sold to
gourmet restaurants because of the great demand for exotic food, to aquariums and to pet shops. In its
issue of July 19, 1993. Time Magazine 4 reported that the illicit trade in live animals is the third biggest
contraband business in the world, after drugs and arms, and identified the Philippines as a major source of
tropical fishes for the global traffic in live fishes.
The use of cyanide enables fishermen to catch fish alive and in commercial quantity in a way not possible
with the use of such traditional methods as hook and line, fish traps, baklad and the like, which allows only
limited catch and often results in injuries to fishes and the loss of their scales, thereby reducing their
survival for transportation abroad. 5 Cyanide does not kill fish but only stuns them. The stunned creatures
are then scooped up and placed in containers ready for shipment across borders, national and
transnational. What cyanide does, however, is poison the fragile reefs and cause them to die and cease as
fish habitats. 6
Concern over the use of cyanide in fishing and its ill effect on the marine environment also prompted the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to pass Ordinance No. 15-92, which makes it unlawful for
any person or business enterprise or company "to ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of
destinations either via aircraft or seacraft of any live fish and lobster except SEA BASS, CATFISH,
MUDFISH and MILKFISH FRIES." 7 The ban is for five years, from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998.
The penalty for violation of the ordinance is a fine of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not more
than 12 months. 8
To enforce the ordinance, the mayor of Puerto Princesa ordered the inspection of cargoes of live fish and
lobsters leaving the city by air or sea. Inspectors are to ascertain if the shipper has a permit issued by the
office of the city mayor. Any cargo of live fish and lobster without a permit from the mayor's office will be
"held for proper disposition." 9
The ordinances in question are police power measures, enacted by the Province of Palawan and the City
of Puerto Princesa, pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991 which makes it in fact their duty to
enact measures to "protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing. . . ." 10
There is no basis for
the claim in the dissenting opinion that the subject of these ordinances lies within the competence of the
national government. For the matter concerns a local problem, namely, the destruction of aquatic
resources in the Province of Palawan. For this reason the Solicitor General asked for leave to withdraw
from this case. On the other hand, the Department of Agriculture submitted its report on the extent of the
devastation of coral reefs caused by illegal fishing to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan and
thereby left the solution of the problem to be worked out by the local authorities. It would therefore set back
the policy of decentralization were this Court to sustain such a claim.
Indeed, petitioners' challenge to the validity of the ordinances does not rest on the claim that the
ordinances are beyond the power of local governments to enact but on the ground that they deprive
petitioners of their means of livelihood and occupation and for that reason violate the Constitution of the
Philippines. For support, petitioners invoke the following constitutional provisions:
Art. XII, §2 . . . . .
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens,
as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in
rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
Art. XIII, §1: The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good.
Id., §7: The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland
and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and
research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The
State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to
offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall
receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
I cannot see how these provisions can, in any way, lend support to petitioners' contention that the
ordinances violate the Constitution. These provisions refer to the duty of the State to protect the nation's
marine resources for the exclusive use and enjoyment of Filipino citizens, to the preferential right of
subsistence fishermen in the use of such communal marine resources, and to their right to be protected,
even in offshore fishing grounds, against foreign intrusion. There is no question here of Filipino preference
over aliens in the use of marine resources. What is in issue is the protection of marine resources in the
Province of Palawan. It was precisely to implement Art. XII, §2 that the ordinances in question were
enacted. For, without these marine resources, it would be idle to talk of the rights of subsistence fishermen
to be preferred in the use of these resources.
It has been held that "as underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute." 11
No evidence has been presented by petitioners to overthrow the
factual basis of the ordinances — that, as a result of the use of cyanide and other noxious substances for
fishing, only 5% of the coral reefs in Palawan was in excellent condition, that 75% had been heavily
destroyed, and that because of the thriving market for live fish and lobster here and abroad there was
rampant illicit trade in live fish.
Nor has it been shown by petitioners that the local legislation here involved is arbitrary or unreasonable. It
has been held: "If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose,
and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with
the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and
unauthorized to deal. . . ." 12
It is contended that neither Provincial Ordinance No. 2-93 nor City Ordinance No. 15-92 prohibits cyanide
fishing and therefore the prohibition against catching certain species of fish and their transportation is
"excessive and irrational." It is further argued that the ban is unreasonable because it is not limited to
cyanide fishing but includes even legitimate fishing.
The ban on the use of cyanide and other noxious substances is already provided for in other legislation.
P.D. No. 534, §2 punishes fishing by means of "explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by the
use of electricity." Consequently, the ordinances in question can be seen as a necessary corollary of the
prohibition against illegal fishing contained in this Decree. By prohibiting the catching of certain fishes and
lobsters, Ordinance No. 2-93 in effect discourages cyanide fishing because, as already stated, cyanide is
preferred in catching fishes because it does not kill but only stuns them and thus preserves them for export
to the world market.
On the other hand, the claim that the ordinance sweeps overbroadly by "absolutely prohibit[ing] the
catching, gathering, buying and shipment of live fishes and marine coral resources by any and all means
including those lawfully executed or done in the pursuit of legitimate occupation" misconceives the
principal purpose of the ordinance, which is not so much to prohibit the use of cyanide for fishing as to

rebuild corals because of their destruction by cyanide fishing. This is clear from the "whereas" clauses of
Resolution No. 33, accompanying Ordinance No. 2-93:
WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches and studies disclose that only five (5) percent of
the corals of our province remain to be in excellent condition as habitat of marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms;
WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and devastation of the corals of our
province were principally due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide
fishing, use of other obnoxious substances and other related activities;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to protect and preserve the existence of the
remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to reinvigorate and regenerate
themselves into vitality within the span of five (5) years;
WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the environment
and impose appropriate penalties [for] acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, among others;
The principal aim of the ordinance is thus the preservation and rehabilitation of the corals. Only indirectly is
it also concerned with prohibiting the use of cyanide. That this is the aim of the ordinance can also be
inferred from the fact that the ban imposed by it on the catching and gathering of fishes is for a limited
period (5 years) calculated to be the time needed for the growth and regeneration of the corals. Were the
purpose of the ordinance the prohibition of the use of cyanide for fishing, the ban would not be for a limited
period only but for all time.
I am not much moved by the plea that the ordinances deprive small fishermen of their means of livelihood
and occupation. The ban imposed by Ordinance No. 2-93, as amended, covers only three species, i.e.,
mameng (scaridae), panther or señorita (cromilepres altivelis) and ornamental aquarium fishes
(balistiedae), which are prized in the black market. With respect to other species, it is open season for
legitimate fishermen. On the other hand, the ban imposed by Ordinance No. 15-92 allows the
transportation and shipment of sea bass, catfish, mudfish and milkfish fries. The ban imposed by the two
ordinances is limited to five years. It is thus limited both as to scope and as to period of effectivity. There
is, on the other hand, the imperative necessity for measures to prevent the extinction of certain species of
fish.
Indeed, the burden of showing that there is no reasonable relation between the end and the means
adopted in this case is not on the local governments but on petitioners because of the presumption that a
regulatory statute is valid in the absence of factual evidence to the contrary. As held in United States
v.Salaveria. 13
"The presumption is all in favor of validity. . . The councilors must, in the very nature of
things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject, and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting
the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the
people. . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation."
Finally, petitioners question Office Order No. 23, s. of 1993, of the city mayor of Puerto Princesa, for being
allegedly vague. This order prohibits the transportation of fish outside the city without permit from the
mayor's office. Petitioners contend that the order does not state under what condition a permit may be
granted and, consequently, leaves it to the absolute discretion of the mayor when to grant and when to
deny a permit. The questioned paragraph of the order states:
The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required
Mayor's Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued
by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with
all other existing rules and regulations on the matter.
This contention is untenable. As the office order is intended to implement City Ordinance No. 15-92, resort
must be made to the ordinance in order to determine the scope of such office order. As already noted, the
ordinance prohibits the shipment out of Puerto Princesa of live fish and lobsters, with the exception of
catfish, mudfish and milkfish fries. Consequently, a permit may be denied if it is for the transportation of
fishes which are covered by the ban, but not for those not covered by it. This is the common sense
meaning of the office order in question. Criminal laws must be precisely drawn, but, as Justice Holmes
once said, "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there
is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."14
One final point. This case was brought to this Court on the bare bones of the ordinances, on the mere
claim of petitioner Alfredo Tano and his 83 copetitioners that they are subsistence fishermen. The
constitutional protection refers to small fishermen who depend on the sea for their existence. Ten of the
petitioners, led by Alfredo Tano, are accused in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of possession of the
species covered by Provincial Ordinance No. 2-93, while two, Roberto Lim and Virginia Lim, are charged
with violation of the two ordinances in the City Prosecutor's Office. There is no telling from the records of
this case whether petitioners are subsistence fishermen or simply impecunious individuals selling their
catch to the big businessmen. The other petitioners are admittedly fish traders, members of an association
of airline shippers, to whom the constitutional provisions obviously do not apply.
The judicial invalidation of the ordinances in this case could undermine the on-going trial of some of
petitioners. Instead of leaving the determination of the validity of the ordinances to the trial court, where
some of petitioners are facing charges, this Court will be shortcircuiting the criminal process by
prematurely passing upon the constitutional questions and indirectly on the criminal liability of some of the
petitioners. This is a task which should await the development of evidence of record.
Indeed because of the unsatisfactory abstractness of the record, this case should not have been brought
here. The mere fact that some of petitioners are facing prosecution for violation of the ordinances is no
reason for entertaining their suit. Our jurisdiction is limited to cases and controversies. Who are
petitioners? What is the impact of the ordinance on their economic situation? Are the factual bases of the
two ordinances supported by evidence? These questions must be raised in the criminal trial or in a suit
brought in the trial court so that facts necessary to adjudicate the constitutional questions can be
presented. Nothing can take the place of the flesh and blood of litigation to assess the actual operation of
a statute and thus ground the judicial power more firmly.
Petitioners justify the filing of the present action in this Court on the ground that constitutional questions
must be raised at the earliest time. That is true, but it does not mean that the questions should be
presented to the Supreme Court first hand. Moreover, the rule is not absolute. Constitutional questions like
those invoked by petitioners can be raised anytime, even in a motion for reconsideration, if their resolution
is necessary to the decision of an actual case or controversy, as our recent resolution 15
of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, reimposing the death penalty, amply demonstrates.
Romero, Melo, Puno and Francisco, JJ., concur.
BELLOSILLO, J., dissenting:
It is settled rule that where the provisions of the law are clear and unambiguous there is no room for
interpretation. The duty of the court is only to apply the law. The exception to such rule cannot be justified
on the sole basis of good motives or noble objectives. For it is also basic that the end does not justify the
means.

The petition raises significant constitutional questions. While petitioners apparently instituted the action to
enjoin their criminal prosecution, the issue boils down to whether the subject ordinances of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa are valid and enforceable as to authorize the criminal prosecution of those charged with
violation thereof.
Notwithstanding the procedural limitations strictly applied in the majority opinion to render the petition
dismissible on grounds of prematurity and lack of real interest in the controversy, the case clearly falls
under the exceptions allowed by law. The petition, I submit, can be properly treated as a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to correct errors of jurisdiction committed
by the lower court arising from the implementation of a void ordinance. Even if the purpose of the petition
is for declaratory relief, if the petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be
resolved as they involve national interest, it may be treated as a special civil action under Rule 65. 1 The
mere absence of a prior motion to quash the Information in the trial court should not prevent the accused,
petitioners herein, from seeking to render null and void the criminal proceedings below.
In criminal cases, when the constitutionality or validity of a law or ordinance is essentially involved, the
same may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. It can also be considered by the appellate court at
any time if it involves the jurisdiction of the lower Court. 2 Further, under Sec. 8, Rule 117, of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads
to the Complaint or Information either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the
same in the motion shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of
no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty, and
jeopardy.
Petitioners are proper parties to set aside the proceedings in the trial court. A proper party is one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. Petitioners
have been criminally charged and arrested for alleged violation of the ordinances in question.
Consequently, unless the trial court is enjoined from continuing with the proceedings, petitioners are in
danger of being convicted and punished under ordinances which they allege to be invalid and ineffective.
In fact this Court initially recognized the real interest of petitioners in instituting the action when it issued a
restraining order directing Judge Angel R. Miclat to cease and desist until further orders from proceeding
with the arraignment and pre-trial of People v. Alfredo Tano, et al., Crim. Case No. 11223, for violation of
Resolution No. 2-93 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, and Ordinance No. 15-92 of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City.
The question to be resolved is whether Resolution No. 2-93, Office Order No. 23 and Ordinance No. 15-92
are constitutional, valid and enforceable. By considering the purpose and objective of the ordinances as
laudable, the majority adopts the affirmative view in consonance with the general welfare clause and
principle of devolution well-rooted in the Local Government Code of 1991.
While I agree with the majority that the local leaders of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City be commended
for their efforts to uplift and protect the environment and natural resources within their areas, the general
welfare clause is not the sole criterion to determine the validity or constitutionality of the ordinances.
InMagtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, 3 we reiterated that the well-established tests of a valid
ordinance are: (a) It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (b) It must not be unfair or
oppressive; (c) It must not be partial or discriminatory; (d) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (e) It
must be general and consistent with public policy; and, (f) It must not be unreasonable.
As admitted by the majority, among our existing statutes on fishing and fishery or aquatic resources are
P.D. Nos. 704, 1015 and 1219. P.D. No. 704 is titled "Revising and Consolidating All Laws and Decrees
Affecting Fishing and Fisheries." With the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, only Secs.
16 and 29 of P.D. No. 704 were expressly repealed. All the rest of the provisions of P.D. No. 704 remain
valid and effective, Sec. 4 of which is enlightening —
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction of the Bureau (of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources). — The Bureau shall
have jurisdiction and responsibility in the management, conservation, development, protection,
utilization and disposition of all fishery and aquatic resources of the country except municipal
waters which shall be under the municipal or city government concerned: Provided, That
fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal centers shall be under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau: Provided, further, That all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing
and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary for appropriate
action and shall have full force and effect only upon his approval. The Bureau shall also have
authority to regulate and supervise the production, capture and gathering of fish and
fishery/aquatic products.
There is no doubt that under P.D. No. 704 fishing, fishery and aquatic resources in municipal waters are
under the jurisdiction of the municipal or city government concerned. However, the same decree imposes
a mandatory requirement directing municipal or city governments to submit ordinances enacted pertinent
to fishing and fishery resources to the Secretary of Agriculture who now has control and supervision over
the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). The ordinances will attain full force and effect
only upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture.
Ordinance 15-92 of Puerto Princesa City, admittedly, was not submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture
through the BFAR for approval. Such failure of compliance with the law prevented it from becoming valid
and effective. Consequently, Office Order No. 23 of the Mayor of Puerto Princesa City which seeks to
implement and enforce Ordinance No. 15-92 is also ineffective as there is nothing to implement.
To say that Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 704 was impliedly repealed by the Local Government Code is gratuitous.
For, if it was the intention of the legislature to dispense with the requirement of prior approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture of ordinances pertinent to fishery resources, it would. have expressly repealed
Sec. 4 when, in fact, it did so with Secs. 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 704. Cases abound holding that a repeal by
implication is not presumed or favored considering that the legislature is presumed to be aware of existing
laws; ordinarily, if it intends to revoke a statute it would manifest such intention in express terms.4 Before
such a repeal is deemed to exist it should be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the
same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of
repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language used in the latter statute must be such as to
render it irreconcilable with what has been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that
standard does not suffice. In fact, there is no inconsistency between the Local Government Code and P.D.
No. 704 as amended. While the Local Government Code vests power upon the local government to enact
ordinances for the general welfare of its inhabitants, such power is subject to certain limitations imposed
by the Code itself and by other statutes. When the legislature failed to repeal Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 704 it
accepted and recognized a limitation on the power of the local government to enact ordinances relative to
matters affecting fishery and aquatic resources. A reading of particular provisions of the Local Government
Code itself will reveal that devolution on the powers of the local government pertaining to the protection of
environment is limited and not all-encompassing, as will be discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.
Further, while the Local Government Code is a general law on the powers, responsibilities and
composition of different local government units, P.D. No. 704 is a special law dealing with the protection
and conservation of fishing and aquatic resources including those in the municipal waters. Hence, the
special law should prevail over the general law.
There is also P.D. No. 1015 which vests upon the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to establish closed
seasons. Another existing law on fisheries which has not been repealed by the Local Government Code is
P.D. No. 1219, which provides for the exploration, exploitation, utilization and conservation of coral
resources. Section 4 thereof provides that the decree shall be implemented by the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources who shall have jurisdiction and responsibility in the exploration,
exploitation, utilization and conservation of coral resources. Section 6 authorizes the Secretary to issue
special permit to any person or institution to gather in limited quantities any coral for scientific or
educational purposes. Section 10 empowers the Secretary to promulgate rules and regulations for the
implementation of this law.

It is true that police power can be exercised through the general welfare clause. But, while police power is
inherent in a state, it is not so in municipal corporations or local governments. In order that a local
government may exercise police power, there must be a legislative grant which necessarily sets the limits
for the exercise of the power. 5 In this case, Congress has enacted the Local Government Code which
provides the standards as well as the limitations in the exercise of the police power by the local
government unit.
Section 2 of the Local Government Code provides for a system of decentralization whereby local
government units are given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources, and the process shall
proceed from the national government to the local government units. However, under Sec 3, par. (i), of the
Local Government Code, the operative principles of decentralization upon the environment and natural
resources are not absolute when it is provided therein that "local government units shall share with the
national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within
their territorial jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of this Code and national policies." The national
policies mentioned here refer to existing policies which the DENR and other government agencies
concerned with the environment may implement at any given moment. The national policies are embodied
in existing laws, rules and regulations pertaining to environment and natural resources, such as P.D. Nos.
704 and 1219 relating to fishery resources. The above provision was crafted to make sure that local
government enactments do not supplant or negate national government policies on environment. 6 This is
precisely the reason why the Local Government Code did not repeal Sec. 4 of P.D. NO. 704 requiring prior
submission to and approval by the Secretary of Agriculture of ordinances relative to fishery and aquatic
resources. Needless to stress, the approval of the Secretary is necessary in order to ensure that these
ordinances are in accordance with the laws on fisheries and national policies. Likewise, the jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources over coral resources under P.D. No. 1219 remains.
The core of the devolution adopted by the Local Government Code is found in Sec. 17 thereof which
reiterates the basic services and facilities to be rendered by the local governments. With respect to the
protection and conservation of fisheries, Sec. 17, par. 2 (i), specifically provides that the municipality shall
conduct "extension and on-site research services and facilities related to agriculture and fishery activities
which include dispersal of livestock and poultry, fingerlings and other seeding materials for aquaculture
. . . . and enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves . . . ."
The power devolved upon the municipality under the Local Government Code is the enforcement of
existing fishery laws of the State and not the enactment thereof. While a local government unit may adopt
ordinances upon subjects covered by law or statute, such ordinances should be in accordance with and
not repugnant to the law. 7 In view thereof, ordinances which may be enacted by the municipality or city
should be pursuant to the provisions of P.D. Nos. 704, 1015 and 1219. Thus, under the provisions of Secs.
447, par. 1 (vi), 458, par. 1 (vi) and 468, par. 1 (vi), the municipality, city and province respectively may
approve ordinances protecting the environment by specifically penalizing only those acts which endanger
the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing which are already
prohibited under P.D. Nos. 704 and 1219, and other laws on illegal fishing. 8
The questioned ordinances may also be struck down for being not only a prohibitory legislation but also an
unauthorized exercise of delegation of powers. An objective, however worthy or desirable it may be, such
as the protection and conservation of our fisheries in this case, can be attained by a measure that does not
encompass too wide a field. The purpose can be achieved by reasonable restrictions rather than by
absolute prohibition. Local governments are not possessed with prohibitory powers but only regulatory
powers under the general welfare clause. 9 They cannot therefore exceed the powers granted to them by
the Code by altogether prohibiting fishing and selling for five (5) years all live fishes through Ordinance No.
15-92 and coral organisms through Ordinance No. 2-93 involving even lawful methods of fishing.
These prohibitions are tantamount to the establishment of a closed season for fish and aquatic resources
which authority is not among those powers vested by the Local Government Code to the local government
units. For the authority to establish a closed season for fisheries is vested upon the Secretary of
Agriculture by virtue of P.D. Nos. 704 and 1015 and in the Secretary of Environment and Natural
resources pursuant to P.D. No. 1219 in relation to coral resources. The power of the local governments is
confined and limited to ensuring that these national fishery laws are implemented and enforced within their
territorial jurisdictions. Hence, any memorandum of agreement which might have been executed by the
Department of Agriculture or Department of Environment and Natural Resources granting additional
powers and functions to the local governments which are not vested upon the latter by the Local
Government Code because such powers are covered by existing statutes, is an undue delegation of power
and, consequently, null and void.
The majority also cites R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for
Palawan Act, as proof of the power of the local governments of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City to issue
the assailed ordinances. Although the objectives of R.A. No. 7611 and of the ordinances are one and the
same, i.e., the protection, conservation and development of natural resources, the former does not grant
additional powers to the local governments pertaining to the environment. In fact, the law adopts a
comprehensive framework which shall serve to direct and guide local governments and national
government agencies in the implementation of programs and projects affecting Palawan. With the
enactment of this Act, the local governments are mandated to coordinate and align their developmental
plans, projects and budgets in accord with the framework of the SEP. It can be said that this is another
limitation on the exercise of police power by the local governments of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City
because the governance, implementation and policy direction of the SEP shall be exercised by the
Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) which is under the Office of the President.
Finally, I find unreasonable Resolution No. 2-93 of Palawan and Ordinance No. 15-92 of Puerto Princesa
City. The prohibitions set forth are not germane to the accomplishment of their goals. Ordinance No. 15-92
is aimed to free effectively the marine resources of Puerto Princesa from cyanide and other obnoxious
substances. But the means to achieve this objective borders on the excessive and irrational, for the edict
would absolutely ban the shipment of live fishes and lobsters out of the city for a period of five (5) years
without prohibiting cyanide fishing itself which is the professed goal of the ordinance. The purpose of
Resolution No. 2-93, on the other hand, is to protect and preserve all marine coral-dwelling organisms
from devastation and destruction by illegal fishing activities, e.g., dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide fishing,
and the use of other obnoxious substances. But in absolutely prohibiting the catching, gathering, buying
and shipment of live fishes and marine coral resources by any means including those lawfully executed or
done in the pursuit of legitimate occupation, the ordinance overstepped the reasonable limits and
boundaries of its raison d'etre. This I cannot help viewing as plain arbitrariness masquerading as police
power. For the consequent deprivation of the main source of livelihood of the people of Palawan can only
be regarded as utter depravation of this awesome power of the State.
For all the foregoing, I vote to grant the petition.
Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 None, however, exists in Puerto Princesa City.
2 Petitioners filed their Memorandum on 24 October 1994, respondents City Mayor Hagedorn
and Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princess filed their
Memorandum on 25 January 1995, while respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan filed their Memorandum on 31 January 1995.
3 Annex "D" of Petition, Rollo, 35.
4 Annex "E" of Petition; id, 36.
5 Annex "A" to "A-5" of Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order,Rollo, 86 et seq.
6 VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 582 (2nd ed. 1969), citing U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245 [1915].
7 Acharon v. Purisima, 13 SCRA 309, 311 [1965]; Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 145,
152-153 [1991]; Yap v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 245, 253 [1993]; People v.
Bans, 239 SCRA 48, 54-55 [1994].
8 Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 37, 47 [1993]; Lasco v. United
Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, 241 SCRA 681, 684 [1995].
9 See Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 343 [1991]; People v. Bans, supra note 7.

10 Rollo, 25.
11 Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 243 [1993], citing Remotigue v.
Osmeña, 21 SCRA 837 [1967]; Rural Bank of Olongapo v. Commissioner of Land Registration,
102 SCRA 794 [1981]; and Allied Broadcasting Center v. Republic of the Philippines, 190 SCRA
782 [1990].
12 Philnabank Employees Association v. Hon. Estanislao, 227 SCRA 804, 811 [1993].
13 172 SCRA 415, 423-424 [1989], reiterated in Manalo v. Gloria, 236 SCRA 130, 138-139
[1994].
14 217 SCRA 633, 652 [1993].
15 La Union Electric Cooperative Inc. v. Yaranon, 179 SCRA 828, 836 [1989]; Francisco v.
Permskul, 173 SCRA 324, 333 [1989].
16 See Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978].
17 Paredes v. Executive Secretary, 128 SCRA 6, 11 [1984], citing Yu Gong Eng v. Trinidad, 47
Phil. 385 [1925]. See also Aris (Phil.) Inc. v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 246, 255-256 [1991].
18 Although the intent of the framers was to have the terms refer to those "who lived a hand-to-
mouth existence.," JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION
WRITERS 964 (1995).
19 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1381 [1993].
20 Webster's, supra, 2279.
21 III Record of the Constitutional Commission, 50.
22 Section 16, Article II.
23 224 SCRA 792, 804-805 [1993].
24 Section 149.
25 Section 447[a][1][vi]; Section 458[a][1][vi]; Section 468[a][1][vi].
26 Section 2(a).
27 Section 3, Article X.
28 Section 5(a).
29 Section 17(e).
30 Section 17[b][2][i].
31 Section 13[r], LGC.
32 Sec. 4. R.A. No. 7611.
33 Section 458[a][1][vi]; Section 468[a][1][vi].
34 Section 3[3], R.A. No. 7611.
35 Jay Batongbacal, Note, The Coastal Environment and the Small-Scale Fisherfolk: Advocacy
for Community-Based Coastal Zone Management, 66 PHIL. L. J. 149, 162 (December 1991).
36 Anthony Spaeth, Reef killers, TIME Magazine, 3 June 1996, 49, 50.
37 Anthony Spaeth, Reef Killers, TIME Magazine, 3 June 1996, 49, 50.
38 Batongbacal, 168.
39 Spaeth. 51.
40 Id.
41 Batongbacal, 168.
42 Said section reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction of the Bureau. — The Bureau shall have jurisdiction and responsibility in the
management, conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of all fishery and
aquatic resources of the country except municipal waters which shall be under the municipal or
city government concerned: Provided, That fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal centers
shall be under the jurisdiction of the Bureau: Provided, further, That all municipal or city
ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall
be submitted to the Secretary for appropriate action and shall have full force and effect only
upon his approval. The Bureau shall also have authority to regulate and supervise the
production, capture and gathering of fish and fishery/aquatic products.
The Bureau shall prepare and implement, upon approval of the Fishery Industry Development
Council, a Fishery Industry Development Program.
43 Executive Order No. 292.
44 Section 20, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book IV.
45 These sections read as follows:
Sec. 16. License, lease, and permit. — No person shall exploit, occupy, produce, culture,
capture or gather fish, or fry or fingerling of any species of fish or fishery/aquatic products, or
engage in any fishery activity in Philippine or municipal waters without a license, lease or
permit: Provided, That when due to destruction wrought upon fishponds, fishpens or fish
nurseries, by typhoons, floods and other fortuitous events, or due to speculation, monopolistic
and other pernicious practices which tend to create an artificial shortage of fry and/or fingerling,
the supply of fish and fishery/aquatic products can reasonably be expected to fall below the
usual demand therefor and the price thereof, to increase, the Secretary, upon recommendation
of the Director, is hereby authorized to fix a fair and reasonable price for fry and fingerling of any
species of fish, and in so doing and when necessary, fix different price levels for various areas
or regions taking into account such variable factors as availability, accessibility to transportation
facilities, packing and crating, and to regulate the movement, shipment and transporting of such
fry and fingerling: Provided, Further, That the price so fixed shall guarantee the gatherers of fry a
just and equitable return for their labor: Provided, Finally, That any administrative order issued
by the Secretary to implement the foregoing shall take effect immediately, the provisions of
Section 7 hereof to the contrary notwithstanding.
xxx xxx xxx
C. MUNICIPAL FISHERIES
Sec. 29. Grant of fishery privileges. — A municipal or city council, conformably with an
ordinance duly approved by the Secretary pursuant to Section 4 hereof may:
a. grant to the highest qualified bidder the exclusive privilege of constructing
and operating fish corrals, oyster culture beds, or of gathering "bangus" fry,
or the fry of other species, in municipal waters for a period not exceeding
five (5) years: Provided, That in the zoning and classification of municipal
waters for purposes of awarding, through public bidding, areas for the
construction or operation of fish corrals, oyster culture beds, or the
gathering of fry, the municipal or city council shall set aside not more than
one-fifth (1/5) of the area, earmarked for the gathering of fry, as may be
designated by the Bureau, as government "bangus" fry
reservation: Provided, Further, That no fish corral shall be constructed
within two hundred (200) meters of another fish corral in marine fisheries, or
one hundred (100) meters in freshwater fisheries, unless they belong to the
same licensee, but in no case shall the distance be less than sixty (60)
meters, except in waters less than two (2) meters deep at low tide, or unless
previously approved by the Secretary;
b. authorize the issuance to qualified persons of license for the operation of
fishing boats three (3) gross tons or less, or for the privilege of fishing in
municipal waters with nets, traps or other fishing gear: Provided, That it
shall be beyond the power of the municipal or city council to impose a
license for the privilege of gathering marine mollusca or the shells thereof,
for pearling boats and pearl divers, or for prospecting, collecting, or
gathering sponges or other aquatic products, or for the culture of
fishery/aquatic products: Provided, Further, That a licensee under this
paragraph shall not operate within two hundred (200) meters of any fish
corral licensed by the municipality except when the licensee is the owner or
operator of the fish corral but in no case within sixty (60) meters of said

corral. The municipality or city council shall furnish the Bureau, for statistical
purposes, on forms which shall be furnished by the Bureau, such
information and data on fishery matters as are reflected in such forms.
46 Section 149.
47 Section 447[a][1][vi]; Section 458[a][1][vi]; Section 468[a][1][vi].
MENDOZA, J., concurring:
1 §§I and III.
2 §IV.
3 Quoted in Respondents Comment on the Petition. p. 7.
4 Toufexis. All God's Creatures Priced to Sell. Time, July 19, 1993, p. 32.
5 Supra note 3 at p. 8.
6 Supra note 4 at p. 34.
7 §4.
8 §5.
9 Office Order No. 33, s. 1993.
10 R.A. No. 7160, §458(a)(1 )(vi) and §468(a)(1)(vi).
11 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass'n v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849, 857
(1967), citingO'Gozman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 255, 257, 75 L.Ed. 324, 328
(1931).
12 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See also Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, 481
(1971): People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972).
13 39 Phil. 102, 111 (1918).
14 Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339, 73 L.Ed. 722, 728 (1929), quoted by this Court in
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass'n v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA at 867.
15 People v. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, Feb. 7, 1997 (death penalty statute valid).
BELLOSILLO, J.: dissenting:
1 Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 60403, 3 August 1983, 124
SCRA 1.
2 San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, No. L-2187, 29 September 1967, 21 SCRA 292.
3 G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994, 234 SCRA 255.
4 Almeda v. Florentino, No. L-23800, 21 December 1965, 15 SCRA 514.
5 Martin, Ruperto G., Public Corporations, Rev. Ed., p. 46, citing Elliot, Municipal Corporations,
p. 33.
6 Pimentel, Aquilino, The Local Government Code of 1991, Key to National Development, 1993,
p. 19.
7 See Note 5, p. 69, citing U.S. v. Chan Tienco, 25 Phil. 89 (1913).
8 See Note 6, p. 73.
9 Cruz v. Paras, Nos. L-42571-72, 25 July 1983, 123 SCRA 569.
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are
commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If they are
considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private ownership. The private respondent's claim
to the land in question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz.
Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the
petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First
Instance. of Capiz. 1
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2
The Director of Forestry then came to this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to
private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is
mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is the legal nature of
mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private
respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American
organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three
grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This classification was maintained in the
Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That
new charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. 3
This provision has been
reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution.4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only agricultural lands
were allowed to be alienated. 5
Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest
lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released
for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6
promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps or manglareswere
defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred plants
which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and
casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the
tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sake
of the combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that
they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in
general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for purpose of
navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what
remains.
x x x
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom had grown of
converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a common feature of
settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of
the most productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested
interests and prove a public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that mangrove
swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became
effective on October 1 of that year, thus:

Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public forest'
includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and
mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case
when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act (Act of
Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this translation and that a better
translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English means land with trees
growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land
which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the
general character of the land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase
agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which
are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of
Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral
or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or
ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917
cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have considered them
agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established
by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8
promulgated on March 4, 1933,
more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a
unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the application there
are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition of the
Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove
lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in
1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9
with Justice Fernando declaring that the
mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial
court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small
and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as
lumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do
not form part of the public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10
the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11
reiterated the ruling in
the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12
promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the
Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public
domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13
the Court was more positive when it held, again
through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land
because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that
'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820
of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section
1821 of the said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons
for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be
kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14
where this Court agreed with the Solicitor
General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not
private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical pronouncement that
should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to
implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even permitted to
provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made such implementation, the executive
officials may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty "

to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts
will step into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is
claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating
with each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our
natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of making periodic
classifications of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable lands,
the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable
or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands
are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time
and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon there
commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, the
President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public lands and he shall by
proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and
thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall
remain as such for forest uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify the
boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such proclamation, and upon
such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as though such
proclamation had never been made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public forest, not
including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are
better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by
the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be
agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as
defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we
have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The
statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive
department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or
unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus
presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of
mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised
to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be understood as
covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 became
effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly
acquired property right protected by the due process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of
the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 15
where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909,
before it was much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and
for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be
considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership
claimed by the private respondent in support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as
forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under
Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands, 16
to
prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not have
the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual
because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the
aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable
for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private
ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until
timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor
the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for

homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and other
modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp lands or
mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest
land or timber land and not released for fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant
of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the forest land has
been declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot
convert it into private property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private respondent offers of
prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record contains no
convincing evidence of the existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the
property, let alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been
shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that the land
has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty years as required by the
Spanish Mortgage Law. 17
These matters are not presumed but must be established with definite proof, which is
lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis used by the
appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not
sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless
cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the subject land in his
name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglaresform part of the
public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of
private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title of
private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Record on Appeal, pp. 41-63, Rollo p. 18; Decision penned by Judge Ignacio Debuque.
2 Rollo pp. 15-17; Decision penned by Concepcion, Jr., J., Serrano and San Diego, JJ.,
concurring.
3 Sec. 10, Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution.
4 Sec. 3, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
5 Sec. 1, Art. XIII, 1935 Constitution.
6 12 Phil. 572.
7 39 Phil. 560.
8 58 Phil. 21.
9 79 SCRA 130.
10 151 SCRA 88.
11 79 SCRA 461.
12 3 SCRA 441. 13 126 SCRA 69.
14 151 SCRA 679.
15 G.R. No. L-46048, November 29, 1988.
16 Brief for the Applicant-Appellee, pp. 5-6, Rollo, p. 20.
17 Republic of the Philippines v. CA and Miguel, G.R. No. I, 60847, May 21, 1988, citing Director
of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, Fernandez Hermanos v. Director of Lands, 57 Phil. 929,
Querol v. Querol, 48 Phil. 90; Archbishop of Manila v. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593 and Carino v. Insular
Government, 8 Phil. 150.
18 J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Villanueva, 104 Phil. 643; Masaganda v. Argamosa, 109 SCRA
53; Director of Lands v. CA., 133 SCRA 701; De Guzman, v. C.A., 148 SCRA 75.
G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983
SERAFIN B. YNGSON, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE GONZALES and JOSE
M. LOPEZ, defendants-appellees.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which upheld the orders of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President regarding the disposition of
swamplands for conversion into fishponds. Originally taken to the Court of Appeals, the case was elevated to this
Court on a finding that only a pure question of law was involved in the appeal.
There is no dispute over the facts. The Court of Appeals adopted the statement of facts in the Solicitor-General's
brief. We do the same:
The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about 66
hectares, more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante,
province of the Negros Occidental. In view of the potentialities and possibilities of said area for
fishpond purposes, several persons filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize
the same for said purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her
application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio Doromal who filed his on October 28,
1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because said area were then still considered as
communal forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond purposes.
On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for fishpond
permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de
Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the same bureau on
March 19 and April 24, 1953. When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the
instant case, said area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was only

released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties
were brought to the attention of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on
April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant and rejecting the
claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal). Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales
and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources where their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos.
901 and 901-A (p. 3, Rec. on Appeal).
In an order dated April 5, 1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources set aside the order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the
division of the area in question into three portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of
the whole area covered by their respective applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). Appellant filed
a petition for review dated July 6, 1955 from the aforesaid order of the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources but the same was dismissed by the Office of the President of the
Philippines on December 20, 1955 (pp. 5-8, Rec. on Appeal). A motion for reconsideration filed
by the appellant on February 15, 1956 was likewise denied on August 3, 1956. A second and
third motion for reconsiderations filed by the appellant was also denied on August 5, 1958 and
October 26, 1960, respectively (p. 18, Rec. on Appeal).
Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance
against the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Anita
V. Gonzales, and Jose M. Lopez.
The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void and that the order
of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition on the ground that plaintiff had not
established such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Office of the President of the Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of discretion
justifying review by the courts in a special civil action.
The plaintiff-appellant made the following assignments of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED SUCH
'CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS-
APPELLEES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AS TO CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, JUSTIFYING
REVIEW THEREOF IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION BY THE COURT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RULE OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES IN EFFECT ITSELF HOLDING THAT THE 'PRIORITY RULE' ESTABLISHED IN
PARAGRAPHS (a) AND (d), SECTION 14, FISHERY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
FISHPOND APPLICATIONS FILED PRIOR TO THE CERTIFICATION OF THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY THAT
THE AREA APPLIED FOR IS AVAILABLE FOR FISHPOND PURPOSES; IN TREATING THE APPLICATIONS OF
THE APPELLANT AND THAT OF THE APPELLEES LOPEZ AND GONZALES ON EQUAL FOOTING ONLY AND
IN ORDERING THE DIVISION OF THE AREA INVOLVED IN THESE APPLICATIONS INTO THREE EQUAL
PARTS AWARDING ONE-THIRD SHARE EACH TO THESE APPLICANTS.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for development into fishponds gravely
abuse their discretion in interpreting and applying their own rules? This is the only issue in this case.
The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:
SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application-In determining the priority of application or right to a permit
or lease the following rules shall be observed:
(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied and
unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of preference thereto.
(d) A holder of fishpond application which has been rejected or cancelled by the Director of
Fisheries by reason of the fact that the area covered thereby has been certified by the Director
of Forestry as not available for fishpond purposes, SHALL NOT LOSE his right as a PRIOR
APPLICANT therefore, if LATER ON, the area applied for is certified by the Director of Forestry
as available for fishpond purposes, provided that not more than one (1) year has expired since
the rejection or cancellation of his application, in which case, his fishpond application which was
rejected or cancelled before, shall be reinstated and given due course, and all other fishpond
applications filed for the same area shall be rejected.
The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates:
1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.
2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947
3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952
4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953
5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953
The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January 14, 1954. It is
clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land available for lease permits and
cnversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their applications.
After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably gave due course to Yngzon's
application and rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason given was Yngzon's priority of
application.
We see no error in the decision of the lower court. The administrative authorities committed no grave abuse of
discretion.
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are
released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease,
grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes,
fishpond leases, and other modes of utilization. (Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175; Ankron v. Government of
the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10; Vda. de Alfafara v. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA
1184).
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming
part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery
or other purposes.

All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over another.
The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so close in time to the actual
opening of the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be given some kind of
administrative preferential treatment. Whether or not the administrative agencies could validly issue such an
administrative order is not challenged in this case. The validity of paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-
appellant Yngson is clearly not covered by the provision. His application was filed almost two years before the
release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the one-year
period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has apparently
the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretary's order states that all three
applications must be considered as having been filed at the same time on the day the area was released to the
Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the 66 hectares among the three of them equally. The private
respondents accept this order. They pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto.
The Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose of the provision in question is to redeem a rejected
premature application and to consider it filed as of the date the area was released and not to grant a premature
application a better right over another of the same category. We find such an interpretation as an exercise of sound
discretion which should not be disturbed. In the case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) we reiterated the rule
that the construction of the officer charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should be
given controlling weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA 220) we held that in the absence of a clear
showing of abuse, the discretion of the appropriate department head must be respected. The records show that the
above rulings should also apply to the present case.
During the pendency of this petition, petitioner Yngson filed a motion to have Patricio Bayoborda, Rene Amamio, and
nine other respondents, declared in contempt of court. Petitioner charged that Bayoborda and Amamio entered the
property in controversy and without petitioner's consent, laid stakes on the ground alleging that the same were
boundaries of the areas they were claiming; that the other respondents likewise entered the property on different
dates and destroyed petitioner's hut and the uppermost part of his fishpond and started to build houses and to
occupy the same. In their comment, the respondents in the contempt motion denied petitioner's charges. Bayoborda
and Amamio stated that they were bona-fide applicants for fishpond purposes of areas outside the 22 hectares
alloted for the petitioner and that they were authorized to place placards in the areas they applied for. As evidence
the respondents attached a copy of the resolution of the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP)
showing that their applications have been duly received and acknowledged by the latter and in compliance with
government regulations, they placed markers and signs in their respective boundaries. The resolution likewise stated
that these markers and signs were subsequently destroyed and later on Mr. Yngson started development by building
dikes in the area applied for, which he has no authority to do so due to the present conflict. The resolution further
prohibited Yngson from constructing any improvements in any area outside his 22 hectares and also prohibited
Bayoborda and Amamio from entering and making constructions in the applied for areas pending the issuance of
their permits.
The petitioner has failed to show that the acts committed by the respondents were a direct disturbance in the proper
administration of justice and processes of the law which constitutes contempt of court. If there were any violations of
petitioner's rights, he should resort to PACLAP which issued the resolution between him and respondents or file, as
he alleged he did, a criminal complaint or other action before the courts. The motion also raises factual
considerations including boundaries and geographical locations more proper for a trial court.
We have held that contempt of court presupposes contumacious and arrogant defiance of the court. (De Midgely v.
Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23; Matutina v. Judge Buslon, 109 Phil. 140,142)
The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court which we can take cognizance of and punish. If any of his
property or other rights over his one-third's share of the disputed property are violated, he can pursue the correct
action before the proper lower court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack
of merit. Costs against petitioner-appellant.

238097308 envi-cases-full

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