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1.)GALLARDO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-67742 October 29, 1987
I. Parties:
MELITON GALLARDO and TERESA
VILLANUEVA, petitioners
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, MARTA
VILLANUEVA VDA. DE AGANA,
VISITACION AGANA KIPPING, PEDRO V.
AGANA, MARCELO V. AGANA, JR.,
TERESITA AGANA SANTOS and JESUS V.
AGANA, respondents.
Petitioners were nephew and niece of the
late Pedro Villanueva (owner of the subject
land).
The private respondent Marta Villanueva
vda. de Agana, daughter of Pedro
Villanueva.
II. Prior Proceeding:
The Court of First Instance of Laguna
rendered its decision declaring the deed of sale
of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted
transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab
initio.
The Intermediate Appellate Court, on
May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision
of the trial court
III. Theories of the Parties:
Petitioner’s contentions.
Petitioner claimed that the aforestated
land was sold to them in a private document, an
unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog
(Annex "B" of the complaint) that was allegedly
signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying
and transferring the property in question in
favor of the petitioners.
Petitioners claim that the sale although
not in a public document, is nevertheless valid
and binding according to jurisprudence wherein
Court ruled that even a verbal contract of sale of
real estate produces legal effects between the
parties.
Respondent’s contentions.
As the respondent court aptly stated in
its decision
True, as argued by appellants, a private
conveyance of registered property is valid as
between the parties. However, the only right the
vendee of registered property in a private
document is to compel through court processes
the vendor to execute a deed of conveyance
sufficient in law for purposes of registration.
Plaintiffs-appellants' reliance on Article 1356 of
the Civil Code is unfortunate.
The general rule enunciated in said Art.
1356 is that contracts are obligatory, in
whatever form they may have been entered,
provided all the essential requisites for their
validity are present. The next sentence provides
the exception, requiring a contract to be in some
form when the law so requires for validity or
enforceability. Said law is Section 127 of Act 496
which requires, among other things, that the
conveyance be executed "before the judge of a
court of record or clerk of a court of record or a
notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall
certify such acknowledgment substantially in
form next hereinafter stated" was violated in
this case.
IV. Objective of the Parties:
Petitioners
To set aside or reverse the decision * of
the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) promulgated on May 22, 1984 in AC-
G.R. CV No. 69946 entitled Meliton Gallardo and
Teresa Villanueva v. Marta Villanueva vda. de
Agana, et al. (Rollo, p. 37) affirming the
decision **of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna 8th Judicial District, Branch II, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna (now Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna) dated January 20, 1982, which
dismissed the complaint for Quieting of Title in
Civil Case No. SC-1492 and declared
the plaintiff's (petitioner's herein) Re-constituted
Transfer Certificate of Title RT-6293 (No.
23350) as null and void (Record on Appeal, pp.
215-216).
Respondents
For the Intermediate Appellate Court
decision be AFFIRMED in declaring the deed of
sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the
reconstituted transfer certificate of title of
petitioners, void ab initio.
V. Key Facts:
1. The subject matter of this controversy
involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti,
Laguna consisting of 81,300 square meters,
more or less, initially covered by an original
Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April
2, 1924 owned and registered in the name
of the late Pedro Villanueva (former Justice
of the Peace of the Municipal Court, Cavinti,
Laguna).
2. The Original Certificate of Title was
cancelled on the basis of the private
document of sale (Exhibit "B" an
unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog,
2. that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro
Villanueva conveying and transferring the
property in question in favor of the
petitioners.) and a new certificate of title
was issued in the name of the petitioners
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT- 6293 (No. 23350)
3. During the Second World War, the records
as well as the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Laguna, where the original of their new
transfer certificate of title was kept, were
completely burned. Accordingly, by virtue of
an Affidavit of Reconstitution dated
December 2, 1958 (Record on Appeal,
Annex "DD," pp. 41-42) and upon
presentation of the Owner's Duplicate
Certificate of Title, the title was
administratively reconstituted and the
Register of Deeds of Laguna issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-6293 (No. 23350)
in the name of the petitioners (Record on
Appeal, Annex "B", pp. 7).
4. On November 17, 1976, defendant Marta
Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva,
Jr., and Restituto R. Villanueva executed and
filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna.
When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of
Adverse Claim, attempt was made to settle
said controversy amicably, but they failed.
So, petitioners instituted court suit against
the private respondent and her husband, Dr.
Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint
for Quieting of Title and Damages with the
Court of First Instance of Laguna on
February 3, 1977.
5. The trial court found that said private
document (Exhibit "B") was null and void
and that it was signed by somebody else not
Pedro Villanueva. Such findings of fact
besides being based on the records, were
sustained by the Court of Appeals.
VI. Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid
reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of
petitioners.
VII. Holdings:
No. Section 127 of Act 496 which
requires, among other things, that the
conveyance be executed "before the judge of a
court of record or clerk of a court of record or a
notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall
certify such acknowledgment substantially in
form next hereinafter stated” was violated in
this case.
VIII. Ratio Decidendi:
The action of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna in allowing the registration of the
private deed of sale was unauthorized and did
not lend a bit of validity to the defective private
document of sale. With reference to the special
law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act,
Act 496 “Deeds of Conveyance, ... affecting lands,
whether registered under this act or
unregistered shall be sufficient in law when
made substantially in accordance with the
following forms, and shall be as effective to
convey, encumber, ... or bind the lands as though
made in accordance with the more prolix forms
heretofore in use.” It is therefore evident that
Exhibit "E" in the case at bar is definitely not
registerable under the Land Registration Act.
Also, the contention that ownership over
registered property may be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession is absolutely
without merit. No title to registered land in
derogation of that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Prescription is unavailing not only
against the registered owner but also against his
hereditary successors.
IX. Disposition:
Petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is
AFFIRMED.
2.)CASE ANALYSIS
GR No. L-68533, May 23, 1986
Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development,
petitioners
vs.
Mariano Funtilar, Magdalena Funtilar, Heirs of Felipe
Rocete and Intermediate Appellate Court, respondents
I. Parties
a. Petitioners
Director of Lands and Director of
Forest Development, petitioners
b. Respondents
Mariano Funtilar, Magdalena Funtilar, Heirs
of Felipe Rocete and Intermediate Appellate
Court
II. Prior Proceedings
Trial Court (The private respondents
delivered the owners of the parcel of land)
*the petitioners filed an appeal to
IAC
Intermediate Appellate Court (The decision
of the trial court was affirmed by the IAC)
• petitioners filed a petition to
review the decision of the IAC
to the Supreme Court
Supreme Court-
III. Theories of the Parties
Petitioners-
1) that neither of the respondents
possessed sufficient title of the land
2) that neither of them have been in open,
continuous, exclusive possession and
occupation of the land for at least 30
years immediately preceding the filing
of the application
3) that the land is a portion of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines
Respondents-
1) they have registrable title on account of
their possession since time immemorial
2) that there was no actual survey of the
land applied for and he is entitled to
registration
IV. Objective of the Parties
Petitioners-
3. They wanted to recover the parcel
of land
Respondents-
They wanted to have a peaceful
ownership and to have a land title under
their name
V. Key Facts
The land was a part of the property
originally belonging to one Candida
Fernandez until she died in 1936. The
respondents were the grandchildren of
Fernandez and her heirs under the Tax
Declaration No. 9622 with an area of 30
hectares.
Sometime in 1940, the parcel of land was
forfeited in favor of the government for failure to pay real
estate taxes. But Vitaliano Aguirre one of the 3 children of
Fernandez and the administrator of the property redeemed
the land and a final deed of sale was executed by the
Provincial Treasurer of Tayabas. It had been agreed among
the heirs that the property would first be held by Vitaliano
until such time that partition among them was effected. The
respondents later partitioned the property among
themselves.
Then an ocular inspection conducted by the trial
court because the property was found to actually contain an
area of 22.6773 hectares and there were more than 100
coconut trees with ages over 30 years old, and 1400 coconut
trees on the land.
The Director of Lands and Director of Forest
Development filed an opposition.
VI. Issue/s
a. Whether or not the respondents are not
entitled to registration.
b. Whether or not the parcel of land is
unalienable.
VII. Holdings and Findings
The court held that respondents are hereby
declared as owners of the parcel of land
described according to the Plan Psu-
215779.
VIII. Ratio Decidendi
A certification was issued by the
District Forester that…said parcel of land
falls within alienable and disposable …In
view of thereof, this office interposes no
objection in behalf of the Director Forestry
for the registration and/or confirmation of
title on the property mentioned xxx.
The land sought to be registered
was alienable and disposable 33 years ago.
It is not forest land. It has been possessed
and cultivated by the respondents and their
predecessors for at least 3 generations.
IX. Disposition
The Court dismissed the petition and
affirmed the decision of the appellate court.
3.)Case Analysis
Arradaza,et.al. vs. Court of Appeals and Larrazabal
GR. No. 50422, February 8, 1989
PARTIES
Petitioners (heirs/ claimants)- Nicolas Arradaza,
Marcelino arradaza, Oprecilo Arradaza, Catalina Arradaza,
Miguela Arradaza, Lilia Arradaza, Melchor Arradaza and
Cerlito Arradaza.
Private Respondent (new owner of the property/
vendee)- Melchor Larrazabal.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Court of First Instance of Leyte (Regional Trial
Court), Branch V, Ormoc City dismissing plaintiffs’ (herein
petitioners) complaint and adjudicating the land in litigation
in favor of defendant (herein respondent) plaintiffs
appealed to the Court of Appeals Court of Appeals affirms
the decision of Regional Trial Court and denies the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
THEORIES OF THE PARTIES
Petitioners- They contended that under the factual
milieu of the case which involves registered land, title to
which was, the sale made by their father (Ignacio Arradaza)
when he was already a widower and with no liquidation of
the conjugal partnership ever made was invalid, null and
void ab initio and inexistent insofar as it included as their
shares who are the children of Marcelina Quirino. He
(Ignacio) could not have legally and validly sold the whole of
the land, for one-half thereof pro-indiviso had automatically
passed by succession to the heirs of Marcelina Quirino. They
concluded that the defect of inexistence of a contract, like that
of the sale by their father who could not have transmitted any
title of ownership over the other half belonging to his wife for
it had already passed to her heirs who are the petitioners, is
permanent and incurable. Hence, it could not be cured by
ratification and prescription. Therefore, they have the right
and legal standing to recover the one- half (1/2) of the land in
dispute as their share for being the children of the late Ignacio
Arradaza by his wife Marcelina Quirino.
Respondent- He contended that prescription has set
in because the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners were
not registered owners protected by Act 496. He asserts that
when the transaction that gave rise to the present action
occurred on October 21, 1947 the Code of Civil Procedure was
still in force. The prescriptive period was only ten (10) years
irrespective of the good or bad faith of Estelita M. Bangloy
(vendor of the property that was sold to private respondent)
who took possession of the land as of that date, she then
completed the period of ten (10) years in 1957 and acquired
absolute title by prescription pursuant to Article 1116 of the
New Civil Code. Private respondent claims that he can avail
himself of such prescription acquired by his predecessor.
Therefore, he is the legal owner of the land and the
petitioners can no longer recover the property in dispute
since it was already prescribed.
OBJECTIVES
Petitioners- to recover their pro-indiviso one-half (1/2) share
of the land as heirs of Ignacio Arradaza and Marcelina
Quirino, and to exercise the right of legal redemption over
one-half (1/2) of the property sold by their deceased father
while he was already a widower on October 21, 1947.
Respondent- To be the legal owner of the property (land in
Ormoc, Leyte) in dispute and have the legal possession of
such.
FACTS
The petitioners are the legitimate children of spouses Ignacio
Arradaza and Marcelina Quirino who died on 1974
respectively. In 1941, Ignacio Arradaza and Marcelina Quirino
purchased from spouses Gervacio Villas and Jovita Tabudlong
a piece of land located in Ormoc, Leyte. The deed of sale was
lost during the war and all efforts to recover it proved futile.
The Arradazas paid the taxes thereon pre-war, but in the
cadastral hearings, the land was adjudicated to the vendor
spouses for failure of the vendee spouse to claim it. Original
Certificate of Title No. 35901 was therefore issued in the
name of Gervacio Villas and Jovita Tabudlong but they
recognized the vendee spouses as the real owners of the land.
While Marcelina Quirino was still living, Ignacio Arradaza
mortgaged the land to Estelita Magalona for a period of five
(5) years. On October 21, 1947, after the death of Marcelina
4. Quirino, Ignacio Arradaza sold the same land to mortgagee
Estelita Magalona Bangloy. Consequently she took over
possession of the land, declared it for taxation purpose and
paid taxes thereon.
On 1963 while the land was still in the name of
spouses Villas, private respondent Larrazabal purchased the
property from Estelita Magalona Bangloy. This was evidenced
by a "Deed of Sale of a Parcel of Land" executed by Bangloy in
favor of Larrazabal and Bangloy, together with a "Deed of
Sale" executed by Arradaza in favor of Bangloy, as well as the
"Deed of Quitclaim" executed by the registered owners
spouses Villas whereby the spouses renounced their rights,
participation, title and ownership in favor of Ignacio
Arradaza, which quitclaim was further affirm firmed by Villas
in an affidavit on 1974, that he sold the land to him. These
documents were registered on April 18, 1963 in the Office of
the Register of Deeds. As a consequence, Original Certificate of
Title No. 35901 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 4581 was issued in the name of private respondent
Melchor Larrazabal and the land was declared for taxation
purposes. Thereafter, after twety- seven (27) years the
petitioners pursue a legal action to enforce their alleged claim
to the recovery and possession of one- half (1/2) of the land
in dispute as their share for being the children of the late
Ignacio Arradaza by his wife Marcelina Quirino.
ISSUE
Issue of Law
Whether or not the action of petitioners has prescribed and is
barred by the statute of limitations.
HOLDINGS
An examination of the record clearly and readily shows that
the statute of limitation has stepped in and that the
petitioners are guilty of laches and that the property has been
in possession of private respondent who is a purchaser in
good faith and for value.
The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief
will be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has
become 'stale' or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable
length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept
on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention.
LACHES- law. Undue delay in claiming privilege or
asserting a right. (Culpable negligence)
RATIO DECIDENDI
Under the law then in force, the prescriptive period
is only ten (10) years, irrespective of the good or bad faith of
the possessor. Inasmuch as under the transitory provision of
the New Civil Code, prescription already running before the
effectivity thereof shall be governed by the laws previously in
force, the prescriptive period in the present case was
completed on October 21, 1957, Melchor Larrazabal having
derived his title from Estelita M. Bangloy may avail himself of
such defense. The alleged deed of sale in favor of plaintiffs'
predecessors-in-interest is not a shield against prescription
since the said document from the Villas uses was not
registered and is not therefore protected by Act 496.
In the case at bar, both the legal defense of
prescription and the equitable defense of laches clearly lie
against the plaintiff's right, if any, to recover the ownership
and possession of the land.
DISPOSITION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
4.)FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v ESTRELLA
QUERMIT
I. Parties
a. Far East Bank and Trust Company;
petitioner
b. Estrella Quermit; respondent
II. Prior Proceedings
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, a complaint demanding
payment of the certificates of deposit
including interest earned, with damages
against petitioner Bank in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor respondent. Petitioner
then appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals which, nonetheless, affirmed the
decision of the trial court with the
modification that FEBTC was solely liable
for the amounts adjudged in the prior
decision. The Bank President and FEBTC-
Harrison Plaza Branch Manager were not
held solidarily liable with the FEBTC
because the latter has a personality
separate from its officers and stockholders.
Hence this recourse to the SC.
III. Theories of the Parties
Petitioner’s Theory
Petitioner Bank claimed that it was not
liable to pay the value of the four
Certificates of Deposit including the interest
thereon because respondent’s husband had
already withdrawn the money from deposit.
Petitioner alleged that it gave respondent’s
late husband Dominador an
“accommodation” to allow him to withdraw
Estrella’s deposit. Petitioner presented
certified true copies of document showing
that the payments were in fact made.
Petitioner further claimed that it did not
demand the surrender of the certificates of
deposit since respondent’s husband was
one of the bank’s senior managers.
Respondent’s Theory
Respondent claimed that money in deposit
could not have been withdrawn since the
subject certificates of deposit were still her
possession and have not been indorsed or
delivered to petitioner Bank.
IV. Objectives of the Parties
Petitioner’s Objective
Respondent sought to have the decision of
the Court of Appeals reversed, that is, it be
not made liable to pay the value of the
Certificates of Deposit and the interest
earned thereon.
Respondent’s Objective
Petitioner sought to have the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirmed, for her to be paid
the value of the Certificates of Deposit plus
5. accrued interests. She likewise sought to be
entitled to the payment of exemplary and
moral damages.
V. Key Facts
Respondent opened a dollar savings
account in petitioner’s Harrison Plaza
Branch for which she was issued four (4)
Certificates of Deposit representing the
amount of $15,000 each. Respondent
thereafter went to the USA to accompany
her husband for medical treatment. When
she returned to the Philippines after her
husband dies, she went to petitioner FEBTC
to withdraw her deposit but to her dismay,
she was told that her husband had already
withdrawn the money in deposit. Despite
respondent’s letters requesting the payment
including the interests earned, petitioner
refused to act on her demands.
VI. Issue of Law
Whether or not petitioner Bank was liable to the
value of the four Certificates, including the
interest thereon as well as mortal and
exemplary damages, attorney’s and appearance
fees
VII. Holding
Yes, petitioner FEBTC is liable of the valued of
the four Certificates, including the interest
thereon as well as mortal and exemplary
damages, attorney’s and appearance fees
VIII. Ratio Decidendi
A certificate of deposit is defined as a written
acknowledgment by a bank or banker of the
receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the
bank or banker promises to pay to the depositor,
to the order of the depositor, or to some other
person or his order, whereby the relation of
debtor and creditor between the bank and the
depositor is created. The principle that payment,
in order to discharge a debt, must be made to
someone authorized to receive it is applicable to
the payment of certificates of deposit. Thus, a
bank will be protected in making payment to the
holder of a certificate indorsed by the payee,
unless it has notice of the invalidity of the
indorsement or the holder's want of title. A bank
acts at its peril when it pays deposits evidenced
by a certificate of deposit, without its production
and surrender after proper indorsement. As a
rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege
non-payment, the general rule is that the burden
rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather
than on the plaintiff to prove payment. The
debtor has the burden of showing with legal
certainty that the obligation has been discharged
by payment.
In this case, the certificates of deposit were
clearly marked payable to "bearer," which
means, to "the person in possession of an
instrument, document of title or security
payable to bearer or indorsed in blank."
Petitioner should not have paid respondent's
husband or any third party without requiring
the surrender of the certificates of deposit.
Petitioner claims that it did not demand the
surrender of the subject certificates of deposit
since respondent's husband, Dominador
Querimit, was one of the bank's senior
managers. But even long after respondent's
husband had allegedly been paid respondent's
deposit and before his retirement from service,
the FEBTC never required him to deliver the
certificates of deposit in question. Moreover, the
accommodation given to respondent's husband
was made in violation of the bank's policies and
procedures.
Petitioner FEBTC thus failed to exercise that
degree of diligence required by the nature of its
business. Because the business of banks is
impressed with public interest, the degree of
diligence required of banks is more than that of
a good father of the family or of an ordinary
business firm. The fiduciary nature of their
relationship with their depositors requires them
to treat the accounts of their clients with the
highest degree of care. A bank is under
obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors
with meticulous care whether such accounts
consist only of a few hundred pesos or of
millions of pesos. Responsibility arising from
negligence in the performance of every kind of
obligation is demandable. Petitioner failed to
prove payment of the subject certificates of
deposit issued to the respondent and, therefore,
remains liable for the value of the dollar
deposits indicated thereon with accrued interest
Respondent is entitled to moral damages
because of the mental anguish and humiliation
she suffered as a result of the wrongful refusal of
the FEBTC to pay her even after she had
delivered the certificates of deposit. In addition,
petitioner FEBTC should pay respondent
exemplary damages, which the trial court
imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good. Finally, respondent is entitled to
attorney's fees since petitioner's act or omission
compelled her to incur expenses to protect her
interest, making such award just and equitable.
However, the Court found the award of
attorney's fees to be excessive and it accordingly
reduced it to P20,000.00.
IX. Disposition
The assailed Decision “making petitioner liable
for the value of four (4) Certificates of Deposit
plus accrued interest, with moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees” was affirmed with
modification that the award of attorney’s fees be
reduced from P100,000 to P20,000.
5.)CASE ANALYSIS
Title: Mataas Na Lupa Tenants Assoc., Inc., Nicolas Aglipay
and those mentioned in Annex “A” of
complaint, petitioners, vs. Carlos Dimayuga and Juliana Diez
Vda. De Gabriel, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32049, June 25, 1984
I-PARTIES
Petitioners:
Mataas Na Lupa Tenants Assoc. Inc., headed by Nicholas
Aglipay-> tenants-lessees of the parcel of land which is the
subject of litigation/Civil case.
Respondents:
Juliana Diez Vda. de Gabriel->lessor, the original owner of the
parcel of land being leased to the petitioners.
Carlos Dimayuga->the buyer/the person to whom the
property was sold.
II- PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners filed a complaint for the exercise of preferential
rights with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
IV alleging that the Contract of Sale executed by Juliana Diez
6. Vda. De Gabriel with Carlos Dimayuga is expressly prohibited
by law as it is mandated for the respondent to execute such
sale to petitioners. Therefore said contract should be declared
null and void. The lower court ruled in favor of the
respondents, ordering the dismissal of the case on the ground
that petitioners failed to state a cause of action. Thus
petitioners resorted to the petition of certiorari for the review
of the said order before the SC.
III- THEORIES OF THE PARTIES
The petitioners claims that on May 14, 1968, without giving
notice to them or informing them of the transaction, Juliana
Diez Vda. de Gabriel sold the parcel of land to respondent
Carlos Dimayuga. They invoke their right vested by R.A. 1162,
as amended by R.A. 2342 and 3516, tenants have a
preferential right to buy the lands they are renting within
Metro Manila, provided there are at least 40 tenants,
regardless of non expropriability or size of the land in
question. The aforesaid provision further requires the
respondent to offer the sale of the land to petitioner unless
the latter renounces their rights in a public instrument.
Making the sale executed by respondents illegal.
Respondent Vda. de Gabriel claimed the land subject of the
complaint is not a landed estate, and not being such, the same
cannot be expropriated , and not being expropriable, no
preferential rights could be availed of by the tenants. While
respondent Dimayuga claims that plaintiffs had no
personality to initiate the action since the Land Tenure
Administration possessed the power to institute the proper
expropriation proceedings before the competent court and
that the subject complaint sated no cause of action against
respondents.
IV- OBJECTIVE
The petitioner prays that the contract of sale be declared null
and void and that respondent Vda. de Gabriel to execute a
deed of sale in favor of petitioners at the same price and
conditions followed in the contract with respondent
Dimayuga, plus attorney's fees and damages.
Respondent prays for the dismissal of the complaint, that the
plaintiffs be ejected from the property and for other remedies.
V- KEY FACTS
For more than ten years prior to 1959, the petitioners have
been occupants of a parcel of land (with their 110 houses
built thereon-110 tenant families) formerly owned by Vda. de
Gabriel to whom petitioners have been paying their rents for
the lease thereof, but who, on May 14, 1968, without notice to
petitioners, sold the same to respondent Dimayuga, who in
turn mortgaged the same to her for the balance of the
purchase price. On the discovery of the sale the petitioner
filed a complaint for the exercise of their preferential rights
before the CFI. And that pursuant to R.A. 1162, as amended by
R.A. 2342 a parcel of land in Manila and suburbs , with at least
50 houses of tenants erected thereon and actually leased to
said tenants for at least 10 years prior to June 20 , 1959, may
not be sold by the land owner to any person other than such
tenants, unless the latter renounced their rights in a public
instrument. Which means, respondent Vda. de Gabriel sold
the land to respondent Dimayuga without the said tenants-
appellants having renounced their preferential rights in a
public instrument. Their complaint also states that since the
aforesaid contract of sale is expressly prohibited by law, the
same be declared null and void and for Vda. De Gabriel to
execute a deed of sale in their favor because they are likewise
willing to purchase said land at the same price and on the
same terms and conditions observed in the contract of sale
with respondent Dimayuga.
On January 31, 1969, respondent Vda. De Gabriel filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is not a
land estate and not being such, the same cannot be
expropriated and that no preferential rights can be availed of
by the tenants. On february 6, 1969, Dimayuga filed his
answer admitting therein certain factual allegations, denied
some averments, interposed the affirmative defense that
plaintiffs had no personality to initiate the action, that the
subject complaint stated no cause of action against
respondent and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and
other remedies. Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion
to dismiss, maintaining that R.A. 1162, as amended by R.A.
2342 does not refer to landed estates, but to any piece of land
occupied by more than 50 families leasing the same for more
than 10 years prior to June 20, 1959; that their preferential
right is independent of the expropriability of the land; that
therefore, said rights may be exercised even if land is not
expropriable pursuant to the police power of the State for the
general welfare.
On october 30, 1969, the CFI issued the subject order which
found respondent's motion to dismiss well-taken and thereby
dismisses complaint. After a series of motions, reply,
rejoinder, surrejoinder, and answer between both parties, the
lower court issued it's order of may 11, 1970 dismissing
petitioners appeal.
Petitioner thus resorted to this petition.
VI- ISSUES
Whether or not the contract of sale is null and void.
Whether or not the petitioners may invoke their preferential
rights as tenants.
VII- HOLDINGS
The Court finds that the said sale was made illegally and
therefore void.
The court also finds that petitioners' case falls with in the law
thus they may invoke their preferential right.
VIII- Ratiodecidendi
The R.A. 1162 as amended by R.A. 2342 and 3516 set forth
the following conditions-that of offering first the sale of the
land to petitioners and the latter's renunciation in a public
instrument-were not met when the land was sold to
respondent Dimayuga. Evidently, said sale is illegal and
therefore void. The 1973 Constitution section 6, article II
emphasizes the stewardship concept that such private
property is supposed to be held by the individual only as
trustee for the people in general, who are its real owners. As a
mere steward, the individual must exercise his right to the
property not for his own exclusive and selfish benefit but for
the good of the entire community. P.D. 1157 “Proclaiming
Urban Land Reform in the Philippines and Providing for the
Implenting Machinery thereof.” superseded R.A. 1152,
2342,3516. This decree is firmly based on sec. 6 of art. II of
the 1973 constitution undoubtedly adopts and crystallizes the
greater number of people criterion when it speaks of tenants
and residents in declared urban land reform zones or areas
without mention of the land area covered by such zones. The
focus therefore, is on people who would benefit and not on
the size of the land involved. Under section 6 of which also
states that tenant-families have been vested the right of first
refusal to purchase of the land within a reasonable time and
reasonable price subject to the rules and regulations of the
Ministry of Human Settlements. It is further supported by PD
1967 which evidently include Mataas na Lupa, the land in
controversy with in the Urban Land Reform Zone.
IX- DISPOSITION
The order issued by the CFI is hereby set aside and the
Ministry of Human Settlements is hereby directed to facilitate
and administer the implementation of the rights of the
petitioner. Cost against respondents.
7. 6.)Dole vs Maritime Company of the Phil
1. Parties
• Dole Philippines Inc. -
plaintiff-appellant
- Claims for loss and damage to a shipment of
machine parts sought to be enforced by
consignee against Maritime Company of the
Philippines
• Maritime Company of the Philippines
- defendant-appellee
- Held liable by plaintiff-appellant to pay
claim for loss of machine parts they
negligently shipped
2. Prior Proceedings
• RTC
Dismissed the first two cases filed by DOLE
due to lack of cause of action.
The third cause of action which covered the
cargo subject of this case now was likewise
dismissed but without prejudice as it was
not covered by the settlement
• CA
- Where the action for damages by plaintiff-
appelle was instituted
3. Theories of the Parties
• Plaintiff-appellant DOLE
- the cargo subject of the instant case was
discharged in Dadiangas unto the custody of
the consignee on December 18,1971 , thus,
defendant is liable for damages caused by
its negligence
- The corresponding claim for damages
sustained by the cargo was filed by plaintiff
with defendant vessel on May 4,1972
• Defendant-appellee Maritime Inc
- the complaint in the subsequent action
Maritime filed an answer pleading inter alia
the affirmative defense of prescription
under the provisions of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, and following pre-trial,
moved for a preliminary hearing on said
defense. It provides that :
“ .. the carrier and the ship shall be
discharged from all liability in respect of
loss or damage unless suit is brought within
one year after delivery of the goods or the
date when the goods should have been
delivered; Provided, That, if a notice of loss
or damage, either apparent or conceded, is
not given as provided for in this section,
that fact shall not affect or prejudice the
right of the shipper to bring suit within one
year after the delivery of the goods or the
date when the goods should have been
delivered. “
4. Objectives of the Parties
• Plaintiff DOLE
- To claim for loss and damages to a shipment
of machine parts negligently enforced by
defendant—appellee
• Defendant Maritime
- To be absolved from the payment of
damages to plaintiff DOLE on the ground of
the provision in the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act which implies that under the given
circumstances of the instant case, they have
no liability to what plaintiff claims to them
5. Key Facts
The cargo subject of the instant case was
discharged in Dadiangas unto the custody of
the consignee on December 18, 1971
The corresponding claim for damages
sustained by the cargo was filed by the
plaintiff on May 4 , 1972
The plaintiff filed a civil case embodying 3
causes of action involving 3 different
shipments
The third cause of action is now the subject
of this present litigation
Defendant Maritime Inc said that they are
not anymore liable for the damages because
the allowance of one year to institute such
action had already lapsed
6. Issue
Whether or not Article 1155 of the Civil Code
providing that the prescription of actions is
interrupted by the making of an extrajudicial written
demand by the creditor is applicable to actions
brought under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
7. Holdings
• Dole concedes that its action is subject to the
one-year period of limitation prescribe in the
above-cited provision. The substance of its
argument is that since the provisions of the Civil
Code are, by express mandate of said Code,
suppletory of deficiencies in the Code of
Commerce and special laws in matters governed
by the latter, and there being "*** a patent
deficiency *** with respect to the tolling of the
prescriptive period ***" provided for in the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, prescription
under said Act is subject to the provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code on tolling and
because Dole's claim for loss or damage made on
May 4, 1972 amounted to a written extrajudicial
demand which would toll or interrupt
prescription under Article 1155, it operated to
toll prescription also in actions under the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. To much the same
effect is the further argument based on Article
1176 of the Civil Code which provides that the
rights and obligations of common carriers shag
be governed by the Code of Commerce and by
special laws in all matters not regulated by the
Civil Code.
• These arguments might merit weightier
consideration were it not for the fact that the
question has already received a definitive
answer, adverse to the position taken by Dole, in
The Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,
Ltd. vs. American President Lines, Inc. 15
There,
in a parallel factual situation, where suit to
recover for damage to cargo shipped by vessel
from Tokyo to Manila was filed more than two
years after the consignee's receipt of the cargo,
this Court rejected the contention that an
extrajudicial demand toiled the prescriptive
period provided for in the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, viz:
• In the second assignment of error plaintiff-
appellant argues that it was error for the court a
quo not to have considered the action of
plaintiff-appellant suspended by the
extrajudicial demand which took place,
according to defendant's own motion to dismiss
on August 22, 1952. We notice that while
plaintiff avoids stating any date when the goods
8. arrived in Manila, it relies upon the allegation
made in the motion to dismiss that a protest was
filed on August 22, 1952 — which goes to show
that plaintiff-appellant's counsel has not been
laying the facts squarely before the court for the
consideration of the merits of the case. We have
already decided that in a case governed by the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the general
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on
prescription should not be made to apply.
8. Ratio Decidendi
No different result would obtain even if the Court
were to accept the proposition that a written
extrajudicial demand does toll prescription under
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The demand in this
instance would be the claim for damage-filed by Dole
with Maritime on May 4, 1972. The effect of that
demand would have been to renew the one- year
prescriptive period from the date of its making.
Stated otherwise, under Dole's theory, when its claim
was received by Maritime, the one-year prescriptive
period was interrupted — "tolled" would be the
more precise term — and began to run anew from
May 4, 1972, affording Dole another period of one
(1) year counted from that date within which to
institute action on its claim for damage.
Unfortunately, Dole let the new period lapse without
filing action. It instituted Civil Case No. 91043 only
on June 11, 1973, more than one month after that
period has expired and its right of action had
prescribed.
Dole's contention that the prescriptive period "***
remained tolled as of May 4, 1972 *** (and that) in legal
contemplation *** (the) case (Civil Case No. 96353) was filed
on January 6, 1975 *** well within the one-year prescriptive
period in Sec. 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act."
equates tolling with indefinite suspension. It is clearly
fallacious and merits no consideration.
9. Disposition
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from
is affirmed, with costs against the appellant, Dole
Philippines, Inc.
7.)22. PDCP v. IAC
G.R. No. 73198 213 SCRA 282
September 2, 1992
Case Analysis
I. Parties:
Private Development Corporation of the Philippines
(PDCP), petitioner.
The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), public
respondent and Ernesto C. Del Rosario, private respondent.
Petitioner and private respondent, as President of a
corporation (DATICOR), had a contractual relationship
(because of a loan agreement) wherein petitioner was the
creditor while respondent was the debtor.
II. Prior Proceeding:
PDCP initiated extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
against a parcel of land owned by Del Rosario and (another
extra-judicial foreclosure) against parcels of land owned by
the corporation (DATICOR) headed by same private
respondent.
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila.
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner.
Said decision was appealed to the Intermediate
Appellate Court.
However, pending CFI
(Manila)resolution, Del
Rosario sought a
restraining order from
another branch of the
Regional Trial Court in
Manila. Also, Del Rosario
filed another civil case of
writ of injunction in the
Court of First Instance of
Davao Oriental so as to
prevent PCDP from
foreclosing its DATICOR
properties on Davao.
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC).
Set aside CFI’s decision.[OR overruled the trial
court’s decision.]
To wit, the Intermediate Appellate Court:
“××× declared void and of no effect the stipulations of
interest in the loan agreement between DATICOR
and PDCP, as if the loan agreement is without
stipulation as to payment of interest. ×××.”
Hence this appeal case in the SC.
III. Theories of the Parties:
Petitioner’s contentions.
That DATICOR entered into a loan agreement by
which it incurred an outstanding balance justifying the extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings.
That Del Rosario is not a party-in-interest in the case.
That the cause of action of Del Rosario is barred by
prescription and that there is a pending case before the CFI
Davao.
Private respondent’s contentions.
That the stipulations on the interest of the loan
agreement are contrary to law (being violative of the Usury
Law) therefore the loan agreement must be annulled.
That PDCP’s extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings are
not justified. PDCP must also be made liable for damages.
IV. Objective of the Parties:
Petitioner.
Granting of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings to
satisfy the unpaid outstanding balance in the loan agreement.
Private respondent.
Annulment of the loan agreement and be awarded
damages.
V. Key Facts:
Davao Timber Corporation (DATICOR) and Private
Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP)
entered into a loan agreement in foreign currency
and in peso.
It was stipulated in the loan agreement, that the
foreign currency loan was to be pain with an interest
rate of eleven and three-fourths (11-¾%) per cent
per annum on the disbursed amount of the foreign
currency; and the peso loan at the rate of twelve
(12%) per cent per annum on the disbursed amount
of the peso loan outstanding, commencing on the
several dates on which disbursements of the
proceeds of loan are made.
The loans were originally secured by a first mortgage
executed by Ernesto del Rosario, President of
DATICOR, in his personal capacity, and his sister, as
third party mortgagors on a parcel of land which
they owned in common. The land was later on
partitioned by the siblings.
9. Thereafter, PDCP executed a partial release of
mortgage on the parcel of land owned by del
Rosario’s sister and caused the DATICOR to execute
an additional mortgage of five parcel of land
consisting prime industrial lands with buildings
thereon. DATICOR also executed a Deed of Chattel
Mortgage on the machineries and equipment
attached to the land in Davao Oriental as added
security for said loan.
Additional fees and charges were added to the loan
interest so that, according to PDCP, DATICOR still has
an outstanding balance of almost Php 11 million
despite payingPhp 3 million ofthe original Php 4.4
million loan.
PDCP then initiated extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings against the mortgage properties of
DATICOR.
Private respondent then filed a complaint against the
PDCP for violation of the Usury Law, annulment of
contract and damages with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction the Court of First
Instance (Manila) and Court of First Instance
(Davao).
In the course of the trial, PDCP contended that
DATICOR entered into a loan agreement by which it
incurred an outstanding balance justifying the extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings, that Del Rosario is
not a party-in-interest in the case, that the cause of
action of Del Rosario is barred by prescription and
that there is a pending case before the CFI Davao.
VI. Issues Identified by the Court:
Whether or not the assailed loan agreement is valid.
Whether or not petitioner’s contentions are valid.
VII. Holdings:
No, the loan agreement is contrary to law hence it is null
and void.
The loan agreement was entered into when the prevailing law
applicable is Usury Law, as amended by P.D. No. 116.
Petitioner’s contentions are not valid.
As to the contention that Del Rosario is not a party-in-
interest in the case:
“Del Rosario mortgaged his properties in his personal
capacity to secure the debt of DATICOR. As such, the creditor,
PDCP, may proceed against Del Rosario or DATICOR or both
of them simultaneously for the payment of the loan or for the
performance of obligation. In fact, PDCP filed for the
foreclosure of the real properties belonging to Del Rosario.”
As to the contention that the cause of action of Del
Rosario is barred by prescription and that there is a pending
case before the CFI Davao:
“Article 1957 of the Civil Code provides: ‘××× contracts
and stipulations under any cloak or device whatever,
intended to circumvent the law against usury shall be void.’
Furthermore, Article 1410 provides: ‘The action or defense
for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.’ The aforesaid articles therefore state that all
usurious stipulations are void and as such, action to annul
such usurious stipulations does not prescribe.”
The principle of litispendenciais not applicable to the case
at bar. The first case (CFI Manila) was against a natural
person (Del Rosario), while the second (CFI Davao), against a
juridical person (DATICOR). “Clearly, there is no identity of
parties, hence litispendencia cannot apply.”
VIII. Ratio Decidendi:
“The usury law ×××, as amended by Presidential
Decree 116, fixed all interest rates for all loans with maturity
of more than 360 days at twelve (12%) per cent per annum
including premiums, fines and penalties.
It is to be noted that PDCP was charging penalties at the
rate of two (2%) per cent per month or an effective rate of
twenty four (24) per cent per month on the peso loan and
one-half (1/2%) per cent per month or an effective
(nalingawangarusuword narate) six (6%) per cent per annum
on the foreign currency loan. It is therefore very clear that
PDCP has been charging and imposing interests in violation of
the prevailing usury laws.”
IX. Disposition:
The decision appealed from is affirmed in toto.
OR
Intermediate Appellate Court decision that it“×××
declared void and of no effect the stipulations of interest in
the loan agreement between DATICOR and PDCP, as if the
loan agreement is without stipulationas to payment of
interest. ×××” is affirmed.
8.) Narciso Buenaventura and Maria Buenaventura vs.
Manotok Realty, inc. GR 50837 Dec.28 1992
Case analysis:
Parties:
Petitioner: Narciso Buenaventura and Maria Buenaventura
(successors of Emeteria Buenaventura)
Respondents: Lorenzo Caina and Francisca Caina (siblings of
Emetria Buenaventura), National Housing Authority (NHA-
formerly PHHC, sold land to Lorenzo and Francisca),
Francisco Custodio (buyer of land from Lorenzo and
Francisca), Manotok Realty (buyer of land from Francisco
Custodio)
Prior proceedings:
On December 1976, petitioner filed a complaint entitled
“Narciso Buenaventura and Maria Buenaventura vs. Lorenzo
Cainta, Francisca Cainta, National Housing Authority,
Fransisco Custodio, and Manotok Realty for Annulment of
Titles, Contracts and/or Sales, Reconveyance and Damages” in
the CFI of Caloocan City. Respondent Manotok Realty
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on ground of
prescription; however petitioner filed for opposition.
Respondent filed motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Aggrieved, respondent filed petition to Court of Appeals,
which the latter court ordered the dismissal of petitioner’s
complaint on the ground of prescription. Petioner filed a
motion for reconsideration in CA but was to no avail. Hence,
this instant petition.
Theories:
Petitioner: action for reconveyance based on grounds of fraud
and simulation of contracts, hence cannot be subject of
prescription.
Respondent: complaint was filed after more than 10 years
from the issuance of the transfer certificate, thus has
prescribed.
Objectives:
Petitioner: annulment of titles, contracts and/or sales,
reconveyance and damages.
Respondent: dismissal of the case
Key Facts:
Julian Caina was a tenant of a land owned by the Republic of
the Philippines, and said land was to be resold to qualified
tenants. Julian had a brother named Justo Caina. Justo had 3
children named Emetria Caina Buenaventura, Lorenzo Caina
and Francisca Caina.
NHA (formerly PHHC) was designated with the task of selling
and transferring lots to qualified tenants and their heirs.
When PHHC executed a deed of sale to the land of Julian on
1965, the latter had been survived by her brother Justo. Justo
has also been survived by Lorenzo, Francisca and Emetria’s
10. successors namely Narciso and Maria as Emetria had already
died. However, when the deed of sale came, it was only given
to Lorenzo and Francisca excluding Narciso and Maria.
On January 1966, Lorenzo and Francisca sold the land to
Francisco Custudio, and the latter executed a deed of sale in
favor of Manotok Realty on the same year. On December
1976, petitioners filed this complaint for annulment of titles,
contracts and/or sale, reconveyance and damages.
Issue:
Wheter or not the complaint is barred by prescription?
Holdings:
Yes. The complaint is barred by prescription.
Ratio Decedendi:
The action of the petitioner had already prescribed since
when the PHHC executed a deed of sale on January 26, 1966
to Lorenzo and Francisca and petioner’s complaint was only
filed on December 28, 1976, the complaint was already
beyond 10 years. Action for reconveyance must be filed by the
defrauded party within 10 years from the date of issuance of
title, otherwise the action prescribes.
Case Analysis
9.)David vs Bandin
I-PARTIES
Felipe David & Antonina David (Plaintiff-appellant)
Eulogio Bandin (Gregorio,Raymundo,Valentin Briones,Sofa
Briones & Agapito Ramos (defendant-appellee)
II- PRIOR PROCEEDINGS:
CFI of Rizal Branch VIII in Pasay City
-Complaint was filed by the respondents for the recovery &
partition of the property
Trial court - where the decision was rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs, declaring however, that certain parties could no
longer be reconveyed, since they had been transferred to
purchasers who bought them in good faith.
CA – both plaintiffs and defendants were ot satisfied with the
decision of TC. Hence, a review for certiorari.
III - THEORIES OF THE PARTIES:
Plaintiff-appellant contend that the CA erred in holding that
they are buyers in bad faith
Defendant-appellee want to modify the decision of the trial
court that they are purchasers in good faith
IV – OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiff wants a cancellation of OCT NO.8916 and all
subsequent transfer certificates of title derived therefrom.
Defendant wants to reconvey their 2/3 pro-indiviso share of
the land.
V- KEY FACTS
The plaintiffs, spouses Felipe David & Antonia David
purchased portions of the Laong property consisting of
15,000 sq.m. from spouses Gregorio & Mary Venturanza who
in turn purchased the property from Juanita Martin vda de
Lucena, on Sept. 23,1959, at the time both purchases took
place, the property in question was still an unregistered land.
The land was registered in the name of Juanita Martin in
1971, to whom was issued OCT NO.8916. the portion sold to
the spouses Felipe and Antonia David is presently covered by
TCT no. 372092.
The trial court, however found that Candida Ramos ,until her
death on Feb. 15,1955, administered the Laong property, and
that plaintiff appellants were given their shares of fruits
thereof though irregular at times, depending on the amount of
harvest. So, They sent a letter of demand to the heirs of
Candida Ramos, and filed a complaint against them. The
defendants invoke their right to cancel OCT NO.8916.
VI- ISSUES
WON, the land could no longer be reconveyed to plaintiffs
since they had been transferred to purchasers who bought
them in good faith and value.
WON, petitioners can invoke the doctrine of conclusiveness
and indivisibility of titles issued under the torrens system.
VII – HOLDINGS
As record shows, petitioners bought the property when it was
still unregistered land. The defense of having purchased the
property in good faith may be availed of only where
registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good
faith on the clear title of the registered owner.
The court a quo did not sustain the defense of the laches and
prescription put up by the defendants, since it was not shown
that the plaintiffs were guilty of negligence or slept their
rights.
VIII – RATIO DECIDENDI
One who purchases an unregistered land does so at his peril.
the claim of having bought the land in good faith, without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, the
property would not protect him if it turns out that the seller
does not actually own the property. Under Art. 494 of the
new civil code, prescription generally does not run in favor of
a co-heir or co-owner as long as, he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership. While an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the rule does not
apply where a fiduciary relation exists and the trustee
recognizes the trust.
10.)CASE ANALYSIS
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans
v. AnianoDesierto
I. Parties
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING
COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS represented by
MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, PCGG
CHAIRMAN, ORLANDO C.
SALVADOR petitioners.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, OMBUDSMAN;
JOSE Z. OSIAS; PACIFICO E. MARCOS; EDUARDO
V. ROMUALDEZ; FERNANDO C. ORDOVEZA; and
JUANITO ORDOVEZA, respondents.
II. Prior Proceedings
The case was filed in the Office of the
Ombudsman and was dismissed on the ground
of prescription.
III. Theories of the Parties
Ombudsman Disierto contends that he did
not commit grave abuse of discretion and that
the offenses with which the respondents were
charged had already prescribed.
Gunigundo argues that the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion and the
respondents’ offenses had not yet prescribed.
IV. Objective of the Parties
Ombudsman Disierto’s objective is not to
undergo preliminary investigation.
11. Gunigundo aim to set aside the resolution of
14 May 1996 and the order of 19 May 1997
of the Ombudsman.
V. Key Facts
On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans.
On 9 November 1992, President Ramos
issued Memorandum Order No. 61 directing
the COMMITTEE to "include in its
investigation, inventory, and study all non-
performing loans which shall embrace both
behest and non-behest loans.
On 2 March 1996, the COMMITTEE through
Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant
detailed with the COMMITTEE, filed with the
OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint against the
Directors of PSI and the Directors of the
Development Bank of the Philippines who
approved the loans for violation of
paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019.
In the resolution dated 14 May 1996 and
approved on 9 June 1996, the OMBUDSMAN
dismissed the complaint in OMB-0-96-0968
on the ground of prescription. Relying
on People v. Dinsay, a case decided by the
Court of Appeals, he ratiocinated that since
the questioned transactions were evidenced
by public instruments and were thus open for
the perusal of the public, the prescriptive
period commenced to run from the time of
the commission of the crime, not from the
discovery thereof. Reckoning the prescriptive
period from 1969, 1970, 1975, and 1978,
when the disputed transactions were entered
into, the OMBUDSMAN ruled that the
offenses with which respondents were
charged had already prescribed.
VI. Issue
Whether or not Ombudsman AnianoDisierto
committed grave abuse of discretion.
VII. Holding
Since the computation of the prescriptive
period for the filing of the criminal action should
commence from the discovery of the offense, the
OMBUDSMAN clearly acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing outright Case No. OMB-
0-96-0968. It should have first received the
evidence from the complainant and the
respondents to resolve the case on its merits and
on the issue of the date of discovery of the
offense.
VIII. Ratio Decidendi
The OMBUDSMAN's reliance on Dinsay is
misplaced. The estafa committed by the accused
was known to the offended party from the very
start; hence, it could even be said that the
commission and the discovery of the offense
were simultaneous. 20
Neither is People
v. Sandiganbayan 21
of any help to OMBUDSMAN.
We ruled therein that the prescriptive period
commenced to run from the filing of the
application for the following reasons:
The theory of the Prosecution that the
prescriptive period should not commence upon
the filing of Paredes' application because no one
could have known about it except Paredes and
Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the
Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: it is not only
the Lands Inspector who passes upon the
disposability of public land . . . other public
officials pass upon the application for a free
patent including the location of the land and,
therefore, the disposable character thereof (p.
30, Rollo). Indeed, practically all the department
personnel, who had a hand in processing and
approving the application, namely: (1) the lands
inspector who inspected the land to ascertain its
location and occupancy; (2) the surveyor who
prepared its technical description; (3) the
regional director who assessed the application
and determined the land classification; (4) the
Director of Lands who prepared the free patent;
and (5) the Department Secretary who signed it,
could not have helped "discovering" that the
subject of the application was nondisposable
public agricultural land.
People v. Duqu is more in point, and what was
stated there stands reiteration: In the nature of
things, acts made criminal by special laws are
frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in
themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute
requires that if the violation of the special law is not
known at the time, the prescription begins to run
only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the
unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
In the case at bar the OMBUDSMAN forthwith
dismissed the complaint in Case No. OMB-0-96-0968
without even requiring the respondents to submit
their counter-affidavits and solely on the basis of the
dates the alleged behest loans were granted, or the
dates of the commission of the alleged offense was
committed.
IX. Fallo
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered GRANTING the petition, and
SETTING ASIDE the resolution of 14 May 1996
and the Order of 19 May 1997 of the public
respondent OMBUDSMAN in Case No. OMB-0-96-
0968.
The OMBUDSMAN is hereby directed to proceed
with the preliminary investigation of the case
OMB-0-96-0968 taking into account the
foregoing disquisitions
11.)PARTIES:
QUIRINO MATEO and MATIAS MATEO, petitioners,
DOROTEA DIAZ; REYNALDO DIAZ; REMEDIOS DIAZ;
ADORACION DIAZ; NORBERTO DIAZ; YOLANDA
CRUZ; OSCAR CRUZ; ESTER CRUZ; NENITA CRUZ;
PRIMO POLICARPIO; GAVINO POLICARPIO;
12. FLORENTINA POLICARPIO; MAURO POLICARPIO;
and MIGUEL POLICARPIO, respondents.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS:
This petition for review via certiorari,raises the question
of whether or not the equitable doctrine of laches may
override a provision of the Land Registration Act
on imprescriptibility of title to registered land.
The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals[2]
affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, at Malolos.
The trial court ruled that prescription and laches are
applicable against the petitioners, that real actions over
immovable prescribe after thirty (30) years, that ownership
can be acquired through possession in good faith and with
just title for a period of ten (10) years, and that ownership
may be acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession
for thirty years without need of just title or of good faith.
THEORIES OF THE PARTIES:
On April 1, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court
at Malolos, Bulacan, Quirino Mateo and Matias Mateo
commenced the present suit, which was originally a
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, against
(1) Dorotea Diaz, Reynaldo
Diaz, Remedios Diaz, Adoracion Diaz and Norberto Diaz, the
children of the late Cornelia Mateo-Diaz; (2) Yolanda Cruz,
Oscar Cruz, Ester Cruz and Nenita Cruz, the grand-
children of Cornelia; and (3)
Primo Policarpio, Gavino Policarpio, Florentina Policarpio,
MauroPolicarpio and Miguel Policarpio, the children of the
late Felisa Mateo-Policarpio. The petition was docketed as
Civil Case No. 165-SM-87.
On June 16, 1987, the
defendants Diazes, Cruzes and Policarpios, with the exception
of Doroteo Diaz, Reynaldo Diaz and Remedios Diaz-Sandel,
filed a motion to dismiss the above petition on the following
grounds: (a) the case was not referred to
the barangay concerned for confrontation and mediation, as
mandated by P. D. 1508; (b) there has been a decision
previously rendered which involved the same parties over the
same cause of action (obviously referring to the decision in
Civil Case No. SM-975); and (c) the action is between
members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been exerted (Records, pp. 60-63). The
said motion to dismiss elicited an opposition from the
petitioners (Rec., p. 79-83).
“14. For their part, defendants Reynaldo Diaz
and Remedios Diaz-Sandel filed their separate motion to
dismiss, grounded, as follows: (a) the lower court has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case; (b) the complaint
states no cause of action against them; (c) the cause of action
of the petitioners is already barred by a prior judgment; (d)
the case is between members of the same family and no
earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made; and
(e) the present case will not in any way terminate the
uncertainty or controversy between the parties as any
declaration or construction of the rights of the parties is not
necessary and proper (Rec., pp. 84-89).
OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTIES:
.Petitioners: that their petition for declaratory relief be
granted
Respondents: that the petition of the petitioners be
dismissed
KEY FACTS:
The spouses Canuto Mateo and Simeona (Simona) Manuel-
Mateo, during their marital union, were blessed with two (2)
daughters, namely: CORNELIA MATEO and FELISA
MATEO. In time, Cornelia will marry Ulpiano Diaz with whom
she will have the following children, to wit: DOROTEA,
REYNALDO, REMEDIOS, ADORACION and NORBERTO, all
surnamed DIAZ. On the other hand, FELISA MATEO will
eventually marry Cirilo Policarpio and they will raise the
following children, namely: PRIMO, GAVINO, FLORENTINA,
MAURO and MIGUEL, all surnamed POLICARPIO. Likewise,
Cornelia will eventually have the following grandchildren, to
wit: YOLANDA, OSCAR, ESTER and NENITA, all surnamed
CRUZ.
Canuto Mateo died sometime in 1898. Not long thereafter, his
widow Simeona will take in a second husband in the person of
CLARO MATEO, a first cousin of Canuto. And out of their
marital union, the spouses Claro Mateo and Simeona Manuel-
Mateo will have two (2) sons, to wit: QUIRINO MATEO and
MATIAS MATEO, the plaintiffs-appellants herein.
The property involved in the controversy is an 11-hectare
Riceland located at Bulak, Sta. Maria, Bulacan and covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 206 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan on October 21, 1910 in the name
of “Claro Mateo, married to Simeona Manuel.”
Claro Mateo died on September 8, 1932,
while Simeona Manuel-Mateo died on October 18, 1948.
On June 12, 1951, the children of Simeon Manuel-Mateo in
her two (2) previous marriages, namely: Cornelia Mateo-
Diaz, Felisa Mateo-Policarpio, Quirino Mateo
andMatias Mateo, executed a document entitled KATIBAYAN
NG PAGHAHATI-HATI NG LUPA (Exhibit “B”, 2/28/89, List of
Exhibits, p. 60), whereunder they divided among themselves
three (3) separate parcels of land all located at Bulak, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan which they had inherited from their
parents. These properties were then covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 3556, 3794 and 3849. It is not clear if these
properties are part and parcel of that property covered by
OCT No. 206.
On February 15, 1979, in San Carlos City, Pangasinan, the
brothers Quirino Mateo and Matias Mateo executed a DEED
OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION (Exh. “B”, 12/22/81, List of
Exhibits, p. 62), whereunder they partitioned between
themselves alone, to the exclusion of their half-sisters
Cornelia Mateo-Diaz and FelisaMateo-Policarpio, that 11-
hectare parcel of Riceland covered by OCT No. 206. It was not
explained if, at the time the brothers executed the deed, any
or both of their half-sisters were already dead. In any event,
the deed of extra-judicial partition was duly published in a
daily newspaper, the Balita.
It was through this newspaper publication that the children of
both Cornelia Mateo-Diaz and Felisa Mateo-Policarpio learned
about the deed of extra-judicial partition executed by their
uncles.
Sometime in 1981, some of the children and grandchildren of
Cornelia and Felisa, namely: Reynaldo Diaz,
Miguel Policarpio, Dorotea Diaz-Perez, Felicidad Diaz-
Mercadel, Maxima and Yolanda Cruz represented by Oscar
Cruz, and Ricardo Nolasco, filed a complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Extra-Judicial Partition with Damages against their
uncles Quirino Mateo and Matias Mateo. Filed in the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan, the complaint was
docketed thereat as Civil Case No. SM-975 (Exh. “15” – sur-
rebuttal). At the same time, a criminal information was filed
at the proper court in San
13. Carlos City, Pangasinan charging Quirino Mateo
and Matias Mateo with falsification of public document.
On August 27, 1987, the lower court issued an order
dropping Reynaldo Diaz and Remedios Diaz-Sandel as party-
defendants in the case (Rec., p. 93).
“On December 4, 1987, defendant Dorotea Diaz filed her
answer with compulsory counterclaim
On October 11, 1988, the petitioners filed a Motion to Admit
Complaint in Lieu of Petition, therein alleging that:
1.The evidence adduced and still to be adduced show the
necessity of amending the petition into an ordinary
complaint, so that the evidence could conform with the
allegations of the cause of action sought to be established.
2. The conversion of the petition to an ordinary complaint
would not affect the basic cause of action and defense of the
defendants.’
Attached to the motion is the intended amended complaint
where Reynaldo Diaz and Remedios Diaz-Sandel had been
dropped as party-defendants
“18. In the said amended complaint, the plaintiffs Mateo
brothers (Quirino and Matias alleged
‘2. The late Claro Mateo, was the absolute and exclusive
owner of a parcel of land with an area of around
eleven (11) hectares situated at Bulac, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
In an order dated November 28, 1988 the lower court
granted the Motion to Admit Complaint in Lieu of Petition and
accordingly admitted the amended complaint
On September 8, 1989, the defendants filed their Amended
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim (Rec., pp. 199-
203), wherethey raised the following special and affirmative
defenses:
That the cause of action, if any, has already prescribed and
also the petitioners are guilty of laches;
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription and the equitable principle
of laches are applicable in derogation of the title of the
registered owner
HOLDING:
Petition granted. prescription and the equitable
principle of laches are not applicable in derogation of the title
of the registered owner
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The land involved is registered under
the Torrens system in the name of petitioners’
father Claro Mateo. There is no question raised with respect
to the validity of the title. The factual issue now raised is that
petitioners had slept on their rights and had not taken any
positive step to assert their rights and interests over the land
covered by OCT No. 206.
The records will show that immediately after petitioners
discovered the existence of OCT No. 206 in 1977 or 1978, they
took steps to assert their rights thereto. They divided the
land between the two of them in an extra-judicial
partition. Then petitioners filed the case below to recover
ownership and possession as the only surviving children of
the original owner, the late Claro Mateo.
In St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Cleofas,it
was ruled that
a party who had filed immediately a case as soon as he
discovered that the land in question was covered by a transfer
certificate in the name of another person is not guilty
of laches.
In J. M. Tuason & Co. v. Aguirre, the SCruled that “an
action to recover possession of a registered land never
prescribes in view of the provision of Section 44 of Act No.
496,to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation
to that of a registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession.”
In fact, there is a host of jurisprudence that hold that
prescription and laches could not apply to registered land
covered by the Torrens system.
With more reason are these principles applicable
to laches, which is an equitable principle. Laches may not
prevail against a specific provision of law, since equity, which
has been defined as ‘justice outside legality’ is applied in the
absence of and not against statutory law or rules of
procedure.[9]
On the other hand, the heirs of the registered owner are
not estopped from claiming their father’s property, since
they merely stepped into the shoes of the previous owners.
In Barcelona v. Barcelona,te SC held that:
“The property in litigation, being registered land under the
provisions of Act 496, is not subject to prescription, and it
may not be claimed that imprescriptibility is in favor only of
the registered owner, because as we have held in the cases
of Teofila de Guinoo, et al., v. Court of Appeals, (97 Phil. 235)
and Gil Atun, et al., v. Eusebio Nuñez (97 Phil. 762),
prescription is unavailing not only against the registered
owner, but also against his hereditary successors because the
latter merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation
of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of
their predecessor in interest.”
DISPOSITION:
The Court reverses the decision of the Court of Appeal .The
Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of
the heirs of Claro Mateo in a proper proceeding.
12.). Basa v. Republic
G.R. No.L-45277
August 5, 1985
Case Analysis
I. Parties:
Augusto Basa, taxpayer,petitioner.
Republic of the Philippines,represented by the
SolicitorGeneral,and
Judge Guillermo F. Villasor,respondent
II. Prior Proceeding:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the
deficiency income taxes of Augusto Basa.
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila.
-Affirmed the assessments in the tax court and ordered
petitioner to pay.
14. -Said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals
-Dismissed the appeal made by the petitioner.
-Petitioner filed the instant special civil action of certiorari
wherein he assailed the trial court's decision
Supreme Court
- The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
III. Theories of the Parties:
Petitioner’s contentions.
-That the assessments were contestable; that the court action
made by him for the reinvestigation of the assessments is
within the prescriptive period which court action may be
brought.
Private respondent’s contentions.
-That taxpayer failed to report n full his capital gains on the
sales of land and that omission of income justified the
imposition of 50% surcharge.
-That there can no longer be an inquiry on merit of the
original case.
-That petitioner’s request for reinvestigation tolled the
prescriptive period of five years within which court action
may be brought. Moreover, the issue of prescription should
have been raised in the tax court.
IV. Objective of the Parties:
Petitioner.
To assailed the trial court's decision; to reinvestigate the
assessments in the tax court.
Respondent,
To affirmed the rendered decision dismissing the appeal by
petitioner.
V. Key Facts:
In a demand letter dated August 31, 1967, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed against Augusto
Basa deficiency income taxes for 1957 to 1960 totaling
P16,353.12.*-The deficiencies were based on the taxpayer's
failure to report in full his capital gains on the sales of land.
This omission or under declaration of income justified the
imposition of 50% surcharge. The taxpayer did not contest
the assessments in the Tax Court. On the assumption that the
assessments had become final and incontestable; the
Commissioner on September 3, 1975 sued the taxpayer in the
Manila Court of First Instance for the collection of said
amount.
The trial court in a decision affirmed the assessments and
ordered Basa to pay P16,353.12 plus 5% surcharge and one
percent monthly interest from August 31, 1967 to August 31,
1970.Instead of appealing to this Court directly, Basa tried to
appeal to the Court of Appeals. He did not perfect his appeal
within the prescriptive period. The trial court dismissed it.
Then Basa filed the instant special civil action of certiorari
wherein he assailed the trial court's decision.
VI. Issues:
Whether or not the issue of prescription raised by
petitioner has basis.
Whether or not the decision rendered by the CFI is
final and executory.
Whether or not the petition is devoid of merit.
VII. Holdings:
-No, the issue of prescription raised by him is
baseless.
The issue of prescription raised by him is baseless.
The assessments were predicated on the fact that his income
tax returns, if not fraudulent, were false because he under
declared his income. In such a case, the deficiency
assessments may be made within ten years after the
discovery of the falsity or omission. The court action should
be instituted within five years after the assessment but this
period is suspended during the time that the Commission is
prohibited from instituting a court action.
-Yes, the decision rendered by the CFI is final and
executory.
The taxpayer’s failure to appeal to the CTA in due
time made the assessment in question final, executory and
demandable. Hence, there can no longer be an inquiry on
merits of the original case.
-Yes. The petition is devoid of merit.
The trial court acted within its jurisdiction in
rendering its decision and dismissing Basa's appeal. He
should have appealed to this Court. His failure to do so
rendered the decision final and executory. He has no cause of
action for certiorari.
VIII. Ratio Decidendi:
** SEC. 332. Exceptions as to period of
limitation of assessment and collection of
taxes. In the case of a false or fraudulent
return with intent to evade tax or of a
failure to file a return, the tax may be
assessed, or a proceeding in court for the
collection of such tax may be begun without
assessment, at any time within ten years
after the discovery of the falsity, fraud, or
omission.
(c) Where the assessment of any internal
revenue tax has been made within the
period of limitation above-prescribed such
tax may be collected by distraint or levy or
by a proceeding in court, but only if begun
(1) within five years after the assessment of
the tax, or (2) prior to the expiration of any
period for collection agreed upon in writing
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
and the taxpayer before the expiration of
such five-year period. The period so agreed
upon may be extended by subsequent
agreements in writing made before the
expiration of the period previously agreed
upon.
SEC. 333. Suspension of running of statue.—
The running of the statute of limitations
provided in section three hundred thirty-
one or three hundred thirty-two on the
making of assessments and the beginning of
distraint or levy or a proceeding in court for
collection, in respect of any deficiency, shall
be suspended for the period during which
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is
prohibited from making the assessment or
beginning distraint or levy a proceeding in
court, and for sixty days thereafter.
IX. Disposition:
The Trial Court’s judgment is affirmed.
-The decision which dismisses the appeal made by the
petitioner.
TITLE: 13.) Canonizado vs. Benitez
GR NO. L-49315 and 60966, February 20, 1984
15. I. PARTIES:
Bernarda S. Canonizado, wife, plaintiff/petitioner
Hon. Judge Regina G. Ordonez-Benitez – presiding Judge of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court – Manila, respondent
and Atty. Cesar R. Canonizado, husband, and
defendant/respondent.
II. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS:
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court – ordered issuance of
an alias writ of execution for the enforcement of a decision
ordering the payment of past support and to order payment
of current support in favor of the petitioner.
Court of Appeals - appealed judgment of JDRC with
modifications.
III. THEORIES OF THE PARTIES
Petitioner Bernarda contends that she and her daughter have
the right to payment of current support.
Respondent Cesar contends that his obligation to support has
terminated since recipients no longer need it for subsistence.
IV. OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTIES
Petitioner prays for the issuance of an alias writ of execution
to compel the respondent judge to issue an order for the
payment of past and current support.
Respondents prays for dismissal of the petition.
V. KEY FACTS:
Petitioner Bernarda (wife) filed for a financial support, for her
and for her daughter, against the respondent husband Cesar.
Bothe the JDRC and CA decided in favor of the petitioner.
Cesar however was not able to faithfully comply with his
obligations in the payment of support. In consideration to the
respondent husband, petitioner entered into series of
compromise agreements with the former, however, still,
despite his solemn accord never made any effort to update his
payment of arrears in support of the petitioner which have
long been overdue. Because of this, petitioner filed a petition
to require the respondent to pay current support based on the
decisions of September 1968 and January 1969. Respondent
opposed contending that his obligation to support has
terminated.
VI. ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to support up to
the present.
VII. Holding:
No.
VIII. RATIO:
Article 303 (3) of the New Civil Code provides that the
obligation to give support shall also ceae when the recipient
may engage in a trade, profession, or industry, or has
obtained work, or has improved his fortune in such a way that
he no longer needs the allowance for his subsistence.
When any of the above circumstances occurs, the support
stops since the recipient no longer needs it for subsistence. It
does not mean, however, that the obligation to give or the
right to ask for support also ceases permanently because the
lack of need for it may only be temporary. In other words, the
above circumstances do not affect the right to support
between spouses but only the action to make it demandable,
such right being born from the law and created as such by the
marriage tie. It subsists throughout the period that the
marriage subsists.
The matter of determining whether or not the petitioner is
entitled to support up to the present is subject to the
presentation of evidence both by the petitioner and the
respondent and is for the lower court to decide. A judgment of
support is never final in the sense that not only can its
amount be subject to increase or decrease but its
demandability may also be suspended or re-enforced when
appropriate circumstances exist.
IX. DISPOSITION:
Petition DISMISSED. The court is directed to set the case for
hearings on whether or not there is a continuing need for
current support.
14.)PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY
Vs. VALENCIA- BAGALACSA
I. Parties:
• PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioner
• Judge Lore R. Valencia- Bagalacsa, and
Eduardo Z. Lumaniog, Celso Z. Lumaniog
and Rubben Z. Lumaniog, Respondents
II. Prior Proceedings:
• Regional Trial Court of Libmanan,
Camarines Sur,- in favour of the
respondents
• Court of Appeals- find no grave abuse of
discretion.
III. Theories of the Parties
Petitioner
• That the respondent Valencia-
Bagalacsa committed grave abuse of
discretion.
• Because the act of the private
respondent had prescribed and guilty
of laches.
Respondent
• That Valencia- Bagalacsa did not
commit grave abuse of description,
IV. Objectives of the Parties
Petitioner
• That the findings of the RTC and of
the CA be reversed.
Respondent
• to recover the sum of money
against petitioner, since their
father was insured in Life
Insurance Policy No.1305486
V. Key Facts
• On 20 June 1995, Eduardo, Celso
and Ruben Z. Lumaniog, as
legitimate children and forced
heirs of their late father,
Faustino Lumaniog, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur,
complaint for recovery of sum
of money against
the Philippine American Life
and General Insurance
Company (Philamlife) alleging
that: their father was insured
by Philamlife under Life
Insurance Policy1305486 with a
face value of P50,000.00; their
father died of "coronary
thrombosis" on 25 November
1980;on 22 June 1981, they
claimed and continuously
claimed for all the proceeds
and interests under the life
insurance policy in the amount of
P641,000.00, despite repeated
demands for payment and/or
16. settlement of the claim due
from Philamlife, the last of
which is on 1 December 1994,
Philamlife finally refused or
disallowed said claim on 14
February 1995; and so, they filed
their complaint. Philamlife filed an
Answer with Counterclaim and
Motion to Dismiss, contending that
the cause of action had prescribed
and that the Lumaniogs are guilty
of laches; that it had denied the
latter's claim in a letter dated 12
March 1982, signed by its then
Assistant Vice President, Amado
Dimalanta, on ground of
concealment on the part of the
deceased insured Faustino when
he asserted in his application for
insurance coverage that he had not
been treated for indication of
"chest pain, palpitation, high
blood pressure, rheumatic fever,
heart murmur, heart attack
or other d i s o r d e r o f t h e
h e a r t o r b l o o d v e ss e l "
w h e n i n f a c t h e w a s a
k n o w n h y p e r t e n s i v e s i n c e
1 9 7 4 ; t h a t t h e Lumaniogs
sent a letter dated 25 May 1983
requesting for reconsideration of
the denial; in a letter dated 11July
1983, it reiterated its decision to
deny the claim for payment of the
proceeds; more than 10 years later,
or on 1 December 1994, it received
a letter from Jose C. Claro, a
provincial board member of the
province of Camarines Sur,
reiterating the early request for
reconsideration which it denied in
a letter dated 14 February1995.
The Lumaniogs opposed the
motion to dismiss. On 7 June
1996, the RTC issued an
Order as to the necessity of trial
on merits. Philamlife's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the
RTC in its Order dated22
December 1997 upholding
however in the same Order
the claim of the Lumaniogs'
counsel that the running of the
10-year period was "stopped" on
25 May 1983 when they requested
for a reconsideration of the denial
and it was only on 14 February
1995 when Philamlife finally
decided to deny their claim that the
10-year period began to
run. Philamlife filed a petition for
certiorari (CA-GR 47885) in the
Court of Appeals and after the
comment of the Lumaniogs and
reply of Philamlife, the appellate
court rendered its Decision,
dated30 April 1999, dismissed the
petition for lack of merit.
Philamlife filed the petition for
review on certiorari.
VI. Issues:
• Whether the complaint filed by the
private respondents for payment
of life insurance proceeds is
already barred by prescription of
action.
• Whether an extrajudicial demand
made after an action has
prescribed shall cause the revival
of the action.
VII. Holding and Findings
• Partly granted. The decision of CA is reversed
and set aside.
VIII. Ratio Decidendi
• Philamlife had specifically alleged in the
Answer that it had denied the
L u m a n i o g s ' c l a i m p e r i t s l e t t e r
d a t e d 1 1 J u l y 1 9 8 3 . H e n c e , d u e
p r o c e s s d e m a n d s t h a t i t b e g i v e n
t h e opportunity to prove that the Lumaniogs
had received said letter. Said letter is crucial to
Philamlife's defence that the filing of the
complaint for recovery of sum of money in June
1995 is beyond the 10-year prescriptive period.
The RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion
when, in resolving the motion for
reconsideration of Philamlife, it arbitrarily ruled
in its Order dated 12 December 1997, that the
period of 10 years had not yet lapsed. It based
its finding on a mere explanation of
the Lumaniogs' counsel and not on evidence
presented by the parties as to the date when to
reckon the prescriptive period. The ruling of the
RTC that the cause of action of the Lumaniogs
had not prescribed is arbitrary and patently
erroneous for not being founded on evidence on
record, and therefore, the same is void.
Consequently, while the Court of Appeals did not
err in upholding the7 June 1986 Order of the
RTC, it committed a reversible error when it
declared that the RTC did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the Order dated 12
December 1997. The Supreme Court
thus partially granted the petition, setting aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30
April 1999 insofar only as it upheld the RTC
Order dated 12 December 1997. A new
judgment was entered reversing and setting
aside the Order dated 12 December 1997
of the Regional Trial Court of Libmanan,
Camarines Sur (Branch 56) and affirming
its Order dated 20 June 1995. Said RTC was
directed to proceed with dispatch with Civil Case
L-787.
15.)I-PARTIES
Luzon Surety Company, Inc., petitioner
Intermediate Appellate Court, and Eugenia G. Puyat,
Gil G. Puyat, Jr., Antonio G. Puyat, Vicente G. Puyat, Victor G.
Puyat, Jesus-Puyat-Concepcion, Alfonso G. Puyat, And Eugenia
Puyat-Joson, respondents.
II-PRIOR JUDGMENT
The Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed
petitioner’s appeal that the prescription of an action is not
counted from the expiration of the five-year period within
which the judgment may be enforced by a mere motion but
from the finality of that judgment.
III-THEORIES OF THE PARTIES
Petitioner asserts that the period of 10 years
presented in the statute of limitations should be counted no
from the finality of judgment but from the date of the finality
of the revived judgment. Hence, its claim against the estate of
Gil Puyat which was instituted on September 1, 1982 is within
the ten-year prescriptive period since the judgment in the
Civil Case No. 59506 on April 13, 1967 was revived by the
judgment in Civil Case No. 93268 on May 24, 1974.
17. The administrators of the estate of Gil Puyat (herein
respondents), contend that the present action for claim filed
by the petitioner is no longer enforceable for the reason that
the revived judgment which was the last chance of the
petitioner to secure a writ of execution of judgment, was not
enforced. Hence, the present action to revive again the
judgment is no longer enforceable.
IV-OBJECTIVE OF THE PARTIES
Petitioner seeks to reverse the decision of the IAC
and enforce the judgment in Civil Case No. 93268 ordering
defendant Gil Puyat to pay petitioner for the unpaid
premiums and stamps, and attorney’s fees and costs of suits.
Respondents, on the other hand, seek to be free
from the liability of paying the petitioner.
V-KEY FACTS
In Civil Case No. 59506, judgment was rendered
against respondents to pay petitioner the amount of
P20,000.00 with interest for premiums and stamps, became
final on April 13, 1967. The judgment was not enforced so
petitioner filed again a motion to revive the judgment
docketed as Civil Case No. 93268 which became final on May
24, 1974. However, it was still not enforced. On March 28,
1981, Gil Puyat died, for this reason, petitioner filed another
motion for the revival of the judgment on September 1, 1982,
this time against the estate of Gil Puyat. The herein
respondents, as administrators of the estate of Gil Puyat,
argue that the present action for claim filed by the petitioner
was already barred by laches on the ground that it was filed
beyond the ten-year prescriptive period to file an action to
enforce the judgment under Art.1144(3) of the New Civil
Code. Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that the period of
10 years presented in the statute of limitations should not be
counted from the date of the finality of the original judgment
but from the date of the finality of the revived judgment
which is the Civil Case No. 93268 on May 24,1974 not Civil
Case 59506 on April 13, 1967. Hence, the claim filed by
petitioner on September 1, 1982, as alleged, was within the
ten-year prescriptive period.
VI-ISSUE
Whether or not the ten-year prescriptive period to
file an action to enforce the judgment pursuant to Art1144(3)
of the New Civil Code commences to run from the finality of
the revived judgment.
VII-HOLDINGS
The SC held that the 10-year prescriptive period
commences from the finality of the original judgment, hence,
petitioner’s action to file to enforce the revived judgment had
already lapsed from the finality of the original judgment in
Civil Case 59506 in April 13, 1967.
VIII- RATIO DECIDENDI
The crux of the controversy lies in the interpretation
of Articles 1144(3) of the New Civil Code in relation to Section
6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, Article 1144(3) provides:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues.
xxx xxx xxx
3. Upon judgment.
while section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 6. Execution of motion or by independent action. A
judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred
by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action.
in Philippine National Bank v. Deloso, the Court held
that the ten-year prescriptive peyiod commences to run from
the date of ftnality of the judgment and not from the
expiration of five (5) years thereafter.
The decision in Civil Case No. 59506 became final
and executory on April 13, 1967. The judgment was not
enforced. The petitioner instituted Civil Case No. 93268
within the prescriptive period to revive the judgment in Civil
Case No. 59506. The revived judgment was rendered on May
24, 1974. This judgment became final and executory
sometime in 1974. Again, this was not enforced. On
September 1, 1982, the petitioner filed a claim in Special
Proceedings No. Q-32291 before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal. What is sought is a second revival of the
judgment that had become final in 1967. This can no longer be
done due to the lapse of the allowable period.
The decision in Philippine National Bank v. Deloso,
supra, is the later and better interpretation of the law. We
apply it to the instant case. We find that the right of the
petitioner to enforce the judgment against Gil Puyat, an
accomodation party and a defendant in Civil Case Nos. 59506
and 93268, filed on September 1, 1982 had already
prescribed considering that more than ten (10) years had
already elapsed from the finality of the original judgment on
April 13, 1967.
IX-DISPOSITION/FALLO
The SC sustained the decision of the IAC dismissing
the appeal of the petitioner that the prescription of an action
is not counted from the expiration of the five-year period
within which the judgment may be enforced by a mere motion
but from the finality of that judgment.
Proverb
12:1
Any who love knowledge want to be told
when they are wrong. It is stupid to hate being corrected.
15.)PNB VS CA
GR NO 116181, APRIL 17 199
Case Analysis
I. Parties:
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner
COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELO H. FLORES, respondents.
II. Prior Proceeding:
• RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant Philippine National Bank
ordering PNB to pay Flores the sum of P 100,000.00
representing the amount of the check dishonored
with interest, moral and exemplary damages
• Petitioner interposed an appeal with the respondent
court where CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court
Hence this appeal case in the SC.
III. Theories of the Parties:
Petitioner’s contentions.
• That THE CA ERRED IN LAW IN HOLDING THAT,
THE BEST EVIDENCE TO SHOW WHETHER MR.
FLORES PAID THE PNB CASINO UNIT P900,040
OR P1,000,040 IN PURCHASING THE TWO
MANAGER’S CHECKS EACH WORTH P500,000 IS
THE RECEIPT FOR P1,000,040.
• THAT MR. FLORES ACTUALLY PAID P900,040
AND NOT P1,000,040 FOR THE SUBJECT
MANAGER’S CHECKS.
• That a receipt is merely presumptive evidence
and is not conclusive.
18. Private respondent’s contentions.
• That he paid the petitioner the amount of
P1,000,040.00 when he purchased the two (2)
manager’s checks worth (sic) P1,000,000.00 as
clearly manifested in the receipt
IV. Objective of the Parties:
Petitioner.
• To dishonor the receipt presented by Flores for they
can present competent and relevant evidence to
support its allegation in the answer that Mr. Flores
actually paid P900,000.00 and not P1,000,040.
• That the court should recognize evidence of the
particulars or the actual denominations of the
money it received from Flores in exchange for its
managerial checks.
Private respondent.
• To get the payment from petitioner for the
encashment of the manager’s checks worth
P1,000,000.00 with interest and exemplary damages.
V. Key Facts:
• Private respondent Carmelo H. Flores (Flores)
purchased from petitioner at its Manila Pavilion
Hotel unit, two (2) manager’s checks worth
P500,000.00 each, paying a total of P1,000,040.00,
including the service charge.1
A receipt for said
amount was issued by the petitioner.
• Flores presented these checks at the unit of
petitioner however petitioner refused to encash the
checks
• After a lengthy discussion, it agreed to encash one
(1) of the checks.3
However, it deferred the payment
of the other check until after Flores agreed that it be
broken down to five (5) manager’s checks of P
100,000.00 each. Furthermore, petitioner refused to
encash one of the five checks until after it is cleared
by the Manila Pavilion Hotel unit having no other
option.
• Flores agreed to such an arrangement. However,
upon his return to Manila, he made representations
to petitioner through its Malate Branch so that the
check may be encashed but to no avail
• Flores, thereafter, wrote a letter to his counsel
informing the latter of the aforementioned events.A
Formal Demand was made by private respondent’s
counsel but petitioner persisted in its refusal to
honor the check.
• In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,
petitioner insisted that only P900,000.00 and P40.00
bank charges were actually paid by Flores when he
purchased the two (2) manager’s checks worth
P1,000,000.00. It alleged that due to Flores’
“demanding attitude and temper,” petitioner’s
money counter, Rowena Montes, who, at that time
was still new at her job, made an error in good faith
in issuing the receipt for P1,000,040.00.The
actuations of Flores allegedly distracted the
personnel manning the unit.
VI. Issues Identified by the Court:
Whether or not the receipt will serve as best evidence to
prove how much money Flores actually paid for the purchase
of petitioner’s manager’s checks.
VII. Holdings:
Yes, Although a receipt is not conclusive evidence, in the
case at bench, an exhaustive review of the records fails to
disclose any other evidence sufficient and strong enough to
overturn the acknowledgment embodied in petitioner’s own
receipt (as to the amount of money it actually received).
Defendant even failed to adduce concrete evidence showing
that the forms which were crumpled and retrieved from the
waste basket were made the basis of the approval of the
purchased (sic) made. At any rate, the Court finds such pieces
of evidence not only unconvincing but also self-defeating in
the light of the receipt, the accuracy, correctness and due
execution of which was indubitably established. It is a
cardinal rule in the law on evidence that the best proof of
payment is the receipt.
VIII. Ratio Decidendi:
“A “receipt” is defined as:A written and signed
acknowledgment that money has been paid or goods have
been delivered. A receipt is merely presumptive evidence and is
not conclusive. Since a receipt is a mere acknowledgment of
payment, it may be subject to explanation or contradiction. A
receipt may be used as evidence against one just as any other
declaration or admission. A simple receipt not under seal is
presumptive evidence only and may be rebutted or explained
by other evidence of mistake in giving it, or of non-payment
or of the circumstances under which it was given. While
receipts are deemed to be the best evidence, they are not
exclusive. Other evidence may be presented in lieu thereof if
they are not available, as in case of loss, destruction or
disappearance. The fact of payment may be established not
only by documentary evidence, but also by parol evidence
especially in civil cases where preponderance of evidence is
the rule. Here respondents presented documentary as well as
oral evidence which the Court of Appeals found to be
sufficient, and this finding is final.
IX. Disposition:
SC dismissed the petition and MODIFIED assailed
decision of the lower court as only to damages:
1. The award of moral damages is reduced from
P1,000,000.00 to P100,000.00; and
2. The award of exemplary damages is reduced from
P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00.
16.)FRANCISCO VS CA
122 SCRA 538
I. Parties:
ADALIA FRANCISCO, petitioner
COURT OF APPEALS , HERBY COMMERCIAL &
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION AND JAIME C.
ONG, respondents.
II. Prior Proceeding:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is
the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court in
favor of private respondents.
III. Theories of the Parties:
Petitioner’s contentions.
Petitioner claims that she was, in any event, authorized to