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1. 1
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 1526 January 31, 2005
NAZARIA S. HERNANDEZ (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY LUCIANO S.
HERNANDEZ, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE C. GO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
For our resolution is the verified letter-complaint1
for disbarment against Atty. Jose C.
Go dated June 23, 1975 filed by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now deceased). Both parties
are from Zamboanga City.
The allegations in the letter-complaint are:
Sometime in 1961, complainant’s husband abandoned her and her son, Luciano S.
Hernandez, Jr. Shortly thereafter, her husband’s numerous creditors demanded
payments of his loans. Fearful that the various mortgage contracts involving her
properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending suits for sums of money against
her, complainant engaged the legal services of Atty. Jose C. Go, herein respondent.
Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness, fear, embarrassment, and
social humiliation. He advised her to give him her land titles covering Lots 848-A, 849-
Q, and 849-P at Zamboanga City so he could sell them to enable her to pay her
creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of sale in his favor without any
monetary or valuable consideration. Complainant agreed on condition that he would sell
the lots and from the proceeds pay her creditors.
Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A, likewise located in Zamboanga
City, which were mortgaged to her creditors. When the mortgages fell due, respondent
redeemed the lots. Again, he convinced her to execute deeds of sale involving those
lots in his favor. As a result, respondent became the registered owner of all the lots
belonging to complainant.
Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that respondent did not sell her lots as
agreed upon. Instead, he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles
registered in his name, depriving her of her real properties worth millions.1a^/phi1.net

2. 2
In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975, respondent was required to file his
comment on the complaint.
Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint is premature since there is pending before the then Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga City Civil Case No. 17812
for recovery of ownership and
declaration of nullity of deeds of sale filed by complainant against him involving the
subject lots.
On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying respondent’s motion and
requiring him to submit his answer.
In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent denied the allegations in the
instant complaint. He averred that he sold, in good faith, complainant’s lots to various
buyers, including himself, for valuable consideration. On several occasions, he
extended financial assistance to complainant and even invited her to live with his family.
His children used to call her "Lola" due to her frequent visits to his residence. He prayed
that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
for investigation, report, and recommendation.
It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month and 26 days that the OSG
filed a motion to refer the instant case to the IBP for the retaking of the testimonies of
complainant’s witnesses and the submission of its report and recommendation.
On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004 of Atty. Lydia A. Navarro,
Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, is quoted as follows:
"A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties showed
that all the properties of the complainant are presently owned by the respondent by
virtue of several deeds of sale executed by the complainant in favor of the respondent
without monetary consideration except Lot 849-D situated in Tomas Claudio which was
returned by the respondent to the complainant on September 5, 1974.
It is evident from the records that respondent was the one who notarized the documents
involving the said properties redeemed or repurchased by the complainant from her
creditors which ended up in respondent’s name like in the deed of sale executed by
Victoriano Dejerano in favor of Nazaria Hernandez over Lots 1141-A-3-A and 1141-A-3-
B; deed of sale executed by Antonio Masrahon on September 3, 1961regarding Lot No.
1141-A; deed of absolute sale executed by Francisco Esperat over the Curuan
properties on November 9, 1971 and the cancellation of the mortgage executed by
Alfonso Enriquez on July 18, 1964 over the Tomas Claudio properties.

3. 3
The foregoing legal activities and operations of the respondent in addition to his having
discussed, advised and gave solutions to complainant’s legal problems and liabilities to
her creditors and even requested her creditors for extension of time to pay
complainant’s accounts constitute practice of law as legal counsel for consultation aside
from representing complainant in other cases; a mute proof of a lawyer-client relations
between them, a fact also admitted by the respondent.
It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a detailed report to the
complainant on how he paid complainant’s creditors without selling her properties.
Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid them out of his own funds; then later
on admitted that he was one of the purchasers of complainant’s properties in utter
disregard of their agreement and no evidence was submitted by the respondent
concerning the value of the said sale of complainant’s properties.
As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his obligation and duty as
complainant’s legal adviser and counsel when he took advantage of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the complainant in ultimately putting complainant’s
properties in his name and possession in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends that
respondent Atty. Jose C. Go be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months from receipt hereof and the IBP Chapter where he is a registered member
be furnished a copy of the same for implementation hereof, subject to the approval of
the Honorable Members of the Board of Governors."
On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-39
adopting and approving the Report of Commissioner Navarro with modification in the
sense that the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law was
increased from six (6) months to three (3) years.
We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.l^vvphi1.net However, we have to
modify its recommended penalty.1a^/phi1.net
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the principal source of ethical
rules for lawyers in this jurisdiction, provides:
"A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession."
Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for himself complainant’s lots
entrusted to him are, by any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous
wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful
intent and not mere error in judgment.3
Such conduct on the part of respondent
degrades not only himself but also the name and honor of the legal profession. He

4. 4
violated this Court’s mandate that lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealing with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach.4
Canon 17 of the same Code states:
"A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him."
The records show that complainant reposed such high degree of trust and confidence in
herein respondent, that when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land
titles and allowed him to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds thereof would be used
to pay her creditors. Respondent, however, abused her trust and confidence when he
did not sell her properties to others but to himself and spent his own money to pay her
obligations. As correctly observed by Investigating IBP Commissioner Lydia Navarro,
respondent is duty-bound to render a detailed report to the complainant on how much
he sold the latter’s lots and the amounts paid to her creditors. Obviously, had he sold
the lots to other buyers, complainant could have earned more. Records show that she
did not receive any amount from respondent. Clearly, respondent did not adhere
faithfully and honestly in his duty as complainant’s counsel.
Undoubtedly, respondent’s conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal
profession. He has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful,
dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. We have been exacting in our demand for
integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all
times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession5
and refrain from any act
or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.6
Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege.7
And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not
only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and
gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.8
Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar,
but also the legal profession.
Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his best efforts and ability to
protect the interests of his clients. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and
candor not only protects his client’s cause; he also serves the ends of justice and does
honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining
in the legal profession.9

5. 5
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party without authority to do so.10
In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos ,11
we ordered the disbarment of lawyer when he deceived
his 85-year old aunt into entrusting him with all her money and later refused to return
the same despite demand. In Navarro vs. Meneses III ,12
we disbarred a member of the
Bar for his refusal or failure to account for the P50,000.00 he received from a client to
settle a case. In Docena vs. Limson ,13
we expelled from the brotherhood of lawyers, an
attorney who extorted money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation. In
Busiños vs. Ricafort ,14
an attorney was stripped of his license to practice law for
misappropriating his client’s money.
Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, we find the penalty recommended by
the IBP too light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his client’s
financial plight to acquire the latter’s properties for his own benefit is destructive of the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and consistent with the need to
maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the
legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.
WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is
DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., on official leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

6. 6
A.C. No. 6131 February 28, 2005
EDUARDO L. NUÑEZ, EUGENIO O. NUÑEZ, ELISA NUÑEZ-ALVARICO and
IMELDA L. NUÑEZ, complainants,
vs.
Atty. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Disbarment and suspension of an attorney are the most severe forms of disciplinary
action; thus, they should be imposed with great caution. They should be meted out only
for duly proven serious administrative charges.1
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit2
filed with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Eduardo L. Nuñez,
Eugenio O. Nuñez, Eliza Nuñez-Alvarico and Imelda L. Nuñez. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga
was charged therein with conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. The material
averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD as follows:
"Complainants allege that sometime on June 5, 1968, the late Maria Ortega Vda. De
Nu[ñ]ez executed a Sale with Right to Repurchase in favor of Eugenio O. Nu[ñ]ez Lot
No. 106 covered by OCT No. 2651 (now TCT No. 8955) containing an area of 384 sq.
ms. for a consideration of P400.00. In the said contract, the stipulated time of
repurchase was ten (10) years from the date of execution thereof or until June 5, 1978.
That said period of vendor’s right to repurchase expired without any agreement of
extending said period of repurchase. To date, even the heirs of the late Maria Ortega
Vda. de Nu[ñ]ez have not exercised[d] their right of repurchase. A year after the
execution of the said pacto de ret[r]o sale, the late Maria Ortega Vda. de Nu[ñ]ez and
her son Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez, as the surviving heirs of the late Eleuterio Nu[ñ]ez,
extrajudicially partitioned his estate, among others, the subject [L]ot No. 106 was
adjudicated to Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez which eventually was the basis for the issuance of TCT
No. 8955 in the name of Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez. Eugenio O. Nu[ñ]ez [has] occupied and
possessed said Lot No. 106 for more than 40 years up to the present and it is also
where his children, Eduardo, Elisa and Imelda, all surnamed Nu[ñ]ez, grew and [are]
presently residing.
"By virtue of a power of attorney executed sometime in 1982 by the late spouses
Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez and Paterna Nu[ñ]ez appointing respondent as administrator, as well
as on the alleged judicial confirmation of respondent’s wife, as acknowledged natural
child of Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez, respondent, on the pretext of administering the properties of
the late spouses, had been disturbing the peaceful occupation and possession of
complainants of Lot No. 106 claiming that complainants have no right over the same.

7. 7
With our desire to peaceably settle the controversy, complainants agreed to buy Lot No.
106, and respondent, who, without being appointed by the court as administrator of the
intestate estate of the late spouses Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez and Paterna Nu[ñ]ez, sold and
conveyed to Imelda Nu[ñ]ez and Elisa Nu[ñ]ez-Alvarico the portions of Lot No. 106 they
were occupying. After which Elisa Nu[ñ]ez-Alvarico filed a criminal complaint for Estafa
against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte docketed as
Criminal Case No. R-4013-A.1a^/phi1.net
"Sometime on 29 March 2001 at around 7:30 in the evening, respondent went to the
house of Eduardo L. Nu[ñ]ez at corner J.P. Laurel and M.L. Quezon Sts., Baybay, Leyte
and threatened to kill Eduardo Nu[ñ]ez by uttering the words ‘ipaposil ta ka’ which
means ‘I’ll have you shot.’ A complaint for Grave Threats docketed as Case No. R-
4012-A was filed by Eduardo L. Nu[ñ]ez before Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte."3
In a hearing held on June 5, 2002, complainants appeared with their counsel, while
respondent was represented by Atty. Arnold Logares. As respondent had not yet filed
his answer to the Complaint despite a previous Order dated December 7, 2001, he was
granted a period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so. The hearing was thus reset
to June 26, 2002.4
On June 26, 2002, only respondent’s counsel, Atty. Arnold Logares, was present.
Respondent filed a Motion seeking a cancellation of the scheduled hearing and another
extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file his answer. He was thus granted a
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so.5
On July 18, 2002, Atty. Astorga finally submitted his Answer.6
He denied that he had
utilized his profession to circumvent the law and averred that there were already several
pending cases involving the same issues raised by complainants in the present
administrative action:
"2. That the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed by the late Maria Ortega
Vda. De Nuñez on June 5, 1968 is more civil in nature and can be best threshed out in
the amended complaint of Civil Case No. B-2001-10-27, entitled [‘]The Intestate Estate
of the late Spouses Ricardo O. Nuñez, et al versus Spouses Bonito D. Alvarico, et al[‘]
for Rescission of Contract[.] [T]he original complaint was filed in October 2001 at the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte; an amended complaint of which is filed
where one of the issues is the declaration of invalidity of the foregoing questioned deed
of sale with right to repurchase because if this document is really valid and existing then
why did complainant Eugenio Nuñez [affix] his signature as one of the instrumental
witnesses in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition among Maria Ortega Vda. De Nuñez
and Ricardo O. Nuñez on May 19, 1969 otherwise he would have protested at the time
of the execution thereof because he is the temporary owner of Lot No. 106, one of the
properties subject of partition. Why did he allow the late Ricardo O. Nuñez to take
control and full possession and ownership of Lot 106 to his exclusion after the partition
in 1969?

8. 8
x x x x x x x x x
"[3] b) It is not only the authority of the Spouses Ricardo O. Nuñez and Paterna Baltazar
that herein respondent is relying as administrator of the said intestate estate but the
same had been duly confirmed by the judicially declared daughter of Ricardo O. Nuñez,
namely, respondent’s wife Dr. Linda Teresa Tan-Nuñez who confirmed undersign[ed]’s
authority as administrator of the aforenamed estate;
"[3] c) With the discovery of the aforenamed deed of sale with the right to repurchase
only recently, the complainants were emboldened to actively [question] [the] estate as
they now [refuse] to recognize the ownership and long time possession of the real
properties forming part of the aforenamed [estate] to belong to the offspring of the late
Ricardo O. Nuñez;
"[3] d) Undersigned respondent did not utilize his profession to circumvent the law.
Complainants Elisa L. Nuñez and Imelda L. Nuñez are actually renting the cornermost
portion of the consolidated Lot Nos. 106 and 107 of the Baybay Cadastre with an area
only of 201 square meters, more or less, and when respondent was trying to eject them,
complainants negotiated with the respondent to buy their area of Lot No. 106 they
rented and in fact actually advanced part of the agreed consideration until their father
Eugenio Nuñez discovered an existing document of sale with right to repurchase when
they, ill-advised by their counsel [started] filing [a] series of criminal, civil and
administrative cases against respondent and his wife at the instigation of their lawyers,
the late Atty. Jose C. Modina and their current counsel, Atty. Norjue I. Juego as a way
of pressuring respondent and wife to give up [the] portion they are occupying [of] Lot
No. 106[,] including [the] portion which complainant Eduardo Nuñez is now renting of
Lot No. 89;
"4. That respondent in response to paragraph 7 of the complaint hereby admit the
pendency of Criminal Case No. R-4013-A which was personally filed by Elisa L. Nuñez
without the intervention from any government prosecutor but said case is no longer
pending in the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte when then same was
recommended for dismissal x x x. Later it was ordered dismissed by the Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero and approved by Provincial Prosecutor Teresita S. Lopez
on February 22, 2001 x x x but complainants elevated the case for review to the
Department of Justice x x x. Because of the pendency of this criminal case with the
Department of Justice[,] a prejudicial question now exist[s] whereby this administrative
case should be suspended until the resolution of that petition for review by the
Department of Justice;
"5. That respondent specifically denies the material allegations of paragraph 8, 9 and 10
of the complaint, the truth of the matter is that Amado Caballes at the instigation of the
complain[an]ts and their counsel filed Criminal Case No. R-4011-A with the Municipal
Trial Court, Baybay, Leyte which is pending pre-trial. Like Criminal Case No. R-4013-A,
the same was filed at the instance of Amado Caballes, x x x. But before the filing of this
present action initiated by Mr. Caballes’s counsel and complainants Eduardo Nuñez and

9. 9
Eugenio Nuñez required Mr. Caballes to execute a document of resale on August 14,
2001 despite knowing that the same has already been long redeemed by respondent x
x x. Despite legal redemption, and despite Amado Caballes having executed x x x a
Deed of Resale which was witnessed by complainant Eugenio Nuñez x x x, the
complainants convinced Amado Caballes to file Crim. Case No. R-4011-A[.] x x x. That
by virtue of the pendency of Criminal Case No. R-4011-A, there exist[s] a prejudicial
question and that further hearing of the present administrative action should be
suspended until the outcome of this criminal case;
"6. That respondent is duly authorized to negotiate for the disposal of any part of the
Intestate Estate of the late Spouses Ricardo O. Nuñez and Paterna Baltazar x x x.
"7. That regarding paragraph 12 and 13 of the complaint[,] this is a matter of existence
and pend[ing] with [the IBP-CBD] and need not be a part of this complaint because this
will be threshed out in another hearing[.] [T]he truth of the matter is that respondent had
been already acquitted in Crim. Case No. CBU-29395 x x x.
"8. That similar to other cases filed at the instance of the Nuñezes, there is also filed
Crim. Case No. R-4012-A for Grave Threats by complainant Eduardo Nuñez and now
pending in the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte despite the lack of witnesses x x x.
Again, the pendency of this case will constitute a prejudicial question which necessarily
will suspend further hearing of the present administrative action until the final outcome
of the aforesaid Crim. Case No. R-4011-A;"
x x x x x x x x x.7
On August 8, 2002, complainants submitted their Reply.8
Thereafter, IBP-CPD
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala scheduled the case for hearing on December
11, 2002. On this date, respondent requested and was a granted a period of fifteen (15)
days to file his rejoinder. The parties agreed to file simultaneous memoranda on
January 15, 2003, after which the case was to be considered submitted for
resolution.9
1awphi1.nét
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In her Report,10
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala found respondent guilty of serious
misconduct. Thus, the investigating commissioner recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for a period of one year.
In Resolution No. XV-2003-346 dated June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.

10. 10
The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for
final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Respondent
also filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to set aside
Resolution No. XV-2003-346 of the IBP Board of Governors.
The Court’s Ruling
We disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP, but find respondent’s
offensive language against complainants and their counsel unbecoming an attorney.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
The legal profession exacts a high standard from its members. Lawyers shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness to practice law. Neither shall
they, whether in public or in private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.11
In gr_ Gonzaga v. Villanueva,12
this Court, citing Tucay v.
Tucay,13
held thus:
"A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit;
malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to
cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his
professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity
and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but
are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein."14
However, the penalties of disbarment and suspension are severe forms of disciplinary
action and must be imposed with great caution.15
The allegations in the Complaint were
not substantiated by clear evidence; they were bereft of convincing proof of
respondent’s deceit and gross misconduct.
The admission of respondent that there are various cases filed or pending against him
does not ipso facto constitute serious misconduct. His contention that the pending
cases against him pose a prejudicial question that will bar the instant administrative
case is untenable. Likewise bereft of merit, however, is the finding of the IBP
investigating commissioner that the mere existence of the same pending cases
constitute serious misconduct on the part of respondent.

11. 11
Under Section 27 of Rule 138, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. Suspension or disbarment may follow as a matter
of course, upon a finding that the crime a lawyer has been convicted of involves moral
turpitude. By such conviction, such lawyer has become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and is no longer possessed of good moral character.16
In the
present case, however, while respondent has been charged with several criminal cases
involving moral turpitude, he has yet to be convicted of any of them.
Without clear and convincing evidence that he committed acts that allegedly constituted
serious misconduct, the mere existence of pending criminal charges cannot be a ground
for disbarment or suspension of respondent. To hold otherwise would open the door to
harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against
them.
Respondent contends that his right to due process was violated when the IBP
investigating commissioner failed to conduct a formal investigation.17
As borne by the
records, Investigating Commissioner Villanueva-Maala conducted hearings on the case
on June 5 and June 26, 2002, during which counsel for respondent, Atty. Logares,
appeared. Respondent was allowed to file his Answer, as well as his Rejoinder. And,
more important, he himself appeared at the December 11, 2002 hearing when the
parties agreed to file simultaneous memoranda, after which the case was deemed
submitted for resolution. Records show that respondent filed his Memorandum on
January 29, 2003. Hence, he cannot claim that he was not given ample opportunity to
rebut the charges filed against him.1awphi1.nét
While we are not convinced that complainants have clearly and convincingly proven the
charges of serious misconduct, we do, however, note the use of offensive language in
respondent’s pleadings. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In his Memorandum18
dated January 15, 2003, the opposing counsel, Atty. Norjue I.
Juego, points out the manner and tenor of the language in the Answer19
and the
Rejoinder of respondent.20
The latter suggested that complainants and their counsel had
caused the filing of several baseless suits, including the present charge, merely to
harass and place him in a bad light.21
He hurled insulting language in describing the
opposing counsel22
and cast doubts on the latter’s integrity by implying that the lawyer
had instigated the filing of the so-called baseless suits, violated the rules on non-forum
shopping and committed malpractice.23

12. 12
Indeed, these statements, particularly the words "who he is despite x x x his shortness
not only in size but in arrogance," constitute conduct unbecoming a member of the legal
profession and cannot be countenanced by this Court.
A lawyer’s language may be forceful, but should always be dignified; emphatic, but
respectful as befitting an advocate. Arguments, whether written or oral, should be
gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should use such language as may be
properly addressed by one gentleperson to another.24
WHEREFORE, Atty. Arturo B. Astorga is ACQUITTED of the charge of serious
misconduct, but is held liable for conduct unbecoming an attorney and is FINED two
thousand pesos.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 4807 March 22, 2000
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE

13. 13
V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND
ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics,
specifically Canon 9 thereof, viz:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the
matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer
most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law.
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C.
Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos.
Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer
College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel for the
defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his knowledge,
compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the
aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims
they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil,
criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such
an act of respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession
warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents
had taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various
Re-Admission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the
time with the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements,
he claimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were
executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case
involving nine students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the
recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian Dexter
Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B.
De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz,
were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused to
be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member
Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of hearings,
it found the students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the
student publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the
erring students.

14. 14
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC
President, gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th
March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil
case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were
separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter
of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-
Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology,
dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon
and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of
apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission
Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter or apology, dated 22
September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997
with the AMACC President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael
Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with
the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a
Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was
pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law
Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was furnished complainant.
In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case against
the other Respondents for they did not take part in the negotiation of the case.
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission
Agreements were formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for
plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this
fact. Although aware that the students were represented by counsel, respondent
attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents without at the
very least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was
counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by
design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional
ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the
demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

15. 15
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the
administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the Manifestation 1 which, among
other things, explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz:
1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their
parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President,
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER
COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings which they may have against
the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal.
xxx xxx xxx
3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No.
Q-97-30549 will by filed them.
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP
Board of Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month
suspension would appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances
and the explanation of respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon
his receipt of this decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an
attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 April 27, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
CLAIMING TO BE AND ACTING AS TANODBAYAN-OMBUDSMAN UNDER THE
1987 CONSTITUTION, respondents.

16. 16
G.R. No. L-80578 April 27, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
Francisco Carreon and Nestor C. Lumba for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In G.R. Nos. 79690-707 "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus under Rule
65," petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, sought to
restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the
prosecution and hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163-12177 on
the ground thatsaid cases were filed by said Tanodbayan without legal and
constitutional authority, since under the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February
2, 1987, it is only the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent Tanodbayan) who has
the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. The complete prayer of the petition
reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the final disposition of this petition or
until further orders of the Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary injunction issue upon the
filing of a bond in such amount as may be fixed by the Honorable Court, restraining the
Honorable Sandiganbayan from hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161,
and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar is concerned and from
hearing and resolving the special prosecutor's motion to suspend (Annex J) and
thereafter, final judgment be rendered: —
(1) ordering that the amended informations in the above-mentioned crimininal cases be
or issuing a writ of mandamus commanding and ordering the respondent Sandiganbayan
to do so and, in consequence, prohibiting and restraining the respondent Sandigan-
bayan from proceeding to hear and try the abovementioned criminal cases or making the
temporary preliminary injunction permanent;
(2) declaring the acts of respondent Gonzalez as "Tanodbayan-Ombudsman" after 2
February 1987 relating to these cases as anullity and without legal effect, particularly, the
promulgation of Tanodbayan resolution of 5 February 1987, the filing of the original
informations on 3 March 1987 and the amended ones on 4 June 1987, and the filing of
the Motion for Suspension Pendente Lite.
PETITIONER prays for such other and further relief as may be deemed proper in the
premises, with costs against the respondents.
Manila, Philippines, September 9, 1987.

17. 17
(pp. 45-47, Rollo)
In G.R. No. 80578, petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, on substantially the same ground as
the first petition, prays that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained from conducting
preliminary investigations and similar cases with the Sandiganbayan. The prayer reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the final disposition of this petition or
until further orders of this Honorable court, a writ of preliminary injunction issue
restraining the respondent from further acting in TBP CASE NO. 87-01304 and,
particularly, from filing the criminal Information consequent thereof-, and from conducting
preliminary investigations in, and filing criminal informations for, such other complaints/
cases now pending or which may hereafter be filed against petitioner with the Office of
the respondent.
It is likewise prayed that the present petition be consolidated with G.R.L-Nos. 79690-
79707.
After proper proceedings, it is prayed that final judgment be rendered annulling the acts
of respondent Gonzalez as "Tanodbayan- Ombudsman" after 2 February 1987 relating to
the investigation of complaints against petitioner, particularly:
(1) Annulling, for absolute want of jurisdiction, the preliminary investigation conducted,
and the Resolution rendered, by respondent in TBP CASE NO. 87-01304;
(2) Prohibiting and restraining the respondent from filing any criminal Information as a
consequence of the void preliminary investigation he conducted in TBP CASE NO. 87-
01304, or annulling the criminal Information in the said case which may, in the meantime,
have already been filed;
(3) Prohibiting and restraining the respondent from conducting preliminary investigations
in, and filing criminal informations for, such other complaints/cases now pending or which
may hereafter be filed against petitioner with the Office of the respondent.
PETITIONER further prays for such other and further reliefs as may be deemed proper in
the proper with costs against the respondent.
Manila, Philippines, November 18,1987
(pp. 24-25, Rollo)
We issued the restraining orders prayed for.
After a study of the petitions, We have decided to give due course to the same; to
consider the comments of the Solicitor-General and of Tanodbayan Gonzalez as their
Answers thereto; and to forthwith decide the petitions.
We find the petitions impressed with merit.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from theincumbent
Tanodbayan) is charged with the duty to:

18. 18
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or commission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient (Sec. 13, par. 1)
The Constitution likewise provides that:
The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the office of the Special
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may
be provided by law, contempt except those conferred on the office of the Ombudsman
created under this Constitution. (Art. XI, Section 7) (Emphasis ours).
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the
incumbent Tanodbayan (caged Special Prosecutor under the 1987 constitution and who
is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly
without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal
cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do
so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he has been divested of such
authority.
Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere
subordinate of the Tanodbayan Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases
only upon the latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the
prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if instructed to do so by the
Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue subpoena, which he still claims under
Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may,
however, retain it in the Spedal Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to
investigate.
It is not correct either to suppose that the Special Prosecutor remains the Ombudsman
as long as he has not been replaced, for the fact is that he has never been the
Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman is a new creation under Article XI of the
Constitution different from the Office of the Tanodbayan created under PD 1607
although concededly some of the powers of the two offices are Identical or similar. The
Special Prosecutor cannot plead that he has a right to hold over the position of
Ombudsman as he has never held it in the first place.
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and
hereby NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the
Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from
conducting investigations and filing criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and function of the
Ombudsman.

19. 19
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I maintain, however, consistent with my dissent in De Leon vs. Esguerra, G.R. No.
78059, that the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 11, 1987.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I maintain, however, consistent with my dissent in De Leon vs. Esguerra, G.R. No.
78059, that the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 11, 1987.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
AC No. 99-634 June 10, 2002
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and
client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering
is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration.
The Case

20. 20
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary
action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14,
1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:
"x x x x x x x x x
"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta, sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and
Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who
agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against
certain parties for breach of contract;
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me
the demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have
accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the
dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he
subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee
whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January
4, 1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of
the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case
filed immediately;
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint
had already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;
"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from
Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I
frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every
time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that
the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he
even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about
4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground
floor of the building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes
with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me
that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go
to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to
personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that there was no record
at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the
Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;

21. 21
"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he
continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court
personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at
all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his
own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing
two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of
P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as
Annexes D and E;
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish
to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and
oppressive conduct;"
x x x x x x x x x.1
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline,2
respondent filed his Answer3
vehemently denying the allegations of
complainant "for being totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly been
introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former's law partners. After their meeting,
complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a
service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business
partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another demand
letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly
agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of
the former's law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting,
respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner
to settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by
complainant to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all
the files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the
latter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose
services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about his

22. 22
acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because
the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment
basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's
secretary and told her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of
the payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the
latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be
filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the
acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime
the filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the
First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned
by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never
arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing
the complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In
response, complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of
respondent's acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant
demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own
personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the
time, and their office personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondent's checks were
accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived
complainant, and if anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was
he.
The IBP's Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio
Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant's
deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on
the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint
within the time frame contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of
respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited
by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client,
which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly
dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The
subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by
complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his

23. 23
misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity
of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year."4
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Commission's recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing
of the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the
money given for the filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill
complaint; hence, the former's failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent
alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was
for attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the
prosecution or the defense of the client's cause. They who perform that duty with
diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends
of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for
the legal profession.5
Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the
profession.6
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed
between him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered.
The former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the
kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To
constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer
be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with
a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is
established.7

24. 24
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal
relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's
fees.8
Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of
respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal
favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to
prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect
the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of
a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in them.9
They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of
their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the
client, save by the rules of law legally applied.10
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his
office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly
noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed
upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else.
Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should
have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling
complainant's attention to the matter and should have issued another receipt indicating
the correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business.11
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-
making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.12
The
gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration.13
Duty to
public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the
highest eminence may be attained without making much money.14
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by
the receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that
lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their
professional capacity.15
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come
into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.16
It may be

25. 25
true that they have a lien upon the client's funds, documents and other papers that have
lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction
of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of
their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct.17
In any event, they must still exert all effort to
protect their client's interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice
law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar,
and to the public.18
Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his
legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint
promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his
breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from
the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar
will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is
instructed to include a copy in respondent's file.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J.*
, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.