Ethics

4. ALEX ONG vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO [Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002]
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 11, 2013
FACTS:
The complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent as legal counsel of one Nemesia
Garganian claiming for the support of the alleged child of the complainant with the latter. A few days
thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an emissary of the
complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed down the alleged additional financial demands of Ms.
Garganian against the complainant and discussed the courses of action that he would take against the
complainant should the latter fail to comply with his obligation to support Ms. Garganian and her son.
It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganian’s son was the complainant’s brother and that the
complainant merely assumed his brother’s obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening to
sue them. The complainant then did not comply with the demands against him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal (now Prosecutor’s
Office) of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one Albina Ong, for alleged
violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the complainant, Lim, Ong and
Adela Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant before the
Bureau of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the Office of the
Solicitor General. According to the complainant, these cases were subsequently denied due course and
dismissed by the aforesaid government agencies.
The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for disbarment. The records show that
the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any information against
the complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions against the latter. The complainant
branded the respondent’s tactics as “highly immoral, unprofessional and unethical,
constituting…malpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer.”
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of lawyer.
HELD: YES.
The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It mandates
lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further
commands that “a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain
an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.”
We find the respondent’s action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did
not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the respondent
has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is inexcusable. His tactic is unethical

5. and runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding and he shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness,
fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for
any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity. Public confidence in law and lawyers
may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer
should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months and
sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

6. Nakpil vs Valdes [A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]
Ponente: PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Jose Nakpil, husband of the complainant, became interested in purchasing a summer residence in
Moran Street, Baguio City. For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property
for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter
could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank which he
used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in respondent’s name.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings when Jose Nakpil
died. Respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow. Respondent excluded the
Moran property from the inventory of Jose’s estate and transferred his title to the Moran property to his
company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was conflict of interest between the respondent Atty. Valdes and the
complainant.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for one (1) year.
RATIO:
[T]here is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other.
Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same
time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the
interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of
the estate.
[R]espondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his client could be
doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of respondent’s law firm was to contest the claims of these
two creditors but which claims were prepared by respondent’s accounting firm. Even if the claims were
valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether
there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was
respondent’s duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of
conflict of interest.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to
always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship
between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good
faith. In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients.

7. G.R. No. 173188 January 15, 2014
FACTS: Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (Spouses Cadavedo)
acquired a homestead grant over a land in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. On
April 30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the lot to the spouses Vicente Ames and
Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames).
Spouses Cadavedo filed an action before the RTC of Zamboanga City against the
spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after
the latter failed to pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially
engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health reasons, later withdrew
from the case; he was substituted by Atty. Lacaya. Spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya
on a contingency fee basis. The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a
contingent fee of P2,000.00
While Atty. Lacaya was handling the cases of petitioners, Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half
of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two
equal portions, based on area, and selected the more valuable and productive half for
himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses Cadavedo.
Vicente Cadavedo and his sons-in-law entered the portion assigned to the respondents
and ejected them by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry.
Vicente and Atty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement, re-adjusting the area and
portion obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the
agreement. The MTC approved the compromise agreement.
The spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the respondents, assailing
the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The spouses Cadavedo prayed, among
others, that the respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot;
that they be ordered to render an accounting of the produce of this one-half portion
from 1981;and that the RTC
fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due consideration of the
expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.
Ruling of the RTC:
RTC declared the contingent fee of 10.5383 hectares as excessive and unconscionable.
RTC reduced the land area to 5.2691 hectares and ordered the respondents to vacate
and restore the remaining 5.2692 hectares to the spouses Cadavedo. The RTC noted
that the agreed attorney’s fee on contingent basis was P2,000.00. The RTC was
convinced that the issues involved in the Civil Case handled by Atty. Lacuya were not
sufficiently difficult and complicated to command such an excessive award; neither did it
require Atty. Lacaya to devote much of his time or skill, or to perform extensive research.

8. However, the RTC deemed the respondents’ possession, prior to the judgment, of the
excess portion of their share in the subject lot to be in good faith. The respondents were
thus entitled to receive its fruits.
The respondents appealed the case before the CA.
Ruling of the CA:
CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision and maintained the partition and
distribution of the subject lot under the compromise agreement.
Consistent with Canon 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (enumerating
the factors that should guide the determination of the lawyer’s fees), the CA ruled that
the time spent and the extent of the services Atty. Lacaya rendered for the spouses
Cadavedo in the three cases, the probability of him losing other employment resulting
from his engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses Cadavedo, and the
contingency of his fees justified the compromise agreement and rendered the agreed
fee under the compromise agreement reasonable.
Petitioner’s Contention:
The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s compensation for professional
services, especially those contained in the pleadings filed in courts, control the amount
of the attorney’s fees to which the lawyer shall be entitled and should prevail over oral
agreements. In this case, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed that the latter’s
contingent attorney’s fee was P2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of the subject lot. This
agreement was clearly stipulated in the amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721.
Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly stipulated fee and cannot insist on
unilaterally changing its terms without violating their contract.
Respondent’s Contention:
Respondents counter that the attorney’s fee stipulated in the amended complaint was
not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya for his legal services. They argue that the questioned
stipulation for attorney’s fees was in the nature of a penalty that, if granted, would inure
to the spouses Cadavedo and not to Atty. Lacaya.
The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya caused the survey and
subdivision of the subject lot immediately after the spouses Cadavedo reacquired its
possession with the RTC’s approval of their motion for execution of judgment in Civil
Case No. 1721; (2) Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed the agreement on the
contingent attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot; (3) the MTC in Civil
Case No. 215 (ejectment case) approved the compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the
legally designated administrator of the conjugal partnership, hence the compromise
agreement ratifying the transfer bound the partnership and could not have been

9. invalidated by the absence of Benita’s acquiescence; and (5) the compromise agreement
merely inscribed and ratified the earlier oral agreement between the spouses Cadavedo
and Atty. Lacaya which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and
public policy.
Issue: Whether or not the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is
valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners?
HELD: No, the attorney’s fees consisting of the one half of the subject lot is not
valid for the following reasons:
1) The written agreement providing for a contingent fee of P2,000.00 should prevail over
the oral agreement providing for one-half of the subject lot.
An agreement between the lawyer and his client, providing for the former’s
compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing contracts in general. As the
rules stand, controversies involving written and oral agreements on attorney’s fees shall
be resolved in favor of the former. Hence, the contingency fee of P2,000.00 stipulated in
the amended complaint prevails over the alleged oral contingency fee agreement of
one-half of the subject lot.
The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of P2,000.00 and
not one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended complaint filed
by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a
contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer P2,000.00 as
attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their favor.
Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty
that the court would award the winning party, to be paid by the losing party. The
stipulation is a representation to the court concerning the agreement between the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, on the latter’s compensation for his services in the
case; it is not the attorney’s fees in the nature of damages which the former prays from
the court as an incident to the main action.
2) The contingent fee agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya,
awarding the latter one-half of the subject lot, is champertous.
Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an
oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the
agreement is nevertheless void. This agreement is champertous and is contrary to
public policy.
“The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part
of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is
designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client.

10. To permit these arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the
outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than
that of his client or to accept a settlement which might take care of his interest in the
verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity
to his client’s cause."
In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case
expressly transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer
may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of
litigation.
3) The attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is excessive and
unconscionable.
The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was allegedly agreed to secure the
services of Atty. Lacaya. Plainly, it was intended for only one action as the two other civil
cases had not yet been instituted at that time. While Civil Case No. 1721 took twelve
years to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters then stood, was not a
sufficient reason to justify a large fee in the absence of any showing that special skills
and additional work had been involved.
The issue involved in that case, as observed by the RTC was simple and did not require
of Atty. Lacaya extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the
prohibition against the sale of a homestead lot within five years from its acquisition.
Also, with respect to the two subsequent cases, it did not and could not otherwise justify
an attorney’s fee of one-half of the subject lot.
The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate arrangements for the costs and
expenses for each of these two cases. Thus, the expenses for the two subsequent cases
had been considered and taken cared of.
4) Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of the one-half portion contravenes Article 1491 (5) of
the Civil Code
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or
assignment, the property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have
taken part by virtue of their profession.
The same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid
exception to the prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code. however, this
recognition does not apply to the present case. A contingent fee contract is an
agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may be recovered

11. in the action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation. The payment of the
contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s
property but only after the judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the
lawyer.
In the present case, the transfer or assignment of the disputed one-half portion to
Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under litigation and the
lawyer-client relationship still existed between him and the spouses Cadavedo.
Thus, the general prohibition provided under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, rather than
the exception provided in jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously erred in upholding
the compromise agreement on the basis of the unproved oral contingent fee
agreement.
5) Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis
"Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he deserves’—is used as basis for
determining a lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract x x x taking into
account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees." The doctrine of quantum
meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it
is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, factors such as the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the time spent and the extent of the services rendered, the customary
charges for similar services, the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the service, to name a few, are considered in determining the
reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer is entitled.
In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and
setting Atty. Lacaya’s fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the questions involved in these
civil cases were not novel and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in
terms of time, skill or the performance of extensive research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered
legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases beginning in 1969 until 1988
when the petitioners filed the instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases (Cadavedo v.
Ames) lasted for twelve years and reaching up to this Court; the second (Ames v.
Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third (Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for
six years, reaching up to the CA; and (4) the property subject of these civil cases is of a
considerable size of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765 hectares.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondents are entitled only to two (2) hectares (or
approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the fruits previously received
from the disputed one-half portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the
petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half portion.

12. Hadjula vs. Atty Madiana [A.C. No. 6711. July 3, 2007]
Ponente: GARCIA, J.
FACTS:
[C]omplainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of
Fire Protection (BFP), claimed that she approached respondent for some legal advice and further alleged
that in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential she disclosed
personal secrets only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the
matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused
handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.
[R]espondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the
supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common
knowledge in the BFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Atty. Madiana breached her duty of preserving the confidence of a client and
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was reprimanded and admonished.
RATIO:
The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable
lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain
restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that
which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information
acquired or revealed during legal consultations.
The seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Supreme Court feels that there is
room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without
meaning to condone the error of respondent’s ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former
friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using
whatever convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information
respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the
score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to the Court that respondent was actuated by the urge to
retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was
violating the rule on confidentiality.

13. 253572031-Roxas-v-Z
uzuarregui-Jr-docx.pdf
339213243-30-Tan-v-
Lapak.pdf

14. Tan vs Lapak
Facts: This is a complaint filed by Rosita Tan against Atty. Jose L.
Lapak for misconduct, based on respondent’s failure to file with the Supreme
Court a petition for review on certiorari of a resolution of the Court of
Appeals dismissing complainant’s appeal. Complainant alleged that despite the
fact that Supreme Court had granted respondent an extension of the time to
file the petition for review on certiorari and she had paid respondent his
fee, the latter nonetheless failed to file the petition.
The respondent denied
the allegations against him and the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation. IBP passed a
resolution that respondent be reprimanded and ordered to restitute to
complainant the amount of P1,000.00.
On August, 8, 1990, Atty. Lapak still asked for the balance of P5,000.00
which complainant had agreed to pay despite the fact that the Supreme Court’s
resolution had already become final at that time due to his failure to file
the petition within the extended period or on June 25, 1990. Respondent also
never informed or explained to Tan that a petition for review was no longer
possible or perhaps that another remedy was still open.
Respondent advanced two reasons why he did not file a petition for
review on certiorari in the Supreme Court, which were: (1) Respondent asserted
that complainant only engaged his services to pursue her appeal in the Court
of Appeals which was dismissed due to the failure of complainant’s former
counsel, Atty. Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura, to file the appellant’s brief;
and (2) because complainant failed to pay the balance of P1,000.00 of his fee.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Lapak’s failure to file the petition
for review on certiorari can be excused by the fact that Tan only engaged his
services to pursue her appeal in the Court of Appeals?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that he has the right to decline
employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care
and devotion. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and
he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
Nor can respondent excuse himself for his failure to file the petition
for review on certiorari on the ground that complainant failed to pay what she
promised to pay. Complainant agreed to pay P5,000.00. Of this amount, she
paid respondent P3,000.00 and later P1,000.00, leaving only a balance of

15. P1,000.00. Even if this balance had not been paid, this fact was not
sufficient to justify the failure of respondent to comply with his
professional obligation which does not depend for compliance on the payment of
a lawyer’s fees.
As respondent utterly failed to comply with his professional commitment to
complainant, it is, therefore, not just for him to keep the legal fee of
P4,000.00 which complainant paid him. He has not rightfully earned that fee
and should return it to complainant.
Hence, Atty. Jose L. Lapak is reprimanded and ordered to refund to
complainant Rosita Tan the amount of P4,000.00.
Discussion:
Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy unless a) he is in no
position to carry out the work effectively or competently; or
b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective
client or between a present client and the prospective client. (Rule 14.03).
Moreover, Rule 14.04 provides that a lawyer who accepts the cause of a person
unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct
governing his relations with paying clients.
Once a lawyer accepts to accept the cause of a client, he owes entire
devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, saved by
the rules of law legally applied.
Moreover, the misconduct of Atty. Lapak was a violation of the
following:
Canon 17, which states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him;
Canon 18, Rule 18.03, which provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection there
with shall render him liable; and,
Canon 18, Rule 18.04, a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
client’s request for information.

16. 72534172-Hornilla-vs
-Atty-Salunat-63.pdf
399098667-Kimteng-
v-Young.pdf
345657249-Lim-vs-Vil
larosa.pdf

17. LINSANGAN v. TOLENTINO
LINSANGAN v. TOLENTINO
A.C. No. 6672
September 4, 2009
FACTS:
• There was a complaint for disbarment filed by LINSANGAN against Atty. TOLENTINO for
solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
– LINSANGAN alleged that TOLENTINO, with the help of a paralegal, LABIANO, convinced his clients
to transfer legal representation. TOLENTINO promised them financial assistance and expeditious
collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent
them text messages.
• LINSANGAN presented an affidavit attesting that LABIANO tried to prevail upon a client to sever
his lawyer-client relations with LINSANGAN and utilize TOLENTINO's services instead, in exchange
for a loan of ₱50,000.
• LINSANGAN also attached TOLENTINO's calling card.
• TOLENTINO denied knowing LABIANO and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said
calling card.
• The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.
• The CBD recommended that TOLENTINO be reprimanded as it found that he:
– had encroached on the professional practice of LINSANGAN, violating Rule 8.02 and other canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
– contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers
as stated in Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court
ISSUE/S:
• W.O.N. Tolentino's actions warrant disbarment
RULING:
• SC adopts the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of TOLENTINO but modifies the
recommended penalty.
• The means employed by TOLENTINO in furtherance of the said misconduct constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.
• • Canon 3, CPR provides:
– A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts.
– The practice of law is a profession and not a business. To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or
skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and
impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the
bar is called.
• • Rule 2.03, CPR provides:
– A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

18. – Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
• • Rule 1.03, CPR which provides:
– A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay
any man’s cause.
– This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.
• TOLENTINO clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the
CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
• TOLENTINO also committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice, in
violation of
• • Rule 8.02, CPR
– A lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of
better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.
• Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, TOLENTINO
violated:
• • Rule 16.04, CPR
– A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he
is handling for the client.
• • The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of
his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case
he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause.
• Any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Courts
disciplinary powers.
• Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending
money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the
wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
• • Atty. TOLENTINO for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of 1 year .
• Lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of
simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: lawyers
name; name of the law firm with which he is connected; address; telephone number and special
branch of law practiced.

19. Narciso Melendrez and Erlinda Dalman v. Atty. Reynerio I. Decena A. M. No. 2104: August 24, 1989
FACTS:
Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from respondent a loan of P 4,000.00.
This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage. In the said Real Estate Mortgage document,
however, it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by complainants was P5,000.00.
Confronted by this discrepancy, respondent assured complainants that said document was a mere
formality, and upon such assurance, complainants signed the same. Despite the assurance,
respondent exacted from complainants P500.00 a month as payment for what is beyond dispute
usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan. Complainants religiously paid the obviously usurious
interest for three months: September, October and November, 1975. Then they stopped paying due
to financial reverses.
In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest, respondent prepared a new document on
May 7, 1976, a Real Estate Mortgage over the same lot 3125-C, replacing the former real estate
mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this time the sum indicated in said new contract of mortgage is
P 10,000.00, purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. In this new Real Estate Mortgage, a
special power of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted, authorizing him to sell the
mortgaged property at public auction in the event complainants fail to pay their obligation on or
before May 30, 1976.
Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to complainants, respondent insisted that
complainants sign the same, again upon the assurance that the document was a mere formality.
Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent, complainants signed the document.For their failure to
pay the obligation, the respondent on October 12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the second real estate mortgage. All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended, re extrajudicial
sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent. Hence, finally, title was transferred
to him, and on June 20, 1979, respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan for
P12,000.00.When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March 1979,
and not having known the legal implications of the provisions ofthe second Real Estate Mortgage
which they had executed, complainants could not believe that title to their lot had already been
transferred to respondent and that respondent had already sold the same to a third person.Upon
learning of the sale in March,1979, complainants tried to raise the amount of P10,000.00 and went
to respondent's house on May 30, 1979 to pay their obligation, hoping that they could redeem their
property, although three years had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage.Respondent did
not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave complainants a sheet of paper, which
indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to P20,400.00.Complainants went home with
shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant competent for disbarment against
respondent filed on October 5, 1979.Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He
maintains that what appears on the two documents allegedly executed by complainants, i.e., that
they obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May 7,1976, is
allegedly the truth, and claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount of P5,000.00 to
complainants and not P4,000.00. With respect to the second loan, respondent claims that he
delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00 loan previously extended [to]

20. complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva, which loan had been indorsed to respondent for
collection, thus making a total of P10,000.00, as appearing on said document. Respondent denies
that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500.00 from complainants. He asserts that
the fact that complainants were able to secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America
only proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the property, at the time complainants
obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976, was clear of any encumbrance, since complainants had
already paid the original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that complainants knew fully
well all the conditions of said mortgage; and that his acquisition of the property in question was in
accordance with their contract and the law on the matter. Thus, he denies that he has violated any
right of the complainants.
ISSUE:Whether Respondent’s acts are grounds for disbarment
RULING:
YES. While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual cash of
P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the P10,000.00 appearing in the
second Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied to interest considering that not all the
P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied to interest, computed as follows: the first loan of
P5,000.00 was supposedly due on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or
P500.00 on September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975and November 30, 1975. Consequently,
beginning December 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the date of the execution of the second Real
Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six (6) months at P500.00 equals P 3,000.00,
which amount plus the P2,000.00 complainants' loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to
respondent for collection) totals P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the previous P5,000.00 indicated
loan secured by the first mortgage results in P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the second
RealEstate Mortgage.There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate
Mortgages covering the supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the inflated P10,000.00,
respectively, were voluntarily signed by the complainants. The general rule is thatwhen the parties
have reduced their agreement to writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing the only
repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood
to have been waived and abandoned.However,the rule is not absolute as it admits of some
exceptions. One of the exceptions, that is, failure to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties, applies in this case.From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants
were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent
representations of respondent that each of the successive documents was a are formality.While it
may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, should have at
least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage,
particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of
default in payments on the part of complainants. While it may be conceded that it is presumed that
in practice the notary public apprises complainants of the legal implications of the contract, it is of
common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through the desired practice. Respondent
at least could have informed the complainants by sending a demand letter to them to pay their
obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their contract. This
respondent failed to do, despite the fact that he knew fully wen that complainants were trying their
best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him, as shown by the loan obtained by

21. complainants from the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this connection, it may be stated that
complainants, per advice of respondent himself, returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank
immediately on April 30, 1976, considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was
only P4,300.00 and not enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of P5,000.00, which per
computation of respondent would already have earned interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months
(December 1975 to April, 1976).Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan
of P5,000.00, and that this was the reason why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the
bank free from any encumbrance. This claim is incorrect. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free
from any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first Real Estate Mortgage for the
indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual amount was only P 4,000.00) had not been annotated at the
back of the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.).Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him
the amount of Pl0,000. 00 as payment of the loan, alleging that if the offer were true, he could have
readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the same amount, for only P12,000.00, a
difference of a few thousand pesos. Respondent's denial is spacious.
After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by
both parties, we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General.The following acts
of respondent:1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount
loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;2. exacting grossly unreasonable and
usurious interest;3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the
loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;4. failing to inform complainants of the
import of the real mortgage documents and inducing them to sign those documents with
assurances that they were merely for purposes of "formality";5. failing to demand or refraining
from demanding payment from complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgaged property; and6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real
estate mortgage had already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem the
foreclosed property within a certain period of time.constitute deception and dishonesty and
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with the Solicitor General that the acts of
respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are punishable by
law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals." The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of course, satisfied by
conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's conduct, in fact,
may be penalizable under at least one penal statute —the anti-usury law.The second charge against
respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a time when he was
counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. There
are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise
agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent
andapproval of the complainants; the second is that, having received the amount of P500.00 as an
advance payment on this "settlement," he failed to inform complainants of that advance payment
and moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to the complainants. The facts show that respondent
"settled" the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of
complainants. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500.00
advance payment only after petitioner NarcisoMelendrez had confronted him about these matters.
And respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be
aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special authority, compromise their clients' litigation
or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim, but the full amount in cash.6Respondent's failure

22. to turn over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the
estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.Generally, a
lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or non-
professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so
patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court
must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys.7The nature of the office
of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is
not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar.
Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional
duties as a member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to
continue in the practice of law.8

23. 525994764-Cabaruig
guis-v-Basa.pdf