Office of Emergency Communications August 2013Emergency Communications Case Study: EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE RESPONSE TO THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING The athletes competing in the 2013 Boston Marathon had prepared for months and even years to tackle the mental and physical challenges of running 26.2 miles. From the elite athletes to the middle-of-the-packers, each runner came to the starting line with a foundation of training and hard work. The same was true for the police, fire, and other emergency personnel present to support the race. It was their foundation of communications planning, training, and coordination that made a lifesaving difference when one of Boston’s best days became one of its worst. PLANNING FOR RACE COMMUNICATIONS The region’s public safety community was prepared for a challenging, large planned event on the morning of April 15, 2013. The Boston Marathon is one of the world’s oldest and most cherished races--attracting tens of thousands of participants, international media attention, and more than half a million spectators. The city has hosted its marathon since 1897 and over the years has honed its approach to the sprawling Patriot’s Day race as it has improved communications technology, coordination, interoperability, and planning across the region. Steve Staffier, Communications and Interoperability Manager for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC), says that for the last several decades the State has worked with the Boston Athletic Association, Federal authorities, and the eight communities affected by the race to plan and coordinate communications among the various agencies that support the marathon. In 2010, as part of assessing National Emergency Communications Plan Goal 1, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) observed the Metro Boston Homeland Security Region’s communications capabilities during the marathon. In its assessment, OEC recommended further integrating communications into the event’s overall command and control functions. The region responded by requesting OEC technical assistance to train additional Communications Unit Leaders (COML) and used funding available through the Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program to train more Communications Unit Technicians (COMT). COMLs plan and manage communications during an event while COMTs support the technical needs of the plan and communications unit. The region also participated in a Statewide Communication Interoperability Plan (SCIP) workshop, facilitated by OEC, to ensure public safety organizations understood the Statewide Plan and how to leverage existing resources and capabilities. Boston then participated in two additional SCIP workshops in 2012 to incorporate advancements in technology into the updated plan. RACE DAY TURNS TRAGIC Before the 2013 rac ...

1. Office of Emergency Communications
August 2013Emergency Communications Case Study:
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS
DURING THE RESPONSE TO THE BOSTON
MARATHON BOMBING
The athletes competing in the 2013 Boston Marathon had
prepared for months and even years to tackle the mental
and physical challenges of running 26.2 miles. From the elite
athletes to the middle-of-the-packers, each runner
came to the starting line with a foundation of training and hard
work. The same was true for the police, fire, and
other emergency personnel present to support the race. It was
their foundation of communications planning,
training, and coordination that made a lifesaving difference
when one of Boston’s best days became one of its
worst.
PLANNING FOR RACE
COMMUNICATIONS
The region’s public safety community was prepared
for a challenging, large planned event on the
morning of April 15, 2013. The Boston Marathon
is one of the world’s oldest and most cherished
races--attracting tens of thousands of participants,
international media attention, and more than half a
million spectators. The city has hosted its marathon
since 1897 and over the years has honed its
approach to the sprawling Patriot’s Day race as it has
improved communications technology, coordination,

2. interoperability, and planning across the region.
Steve Staffier, Communications and Interoperability
Manager for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
and Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC),
says that for the last several decades the State has
worked with the Boston Athletic Association, Federal
authorities, and the eight communities affected by
the race to plan and coordinate communications
among the various agencies that support the
marathon.
In 2010, as part of assessing National Emergency
Communications Plan Goal 1, the Department
of Homeland Security’s Office of Emergency
Communications (OEC) observed the Metro Boston
Homeland Security Region’s communications
capabilities during the marathon. In its
assessment, OEC recommended further integrating
communications into the event’s overall command
and control functions. The region responded
by requesting OEC technical assistance to train
additional Communications Unit Leaders (COML)
and used funding available through the Interoperable
Emergency Communications Grant Program to train
more Communications Unit Technicians (COMT).
COMLs plan and manage communications during
an event while COMTs support the technical needs
of the plan and communications unit. The region
also participated in a Statewide Communication
Interoperability Plan (SCIP) workshop, facilitated

3. by OEC, to ensure public safety organizations
understood the Statewide Plan and how to leverage
existing resources and capabilities. Boston then
participated in two additional SCIP workshops in
2012 to incorporate advancements in technology
into the updated plan.
RACE DAY TURNS TRAGIC
Before the 2013 race, the region created a
comprehensive event communications plan (Incident
Command Form 205), a recommendation from
OEC’s 2010 assessment, and assigned Staffier as
COML, supported by Blair Sutherland, a COMC
from the Massachusetts State Police. Staffier states
that during the planning for the 2013 race, the
communications unit added a medical command
and control radio network, enabling public safety
supervisors and commanders to better circulate and
share medical information.
The medical network turned out to be critical. At
2:50 p.m., an improvised explosive device detonated
near the marathon’s finish line, followed 13 seconds
later by a blast from a second device several hundred
feet away. The bombs killed three people and injured
nearly 300 others.
As news of the bombs spread, Staffier says land
and cell phone communications became saturated
with users and were largely unavailable for about
90 minutes. During that intense period when
first responders were tending to and treating the
wounded, moving runners and spectators to safety,
and securing the area, Staffier reports that the State’s
800 MHz trunked radio system kept up with the
demand.

4. “The radio system absolutely worked and became
the key connection for the key decision makers back
to their respective dispatch centers or command
centers,” Staffier says.
With severe congestion on the phone lines,
emergency responders also turned to OEC’s priority
services – known as the Government Emergency
Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the Wireless
Priority Service (WPS) – to enhance call completion
and support communications continuity. These
programs allowed personnel to make critical calls
necessary to aid in the response.
INVESTIGATION TURNS TO
MANHUNT
The need for coordinated communications only
intensified as law enforcement turned its focus
from bomb response to an investigation. The
region continued to create and work from detailed
communications plans to address the growing
number of agencies present in the area. Staffier
says those plans even allowed the National Guard
members and State police officers who were working
underground to secure the subway system to
seamlessly connect to agencies above ground.
“We had other radio nets or patches that we tied
together to ensure regional SWAT teams could
talk with Boston and State police assets, as well as
logistical and support communication amongst the
technicians,” Staffier reports.
In the early morning hours of Friday, April 19, the

5. region transitioned to yet another communications
plan after the two bombing suspects killed an MIT
campus police officer, carjacked an SUV, and engaged
in a shootout with police. As the region went into
lockdown while law enforcement searched for the
one surviving suspect, Federal, State, and local public
safety agencies created a base camp in Watertown,
where the suspect was believed to be hiding and
was eventually found. To support communications
among such a large and diverse group of agencies,
officials created what Staffier calls a “superpatch.”
“We actually had six different radio systems all
patched together at a system level and it worked
smooth,” he says. “That allowed all those different
agencies on different radio bands to communicate”
and supported the entire tactical operation.
A FOUNDATION OF PLANNING,
TRAINING, AND COORDINATION
During the May 9, 2013, hearing on Capitol Hill
about the Boston Marathon bombing, Kurt Schwartz,
Director of the Massachusetts
Emergency Management Agency, testified: “We
benefited from our history of using pre-planned
events like the Marathon as real-life opportunities
to exercise and utilize our command posts and
emergency operations centers, to test our operational
plans and mutual aid
systems, to activate our
specialized response
teams, to stay familiar

6. with the technology
based systems that
we rely on during
emergencies, and to
strengthen personal and
professional relationships
amongst people,
agencies, disciplines,
and jurisdictions that
otherwise may not have
many opportunities to
work together.”
Staffier also emphasized the importance of strong
working relationships among communications
personnel.
“Overall, the key to our success is that we have the
State communications unit team, which is made
up of COMLs, COMTs, and all of the subject matter
experts who run these radio systems,” he says.
In addition to the regular meetings, the team is
well practiced at creating communications plans for
special events. “That,” Staffier stresses “is more key
than anything money can buy as far as systems and
technology.”
LESSONS LEARNED
Every major event reveals things that could have been
done better. Boston was no different.
One major issue during the bombing and its
aftermath was the battery life of the portable radios
carried by law enforcement and public safety during
the long shifts and deployments the situation

7. required. Massachusetts officials are exploring the
idea of creating a power and battery trailer and
purchasing an extra supply of batteries to ensure
radios stay functional.
When phone lines became saturated in the first
hours after the bombing, OEC’s priority services
were called on. Staffier notes that the events were a
reminder of the need for agencies to regularly test
their GETS and WPS accounts and keep them up to
date so they can be accessed immediately.
Throughout the response activities occurring that
week, GETS had a call completion rate of over 99
percent, providing routing to over 280 calls. Over
93 percent of calls made via WPS were completed,
offering emergency responders much needed
cellular connectivity. OEC also expedited 152 WPS
enrollment requests to provide priority for critical
response personnel on the cellular networks.
Another issue that arose was incomplete
implementation of the Massachusetts Tactical
Channel Plan. Best practices suggest that standard
interoperability channels, which help provide
baseline interoperability across all jurisdictions
statewide, should be programmed into each public
safety radio. Staffier says that those agencies that
followed the plan were able to plug into the channels
immediately. However, a small number of agencies
that came to assist did not have the interoperability
channels programmed in and needed to be given a
pre-programmed radio to use.
In addition, during the response to the bombings

8. and the subsequent investigation and manhunt,
public safety was reminded of the need for
communications staff and operational staff to work
in concert to ensure seamless response efforts.
Although great strides have been made in recent
years, Staffier says there could be an even better flow
of information from operations to communications
about the functions and assignments needed in a
given operational period and what kind of radio
channels or radio nets were required.
As the nation mourns the four lives lost in Boston
and supports those injured in the blasts, OEC and its
stakeholders continue the process of examining and
understanding the communications successes and
gaps revealed during a week of extraordinary events.
OEC remains committed to working with its Federal,
State, local, and tribal partners to create new training
offerings, explore policy and practice changes, invest
funds where needed, and spread the word to ensure
first responders have the tools and knowledge to
further strengthen their communications efforts.
FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Please contact [email protected] or visit www.dhs.gov (keyword
OEC).
Version 8/13

9. Office of Emergency Communications
June 2012
Emergency Communications Case Study:
Hurricane Irene-North Carolina
COMLs Keep eMergenCy
COMMuniCatiOns Operating
During HurriCane irene
Hurricane Irene was a powerful and expansive storm
that brought flooding rains and high winds from the
coast of North Carolina to inland areas of Vermont and
New Hampshire. Hurricane warnings and states of
emergency were declared in 13 states and the District
of Columbia, and hundreds of thousands of residents
in New York City faced unprecedented evacuation
orders. This case study provides an overview of how
communications training helped North Carolina
emergency responders keep communications systems
operating during the hurricane.
As Hurricane Irene made its way through the Atlantic
Ocean toward the East Coast of the United States,
North Carolina began making preparations for the

10. storm. On Wednesday, August 23, 2011, Governor
Bev Purdue put residents and emergency responders
on alert. She activated the North Carolina Emergency
Management Regional Coordination Center-East
(RCC-E) in Kinston, and 16 trained Communications
Unit Leaders (COMLs) were advised to be prepared to
lead emergency communications during and after the
storm.
Irene made landfall before dawn on Saturday, August
27, near Cape Lookout, NC, as a Category 1 storm and
affected several counties in the southeastern portion of
the State. According to the Governor’s office, the storm
surge, winds, and heavy rains of Irene left more than
half a million residents without power, closed 200
roads and bridges, suspended air and rail service, and
destroyed many homes and buildings. In the midst of
the storm and its immediate aftermath, COMLs were
ensuring emergency communications systems were
operating continuously and effectively.
Keeping COMMuniCatiOns running
One of the State’s COMLs trained through the DHS
Office of Emergency Communications’ (OEC)
Program and called to action was Greg Hauser,
the Operations Manager at the Charlotte Fire
Department-Communications Division. Another
COML was Matt McMahon, a lieutenant with the
Greenville Fire and Rescue and a member of the
State’s Urban Search and Rescue team.
On Friday, August 26,
Hauser received a message
notifying him of the need
for a Communications
Coordinator in the

11. emergency management
center. According to
Hauser’s after action report, when he arrived at the
center it “had very limited communications, with
no land line phone service, no Internet, spotty cell
coverage, and limited radio communications due
to the NC VIPER (Voice Interoperability Plan for
Emergency Responders) system going in and out
of site trunking. The building was also without
power and running on generator.” VIPER is North
Carolina’s statewide digital 800 MHz radio system.
Hauser assessed the equipment in the center and
set up a workstation. He requested that the amateur
radio operator return to the regional coordination
center to provide a direct communications link
to the State Emergency Operation Center (EOC)
via amateur radio. Hauser also worked with
team members to request satellite telephones,
and to deploy a satellite system brought in to
assist the Helicopter and Aquatic Rescue Team.
Within hours, the Regional Coordination Center-
East had adequate data and IP telephone capabilities
July 2011

12. to function normally. When the local amateur
radio operator arrived, he initiated three radio
nets on three different frequency bands, and was
directed to make contact with as many county
emergency operation centers as possible. According
to Hauser’s report, they found that while “a few
PSAPs (public safety answering points) had been
flooded, were running on generator power, or
moved to a backup center, a majority of PSAPs and
EOCs were fully functional with no problems.”
As Saturday evening came to an end, the storm
moved up the coast and the VIPER system
stabilized and could be used effectively.
preparatiOn in greenviLLe
Meanwhile, in Greenville, COML Matt McMahon
and his team used the days before the storm
to check their communications gear, and make
contact with various regional managers to discuss
communications procedures and equipment
availability. By 8 p.m. on August 26, as the storm
headed for North Carolina, McMahon and his

13. team had established a communications unit in the
operations section of the Greenville Fire and Rescue
headquarters. According to McMahon’s report from
the storm, an amateur radio station was established
in the EOC,VIPER handhelds were distributed
to additional units that had been placed into
service, and the remainder of the communications
cache was loaded for transport if needed.
assistanCe On OCraCOKe isLanD
Late Saturday night, the Operations Section Chief
requested a communications assessment team
to fly a reconnaissance mission to Ocracoke, an
island on the State’s Outer Banks, to assess damage
to infrastructure. A large portion of Highway
12 on the island had been damaged and, as the
team gathered on the morning of Sunday, August
28, reports indicated that Ocracoke had no
communication with the mainland. The team, which
included a COML, a network specialist, and a VIPER
technician, assembled its gear and made plans to
reestablish basic communications to the island.
Although the team was not called into action,
Hauser says “it was a good exercise for us to see
what we could put together.” McMahon’s after
action report notes, “the team had excellent plans
to recon, repair, and establish communications
if needed. A tremendous amount of gear
was on hand with any mode needed.”
Key tO suCCess
The Communications
Unit Leader (COML):
A Valuable Resource for

14. Incident Commanders
During the storm, North
Carolina was well served by its
statewide emergency planning
and the VIPER system, which
weathered the storm with
relatively few issues.
The COML program has also
made a significant impact in
North Carolina, producing a
team of skilled communications professionals, who
have extensive experience coordinating regional
resources and developing and implementing
communications plans.
Hauser says Hurricane Irene produced “a very busy
several days, but provided really good exposure to
the communication unit.” He asserts that without
the COMLs in their roles, communications efforts
would not have been as effective or as coordinated.
“We were able to assemble full communications
packages within hours.”
He also says that the storm helped show that the
communications unit’s expertise and specialization
can lighten the load for the emergency management
coordinators. “If you have a hazardous material, you
don’t call the SWAT team, you call in HAZMAT. It’s
the same thing with communications,” said Hauser.
In the storm’s aftermath, the statewide
interoperability coordinator recognized the need
for more trained technicians in the State and has

15. requested additional COMT training and COMT
train-the-trainer sessions from OEC’s Technical
Assistance program to enhance this important aspect
of emergency response.
FOr aDDitiOnaL inFOrMatiOn
Please contact [email protected] or visit www.dhs.gov (keyword
OEC).
Revised 06/12