CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Kenyan intelligence reports that al Shabaab's Lower Jubba regional commander, Mohamed Mohamud Kuno “Dulyadeyn,” defected to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in late November, bringing with him approximately 1,200 militants. If true, Dulyadeyn’s defection is a significant inflection for al Qaeda-ISIS competition in East Africa, as well as a major internal schism for al Shabaab. He is an ethnic Kenyan with connections to radical pro-ISIS figures in that country, so his defection would likely lead to an uptick in pro-ISIS militant activity in Kenya. 2. The Saudi-led coalition initiated a seven-day ceasefire in support of UN-led peace talks that aim to end hostilities in Yemen. The ceasefire remains tenuous following an al Houthi-Saleh Tochka (SS-21) rocket attack on a coalition base that killed the commander of Saudi Special Forces in Yemen. Pro-coalition media have accused al Houthi forces of violating the truce in several locations, and the coalition may choose to respond to alleged violations by resuming military operations in Yemen. 3. Iranian officials condemned the clashes between the Nigerian army and Shia Muslims in northern Nigeria. The Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Nigerian chargé d'affaires on December 14 after soldiers besieged the house of Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), a pro-Iranian opposition group. The Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy (NSFP) Commission also released a statement claiming that “Iran considers it its duty to defend the people of Nigeria and that country’s Muslim scholars, particularly Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky.” Tehran will likely use these clashes as an opportunity to champion its role as the defender of the global Shia population.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
December 15, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1
3
1. Kenyan intelligence reports indicate that an al Shabaab regional commander defected to ISIS along with a
significant fighting force, signaling a significant uptick in al Qaeda-ISIS competition in East Africa.
2. The Saudi-led coalition initiated a seven-day ceasefire in support of UN-led peace talks that aim to
permanently end hostilities in Yemen, but the status of the truce remains uncertain.
3. Iranian officials condemned the clashes between the Nigerian army and Shia Muslims in northern Nigeria;
Tehran will likely use these clashes as an opportunity to champion its role as the defender of the global Shia
population.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
The leader of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, continues to defend the group’s relationship with al Qaeda. Leader
Abu Muhammad al Julani stated that the group will continue its fight to empower shari’a-based governance in Syria and will not
make a deal with any adversaries, a reference to the Syria Vienna talks. Julani noted Jabhat al Nusra’s primary fight is with the
Assad regime and Hezbollah, and that al Qaeda has other factions tasked with fighting the U.S. and Europe.
Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, faces growing tensions over possible internal support for the Islamic State in
Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). An al Shabaab religious cleric based in northern Somalia broke rank with the group this fall, leading a
score of fighters. New Kenyan intelligence indicates al Shabaab’s commander for operations in Kenya may have defected as
well, though there is little secondary sourcing to confirm. Al Shabaab’s leadership has cracked down on members who have
displayed support for ISIS, though some of the lines of support appear to run along historical fracture lines over power within al
Shabaab. Al Shabaab’s ability to suppress support for ISIS inside of the territory in which it operates in Somalia may make it
difficult for ISIS to gain a true foothold in East Africa.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will likely continue to pursue a long-term strategy in which it builds strength among its affiliates and benefits
from the West’s focus on defeating the ISIS threat.
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AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
UN-led peace talks began between internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s delegation and the
al Houthi-Saleh delegation in Geneva, Switzerland. The talks are expected to last one week and aim to deescalate the military
conflict in Yemen, as well as address the ongoing humanitarian crisis.
Outlook: Delegates may reach a limited military settlement, but future negotiations will be necessary to address political and
governance issues.
Security
The Saudi-led coalition initiated a seven-day ceasefire in conjunction with the peace talks, despite an escalation in hostilities this
week. Al Houthi-Saleh forces carried out a Tochka (SS-21) rocket attack on a coalition base in Taiz governorate, killing dozens of
troops and two high-ranking Saudi and Emirati officers. Coalition-backed popular resistance forces conducted a weeklong
offensive in al Jawf governorate, likely in an effort to secure neighboring Ma’rib and pressure al Houthi-Saleh positions in
northern Yemen. The coalition launched airstrikes throughout northern Yemen in response to al Houthi-Saleh cross-border
attacks on Saudi territory.
Outlook: The ceasefire may hold temporarily, but it is unlikely to last due to the ongoing struggle for territorial control on the
ground and the large number of local armed groups who are capable of reigniting hostilities.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP released two videos featuring a new leader, Ibrahim al Qosi, a former Guantanamo detainee released by the U.S. in 2012.
One of the videos documented AQAP’s history of jihad against America and its allies in the Middle East. This is al Qosi’s first
media appearance since his release.
Outlook: AQAP’s use of al Qosi in media shows the group reconstituting its leadership and reaffirming its role as the leader of
jihad against the West. AQAP will remain active in southern and eastern Yemen as it builds governance capabilities.
4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
5
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1
2
4
3
1) 08-10 DEC:
Coalition-backed
popular resistance
forces launched an
offensive in al Jawf
governorate.
2) 09 DEC: Fighting in
Taiz governorate
killed two Australian
and British
mercenaries.
3) 14 DEC: Al Houthi-
Saleh rocket attack
killed dozens of
coalition soldiers
near Bab al Mandeb.
4) 14 DEC: Al Houthi
forces claimed to
launch rockets into
Saudi Arabia.

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Galmudug State’s president again asked leaders from Ahlu Sunna Wa al Jama’a (ASWJ), a moderate Islamism group that
contests the Galmudug Administration's legitimacy, to engage in peace talks, with the support of Somalia’s prime minister. A
successful peace agreement would aid regional stability by removing one threat to the administration and freeing up security
resources to combat al Shabaab.
Outlook: ASWJ may attend federal government-led peace talks with the Galmudug Administration.
Security
Pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) militants captured the strategically located Tolu-Barwaqo village on the Somali-
Kenyan border, although they withdrew from it when Kenyan government forces arrived. An increasing frequency of attacks
within Kenyan territory near the Kenyan-Somali border suggest militants active in southern Somalia are trying to gain a foothold
in Kenya. Kenya has since deployed additional troops to the border to prevent militants from conducting cross-border attacks.
Outlook: Pro-ISIS militants in southern Somalia will likely begin to conduct attacks against Kenya.
Al Shabaab
Kenyan intelligence stated that al Shabaab’s commander for the Lower Jubba region, Mohamed Mohamud Ali “Dulyadeyn,”
reportedly defected to ISIS, along with approximately 1,200 militants under his command. Dulyadeyn is reportedly seeking
closer ties to key pro-ISIS figures both in Somalia and Kenya. Additionally, Dulyadeyn, may attempt to shift the pro-ISIS in East
Africa movement from Somalia to Kenya. Pro-ISIS figures criticized al Shabaab’s attacks against would-be ISIS defectors,
condemning the organization for destroying the unity of the global jihadist movement. Al Shabaab has yet to release any
statements on Dulyadeyn’s recent defection.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely be forced to acknowledge the scale of the al Shabaab-ISIS split occurring in Somalia.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
1
32
4
7
1) 09 DEC: Pro-ISIS
militants captured
Tulo-Barwaqo Village,
Lower Jubba Region.
2) 12 DEC: IJA and
SNA forces retook
Tulo-Barwaqo Village,
Lower Jubba Region.
3) 10-12 DEC: Al
Shabaab assassinated
security personnel in
Mogadishu, Banadir
region.
4) 11-13 DEC: Rival
clan militias clashed
in Beledweyne,
Hiraan region.
5) 12 DEC: Grenade
detonated in mosque
in Addis Ababa, Addis
Ababa chartered
district, Ethiopia.
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8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
American, European, and UN delegates endorsed a proposed national unity government, which Libyan delegates will sign on
December 16. The participants in the international conference in Rome stated that any political or military group that does not
join the new government will be sidelined. Factions from both the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) and the General
National Congress (GNC) support the proposed government.
Outlook: The emergence of an internationally backed Libyan government of national accord will further fracture the HoR and
the GNC. International backers will struggle to implement the unity government without the support of local power brokers.
Security
The Libyan National Army (LNA), affiliated with the HoR, continued air operations in Ajdabiya in response to ISIS Wilayat
Barqa’s assassination campaign in the city. The LNA also intensified its air and ground operations targeting ISIS and Ansar al
Sharia-held positions in western and southern Benghazi, Libya.
Outlook: The LNA will continue to focus on Ajdabiya in an attempt to prevent an ISIS takeover.
Ansar al Sharia and ISIS in Libya
ISIS Wilayat Tarablus appeared to validate longstanding rumors that the group maintains a base near Sabrata, Libya.
Suspected ISIS militants raided Sabrata on December 10 to retrieve suspected members of the group arrested by Libya Dawn
forces for arms trafficking.
The al Qaeda-linked Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna (MSCD) continued to clash with ISIS Wilayat Barqa forces outside of
Derna, Libya.
Outlook: ISIS Wilayat Tarablus may conduct additional raids in Sabrata, with ancient Roman ruins in the city as a potential
target.
8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST AFRICA
1
2 34
9
1) 08 DEC: ISIS
reinforcement convoys
arrived in Sirte, Libya.
2) 10 DEC: Suspected
ISIS Wilayat Tarablus
forces seized building
and established
temporary checkpoints
in Sabrata, Libya.
3) 12 DEC: MSCD and
ISIS Wilayat Barqa
forces resumed clashes
in Sahel Sharqi, Derna,
Libya.
4) 14 DEC: Unidentified
Libya Dawn militias
clashed and released
400 prisoners from
local prison in Tajura,
Tripoli, Libya.

10. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
AQIM’s Sahara Emirate published a slide show depicting its militants as a powerful group operating unrestricted in northern Mali.
This slide show is a component of AQIM’s ongoing recruitment campaign. Also, the Algerian Army foiled an attempted bombing in
Annaba. Offensive attacks in urban areas have occurred rarely in Algeria in recent years, and this one remains unclaimed. Had it
succeeded, this attack would have dealt a significant blow to a country known for its successful counter-terrorism measures.
Outlook: AQIM will continue to release statements and conduct operations in an effort to drive recruitment and unite radical
Islamist militants in northern Mali.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
The AQIM-linked Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade clashed with a Tunisian army tracking unit on Mount Chaambi in Kasserine near the
border of Algeria. It has not attacked the Tunisian army there since February 2015, suggesting the army renewed its efforts in this
region known for militant strongholds. Police also arrested a 25 member terrorist cell, the Islamic Battalion of Sbiba, east of Mount
Chaambi. It planned to attack local markets, marking a change in attack targets from tourists and security forces to civilians.
Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will defend its stronghold against the Tunisian military should the army attempt to pursue the group into
the mountainous region.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
AQIM-linked Ansar al Din conducted several attacks in Mali after a week of inactivity. It fired rockets at MINUSMA, the UN
peacekeeping mission in Mali, in Gao, and attacked military barracks in Niono. Ansar al Din’s southern affiliate, the Macina
Liberation Front (MLF) attacked a military check point near Timbuktu. Both groups continue low level attacks to preserve their
influence in their operation zones.
Outlook: Ansar al Din and its affiliates will continue to target UN, French, and Malian security forces in order to destabilize the
region and gain control of more territory.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
11
MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
4
1) 09 DEC: ANP foiled
an attempted
bombing in Annaba,
Algeria.
2) 09 DEC: Uqba Ibn
Nafa’a clashed with
an army patrol on
Mount Chaambi,
Kasserine, Tunisia.
3) 10 DEC: Security
forces arrested 25
members of the
Islamic Battalion of
Sbiba in Sbiba,
Kasserine, Tunisia.
4) 08, 13 DEC: ANP
discovered three
arms caches in
Tinzaouten, Bordj
Badji Mokhtar and
Tamanrasset, Algeria.
1
2 3

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
12
SAHELWEST AFRICA
1
2
3
1) 09 DEC: The MLF
shot at an army
checkpoint,
wounding one, in
Goudam, Timbuktu,
Mali.
2) 13 DEC: Ansar al
Din attacked military
barracks, killing one
and injuring two, in
Niono, Segou, Mali.
3) 14 DEC: Ansar al
Din fired rockets at
the city of Gao, Mali.
No injuries were
reported.

13. ASSESSMENT:
Domestic Politics
Senior Iranian leaders escalated their rhetorical jabs concerning the upcoming parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections
in February 2016. During a speech on December 11, President Hassan Rouhani reiterated his call for competitive elections,
echoing his previous challenge to the Guardian Council’s role in disqualifying candidates for elections. Members of Rouhani’s
conservative opposition, meanwhile, intensified their anti-reformist rhetoric. Interim Tehran Friday Prayer Leader Kazem Sedighi
highlighted the importance of the Guardian Council’s vetting process in ensuring the “right of the people to have good officials.”
The Guardian Council is constitutionally mandated to review candidates, but has disproportionally used this power in recent
elections to disqualify reformist and more moderate candidates. Iran’s conservative establishment fears that the upcoming
elections will bring about a larger moderate bloc in the Parliament and the Assembly of Experts, which is responsible for
selecting the next Supreme Leader.
Outlook: Rhetorical disagreements over the constitutional role of the Guardian Council will likely continue in the lead up to the
February elections.
Regional Developments and Diplomacy
Iranian officials condemned the clashes between the Nigerian army and Shia Muslims in the northern city of Zaria. The Iranian
Foreign Ministry summoned the Nigerian chargé d'affaires on December 14 after soldiers besieged the house of Sheikh Ibrahim
Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), a pro-Iranian opposition group. The Parliament’s National
Security and Foreign Policy (NSFP) Commission released a statement claiming that “Iran considers it its duty to defend the
people of Nigeria and that country’s Muslim scholars, particularly Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky.” Foreign Minister Mohammad
Javad Zarif, meanwhile, contacted his Nigerian counterpart to express his concern over the violence targeting Nigeria’s Shia
community.
Outlook: Tehran will likely use these clashes as an opportunity to champion its role as the defender of the global Shia
population.
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IRAN

14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
14
DEC 8: Several parliamentarians in the National Security and Foreign Policy (NSFP) Parliamentary Commission criticized
Turkish policy in the Middle East, including the “illegal arrival” of Turkish forces in Iraq.
DEC 9: President Hassan Rouhani criticized GOP presidential candidate Donald Trump’s proposal to ban Muslims from
entering the U.S.
DEC 9: IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari appointed IRGC Brigadier General Gholam Hossein
Gheibparvar as Commander of the Imam Hossein Battalions. Gheibparvar replaced IRGC Brigadier General Hossein
Hamedani, who was killed on October 8 in Syria.
DEC 9: Iranian media reported the deaths of four Iranians from Mazandaran province in Syria, while the bodies of three
Iranians killed in Syria were returned to Khuzestan province.
DEC 9: Vahid Ahmadi, the Head of the NSFP Commission’s Foreign Relations Committee, denied that Iranian missile tests
violated UN Security Council Resolution 2231.
DEC 10: Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian criticized the meeting of Syrian opposition groups in Riyadh by
claiming that ISIS-linked terrorist groups are participating in them.
DEC 11: President Hassan Rouhani reiterated his call for competitive parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections.
DEC 11: Principlist parliamentarian and NSFP Commission member Mohammad Esmail Kowsari criticized the Reformist bloc
for failing to produce a serious agenda.
DEC 11: Interim Tehran Friday Prayer Leader Hojjat ol Eslam Kazem Sedighi warned against “seditionists” in the Assembly of
Experts elections and stressed the importance of the Guardian Council’s vetting process for candidates.
DEC 13: Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani stated that the Assembly of
Experts is currently examining candidates to become the next Supreme Leader.
DEC 13: Iranian media reported the deaths of three Iranians from Khuzestan province in Syria.
DEC 13: Deputy Foreign Minister Hassan Ghashghavi stated that Tehran is hoping for “more engagement” with Riyadh than in
the past.
DEC 14: Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hossein Jaberi Ansari stated that Iran is ready to change the “current climate” between
Saudi Arabia and Iran if Saudi Arabia shows “a definite will” for improving ties.
DEC 14: The Foreign Ministry summoned the Nigerian chargé d'affaires after soldiers besieged the house of Sheikh Ibrahim
Zakzaky, the leader of a pro-Iranian opposition group called the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN).
08 – 14 DEC

15. ACRONYMS
15
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
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