CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. ISIS increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security
forces in Aden, Yemen.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated
settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern
Nigeria.
3
1
2
3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda affiliates are using the fall of Aleppo as a call to arms. The Afghan Taliban called the Syrian Civil War “a great
divine test” and urged Muslims to act to prevent civilians’ suffering. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) urged Muslims
worldwide to join jihad in response to the Aleppo tragedy. The Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna (MSCD), a Libyan
Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, described the siege of Aleppo as a “war against God and
the Prophet” and called on Muslims to join jihad.
Outlook: Al Qaeda affiliates and associated groups will continue to train recruits for al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is using the unrest in Kashmir & Jammu Province as cover to carry out attacks. LeT attacked an
Indian military convoy, killing three soldiers and wounding several others, near Pampore on December 17.
Outlook: Pakistan-based militant groups will continue to attack Indian military targets in the Kashmir region.
Security
Political and military tensions remained high between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Indian forces conducted cross-
border shelling that struck a Pakistani school bus on December 17, killing one student and wounding eight others. The
Kashmir crisis is harming Indian-Pakistani relations in other spheres, especially water-sharing. Pakistan stated that it will
refuse any changes to the Indus Waters Treaty following Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s threat to block the flow of
water from India to Pakistan.
Outlook: The level of hostilities along the Line of Control will remain steady.
4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
Political
President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government continues to pursue a military solution despite pressure to negotiate.
The Hadi government refused to agree to a mechanism for a political process without securing the disarmament of the al
Houthi-Saleh faction and other demands. This refusal follows a joint communique from U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
and his counterparts from the UK, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman in support of a UN framework proposed in October
2016. The al Houthi-Saleh faction also endorsed the framework, which sequences the signing of an agreement before other
elements of the peace process, including disarmament.
Outlook: The Hadi government will not alter its negotiating position without significant pressure from the Saudi-led coalition.
Security
Hadi government and allied forces advanced shaping operations in northern and central Yemen. Hadi government forces
attacked al Houthi-Saleh forces along the southwestern Taiz-Lahij border as part of an operation to seize territory
surrounding the Bab al Mandeb Strait. Hadi government forces continued offensives in Hajjah, Sa’ada, and al Jawf
governorates in northern Yemen in an effort to seize major roadways. These roadways are required to maintain supply lines
for an offensive on Yemen’s capital city, Sana’a.
Outlook: Hadi government forces will not advance significantly beyond current frontlines due to resource constraints and a
limited support base.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
ISIS increased its operational tempo in Aden in an effort to degrade security forces and advance its narrative of success.
ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan detonated SVESTs on December 10 and December 18 at a military base in Aden, killing more
than 50 people each time. AQAP condemned the December 10 attack, which killed members of an AQAP-allied tribe.
Outlook: ISIS may sustain an elevated operational tempo of at least two SVEST attacks per month.
5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 14 DEC: Hadi
government forces
clashed with al Houthi-
Saleh forces in Baqim,
northern Sa’ada.
2) 15 DEC: AQAP
fighters repelled al
Houthi-Saleh forces in
Rada’a district,
western al Bayda.
3) 16 DEC: Security
forces dismantled
IEDs on the Belhaf oil
pipeline, Shabwah.
4) 18 DEC: An ISIS
suicide bomber
attacked al Sawlaban
base in Aden.
5) 19 DEC: Hadi
government forces
repelled an al Houthi-
Saleh attack in
northern Taiz city.
2
3
5
4
1
6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Repeated accusations of fraud and an increasingly competitive field of presidential candidates signal rising uncertainty in the
Somali electoral process. Somali officials delayed Somaliland Lower House elections in Mogadishu on December 17 after
an electoral dispute. Two popular former prime ministers, Ali Mohamed Gedi and Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, confirmed
that they will run for president. A competitive field of candidates and repeated delays increase the likelihood of a protracted
political crisis.
Outlook: A political crisis would reinforce al Shabaab’s anti-government narrative and may increase recruitment.
Security
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces’ lack of discipline increases the risk of mission failure. AMISOM forces
killed civilians in Lower Shabelle region on multiple occasions this week. Al Shabaab militants retaliated against civilians in
response to a suspected al Shabaab improvised explosive device (IED) attack near Marka town on December 18. AMISOM
forces also killed six civilians in Qoryooley on December 17 when troops opened fire on a van they incorrectly assessed to
be an explosive device.
Outlook: Popular support for the AMISOM will decrease, hampering its ability to work with Somalis to combat al Shabaab.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab is conducting a campaign to seize small towns within striking distance of population centers near Mogadishu. Al
Shabaab militants temporarily seized Mahaday town, located near the strategically important Jowhar town, on December
16. Al Shabaab also maintained pressure on Qoryooley, located near Marka port, where it attacked Somali National Army
(SNA) forces on December 12 and 14. Al Shabaab would likely seek to capture Jowhar or Marka in preparation for a
campaign against Mogadishu.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will wait to capture population centers like Jowhar or Marka until the AMISOM coalition withdraws or
weakens.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
1) 14 DEC: Al
Shabaab attacked a
SNA base near
Qoryooley, Lower
Shabelle region.
2) 15 DEC: Al
Shabaab detonated a
SVBIED at a
restaurant in
Mogadishu.
3) 15 DEC: Kenyan
forces claimed to kill
four al Shabaab
militants in Hulugho,
Garissa County.
4) 16 DEC: Al
Shabaab seized
Mahaday, Middle
Shabelle region.
5) 19 DEC: Puntland
forces attacked ISIS-
linked forces in Bir
Ladhidh, Bari region.
4
2
3
1
5
8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Libya’s most powerful military factions may be seeking a political settlement. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field
Marshal Khalifa Haftar met with high-level officials in Algeria, which has joined neighboring states and the African Union to
press for a political solution to the Libyan crisis. Egypt, which supports the LNA, led talks that proposed several
amendments to the year-old Libyan Political Agreement. The Misratan Military Council, the strongest anti-Haftar bloc,
temporarily conceded control of key oil sites to the LNA and took steps to de-escalate tensions in Tripoli. Key issues,
including Haftar’s role in a future government and the security of Tripoli, remain in question.
Outlook: Talks will likely become deadlocked as Libyan powerbrokers and regional states pursue mutually exclusive goals.
Security
Rival factions are angling for control over Sirte city following its liberation from ISIS. LNA forces have deployed eastward
and are operating a checkpoint on the coastal road in eastern Sirte district, re-establishing a frontline position from the 2014
civil war. Misratan forces allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) currently control the city. GNA-
allied Misratan forces are supporting a military governor for Sirte, while the LNA recognizes a civilian mayor.
Outlook: Likely encounters between LNA and Misratan forces, as well as local militias and Salafi groups pursuing
independent objectives in the region, risk igniting conflict in central Libya.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
An al Qaeda-linked coalition is consolidating its control over Derna city. The Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna (MSCD),
which includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, has purged rival Salafi leaders and developed relationships with local
leaders to alleviate an LNA blockade on the city. The MSCD demonstrates its ties to the al Qaeda network by issuing
statements in line with al Qaeda messaging and reportedly allowing al Qaeda-affiliated militant leaders to operate in Derna.
Outlook: The MSCD will continue to operate freely in Derna while the LNA prioritizes the ongoing Benghazi campaign.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA
9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
01) 14 DEC: The LNA
secured the road
between Qanfouda
and Bousnib,
Benghazi.
02) 16 DEC: Rival
militias clashed over
control of Hay al
Akhwah, Tripoli.
03) 18 DEC: ISIS
Wilayat Barqa
detonated a SVBIED
targeting the LNA in
Qanfouda, Benghazi.
04) 18 DEC: The
Misratan air force
increased surveillance
flights tracking ISIS
militants near Wadi
Souf al Jin.
05) 18 DEC: The LNA
conducted patrols in
Wadi al Ahmar.
13
5
2
4
10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
Senior AQIM leader and al Murabitoun emir Mokhtar Belmokhtar may have died from injuries caused by a French airstrike in
Sebha, Libya on 15 NOV. His death remains unconfirmed. Belmokhtar played a key role in planning attacks, managing illicit
revenue streams, and coordinating groups in the AQIM network.
The Uqba ibn Nafa’a Brigade, AQIM’s Tunisian affiliate, continued to conduct low-level attacks intended to protect its safe
havens in western Tunisia. A landmine likely planted by Uqba ibn Nafa’a injured two Tunisian soldiers on Mount Samama in
Kasserine Governorate on December 15.
Outlook: Belmokhtar’s death, if confirmed, may disrupt coordination between groups in AQIM’s network.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
Salafi-jihadi militant groups are using Mali as a support zone for attacks on the Burkinabe state. Militants attacked a military
base in northern Burkina Faso near the Malian border on December 16, killing twelve soldiers. A separate group attacked a
Malian army position in Mali’s Boura Sikasso region near the Burkinabe border on December 16. Malian President Ibrahim
Keita authorized Burkinabe forces to pursue militants across the border into Malian territory.
The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab Barnawi, the governor of ISIS’s Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya (West Africa Province),
may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The media outlet of ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya released a photoset
documenting members of the organization’s hisbah (religious police) enforcing shari’a law in an unspecified town in Lake
Chad on December 16. The enforcement of shari’a is an indicator of territorial control.
Outlook: Salafi-jihadi militants will intensify attacks against Burkinabe military targets in the border region to prevent
Burkinabe forces from threatening militant safe havens in Mali. ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya will attempt to expand into more
towns in the Lake Chad region.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL
11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 15 DEC: A
landmine likely planted
by the Uqba ibn
Nafa’a Brigade injured
two soldiers on Mount
Samama, Kasserine
Governorate, Tunisia.
2) 16 DEC:
Unidentified gunmen
assassinated an
alleged HAMAS drone
engineer outside his
home in Sfax, Sfax
Governorate, Tunisia.
3) 19 DEC: Algerian
security forces
pursued an armed
militant allegedly
carrying a bomb in
Annaba, Annaba
Province, Algeria.
1
2
3
12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
1) 14 DEC: Boko
Haram attacked a
Nigerian military base
near Kamuya village,
Biu Town, Borno
State, Nigeria.
2) 16 DEC: ISIS
Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya
enforced shari’a law in
a village on the shore
of Lake Chad.
3) 16 DEC: Militants
attacked a Malian
army post in Boura,
Sikasso Region, Mali.
4) 16 DEC: Militants
killed 12 Burkinabe
soldiers in
Nassoumbou, Soum
Region, Burkina Faso.
2
3
1
4
13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569