CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. U.S. administration officials have signaled that the U.S. may take a more aggressive stance against the al Houthis in Yemen to counter Iranian influence. An aggressive position against the al Houthi movement, which is not an Iranian proxy, would further isolate the al Houthis and drive them further into Iran’s orbit. U.S. intervention against the al Houthis would strengthen the Saudi-led coalition and its preferred government in Yemen, led by internationally recognized President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The Hadi government has struggled to gain legitimacy even in territory in southern Yemen under its control. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the al Houthis’ current partner, possesses significant political capital, military capabilities, and public support.
2. Al Shabaab may be expanding terrain under its control, using the sanctuary that it retained in south-central Somalia to support operations. Predicted food shortages may make conditions more permissive for al Shabaab. Somalia is suffering from a severe drought that may cause widespread hunger on par with the 2010-2011 famine, which killed more than 250,000 people. The Somali government is ill-prepared to address a crisis of this magnitude. An insufficient aid response from the government would allow al Shabaab to position itself as a legitimate source of relief and governance. External factors, including the likely expulsion of Somali refugees from Kenya before Kenyan general elections, may exacerbate the crisis in Somalia.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may be facilitating the growth of a Salafi-jihadi insurgency within the Fulani ethnic group across borders in the Sahel region. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an ethnically Fulani AQIM-associated group, is challenging the state in central Mali by forcing secular schools to remain closed in Mopti region. Ansar al Islam, a related Salafi-jihadi Fulani group, is pursuing a similar campaign in Burkina Faso. A Fulani insurgency is also challenging the Nigerian state, though Salafi-jihadi organizations have not yet infiltrated this movement. AQIM and other Salafi-jihadi groups may use ties into the Fulani community to expand their area of operations in the Sahel. AQIM has tapped into Tuareg networks to advance its objectives in West Africa in the past.
2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. Aggressive actions against the al Houthis in Yemen to counter Iranian regional
influence may drive the al Houthis further into the Iranian orbit.
2. Al Shabaab may be expanding terrain under its control as security and
governance falter in Somalia. Predicted food shortages may make conditions
more permissive for al Shabaab in central Somalia.
3. AQIM is likely supporting the growth of a Salafi-jihadi insurgency within the
Fulani ethnic group now spreading across borders in the Sahel region.
2
13
3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda exploited the bad publicity that a January 29 U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) raid against al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen received to advance its own narrative of events and propaganda. Al Qaeda’s media
wing, al Sahab Media Foundation, published a video of deceased al Qaeda senior leader Abu Yahya al Libi discussing the
role of women in jihad. He called for women to be good Muslims in the home and to support their men in battle, and for
locals and immigrants to support each other. Several women were killed in the raid, whom the Pentagon described as
female combatants. An al Qaeda bulletin described the raid and death of civilians as evidence that the U.S. was not just
fighting mujahideen, but Muslim civilians as well.
Reported U.S. airstrikes targeted an al Qaeda training camp in central Idlib province in Syria on February 3. These strikes, if
confirmed, would mark the first U.S. airstrike against al Qaeda in Syria since its rebranding as the Tahrir al Sham Assembly.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will probably utilize outrage over U.S. policies as both a recruiting call and justification for violence.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is re-unifying after May 2014 splits over leadership. The TTP Mehsud faction rejoined
the group led by TTP emir Fazlullah. The allegiance of the Mehsud tribe, whose members founded the TTP, will bolster
Fazlullah’s legitimacy and strengthen the group. The civilian arm of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) rebranded to emphasize its
opposition to the Indian occupation of Kashmir over its Salafi ideology in response to Pakistan’s crackdown on its
leadership. LeT leader Hafiz Saeed, who is under house arrest, called for more attacks on the Indian army in Kashmir.
Outlook: The unified TTP will increase its operational tempo. LeT will sustain its operations in Kashmir.
4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The U.S. may act against the al Houthi movement in Yemen as part of a regional strategy to counter Iran. A significant al
Houthi faction does not support Iranian control, however, and the al Houthis are not an Iranian proxy. U.S. Central
Command deployed the USS Cole to the Gulf of Aden to join the Makin Island Amphibious Readiness Group. The ships will
enforce freedom of navigation through the Red Sea. The U.S. may be aligning more closely with the Saudi-led coalition and
President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government, which does not have a popular support base. Former Yemeni
President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the al Houthis’ current partner, remains the most powerful political actor in the north.
Outlook: An aggressive strategy against the al Houthis could drive the group further into the Iranian sphere of influence.
Security
Operation Golden Spear, an offensive to drive the al Houthi-Saleh movement from Yemen’s Red Sea coast, is progressing
slowly. Hadi government forces continued a multi-week fight for control of Mokha, a small but strategically important port
city. The Saudi-led coalition expanded airstrikes in al Hudaydah governorate in preparation for the next campaign phase.
Outlook: The frontline will stall in al Hudaydah governorate, where the al Houthi-Saleh faction has popular support.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
The U.S. raid on an AQAP headquarters in central Yemen on January 29 was intended to kill or capture AQAP emir Qasim
al Raymi, according to U.S. officials. Al Raymi, named by U.S. officials as the third most dangerous terrorist in the world,
released an audio message taunting U.S. President Donald Trump for the operation on February 4. AQAP forced Emirati-
backed counterterrorism forces to withdraw from checkpoints in northern Abyan governorate, creating a more permissive
environment for AQAP. Yemeni forces are preparing for an operation to clear AQAP from Abyan.
Outlook: AQAP will expand its support base in northern Abyan but will not attempt to hold territory.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 31 JAN: ISIS
Wilayat al Bayda
attempted to
assassinate the
Aden Security
Deputy.
2) 02 FEB: Al Hizam
forces withdrew from
northern Abyan.
3) 03 FEB: AQAP
claimed to seize a
site in northwestern
al Bayda.
4) 31 JAN, 03 FEB:
USS Makin Island
ARG and USS Cole
deployed to the Gulf
of Aden.
5) 05 FEB: AQAP
executed a member
of President Hadi’s
Presidential Guard
in Abyan.
2
3
5
4
1
6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somalia will hold presidential elections, decided by a vote by the Somali parliament, on February 8 amid serious concerns
over security and corruption. Al Shabaab militants conducted multiple attacks targeting Somali parliamentarians in recent
weeks. Elections will take place in Aden Adde International Airport, where AMISOM is headquartered, as a security
precaution. Corruption allegations threaten the legitimacy of the Somali Federal Government no matter the outcome of the
election. Transparency International ranked Somalia as the most corrupt country in the world in its annual report released on
January 25.
Outlook: The new Somali president will face challenges to his legitimacy due to rampant corruption allegations.
Security
Severe drought and impending famine conditions threaten security and governance throughout Somalia. The UN warned
that the current situation resembles conditions that preceded the 2010-2011 famine, which caused more than a quarter
million deaths. The UN placed more than three million people in either “severe” or “crisis” conditions.
Outlook: Insufficient humanitarian response may destabilize the country and allow al Shabaab to resurge.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab retains its sanctuary in southern Somalia, which AMISOM and Somali National Army operations have not been
able to remove. This sanctuary includes parts of Lower Jubba region north of Kismayo through Middle Jubba region into
Dinsor district in Bay region. Recent public executions demonstrate the group’s control of terrain. Al Shabaab carried out a
public execution in Jamame district in Lower Jubba region on February 5, beheading four men accused of spying for U.S.,
AMISOM, and Somali security forces. Al Shabaab orchestrated similar public executions in Middle Jubba region on January
10 and Bay region on January 26.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will expand operations in Kismayo city after consolidating control in surrounding areas.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
1) 01 FEB: Al Shabaab
militants attempted
to assassinate a MP
in Mogadishu.
2) 01 FEB: Al Shabaab
militants raided a
police camp in
northeastern Kenya.
3) 03 FEB: Galmudug
security forces killed
al Shabaab’s head
of finance in Mudug
region.
4) 05 JAN: Al Shabaab
militants executed
four men in Lower
Jubba region.
5) 07 FEB: Al Shabaab
militants ambushed
an AMISOM convoy
in Middle Shabelle
region.
4
2
3
1
5
8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Russia is increasing its influence in the Mediterranean and North Africa by positioning itself as a broker in the Libyan civil
war. The Russian government struck a military deal with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libyan National
Army (LNA) and Russia’s preferred partner, in January 2017. Russian officials also invited Fayez al Serraj, the prime
minister of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), to meet in Moscow. Russia’s invitation to Serraj, whom
Haftar opposes, may be an effort to disrupt the GNA’s growing ties to NATO and the EU. The GNA will allow NATO and EU
ships to operate in Libyan waters as part of a counter-migration agreement signed on February 2.
Outlook: Russia will leverage its position in Libya to extend its military sphere of influence into the central Mediterranean.
Security
Salafi-jihadi groups are positioned for an insurgency against the Libyan National Army (LNA) in eastern Libya as the LNA’s
operation to secure Benghazi culminates. The Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC), a coalition that includes al
Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, clashed with LNA forces in Qanfouda district, Benghazi on February 1-4. The LNA
claimed to clear Qanfouda, a longtime militant stronghold, on January 25. The LNA continued airstrikes on Derna city, which
is controlled by an al Qaeda-linked militia coalition, and arrested alleged Islamist militants in Ajdabiya city. The kidnapping of
political officials increased, signaling a security breakdown in the country’s major urban centers.
Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups will sustain low-level operations in Benghazi and increase operations in Derna and Ajdabiya.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS’s operations temporarily ceased as the group rebuilds its capabilities following U.S. airstrikes on January 19. Mines
planted by ISIS in its defense of Sirte are inhibiting efforts to reconstruct and repopulate the city.
Outlook: ISIS will rebuild its capabilities in northwestern Libya in the near-to-mid term.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA
9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 01 FEB: Militants
attacked the security
directorate in Bani
Walid.
2) 02 FEB: Mines
planted by ISIS
detonated in Sirte.
3) 02 FEB: The LNA’s
air force conducted
airstrikes against the
MSCD in Derna.
4) 04 FEB: BRSC
militants clashed
with the LNA in
Qanfouda district,
Benghazi.
5) 05 FEB: GNA-
aligned militias
clashed with LNA-
aligned militias in
Tripoli over control
of a bridge.
4
2
3
1
5
10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
Maghreb nations are cracking down on Salafi-jihadi cells and foreign fighter networks, which remain military and political
threats. Moroccan authorities arrested three members of a suspected ISIS attack cell on February 6. Algerian security
forces killed three militants during an ambush in Illizi province, which borders militant safe havens in southwestern Libya and
southern Tunisia. Tunisian citizens protested peacefully against the return of militants from conflict zones in Tunis.
Outlook: The return of foreign fighters from Syria, Iraq, and Libya will increase the likelihood of attacks in the Maghreb.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
AQIM is probably helping stoke a Fulani insurgency with Salafi-jihad influence in Mali and Burkina Faso. The Macina
Liberation Front (MLF), an AQIM associate with a Fulani base, compelled secular schools to remain closed in central Mopti
region in Mali. Ansar al Islam, another Salafi-Jihadi Fulani militant group, started similar efforts to the south of Mali in
Burkina Faso. The closure of secular schools delegitimizes the state and lays the groundwork for Salafi-jihadi groups to
establish political control. AQIM recently imposed shari’a punishments in Taoudenni, a remote area of northern Mali,
demonstrating control of the local population.
Nigeria’s crackdown on civilian support for Boko Haram may destroy a fragile alliance that was crucial for degrading Boko
Haram. In Maiduguri, members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), an anti-Boko Haram vigilante group, threatened to
abandon their security checkpoints en masse after Nigerian government forces detained several CJTF members on charges
of supporting Boko Haram on February 6. The governor of Borno State in northeastern Nigeria called for the arrest of any
civilian supporters of Boko Haram on February 3. He then dismissed all local government officials on February 5 after
several were found guilty of providing material support to Boko Haram. The rate of successful interdiction operations against
Boko Haram increased rapidly after the Nigerian government began funding the CJTF in 2013.
Outlook: The Fulani insurgency may challenge the Malian and Burkinabe authorities in central Mali and northwestern
Burkina Faso. Nigeria will ease its crackdown on civilians supporting Boko Haram in order to maintain the loyalty of the
CJTF.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL
11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 01 FEB: The
Algerian army killed
three militants in
Illizi province,
Algeria.
2) 05 FEB: The
Algerian army
destroyed two
militant bunkers
in Bejaia province,
Algeria.
3) 05 FEB: Protesters
demonstrated
against the return of
militants from
conflict zones in
Tunis.
4) 06 FEB: Moroccan
authorities arrested
three members of a
suspected ISIS cell
in al Jadida,
Morocco.
2 3
1
4
12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
1) 01 FEB: AQIM
enforced shari’a law
in Taoudenni,
Timbuktu region,
Mali.
2) 01 FEB: The
Nigerian military
seized armored
vehicles and anti-
aircraft guns in Buk,
Borno State,
Nigeria.
3) 04 FEB: Ansar al
Islam killed a
councilman in
Yorsala, Loroum
Province, Burkina
Faso.
4) 06 FEB: Boko
Haram-Barnawi
overran Sasawa,
Yobe State, Nigeria.
2
3
1
4
13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569