The document discusses how cultural context can significantly impact negotiating style and success. It provides three examples of negotiation situations and describes how a typical American approach may differ from approaches in Asian cultures.
The key differences highlighted are: 1) Asians prefer indirect confrontation over problems rather than direct confrontation to avoid losing face. 2) Asians use emotional, status-based appeals for concessions rather than rational arguments. 3) Asians glean information through a series of proposals rather than direct questions. Understanding these cultural differences can help negotiators have more effective cross-cultural negotiations and expand their negotiation strategies.
2. Example 1:
You have contracted with a manufacturer to
produce a shipment of bicycles. After signing the contract,
you receive credible information that this manufacturer
has had quality problems and, in particular, that the bikes
being produced for your shipment rattle. Your bicycles are
supposed to be shipped next week. Which of the following
options better describes how you would react?
A.
You immediately go to the plant to check on the
quality problem. You tell the plant manager that the
rattling must be fixed before the bikes are shipped.
B.
You go to the plant and test a few of the bikes.
Then you take the plant manager for a bike ride in
the countryside. After the ride, you ask: “Do all the
bikes rattle? Will the rattling be a problem for the
buyer?” And then you leave.
Example 2:
Your raw-materials costs have skyrocketed due
to circumstances beyond your control. You need to reopen
a contract with your biggest customer and negotiate a
3. higher price to cover these costs. Which of the following
options better describes how you would act?
A.
You meet with the customer and calmly explain
the unavoidable circumstances that have affected
your raw-materials costs, focusing on facts. Then
you ask to renegotiate the price.
B.
You meet with the customer and express your ap-
preciation as well as your company’s gratitude for the
relationship. You also express sorrow for the potential
impact of the skyrocketing raw-materials costs on the
relationship, then plead: “We need your help!”
Example 3:
You have identified a great opportunity to ex-
pand your business by negotiating a joint venture with an-
other company. You need to get information about this
company’s needs and priorities. Which of the following
options would you prefer?
A.
4. Ask the other side about their priorities and give
them only a little information about your own.
B.
Do not ask direct questions; instead, be indirect
and try to deduce what the other side’s priorities are
by listening to their reactions to your proposals.
Now consider whether your choices would change if, in
the first situation, you were an American working in Hong
Kong and the bicycle manufacturer was in mainland
China; in the second situation, your customer was a major
Japanese retailer; and, in the third situation, your potential
partner was a highly respected Korean company.
Your intuitive choices provide a good litmus test of your
approach to negotiation. If you initially chose
A
in each
situation and if further information did not sway your
choices, you have a mainstream American approach to ne-
gotiations. If you initially chose
B
in each situation, you
may not be from the United States, and you certainly do
5. not subscribe to the typical American approach to negoti-
ation. If you switched from
A
to
B
when you learned you
were negotiating with an Asian company, you no doubt
have had some significant global negotiating experience.
Our research has identified vast cultural differences be-
tween the way Americans negotiate and the way negotia-
tions are carried out in other cultures, particularly in Asia.
Though your intuitive approach may be functional at
home, it could backfire abroad. Learning a wider reper-
toire of strategies from other cultures should minimize the
risks of negotiating cross-culturally and might even im-
prove your domestic negotiations. In this article, we dis-
cuss three negotiation strategies widely used in Asia that
are likely to be unfamiliar to American negotiators yet ex-
tremely useful: indirect confrontation, status-based per-
suasion, and the use of proposals to gain information.
Try the indirect approach
The tale of the rattling bicycles is true, and it had a happy
ending. The American who brokered the deal went to the
6. Chinese plant, tested a few bikes, rode in the countryside
with the plant manager, and asked gently about the rat-
A
Negotiation and Culture
(continued)
4
Negotiation
January 2005
tling. The buyer received the bikes on time, rattle-free.
Pleased with their quality, the buyer placed another order.
The standard American approach to conflict is direct
confrontation: “Let’s talk about it.” Our individualistic
culture encourages us to place our self-interest first and to
intervene in situations that threaten our desired outcomes.
The problem with direct confronta-
tion is that it often implies blame,
which can make a problem become
personal—to go from being an issue
of rattling bikes to a concern about
the people who made them rattle.
7. By contrast, indirect confronta-
tion is normative in collective cultures, including most
Asian cultures, which emphasize social harmony and the
need to consider other parties’ interests. So that parties in
conflict do not have to confront each other directly, nego-
tiators in Asian cultures often rely on intermediaries.
When an intermediary is not available, verbal confron-
tation typically occurs indirectly, leaving the recipient of
the message to draw his own inferences: “What do you
think the buyer will think about that rattling?” for exam-
ple, rather than “The buyer is going to reject this shipment
if we don’t fix these bikes.” Indirect confrontation has the
benefit of keeping personalities out of the equation, leav-
ing one fewer problem to solve. In cultures where saving
face is critical, indirect confrontation gets the message
across and avoids disrespect.
One might assume that indirect confrontation would
be always appropriate in non-Western cultures and direct
confrontation always appropriate in Western cultures. But
recent research challenges the effectiveness of “in your
face” talk in conflict resolution, even in Western cultures.
After all, Americans don’t want to lose face any more than
Asians do. Once disrespect has been conveyed, the rela-
tionship is damaged, trust is threatened, and the potential
for retaliation increases.
The message from collective cultures to American ne-
gotiators: if you want to fix the problem and preserve the
relationship, try the indirect approach.
Gain concessions through status-based persuasion
8. The second negotiation problem comes from an Octo-
ber 2000
New York Times
article by Leslie Kaufman
about retail giant Wal-Mart and one of its suppliers,
Rubbermaid. Wal-Mart is known for negotiating low-
margin, high-volume contracts with its suppliers.
When prices for the main component in Rubbermaid’s
products began to skyrocket, the tight margins in the
company’s contract with Wal-Mart became almost in-
visible. Rubbermaid asked Wal-Mart to reopen the con-
tract. We do not know the exact nature of Rubbermaid’s
appeal to Wal-Mart, nor Wal-Mart’s response. But it’s
not difficult to imagine that Rubbermaid made a ratio-
nal appeal to Wal-Mart similar to choice
A
: “When we
negotiated our contract, our raw-materials costs had
been stable for years. The increase in oil prices was un-
expected and beyond our control.
We need to renegotiate.”
A negotiator relying on rational-
ity provides the other party with the
facts of the situation as she sees
9. them, with the goal of convincing
the other side to make concessions.
Often this Aristotelian-based factual, linear, and logical ar-
gument consists of threats (such as, “If you don’t, then I
will”) and promises (such as, “If you will, then I will”),
which are based on perceptions of power associated with
each party’s alternatives.
Rubbermaid and Wal-Mart’s negotiation likely re-
flected this rational approach. Ultimately, Wal-Mart did
agree to increase the retail prices of Rubbermaid products;
however, Rubbermaid did not have the power to keep Wal-
Mart from moving Rubbermaid products from their dom-
inant position in the store and replacing them with a com-
petitor’s products.
Choice
B
in this problem is a highly emotional ap-
proach to persuasion more typical of Asian cultures. In
this approach, persuasion is based on relationships and
obligations rather than on rational argument invoking
one’s alternatives. The persuasiveness of emotional ap-
peals in Asian cultures can be explained by the prevalence
there of collective and hierarchical values. In Asia, individ-
uals are embedded in a context of social relationships that
are often hierarchically structured. Emotional appeals are
made to remind the other party of the existence of the rela-
tionship, of the other party’s relatively higher status in the
relationship, and of the social responsibility of high-status
parties to help low-status parties.
10. In negotiations with non-Western partners, status can
be a more important source of power than alternatives. Al-
though alternatives change over time, status is based on a
long-term perspective. Rubbermaid’s assumed rational
appeal to Wal-Mart was culturally correct because the par-
ties were Westerners but would not have been appropriate
if Wal-Mart had been a Japanese retailer.
The message from Asian cultures: with status comes the
responsibility to help your partners through lean eco-
nomic times. When your alternatives are good, the West-
ern approach to negotiation problems seems preferable.
When they are poor, there is a great deal to be said for
using status to prompt concessions.
The problem with direct
confrontation is that it
often implies blame.
Negotiation and Culture
(continued)
Negotiation
January 2005
11. 5
Use proposals to gain information
Around the world, negotiators understand the need to
find wise tradeoffs that improve outcomes for all. But how
do you get the other party to reveal the information you
need about preferences and priorities?
Research shows that Western negotiators typically share
information by asking questions about each other’s prefer-
ences and priorities—assuming the other party is trustwor-
thy and answering truthfully—and giving information to
reinforce the exchange. This direct approach can be used to
identify tradeoffs that can be accumulated into a final,
multi-issue proposal. It reflects the Amer-
ican preference for explicit, context-free
communications.
Now consider how managers in Ja-
pan, China, Hong Kong, Thailand, and
Russia glean information about one an-
other’s preferences and priorities. Re-
search conducted by Wendi Adair of Cornell University’s
Johnson School of Management, Tetsushi Okumura of
Shiga University in Japan, and one of the coauthors of this
article, Jeanne M. Brett, found that Japanese managers
made many more proposals than did U.S. managers.
Subsequent research by Adair and Brett indicates that,
beginning in the first quarter of their negotiation, non-
Western negotiators were using proposals significantly
more frequently than were Western negotiators. This dif-
ference was sustained until the last quarter of the negotia-
12. tion, when Westerners’ proposal rate rose to match that of
non-Westerners.
Gathering information about relative preferences and
priorities from proposals requires highly developed infer-
ential skills and a “big picture” approach. Doing so is com-
mon in collective cultures, where context matters and
indirect communication is the norm. When proposals in-
clude all the issues in a negotiation, Western negotiators
should be able to work effectively in this environment. But
consider that Asian negotiators do not limit themselves to
multi-issue proposals; they also make more single-issue
proposals than Western negotiators. Drawing inferences
from a pattern of single-issue proposals requires a heavy
focus on context.
Imagine a two-issue negotiation over price and deliv-
ery. I offer a delivery date that you don’t explicitly reject;
you then offer a price. Now it’s my turn to build toward a
settlement based on my delivery date and your price. Sup-
pose I make an alternative offer on price, keeping in mind
my prior offer on delivery. If I track your reaction to these
alternative proposals, I can start deducing what your pri-
orities are. Westerners can do this cognitive work, of
course—it is just a matter of preference
regarding how to exchange information
during negotiation.
The message from Asian cultures:
there is more than one way to get infor-
mation in a negotiation. When negotia-
tors are reluctant to share information
directly, try proposals and look for the pattern of prefer-
13. ences revealed by changes in the proposals over time.
The stories in this article illustrate the marked differ-
ences that exist in people’s approach to negotiations across
cultures. Culture can feel invisible until we find ourselves
negotiating using ineffective strategies in a foreign land.
Understanding how cultural context affects negotiations
will not only help you reach agreement abroad, but it also
will allow you to expand your repertoire of negotiation
strategies within your own culture.
✧
Jeanne M. Brett
is the DeWitt W. Buchanan Jr. Distinguished Professor
of Dispute Resolution and Organizations at Northwestern
University’s
Kellogg Graduate School of Management. She is the author of
the
award-winning book
Negotiating Globally: How to Negotiate Deals
Resolve Disputes, and Make Decisions Across Cultural
Boundaries
14. (Jossey-Bass, 2001).
Michele J. Gelfand
is an associate professor of
psychology at the University of Maryland. Together they
coedited
The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture
(Stanford University Press,
2004). They can be reached at [email protected]
There is more than one
way to get information
in a negotiation.
NEGOTIATION STRATEGY 4
Dealing with a Spoiler?
Negotiate Around
the Problem
15. Sometimes the best way to deal with
obstinate negotiators is to bypass them
completely. Here’s how to execute an
effective workaround.
BY ROBERT C. BORDONE
NEGOTIATION DYNAMICS 7
Taking BATNA
to the Next Level
By enhancing your best alternative
to a negotiated agreement, you can
gain a critical advantage at the table.
BY GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN
ACROSS THE TABLE 9
When Dividing the Pie,
Smart Negotiators
Get Creative
Don’t settle for uninspired compromises.
Find ways to modify and expand
resources to achieve more value.
BY DEBORAH M. KOLB AND
PETER J. CARNEVALE
RESEARCH SUMMARIES 12
The Heat of the Moment
Do Attitudes Influence
16. Results?
C O M M U N I C A T I O N
Negotiating
Differences: How
Contrasting Styles
Affect Outcomes
Not everyone bargains the same way. By becoming
attuned to various social motives, you can adapt
your own approach for the better.
B Y L A U R I E R . W E I N G A R T
H
O W W O U L D Y O U D E S C R I B E your negotiating
style? Are you a cooperative negotiator who
focuses on crafting agreements that benefit
everyone, or do you actively compete to get a better
deal than your counterpart? Perhaps you follow a
third route, concentrating only on maximizing
your own outcomes with little concern for how the
other side performs.
In any given negotiation, your style has a stable compo-
17. nent that comes from your disposition and personality;
continued on page 2
some people are naturally more cooperative than others,
for instance. Yet your style will also fluctuate depending on
the situation and the person across the table. For example,
you’re more likely to focus on maximizing joint gain when
you’re negotiating a joint venture with a trusted colleague,
than when you’re battling with other department heads
over the annual budget.
What happens when negotiators with different styles—
or those with similar styles, for that matter—meet at the
bargaining table? Are certain style combinations more
desirable than others? Should you try to adapt your style to
each negotiation? This article addresses these and other
commonly asked questions about negotiation style and, in
particular, illuminates the consequences of using coopera-
tive versus more self-interested strategies.
“What type of negotiator am I?”
Differences in social motives, or one’s preference for certain
18. types of outcomes in interactions with others, affect how
individuals approach negotiation. Psychologists have iden-
tified four basic types of social motives that drive human
behavior in competitive situations such as negotiation:
1. Individualists are motivated to maximize their
own outcomes without concern for the out-
comes of others. About half of U.S. negotiators
studied (typically students and businesspeople)
have an individualistic orientation, making this
the most common group.
2. Cooperators, comprising approximately 25% to
35% of U.S. study participants, are motivated to
I N S I D E
Negotiation and Decision-Making Strategies That Deliver
Results
A Newsletter Published by
the Program on Negotiation
at Harvard Law School
19. Volume 10
Number 1
January 2007
maximize both their own and other parties’
outcomes and to ensure that gains are fairly
distributed.
3. Competitives, comprising about 5% to 10% of
U.S. study participants, prefer outcomes that
maximize the difference between their own and
others’ outcomes. They want to win—and by a
wide margin. As a result, their behavior tends to
be the most self-serving, and their lack of trust
makes joint problem solving difficult.
4. Altruists seek to maximize the other party’s out-
come without concern for their own. Altruists
are difficult to find in today’s business world, so
little research has been done on this motive in
20. negotiation contexts.
Because relatively few people fall into the latter two cate-
gories, most of the negotiation literature has focused on indi-
vidualists and cooperators; this article will as well. Carsten De
Dreu of the University of Amsterdam, Seungwoo Kwon of
Korea University, and I have found that individualists engage
in more value-claiming behavior than do cooperators;
specifically, they are more likely than cooperators to make
threats (within limits), to argue and substantiate their posi-
tions, and to make single-issue offers. Cooperators are more
likely than individualists to engage in value-creating strate-
gies such as providing information, asking questions, gaining
insight into the other party, and making multi-issue offers
and tradeoffs. However, cooperators sometimes act competi-
tively, just as individualists sometimes cooperate. As I will
explain, your counterpart’s approach can influence your own
choice of strategy significantly.
“What type of negotiator should I be?”
Should a negotiator focus on maximizing her own out-
21. comes, or should she take a more cooperative approach?
Cooperative negotiators are more likely than hard bar-
gainers to discover creative solutions that expand the pie of
resources for both sides, as Catherine H. Tinsley and Kath-
leen O’Connor concluded in their December 2006 Negoti-
ation article, “Want the Best Deal Possible? Cultivate a
Cooperative Reputation.” Furthermore, those who engage
in cooperative strategies report higher satisfaction with the
negotiation process and its outcomes than do more self-
interested or competitive negotiators—and they build
strong business relationships as a result.
Cooperators are also more effective than individualists
at using value-creating strategies to improve their own
outcomes, my research with Mary Kern of Baruch College
and Jeanne Brett of Northwestern University has shown.
Why might this be true? It could be that cooperators
appear more sincere than individualists when working to
create value.
22. Despite the proven benefits of cooperative behavior, many
negotiators fail to engage fully in the process of maximizing
joint gain. Some don’t gravitate naturally toward strategies
aimed at meeting both sides’ interests. Others worry that
cooperation leaves them vulnerable to exploitation.
It’s tempting to draw conclusions about the relative
advantages and disadvantages of particular social motives.
Yet even if you were to change your approach, style differ-
ences would continue to crop up in your negotiations.
Your overarching social motive influences not only what
strategies you use but also how you use them—and the
same goes for your counterpart.
Negotiating Differences (continued)
2 Negotiation
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25. views of the author.
Negotiation
About this publication
Negotiation offers subscribers practical advice and guidance for
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About the Program on Negotiation
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looming deadline. Some begin working to create value. This
shift may help them reach an agreement, but they may not
actually achieve high outcomes for themselves.
Yet individualistic negotiating pairs can reach high-
quality agreements, my colleagues and I have found. (See
the sidebar “Individualists: Cooperate to Claim Value.”)
“What if we have different social motives?”
When a cooperator and an individualist bargain, the situa-
tion grows more complex. In addition to engaging your
own strategy, you must react and adjust to a style that may
strike you as foreign or inappropriate.
Notably, though, people in negotiation tend to converge
in their approaches, which allows their interactions to
become more predictable, Kathleen McGinn of Harvard
27. Business School and Angela Keros of Goldman Sachs have
found. Negotiators get in sync by purposefully reciprocat-
ing each other’s approaches and subconsciously mimick-
ing behaviors, my research with Michael Prietula of Emory
University and Elaine Hyder and Chris Genovese of
Carnegie Mellon University has shown.
Whose social motive will dominate the “hybrid” style?
Individualists will not dominate and outperform coopera-
tors for the simple reason that a cooperator is not necessarily
January 2007 3
“What if we have the same social motive?”
When two people share the same motive, they fall prey to
the same flaws and reinforce each other’s failings. Consider
a labor negotiation in which the chief management nego-
tiator withholds information about revenue projections,
while the labor leader holds back details about workforce
sentiment. Impasse is the predicable result. When you’re
negotiating with a fellow individualist or a fellow coopera-
28. tor, your goal should be to overcome the inherent flaws of
your orientation.
The case of two cooperators.
Two cooperators who meet at the negotiating table risk
concentrating so closely on each other’s interests that they
lose sight of their own—and settle for outcomes that split
the difference rather than truly satisfy both parties’ inter-
ests. Imagine that a newly hired research analyst fails to ask
his manager for a cutting-edge workstation for fear of
appearing greedy. The manager, who has already been
quite responsive to his requests, would happily provide the
workstation were she aware of the potential upside. Unfor-
tunately, this joint benefit goes undiscovered.
My research with Mara Olekalns of the University of
Melbourne and Jeanne Brett suggests strategies that can
improve the outcomes of such negotiations. When you’re
negotiating with a fellow cooperator, include value-claiming
behaviors in your repertoire: make offers that focus on a sin-
gle issue, communicate your own preferences and positions,
29. and clarify your limits. When you claim value in a context of
cooperation and trust, you focus the negotiation on explor-
ing value-maximizing agreements—but be careful not to
shift talks from problem solving into contentiousness.
The case of two individualists.
When two individualists negotiate, their natural ten-
dency to use value-claiming strategies, such as making
demands and threats, can escalate into conflict and
impasse, Olekalns and Philip Smith of the University of
Melbourne have found. As Katie A. Liljenquist and Adam
D. Galinsky noted in their September 2006 Negotiation
article, “How to Defuse Threats at the Bargaining Table,”
people tend to reciprocate negative behaviors more than
positive ones.
As conflict increases, the odds of maximizing mutual
gain decrease, as do your chances of maximizing individual
gain. Suppose two individualists negotiate a joint venture.
Although both parties may feel they got the best outcome
30. possible, the resulting agreement will likely overlook syner-
gies across the two organizations. An exception to this ten-
dency sometimes emerges when individualists face a
INDIVIDUALISTS: COOPERATE TO CLAIM VALUE
What happens in negotiations between two individu-
alists who care little about each other’s outcomes? Sup-
pose an engineer and an industrial designer are
arguing over the design of a car bumper. The designer
cares only about whether the bumper matches the style
of the vehicle; the engineer is concerned only about
how the bumper connects to the front. After describ-
ing the trouble he’s having with the existing design, the
engineer presents a solution that the designer deems
“ugly.” The designer threatens to involve her boss if the
engineer doesn’t revert to a prior design
You’re the engineer—what do you do? First, balance
your value-claiming strategies by working to create
value. Ask the designer to explain where she thinks the
31. new design went wrong, and identify possible solu-
tions and low-priority issues on which you can offer
tradeoffs. Second, remind her that there’s hope for a
solution if you both let down your guard and work
together. Third, listen openly to the designer’s propos-
als and try to build on them. Above all, ensure that
your cooperative moves are reciprocated, or you’ll be
vulnerable to exploitation.
4 Negotiation
an individualist, you should avoid revealing too much
information if none is forthcoming. Instead, reciprocate
contentious behavior while signaling your desire to switch
to cooperation. Merely identifying a tactic as unacceptable
can neutralize it, assuming you provide a more effective
course.
If you’re an individualist, don’t lose sight of your ability
to protect yourself from difficult opponents. Even when a
32. solution is not immediately obvious, you’re likely to keep
forging ahead. At the same time, pick up the signals your
counterpart is sending. Reciprocate cooperative behavior,
and don’t be overly wary until you are absolutely sure the
other side can’t be trusted. �
Laurie R. Weingart is a professor of organizational behavior at
the
Tepper School of Business at Carnegie Mellon University,
where she
has researched and taught negotiation skills for more than 15
years.
She can be reached at [email protected]
To order a reprint of this article, call 800-391-8629.
a naïve negotiator. Brett, Olekalns, Smith, and I have found
that cooperators are more sensitive than individualists to
the approaches of others and more likely to adjust in response.
They claim more value when negotiating with individualists.
Much less sensitive to the negotiating environment,
individualists tend to focus on claiming value regardless of
their counterparts’ social motive. Individualists may not
33. even realize they are negotiating with cooperative oppo-
nents, who quickly switch tactics in response to competi-
tive behavior.
“How can I capitalize on my natural tendencies?”
Rather than trying to overhaul your social motive completely,
it makes more sense to work on strengthening your natural
talents and practicing the best elements of other styles.
If you’re a cooperator, this means capitalizing on your
ability to detect others’ social motives and adapting your
own approach accordingly. Although you shouldn’t
immediately abandon problem solving when faced with
Negotiating Differences (continued)
N E G O T I A T I O N S T R A T E G Y
Dealing with a Spoiler?
Negotiate Around the Problem
Sometimes the best way to deal with obstinate negotiators is to
bypass them completely.
Here’s how to execute an effective workaround.
B Y R O B E R T C . B O R D O N E
A
34. T ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, most of us have confronted a fel-
low negotiator who seemed intent on blocking even
our most reasonable requests and actions. This was the sit-
uation faced by Alexis, the CIO at a midsize publishing
company. Phil, the company’s CEO, hired Alexis to create
an online information system tailored to the needs of their
largest customers. Phil promised to support Alexis as she
implemented the new system and restructured the IT
department. The two met on many occasions to negotiate
issues related to cost, increased staff needs, impact on cus-
tomers, and coordination challenges.
Despite his promises of cooperation, in almost every
meeting with Alexis, Phil proved to be a barrier to her
problem-solving efforts. He repeatedly denied her request
to increase the size of her staff, limited her authority, and
delayed making important decisions. To her frustration
and embarrassment, Alexis faced huge project delays, ris-
ing costs, and low credibility throughout the organization.
She felt stuck between two unhappy choices: accepting the
35. status quo or starting another job search.
In past issues of Negotiation, we’ve shown you ways to
transform a difficult counterpart’s no into a hearty yes. But
what happens when you’ve followed all this good advice
and still find yourself faced with a perpetual naysayer?
When interpersonal and tactical strategies fail to win
over someone whose approval is essential to your goals, the
negotiation may seem hopeless. Fortunately, there is an
option of last resort. Consider crafting what I call a
workaround—a strategic approach to getting what you
need without the involvement or support of your adversary.
What type of spoiler are you facing?
When your best efforts fail to budge the other party in the
right direction, you may be facing one of the three types of
“spoilers” identified by Stanford University professor
Stephen John Stedman.
WATCH THE VEDIO : https://youtu.be/G__UzADcz3o
36. Compare and contrast each of the negotiating styles from the
article. Which do you think is most effective? When, how and
why would you use that style?
Name and describe each of the 5 negotiating tips from the
video. Which do you believe is most beneficial and why?
In order to score points you need to complete the assigned
reading and answer the question from the reading
assignment. Please feel free to do additional research on the
topic. But, in all circumstances, make certain you document
your source(s) of information.
You may certainly disagree with what is in the assigned
reading/video, but you must reference where you obtained your
information, your opinion on the topic, and why you
disagree. Just writing your opinion on a topic without doing the
reading assignment will score you zero (0) points.
