Ramamurthy
Industry  AnalysisThreat from New  EntrantsEconomies of Scale - relatively high
Entry Barrier - relatively high
Exit Barrier - relatively highMODERATEBargaining Power SuppliersAvailability of substitutes – internal & external - high
Forward integration
Backward integration
High volumes, high negotiating powerLOWBuying Powers   CustomersLess bargaining power
Ease of Switching Cost, no cost
Lack of differentiation
Ample substitutesLOWIndustry RivalryFierce Competition, Mature Industry
Lack of differentiation
Volume, price game
Low switching cost for buyersHIGHThreat of SubstitutesDiverse Formats Influence- Food Supermarkets, local grocery stores, departmental stores, specialty stores, online stores, direct sales channels -  Medium
Demographic Influence – Low to highMEDIUM
Wal-Mart: Value Chain (1)InfrastructureDiscount Stores, Superstores, Warehouse ClubsHuman ResourcesRecruiting, Training, incentives, employee feedbackTechnology DevelopmentInventory System EDI, Satellite system at HQ Return PolicyProcurementMerchandise Forecasting/Planning Shipping Services MediaInbound Shipment of itemsDistribution  CentersElectronic InvoicingHub & Spoke NetworkOwn Fleet of TrucksLimited Yearly campaignsReturned  Items,Customer FeedbackProcurementOutbound LogisticsMarketing & SalesOperationsService
Wal-Mart: Value Chain (2)Traditional Supply ChainWholesalerManufacturerRetailerCustomerWal-Mart Supply ChainWal-MartCustomerManufacturerDistributionWeekly RoutinesStore OperationsTechnology, ITMarketingPurchasingFrugal, led by Sam Walton
Market Analysis
Business Level StrategyWalmart is a broad cost leaderWalmart( MS = 35.8%,  RoE = 26.6%)RoEKe= 4%Market Share
RBV Analysis – Tangible Resources
RBV Analysis – Intangible Resources

Walmart Case Analysis

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    Industry AnalysisThreatfrom New EntrantsEconomies of Scale - relatively high
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    Entry Barrier -relatively high
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    Exit Barrier -relatively highMODERATEBargaining Power SuppliersAvailability of substitutes – internal & external - high
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    High volumes, highnegotiating powerLOWBuying Powers CustomersLess bargaining power
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    Ease of SwitchingCost, no cost
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    Ample substitutesLOWIndustry RivalryFierceCompetition, Mature Industry
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    Low switching costfor buyersHIGHThreat of SubstitutesDiverse Formats Influence- Food Supermarkets, local grocery stores, departmental stores, specialty stores, online stores, direct sales channels - Medium
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    Demographic Influence –Low to highMEDIUM
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    Wal-Mart: Value Chain(1)InfrastructureDiscount Stores, Superstores, Warehouse ClubsHuman ResourcesRecruiting, Training, incentives, employee feedbackTechnology DevelopmentInventory System EDI, Satellite system at HQ Return PolicyProcurementMerchandise Forecasting/Planning Shipping Services MediaInbound Shipment of itemsDistribution CentersElectronic InvoicingHub & Spoke NetworkOwn Fleet of TrucksLimited Yearly campaignsReturned Items,Customer FeedbackProcurementOutbound LogisticsMarketing & SalesOperationsService
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    Wal-Mart: Value Chain(2)Traditional Supply ChainWholesalerManufacturerRetailerCustomerWal-Mart Supply ChainWal-MartCustomerManufacturerDistributionWeekly RoutinesStore OperationsTechnology, ITMarketingPurchasingFrugal, led by Sam Walton
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    Business Level StrategyWalmartis a broad cost leaderWalmart( MS = 35.8%, RoE = 26.6%)RoEKe= 4%Market Share
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    RBV Analysis –Tangible Resources
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    RBV Analysis –Intangible Resources
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    RBV Analysis –Organizational Capabilities
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    Wal-Mart's key sourcesof Competitive AdvantageBased on RBV Analysis all these competencies are pretty much sustainable over the long term.
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    What’s Wal-Mart’s problem?RevenueGrowthSince Wal-Mart hadn't had significant competition in rural markets, it was able to price its products at a considerably higher price. These markets have saturated in 1994, consequently slowing down Walmart’s growth.
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    Overcapacity had generatedintense competition in the wholesale club market. This resulted in Sam’s clubs cannibalizing their own sales resulting in poor top line growth.Profit MarginsBy 1993, 55% of Walmart faced direct competition from Kmart and 23% from Target. This forced Walmart to price their goods at 7.6% to 10.4% less, which hit the company’s bottom line.
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    Supercenters face directcompetition from supermarkets that sustain on narrow margins. This too impacts Wal-Mart's bottom line.Wal-Mart's options
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    Expanding into globalmarketsProsWal-Mart’s cost leadership is a good fit in developing countries with a sizeable middle class.
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    The satellite-based forecasting& communication system can be easily replicated in other countries
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    Wal-Mart’s global procurementstrategy, vendor relationships and supplier integration will enable it to compete effectively in other markets as well.ConsBuilding the “Everyday Low Prices” reputation in new markets could be time consuming.
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    Setting up itscutting edge distribution system in new markets could entails a huge investment upfront.
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    Promoting Wal-Mart’s uniquecorporate culture in a transnational setting may prove difficult Diversifying into other businessesProsWal-Mart’s state-of-the-art distribution system can be easily leveraged to support other businesses.
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    The satellite-based forecasting& communication system can be easily adapted to other businesses.
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    Wal-Mart’s global procurementstrategy, vendor relationships and supplier integration enable it to compete effectively in other businesses as well.ConsStarting a new business (such as pharmacy) as a separate entity could cannibalize Wal-Mart’s business
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    Wal-Mart’s cost leadershipstrategy wont be a good match for expensive, “value” products
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    New businesses entailhuge investmentsMoving into other retail formatsProsThe satellite-based forecasting & communication system can be easily adapted to other formats.
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    Wal-Mart’s global procurementstrategy, vendor relationships and supplier integration enable it to compete effectively in other formats as well.
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    Wal-Mart’s state-of-the-art distributionsystem can be easily leveraged to support new formats in current Wal-Mart strongholdsConsDue to saturation of rural markets, any further expansion can happen only in urban areas. Distribution in urban areas could prove costlier due to expensive rentals of stores & warehouses and problems like traffic congestion. This could create problems for Wal-Mart to sustain its “Everyday Low Prices” Which format?Discount Stores Selling products at low prices
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    Average storesize – 84,000 Sq. Ft
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    General Merchandise, Groceries,Pharmacy, Optical Center, Tire & Lube, Fast food Super Centers One stop shopping
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    Average storesize – 173,000 Sq. Ft.
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    Super market, Deli,Meat & Poultry, Bakery, Sports, Frozen foods, Diary, Garden, Produce, Seafood, Unisex, Nails, Video rental, Dunkins, Pet shop, Garden Center + Discount StoreSam’s ClubsDeep discounts at wholesale quantities
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    Average storesize – 120,000 Sq. Ft.Thumbs up for Super Centers! Due to availability of Deli & other food items, customers visit Super Centers more frequently.Specialty departments like bakery offer margins of 35% - 40%
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    High revenue &profit per square feet
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    Discount centers areunder margin pressure
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    High competition inwarehouse club business is causing Sam’s clubs cannabalizing on its own stores
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