QAing the Security Way!
Amit & Null
vodQA, Pune 17th March 2018
“A system is secure if it behaves
precisely in the manner intended -
and does nothing more”
- Ivan Arce
Amit Gundiyal
Senior Consultant - Quality Analyst at ThoughtWorks, Inc
6+ years of experience (as Dev, QA & BA)
About Me
Nalinikanth AKA Null
About Me
Senior Consultant - Quality Analyst at ThoughtWorks, Inc
5+ years of experience
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 5
Ground Rules
● Follow the speaker
○ Don’t get deviated.
○ If you are stuck call any of the volunteers.
● We will share you all the material don’t bother about
that.
● Ask questions whenever you have - don’t wait.
● MOST IMPORTANT!
Information Technology Act 2000
Imprisonment upto
5 years
and / or
with fine upto
₹5,00,000
http://www.itlaw.in/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Technology_Act,_2000
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 7
What to expect?
● Talk about QAing and Security.
● OWASP TOP 10
● Hands on few OWASP threats.
● We will be using tools to do an attack, but will not go in
depth on the tools.
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 8
Agenda
● What and Why of security ?
● QA role in testing security.
● OWASP TOP 10
● Hands on security vulnerabilities
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 9
What and Why of Security Testing?
In 2017
● Verizon: 14 Millions of customer records exposed in security lapse.
● Verifone: the largest maker of point-of-sale credit card terminals used across world.
● Deloitte: Embarrassingly for the accounting firm who pride themselves on their Cyber
Intelligence Centre, Deloitte fell victim to a cyber attack in March.
● Deep Root Analytics: A data analytics firm, to gather political information about U.S. voters.
Chris Vickery, a cyber risk analyst, discovered that the sensitive information Deep Root
Analytics obtained–personal data for roughly 198 million American citizens.
● Virgin America: In a letter to employees, airline Virgin America revealed that a hacker had
successfully entered their corporate network gaining access to login information and
passwords used by employees to access the network.
● Equifax: one of the three largest credit agencies in the U.S., suffered a breach that may affect
143 million consumers.
As a QA
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 11
What a QA has?
● End to end knowledge.
● One who tests almost
everything in the system.
● Implement security thinking.
● Add security analysis to stories.
● Identify where security can
possibly go for toss.
● Test the stories if they are
vulnerable.
● Help team build more security
products
What a QA can do?
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 12
QA could have stopped this
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/6421/
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 13
Let's start with a story
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 14
OWASP
● Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
● Online community, which creates freely-available articles, tools,
methodologies, documentation, and technologies in the field of
web application security.
● Not-for-profit charitable organization.
● Focussed on improving the security of software.
● Currently has over 150+ active projects
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 15
OWASP Top 10
● List the 10 most critical web application security risks.
● A powerful awareness document.
● Published at regular intervals.
● Approximately once in 3 years.
● Last published in 2017
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 16
OWASP Top 10 - 2013 vs 2017
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 17
Tools we are using today
● OWASP Mutillidae II - Application to attack
● Burp suite to intercept requests (we can use ZAP as
well)
● Python to steal cookie
What causes most of the attacks?
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 19
User Input - Surface Area
I don’t like user input
and
this is why I don’t
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 20
A7: Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
XSS flaws occur whenever an application takes untrusted data and
sends it to a web browser without proper validation or escaping.
XSS allows attackers to execute scripts in the victim’s browser which
can:
● hijack user sessions
● deface web sites
● redirect the user to malicious sites.
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 21
A7: How XSS works?
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 22
Types of XSS
● Reflected XSS
○ Reflected XSS occurs when user input is immediately returned by a
web application in an error message, search result, etc. and
without permanently storing the user provided data.
● Stored XSS
○ Stored XSS generally occurs when user input is stored on the
target server, such as in a database, in a message forum, visitor
log, comment field, etc.
XSS Hands-on!!
23
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 24
Where in Mutillidae II?
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 25
A1: Injection
Injection flaws occur when untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a
command or query. The attacker’s hostile data can trick the interpreter into
executing unintended commands or accessing data without proper
authorization.
Types of Injection:
● SQL Injection - Anywhere input value is being executed as a database
query.
● OS Command Injection - Anywhere input is being executed as a command.
● Hibernate Query Language (HQL), LDAP, XPath, XQuery, XSLT, XML and
many more
Injection Hands-on!!
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 27
Where in Mutillidae II?
For SQL Injections -
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 28
Where in Mutillidae II?
For OS Command Injection -
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 29
A3 : Sensitive Data Exposure
Many web applications do not properly protect sensitive
data, such as credit cards, tax IDs, and authentication
credentials. Sometimes data pertaining to the
configuration of systems is also leaked by error messages
or forgotten debug pages.
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 30
A3 : Sensitive Data Exposure
Scenario #1: An application encrypts credit card numbers in a database using
automatic database encryption. However, this data is automatically decrypted when
retrieved, allowing an SQL injection flaw to retrieve credit card numbers in clear text.
Scenario #2: A site doesn't use or enforce TLS for all pages, or if it supports weak
encryption. An attacker simply monitors network traffic, strips or intercepts the TLS (like
an open wireless network), and steals the user's session cookie.The attacker then
replays this cookie and hijacks the user's (authenticated) session, accessing or
modifying the user's private data. Instead of the above he could alter all transported
data, e.g. the recipient of a money transfer.
Scenario #3: The password database uses unsalted hashes to store everyone's
passwords. A file upload flaw allows an attacker to retrieve the password database. All
the unsalted hashes can be exposed with a rainbow table of pre-calculated hashes.
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 31
Where do we miss it
● Access to some unwanted files.
● Poor encryption mechanism.
● Not using HTTPS
Sensitive Data Exposure Hands-on!!
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 33
A2 : Broken Authentication
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 34
A2 : Broken Authentication
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 35
A2 : Broken Authentication
Session management is a critical piece of application
security. It is broader risk, and requires developers take
care of protecting session id, user credential secure
storage, session duration, and protecting critical session
data in transit.
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 36
How A2 can happen?
● SQL Injection.
● Weak passwords and Password retrieval mechanisms
● Not handling session ids properly which leads to
privilege escalation or elevation of privilege.
● Cookies (Unencrypted, not securing them properly)
Broken Authentication Hands-on!!
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 38
Set up Proxy on firefox!!
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 39
Set up your burp Proxy!!
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 40
Interceptor on burp
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 41
A9 : Using components with known vulnerabilities
Components such as libraries, frameworks & other
modules, almost always run with privileges. Exploitation
of a vulnerable component can cause serious data loss or
server takeover. Apps using components with known
vulnerabilities may undermine app defenses and enable a
range of attacks.
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 42
Where
● Technology we use.
● Third party libraries
○ Programing languages/ frameworks
○ Node modules
○ Charting libraries
○ Many more...
● Any tools or softwares installed.
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 43
A9 : Recent Times
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 44
Where to check and how to protect?
● https://www.cvedetails.com/
Use dependency checkers..
● https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Dependency_Check
● https://github.com/nodesecurity/nsp
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 45
A4 : XML External Entity (XXE)
Many older or poorly configured XML processors evaluate external entity
references within XML documents. External entities can be used to
disclose internal files using the file URI handler, internal SMB file shares
on unpatched Windows servers, internal port scanning, remote code
execution, and denial of service attacks, such as the Billion Laughs attack.
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 46
A4 : XML External Entity (XXE)
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 47
A8 : Insecure Deserialization
Web servers and applications can leak information and
allow attackers to take control over systems using
misconfigurations either arising out of weak defaults,
hidden applications or via enhanced functionality that
causes the app to become vulnerable.
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 48
A8 : Insecure Deserialization - Example
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 49
A5 : Broken Access Control
Restrictions on what authenticated users are allowed to do are
not properly enforced. Attackers can exploit these flaws to
access unauthorized functionality and/or data, such as access
other users' accounts, view sensitive files, modify other users’
data, change access rights, etc.
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 50
A6 : Security Misconfiguration
Web servers and applications can leak information and allow
attackers to take control over systems using misconfigurations either
arising out of weak defaults, hidden applications or via enhanced
functionality that causes the app to become vulnerable.
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 51
A6 : Security Misconfiguration
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 52
A6 : Security Misconfiguration
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute. 53
A10 : Insufficient Logging and Monitoring
Insufficient logging and monitoring, coupled with missing or
ineffective integration with incident response allows attackers to
further attack systems, maintain persistence, pivot to more systems,
and tamper, extract or destroy data. Most breach studies show time
to detect a breach is over 200 days, typically detected by external
parties rather than internal processes or monitoring.
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute.
● What do you log?
● Where do you log?
● When do you log?
● Why do you log?
● Is this log sufficient?
54
A10 : Insufficient Logging and Monitoring
A system is secure if and only if it
starts in a secure state and cannot
enter an insecure state!!
©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Do not copy. Do not distribute.
References
● https://blog.sqreen.io/reflected-xss/
● https://news.netcraft.com/archives/2008/05/16/paypal_xss_vulnerability_undermines_ev_ssl_security.html
● https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/10/31/wordpress_security_fix_4_8_3/
● https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ne3bv7/equifax-breach-social-security-numbers-researcher-
warning
● http://www.information-age.com/10-cyber-security-trends-look-2017-123463680/
● http://www.information-age.com/10-biggest-hacks-rocked-business-world-2017-123469857/
● http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/
● https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/data-breach/the-16-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-
century.html
● http://fortune.com/2017/06/22/cybersecurity-hacks-history/
● https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_data_breaches
● http://codecurmudgeon.com/wp/sql-injection-hall-of-shame/
● https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/25/deloitte-hit-by-cyber-attack-revealing-clients-secret-
emails
THANK YOU
For questions or suggestions mailto:
amit.gundiyal@thoughtworks.com
nalinim@thoughtworks.com

vodQA(Pune) 2018 - QAing the security way

  • 1.
    QAing the SecurityWay! Amit & Null vodQA, Pune 17th March 2018
  • 2.
    “A system issecure if it behaves precisely in the manner intended - and does nothing more” - Ivan Arce
  • 3.
    Amit Gundiyal Senior Consultant- Quality Analyst at ThoughtWorks, Inc 6+ years of experience (as Dev, QA & BA) About Me
  • 4.
    Nalinikanth AKA Null AboutMe Senior Consultant - Quality Analyst at ThoughtWorks, Inc 5+ years of experience
  • 5.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 5 Ground Rules ● Follow the speaker ○ Don’t get deviated. ○ If you are stuck call any of the volunteers. ● We will share you all the material don’t bother about that. ● Ask questions whenever you have - don’t wait. ● MOST IMPORTANT!
  • 6.
    Information Technology Act2000 Imprisonment upto 5 years and / or with fine upto ₹5,00,000 http://www.itlaw.in/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Technology_Act,_2000
  • 7.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 7 What to expect? ● Talk about QAing and Security. ● OWASP TOP 10 ● Hands on few OWASP threats. ● We will be using tools to do an attack, but will not go in depth on the tools.
  • 8.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 8 Agenda ● What and Why of security ? ● QA role in testing security. ● OWASP TOP 10 ● Hands on security vulnerabilities
  • 9.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 9 What and Why of Security Testing? In 2017 ● Verizon: 14 Millions of customer records exposed in security lapse. ● Verifone: the largest maker of point-of-sale credit card terminals used across world. ● Deloitte: Embarrassingly for the accounting firm who pride themselves on their Cyber Intelligence Centre, Deloitte fell victim to a cyber attack in March. ● Deep Root Analytics: A data analytics firm, to gather political information about U.S. voters. Chris Vickery, a cyber risk analyst, discovered that the sensitive information Deep Root Analytics obtained–personal data for roughly 198 million American citizens. ● Virgin America: In a letter to employees, airline Virgin America revealed that a hacker had successfully entered their corporate network gaining access to login information and passwords used by employees to access the network. ● Equifax: one of the three largest credit agencies in the U.S., suffered a breach that may affect 143 million consumers.
  • 10.
  • 11.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 11 What a QA has? ● End to end knowledge. ● One who tests almost everything in the system. ● Implement security thinking. ● Add security analysis to stories. ● Identify where security can possibly go for toss. ● Test the stories if they are vulnerable. ● Help team build more security products What a QA can do?
  • 12.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 12 QA could have stopped this https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/6421/
  • 13.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 13 Let's start with a story
  • 14.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 14 OWASP ● Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) ● Online community, which creates freely-available articles, tools, methodologies, documentation, and technologies in the field of web application security. ● Not-for-profit charitable organization. ● Focussed on improving the security of software. ● Currently has over 150+ active projects
  • 15.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 15 OWASP Top 10 ● List the 10 most critical web application security risks. ● A powerful awareness document. ● Published at regular intervals. ● Approximately once in 3 years. ● Last published in 2017
  • 16.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 16 OWASP Top 10 - 2013 vs 2017
  • 17.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 17 Tools we are using today ● OWASP Mutillidae II - Application to attack ● Burp suite to intercept requests (we can use ZAP as well) ● Python to steal cookie
  • 18.
    What causes mostof the attacks?
  • 19.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 19 User Input - Surface Area I don’t like user input and this is why I don’t
  • 20.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 20 A7: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) XSS flaws occur whenever an application takes untrusted data and sends it to a web browser without proper validation or escaping. XSS allows attackers to execute scripts in the victim’s browser which can: ● hijack user sessions ● deface web sites ● redirect the user to malicious sites.
  • 21.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 21 A7: How XSS works?
  • 22.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 22 Types of XSS ● Reflected XSS ○ Reflected XSS occurs when user input is immediately returned by a web application in an error message, search result, etc. and without permanently storing the user provided data. ● Stored XSS ○ Stored XSS generally occurs when user input is stored on the target server, such as in a database, in a message forum, visitor log, comment field, etc.
  • 23.
  • 24.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 24 Where in Mutillidae II?
  • 25.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 25 A1: Injection Injection flaws occur when untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The attacker’s hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended commands or accessing data without proper authorization. Types of Injection: ● SQL Injection - Anywhere input value is being executed as a database query. ● OS Command Injection - Anywhere input is being executed as a command. ● Hibernate Query Language (HQL), LDAP, XPath, XQuery, XSLT, XML and many more
  • 26.
  • 27.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 27 Where in Mutillidae II? For SQL Injections -
  • 28.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 28 Where in Mutillidae II? For OS Command Injection -
  • 29.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 29 A3 : Sensitive Data Exposure Many web applications do not properly protect sensitive data, such as credit cards, tax IDs, and authentication credentials. Sometimes data pertaining to the configuration of systems is also leaked by error messages or forgotten debug pages.
  • 30.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 30 A3 : Sensitive Data Exposure Scenario #1: An application encrypts credit card numbers in a database using automatic database encryption. However, this data is automatically decrypted when retrieved, allowing an SQL injection flaw to retrieve credit card numbers in clear text. Scenario #2: A site doesn't use or enforce TLS for all pages, or if it supports weak encryption. An attacker simply monitors network traffic, strips or intercepts the TLS (like an open wireless network), and steals the user's session cookie.The attacker then replays this cookie and hijacks the user's (authenticated) session, accessing or modifying the user's private data. Instead of the above he could alter all transported data, e.g. the recipient of a money transfer. Scenario #3: The password database uses unsalted hashes to store everyone's passwords. A file upload flaw allows an attacker to retrieve the password database. All the unsalted hashes can be exposed with a rainbow table of pre-calculated hashes.
  • 31.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 31 Where do we miss it ● Access to some unwanted files. ● Poor encryption mechanism. ● Not using HTTPS
  • 32.
  • 33.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 33 A2 : Broken Authentication
  • 34.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 34 A2 : Broken Authentication
  • 35.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 35 A2 : Broken Authentication Session management is a critical piece of application security. It is broader risk, and requires developers take care of protecting session id, user credential secure storage, session duration, and protecting critical session data in transit.
  • 36.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 36 How A2 can happen? ● SQL Injection. ● Weak passwords and Password retrieval mechanisms ● Not handling session ids properly which leads to privilege escalation or elevation of privilege. ● Cookies (Unencrypted, not securing them properly)
  • 37.
  • 38.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 38 Set up Proxy on firefox!!
  • 39.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 39 Set up your burp Proxy!!
  • 40.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 40 Interceptor on burp
  • 41.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 41 A9 : Using components with known vulnerabilities Components such as libraries, frameworks & other modules, almost always run with privileges. Exploitation of a vulnerable component can cause serious data loss or server takeover. Apps using components with known vulnerabilities may undermine app defenses and enable a range of attacks.
  • 42.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 42 Where ● Technology we use. ● Third party libraries ○ Programing languages/ frameworks ○ Node modules ○ Charting libraries ○ Many more... ● Any tools or softwares installed.
  • 43.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 43 A9 : Recent Times
  • 44.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 44 Where to check and how to protect? ● https://www.cvedetails.com/ Use dependency checkers.. ● https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Dependency_Check ● https://github.com/nodesecurity/nsp
  • 45.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 45 A4 : XML External Entity (XXE) Many older or poorly configured XML processors evaluate external entity references within XML documents. External entities can be used to disclose internal files using the file URI handler, internal SMB file shares on unpatched Windows servers, internal port scanning, remote code execution, and denial of service attacks, such as the Billion Laughs attack.
  • 46.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 46 A4 : XML External Entity (XXE)
  • 47.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 47 A8 : Insecure Deserialization Web servers and applications can leak information and allow attackers to take control over systems using misconfigurations either arising out of weak defaults, hidden applications or via enhanced functionality that causes the app to become vulnerable.
  • 48.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 48 A8 : Insecure Deserialization - Example
  • 49.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 49 A5 : Broken Access Control Restrictions on what authenticated users are allowed to do are not properly enforced. Attackers can exploit these flaws to access unauthorized functionality and/or data, such as access other users' accounts, view sensitive files, modify other users’ data, change access rights, etc.
  • 50.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 50 A6 : Security Misconfiguration Web servers and applications can leak information and allow attackers to take control over systems using misconfigurations either arising out of weak defaults, hidden applications or via enhanced functionality that causes the app to become vulnerable.
  • 51.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 51 A6 : Security Misconfiguration
  • 52.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 52 A6 : Security Misconfiguration
  • 53.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. 53 A10 : Insufficient Logging and Monitoring Insufficient logging and monitoring, coupled with missing or ineffective integration with incident response allows attackers to further attack systems, maintain persistence, pivot to more systems, and tamper, extract or destroy data. Most breach studies show time to detect a breach is over 200 days, typically detected by external parties rather than internal processes or monitoring.
  • 54.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. ● What do you log? ● Where do you log? ● When do you log? ● Why do you log? ● Is this log sufficient? 54 A10 : Insufficient Logging and Monitoring
  • 55.
    A system issecure if and only if it starts in a secure state and cannot enter an insecure state!!
  • 56.
    ©ThoughtWorks, Inc. Donot copy. Do not distribute. References ● https://blog.sqreen.io/reflected-xss/ ● https://news.netcraft.com/archives/2008/05/16/paypal_xss_vulnerability_undermines_ev_ssl_security.html ● https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/10/31/wordpress_security_fix_4_8_3/ ● https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ne3bv7/equifax-breach-social-security-numbers-researcher- warning ● http://www.information-age.com/10-cyber-security-trends-look-2017-123463680/ ● http://www.information-age.com/10-biggest-hacks-rocked-business-world-2017-123469857/ ● http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/ ● https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/data-breach/the-16-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st- century.html ● http://fortune.com/2017/06/22/cybersecurity-hacks-history/ ● https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_data_breaches ● http://codecurmudgeon.com/wp/sql-injection-hall-of-shame/ ● https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/25/deloitte-hit-by-cyber-attack-revealing-clients-secret- emails
  • 57.
    THANK YOU For questionsor suggestions mailto: amit.gundiyal@thoughtworks.com nalinim@thoughtworks.com