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ExPetr Ransomware
Another global scale situation...
Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade (@juanandres_gs)
GReAT, Kaspersky Lab
Matt Suiche (@msuiche)
Comae Technologies
What you need to know about ExPetr ransomware
Summary
First appeared on 27th June 2017.
Variant of Ransom:Win32/Petya
Initial infection involving Ukrainian company M.E.Doc confirmed by Microsoft
Spreads on the local domain network
Encrypts files (AES128)
Replaces MBR and display a fake identifier or “installation” key.
No way to recover files so far.
Step 1. Supply Chain Attack
• Initial mass deployment as
described by Microsoft MMPC
Team.
• “perfc.dat” being the malware.
Step 2 - Lateral movement (Propagation)
• #1 Stolen credentials
• Stealing credentials via mimikatz variant to try to recover Administrator
credentials.
• Attempts to copy & execute itself using stolen credentials and using either
PSExec or WMIC
• #2 ETERNALBLUE + ETERNALROMANCE
• Originally leaked in April by a group called TheShadowBrokers
• SMB remote code execution exploits.
• Attempts to exploit Windows machines with no MS17-010 patch.
• ETERNALBLUE previously used in WannaCry (see previous Webinar)
• Uses simple XOR encoding to evade signature based detection.
Step 3. Destruction
Once access on a machine is gained:
• The malware encrypts the files
• Changes the MBR for with the fake bootloader.
What you need to know about ExPetr ransomware
Files Encryption
• Affected files
.3ds,.7z,.accdb,.ai,.asp,.aspx,.avhd,.back,.bak,.c,.cfg,.conf,.cpp,.cs,.ctl,.dbf,.disk,.dj
vu,.doc,.docx,.dwg,.eml,.fdb,.gz,.h,.hdd,.kdbx,.mail,.mdb,.msg,.nrg,.ora,.ost,.ova,.ovf,.p
df,.php,.pmf,.ppt,.pptx,.pst,.pvi,.py,.pyc,.rar,.rtf,.sln,.sql,.tar,.vbox,.vbs,.vcb,.vdi,.
vfd,.vmc,.vmdk,.vmsd,.vmx,.vsdx,.vsv,.work,.xls,.xlsx,.xvd,.zip
• C:WINDOWS is excluded.
• The delta between the “installation” key from the README.txt and the boot screen
shows there is no intent from the attacker to provide decryption keys.
• MFT table erased, so README.txt is only recoverable forensically from the raw disk
image.
What you need to know about ExPetr ransomware
MBR
What you need to know about ExPetr ransomware
Personal Installation Key Inconsistency
Installation Key
Random Key Generated and stored in MBR
Victim Distribution
Infection Vectors: Watering Hole
Ukrainian news agency site
waterholed
Only targets Ukrainian visitors
Served 30Kb exPetr variant with
no spreading capabilities
Infection Vectors: Malicious MeDoc Update
• Cisco Talos points to MeDoc Ukrainian tax accounting software pushing
malicious update
• Execution chain confirmed in Kaspersky Security Network telemetry
Who are the attackers?
Well thought out, determined threat actor–
• Well-chosen supply-chain attack
• Compromised several sites to waterhole same target country
• Implemented multiple spreading vectors (2x 1-days, Creds + WMIC/PsExec)
Incompetent file-kidnapper–
• Single BTC Wallet – all funds monitored
• Single Email for victim contact – shutdown within hours
• Broken installation ID mechanism – can’t actually decrypt files, no trust
Mitigations: Active Directory Security
• Best Practices for Securing Active Directory
• Securing Active Directory is its own speciality.
• Don’t underestimate its complexity.
• Filter user privileges, password policy, privileges per group etc.
• Many organization do not have an Active Directory Security go-to person.
• See Lessons from TV5Monde 2015 hack for an English summary of the French
National Security incident-response and recovery plan.
Mitigations: SMB
• If you haven’t yet: MS17-010
• KB4012598 - Emergency patch released by Microsoft on Friday for XP & 2003
• Disable SMBv1 to reduce your attack surface (KB2696547)
• Shadow Volumes can be deleted.
• Connected backups will be encrypted.
• Backups have to be kept disconnected
• Insurance policy against both ransomware & wiper attacks
• Test your backups before you need them
Mitigations: Offline Backups!
Priorities & Mitigations: Block and Rollback!
• Network Level:
• If possible, block incoming traffic to TCP Port 445
• Modern Anti-Malware Solution:
• Strong Heuristics
• Free anti-ransom tool available for businesses
• https://go.kaspersky.com/Anti-ransomware-tool.html
• Kaspersky Users:
• Make sure System Watcher is not disabled (on by default)
Mitigations: Secure Boot
Frequently Asked Questions
Can encrypted files be recovered ?
No viable solution to recover the encrypted files had been found yet.
Should I pay ?
No. First, the ransom email is down. Secondly, the boot screen installation key is
randomly generated.
Did Microsoft released patches for those vulnerabilities ?
Yes, MS17-010 in March (Vista+), KB4012598 on Friday 14 May (< Vista)
Will @Bitcoin be able refund those who have already paid?
No
Additional resources
https://blog.kaspersky.com/wannacry-protection-livestream/16588/
https://blog.comae.io/byata-enhanced-wannacry-a3ddd6c8dabb
https://securelist.com/schroedingers-petya/78870/
https://securelist.com/expetrpetyanotpetya-is-a-wiper-not-ransomware/78902/
https://blog.comae.io/lessons-from-tv5monde-2015-hack-c4d62f07849d
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/06/27/new-ransomware-old-techniques-petya-adds-worm-capabilities/
https://blog.comae.io/byata-enhanced-wannacry-a3ddd6c8dabb

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What you need to know about ExPetr ransomware

  • 1. ExPetr Ransomware Another global scale situation... Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade (@juanandres_gs) GReAT, Kaspersky Lab Matt Suiche (@msuiche) Comae Technologies
  • 3. Summary First appeared on 27th June 2017. Variant of Ransom:Win32/Petya Initial infection involving Ukrainian company M.E.Doc confirmed by Microsoft Spreads on the local domain network Encrypts files (AES128) Replaces MBR and display a fake identifier or “installation” key. No way to recover files so far.
  • 4. Step 1. Supply Chain Attack • Initial mass deployment as described by Microsoft MMPC Team. • “perfc.dat” being the malware.
  • 5. Step 2 - Lateral movement (Propagation) • #1 Stolen credentials • Stealing credentials via mimikatz variant to try to recover Administrator credentials. • Attempts to copy & execute itself using stolen credentials and using either PSExec or WMIC • #2 ETERNALBLUE + ETERNALROMANCE • Originally leaked in April by a group called TheShadowBrokers • SMB remote code execution exploits. • Attempts to exploit Windows machines with no MS17-010 patch. • ETERNALBLUE previously used in WannaCry (see previous Webinar) • Uses simple XOR encoding to evade signature based detection.
  • 6. Step 3. Destruction Once access on a machine is gained: • The malware encrypts the files • Changes the MBR for with the fake bootloader.
  • 8. Files Encryption • Affected files .3ds,.7z,.accdb,.ai,.asp,.aspx,.avhd,.back,.bak,.c,.cfg,.conf,.cpp,.cs,.ctl,.dbf,.disk,.dj vu,.doc,.docx,.dwg,.eml,.fdb,.gz,.h,.hdd,.kdbx,.mail,.mdb,.msg,.nrg,.ora,.ost,.ova,.ovf,.p df,.php,.pmf,.ppt,.pptx,.pst,.pvi,.py,.pyc,.rar,.rtf,.sln,.sql,.tar,.vbox,.vbs,.vcb,.vdi,. vfd,.vmc,.vmdk,.vmsd,.vmx,.vsdx,.vsv,.work,.xls,.xlsx,.xvd,.zip • C:WINDOWS is excluded. • The delta between the “installation” key from the README.txt and the boot screen shows there is no intent from the attacker to provide decryption keys. • MFT table erased, so README.txt is only recoverable forensically from the raw disk image.
  • 10. MBR
  • 12. Personal Installation Key Inconsistency
  • 14. Random Key Generated and stored in MBR
  • 16. Infection Vectors: Watering Hole Ukrainian news agency site waterholed Only targets Ukrainian visitors Served 30Kb exPetr variant with no spreading capabilities
  • 17. Infection Vectors: Malicious MeDoc Update • Cisco Talos points to MeDoc Ukrainian tax accounting software pushing malicious update • Execution chain confirmed in Kaspersky Security Network telemetry
  • 18. Who are the attackers? Well thought out, determined threat actor– • Well-chosen supply-chain attack • Compromised several sites to waterhole same target country • Implemented multiple spreading vectors (2x 1-days, Creds + WMIC/PsExec) Incompetent file-kidnapper– • Single BTC Wallet – all funds monitored • Single Email for victim contact – shutdown within hours • Broken installation ID mechanism – can’t actually decrypt files, no trust
  • 19. Mitigations: Active Directory Security • Best Practices for Securing Active Directory • Securing Active Directory is its own speciality. • Don’t underestimate its complexity. • Filter user privileges, password policy, privileges per group etc. • Many organization do not have an Active Directory Security go-to person. • See Lessons from TV5Monde 2015 hack for an English summary of the French National Security incident-response and recovery plan.
  • 20. Mitigations: SMB • If you haven’t yet: MS17-010 • KB4012598 - Emergency patch released by Microsoft on Friday for XP & 2003 • Disable SMBv1 to reduce your attack surface (KB2696547)
  • 21. • Shadow Volumes can be deleted. • Connected backups will be encrypted. • Backups have to be kept disconnected • Insurance policy against both ransomware & wiper attacks • Test your backups before you need them Mitigations: Offline Backups!
  • 22. Priorities & Mitigations: Block and Rollback! • Network Level: • If possible, block incoming traffic to TCP Port 445 • Modern Anti-Malware Solution: • Strong Heuristics • Free anti-ransom tool available for businesses • https://go.kaspersky.com/Anti-ransomware-tool.html • Kaspersky Users: • Make sure System Watcher is not disabled (on by default)
  • 24. Frequently Asked Questions Can encrypted files be recovered ? No viable solution to recover the encrypted files had been found yet. Should I pay ? No. First, the ransom email is down. Secondly, the boot screen installation key is randomly generated. Did Microsoft released patches for those vulnerabilities ? Yes, MS17-010 in March (Vista+), KB4012598 on Friday 14 May (< Vista) Will @Bitcoin be able refund those who have already paid? No