This document provides an introduction and background to the author's account of the US Army in Afghanistan. The author has observed Afghanistan closely since 2004 as a consultant based in Kabul. Drawing from his experience in the Pakistani military and conversations with ISI officers, the author analyzes the geopolitical factors influencing the US presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan's view of its "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. The author argues that the real obstacle to US goals in Afghanistan has been the Pakistani establishment centered in Rawalpindi and Islamabad, not minor players attacked by drones or in the Afghan surge.
General Musharraf carried out a brilliant strategic deception of the US after their occupation of Afghanistan. The US failed to understand key realities, including that Pakistan saw Afghanistan as strategic depth and its proxies like the Taliban controlled much of the Pashtun south. The US wasted years with unrealistic objectives and failed to address the core issues of Pakistan's role and its dispute with India over Kashmir. As a result, the US surge was futile and they suffered unnecessary casualties while the Taliban recovered in Pakistan. A compromise respecting Pakistani influence may have avoided US failure in Afghanistan.
Mattis is strategically clueless more naieve than naievest milkmaidAgha A
General Mattis' comments about broadening common ground with Pakistan are criticized by the author. The author argues that Mattis and other high-ranking US military officials primarily seek to advance their own careers rather than make strategic decisions in the best interests of the US. Additionally, the author asserts that Pakistan's military establishment, including the ISI, have been the real opponents of the US in Afghanistan, having used the country as a proxy battleground, while the US has failed to recognize and address this strategic reality. The author believes the US occupation of Afghanistan has been a failure of US policy due to its unwillingness to accommodate Pakistani influence in the region.
This document provides a firsthand account of British Army operations in Afghanistan from 2004-2014 as seen by the author, a consultant who worked in Afghanistan during that time. It describes how the British operations lacked clear strategy and purpose, with troops sent into Helmand province in small, vulnerable groups ("penny packets") without sufficient consideration for the local conditions and threat of the Taliban. This approach directly played into the hands of the Taliban and resulted in needless British casualties. Political leaders like Tony Blair sent the troops to Afghanistan without a coherent strategic aim, simply to appease the US, while ignoring local dynamics and making the soldiers targets.
Pak US relations : Media & Current Affairs : Student CollaborationAli Haider Saeed
An illustration of student-teacher collaborative discussion model in the subject of Media & Current Affairs during the Fall session 2020, Students engaged in the discussion on Pak US Relations
This document provides a summary of the British Army's operations in Afghanistan during the Fourth Afghan War from the perspective of the author, who worked as a consultant in Afghanistan from 2004-present. Some key points:
- The author witnessed British Army operations firsthand and argues they lacked clear strategy, with troops sent into Helmand province in small groups without adequate consideration of risks.
- Political motivations like currying favor with the US and opportunities for career advancement led to poor military decisions by British leaders.
- Troops were vulnerable to ambush walking into traps set by the Taliban, who stepped up operations in Helmand in response to the British presence.
- Without proper strategy or understanding of local dynamics,
The document provides an overview of Pak-US relations and the effects of the Russian-Afghan war on Pakistan. It discusses how Pakistan allied with the US due to shared anti-communist goals. Pakistan faced costs for this alliance like refugee crises, drugs/weapons trafficking, and sectarian violence. The US provided billions in aid but also cut off support at times. Ultimately, the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988 was a major world event but left civil war in Afghanistan and ongoing issues for Pakistan.
PAKISTAN - United States Relations ($2 BillionYearFrom 911 Attacks)VogelDenise
The relations between Pakistan and the United States began in 1947 when Pakistan gained independence. Pakistan initially sought to establish close ties with both the US and Soviet Union, but ultimately aligned with the US due to economic and military assistance from the US and shared opposition to Soviet influence in the region. Throughout the Cold War era, the US viewed Pakistan as a strategic ally and anti-communist partner, providing substantial aid. However, tensions arose at times due to Pakistan's internal political conflicts and wars with India. The relationship has been both cooperative and strained at different points in both countries' histories.
General Musharraf carried out a brilliant strategic deception of the US after their occupation of Afghanistan. The US failed to understand key realities, including that Pakistan saw Afghanistan as strategic depth and its proxies like the Taliban controlled much of the Pashtun south. The US wasted years with unrealistic objectives and failed to address the core issues of Pakistan's role and its dispute with India over Kashmir. As a result, the US surge was futile and they suffered unnecessary casualties while the Taliban recovered in Pakistan. A compromise respecting Pakistani influence may have avoided US failure in Afghanistan.
Mattis is strategically clueless more naieve than naievest milkmaidAgha A
General Mattis' comments about broadening common ground with Pakistan are criticized by the author. The author argues that Mattis and other high-ranking US military officials primarily seek to advance their own careers rather than make strategic decisions in the best interests of the US. Additionally, the author asserts that Pakistan's military establishment, including the ISI, have been the real opponents of the US in Afghanistan, having used the country as a proxy battleground, while the US has failed to recognize and address this strategic reality. The author believes the US occupation of Afghanistan has been a failure of US policy due to its unwillingness to accommodate Pakistani influence in the region.
This document provides a firsthand account of British Army operations in Afghanistan from 2004-2014 as seen by the author, a consultant who worked in Afghanistan during that time. It describes how the British operations lacked clear strategy and purpose, with troops sent into Helmand province in small, vulnerable groups ("penny packets") without sufficient consideration for the local conditions and threat of the Taliban. This approach directly played into the hands of the Taliban and resulted in needless British casualties. Political leaders like Tony Blair sent the troops to Afghanistan without a coherent strategic aim, simply to appease the US, while ignoring local dynamics and making the soldiers targets.
Pak US relations : Media & Current Affairs : Student CollaborationAli Haider Saeed
An illustration of student-teacher collaborative discussion model in the subject of Media & Current Affairs during the Fall session 2020, Students engaged in the discussion on Pak US Relations
This document provides a summary of the British Army's operations in Afghanistan during the Fourth Afghan War from the perspective of the author, who worked as a consultant in Afghanistan from 2004-present. Some key points:
- The author witnessed British Army operations firsthand and argues they lacked clear strategy, with troops sent into Helmand province in small groups without adequate consideration of risks.
- Political motivations like currying favor with the US and opportunities for career advancement led to poor military decisions by British leaders.
- Troops were vulnerable to ambush walking into traps set by the Taliban, who stepped up operations in Helmand in response to the British presence.
- Without proper strategy or understanding of local dynamics,
The document provides an overview of Pak-US relations and the effects of the Russian-Afghan war on Pakistan. It discusses how Pakistan allied with the US due to shared anti-communist goals. Pakistan faced costs for this alliance like refugee crises, drugs/weapons trafficking, and sectarian violence. The US provided billions in aid but also cut off support at times. Ultimately, the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988 was a major world event but left civil war in Afghanistan and ongoing issues for Pakistan.
PAKISTAN - United States Relations ($2 BillionYearFrom 911 Attacks)VogelDenise
The relations between Pakistan and the United States began in 1947 when Pakistan gained independence. Pakistan initially sought to establish close ties with both the US and Soviet Union, but ultimately aligned with the US due to economic and military assistance from the US and shared opposition to Soviet influence in the region. Throughout the Cold War era, the US viewed Pakistan as a strategic ally and anti-communist partner, providing substantial aid. However, tensions arose at times due to Pakistan's internal political conflicts and wars with India. The relationship has been both cooperative and strained at different points in both countries' histories.
The document discusses obstacles and steps taken to improve relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some initial obstacles included Afghanistan not recognizing Pakistan, a border dispute, Afghanistan supporting separatist movements in Pakistan and breaking diplomatic relations multiple times. However, both countries also took steps like high-level visits in 1956 and 1973 to improve relations. Pakistan also accommodated Afghan refugees and allowed transit access.
These reports have been made by me and my classmates at IBA Karachi. The sole purpose of putting these reports here is to help the free flow of knowledge to everyone.
Pakistan and China established diplomatic relations in 1947 after Pakistan gained independence. However, they could not become strong allies initially due to Pakistan's alliance with the US and China being a communist state. Relations strengthened in the 1960s as China supported Pakistan in its territorial disputes with India and provided economic assistance. China also aided Pakistan militarily during its wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Cooperation between the two countries continued to grow in subsequent decades, including the building of the Karakoram Highway connecting them and increased nuclear cooperation.
This document provides background information and key details about the 1965 war between India and Pakistan over the disputed Kashmir region. It discusses the causes of the war, including territorial disputes and Pakistan's desire to take Kashmir by force. It describes some major battles between Indian and Pakistani forces, and notes that the war ended in a stalemate. The aftermath saw international pressure and a ceasefire negotiated in Tashkent that restored the pre-war status quo.
A mediocre narrative from a commader assigned with a great strategic responsi...Agha A
- The document discusses Pakistan's strategic concept of "Defence of East Pakistan lies in the West" formulated in the late 1950s. It analyzes weaknesses in this concept, including a lack of clarity in execution plans and not accounting for India's growing military superiority.
- Pakistan failed to preserve its "freedom of manoeuvre" by not launching a counteroffensive in the West early in the 1971 war. This allowed India to conquer East Pakistan without facing pressure elsewhere.
- Even if launched, Pakistan's planned counteroffensive by 1 Corps held no guarantee of success and may have resulted in heavy losses, without relieving pressure on East Pakistan. Other offensive options may have had a better chance of threatening Indian
National defence university of pakistan and other pakistani military mattersAgha A
This document provides a lengthy critique of Aqil Shah's book "The Army and Democracy" which analyzes the relationship between the Pakistani military and democracy. The critique argues that Shah's analysis is overly simplistic and makes numerous factual inaccuracies. It disagrees with many of Shah's arguments, such as his views on Jinnah and the inevitability of military coups in Pakistan. The critique takes issue with Shah overlooking the destabilizing impact of the 1916 Lucknow Pact and argues the military was not the sole factor influencing Pakistan's political development.
The 1962 Sino-Indian War was fought between China and India along their disputed border. China defeated India's ill-prepared forces in the high altitude terrain of Ladakh. This war had significant consequences for regional geopolitics. It weakened India's non-alignment policy and led it to seek allies among foreign powers. Pakistan supported China in the conflict and their alliance strengthened. The war also impacted the India-Pakistan relationship over Kashmir. Long term, China's influence in South Asia rose as it gained an important ally in Pakistan.
This document provides an overview of the history of Afghanistan and Pakistan-Afghanistan relations from 1947 to post-9/11. It discusses the phases of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan over time, covering events like the Durand Line agreement, opposition to Pakistan's formation, and periods of cooperation and conflict, including Pakistan's support for the mujahideen against the Soviets and the Taliban government. After 9/11, the document notes Pakistan aligned with the US against al-Qaeda but tried to mediate for a peaceful solution, and continued supporting Afghanistan's government and elections.
1) The document discusses Pakistan's foreign policy and alliances in the 1960s under President Ayub Khan. It describes how Pakistan initially aligned closely with the US but then began developing relations with other countries like China and the Soviet Union, which angered the US.
2) It outlines US pressure and threats to cut economic assistance if Pakistan did not change its foreign policy. This came to a head during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, when Pakistan accepted a ceasefire under pressure from the international community, especially the US.
3) The document criticizes Pakistan's submission to external pressures and demands during this time period and argues the country should pursue its national interests instead of trying to please international powers like the US
1. Afghanistan has borders with Pakistan, former Soviet republics, Iran, and a short border with China. It became a unified state in the 1700s but remained poor and underdeveloped.
2. In the 20th century, Afghanistan had shifting alliances with Britain and the Soviet Union. A communist coup in 1978 installed a pro-Soviet government and led to a Soviet invasion in 1979 to support the new regime.
3. The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 was followed by a civil war and the rise of the Taliban regime in the 1990s. Al Qaeda attacks from Afghanistan in 2001 prompted a U.S.-led invasion that overthrew the Taliban.
The document outlines the changing diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1988. It began with Pakistan refusing Soviet aid and aligning with the US in the 1950s. Relations fluctuated depending on various geopolitical events and alignments, with periods of both cooperation and deterioration. They hit a low point in the late 1970s and 1980s due to Pakistan supporting US efforts in Afghanistan while the Soviet Union occupied the country.
The document summarizes Pakistan and US relations from 1947 to 1971. It discusses how the US was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic ties with Pakistan in 1947. It also explores why Pakistan joined Western alliances like CENTO and SEATO rather than aligning with the Soviet Union, due to factors like its weak economy and need for military and economic assistance. However, the document notes that in the 1965 and 1971 wars, the US did not provide assistance to Pakistan as promised in their agreements, straining relations between the two countries during this time period.
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948 was fought between India and Pakistan over the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu. On October 22nd, 1947, Muslim tribal militias crossed into Kashmir from Pakistan, claiming to suppress a rebellion. The ruler of Kashmir signed an Instrument of Accession to India in exchange for military aid. Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar and defeated the invading forces. The war involved attacks and counterattacks along the ceasefire line, with both sides gaining and losing territory until a UN-mediated ceasefire took effect in January 1949. The ceasefire line later became the Line of Control dividing Kashmir between India and Pakistan.
The document summarizes the 1965 war between Pakistan and India over the disputed region of Kashmir. It provides background on the establishment of Pakistan and conflicts over Kashmir. It describes India's attacks on multiple fronts on September 6, 1965 and the heroic response of the Pakistani military and people in defending their country against overwhelming odds for 17 days, guided by Islamic teachings. It highlights Major Raja Aziz Bhatti's martyrdom during the war and notes that both Pakistan and India awarded their countries' highest military honors to heroes who fought in the war.
The 1962 Sino-Indian War was caused by a dispute over the Himalayan border between China and India. India claimed the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh regions were part of Kashmir, while China saw them as parts of Xinjiang. In 1962, India's forward policy led its army to cut Chinese supply lines and occupy disputed border areas, prompting China to launch attacks. Though China proposed a negotiated settlement and ceasefire, negotiations broke down, and fighting continued until China achieved its objectives and withdrew from the contested regions.
The document summarizes the events at Hot Springs, a disputed border region between India and China, where 10 members of the Indian Central Reserve Police Force were killed in an ambush by Chinese forces on October 21, 1959. It provides background on the territorial dispute and increasing tensions between India and China. It then describes the ambush at Hot Springs in detail and lists the names of the 10 police officers who were killed in action while defending India's border. Every year on October 21st, Martyr's Day is commemorated across India to honor the sacrifice of these police officers. Their memorial at Hot Springs continues to be an important pilgrimage site.
Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) played a key role in supporting Allied forces during the Myitkyina campaign in northern Burma from 1944 to 1945. As the only ground force involved in all parts of the campaign, Detachment 101 evolved from an intelligence collection and sabotage unit to an effective guerrilla force that supported the 5307th Composite Unit, 10th Air Force, and other Allied troops. This article discusses Detachment 101's role in the first two phases of the campaign, where it infiltrated north Burma in advance and then supported efforts to capture the strategic Myitkyina airfield from February to May 1944.
This powerpoint presentation is created by Gyanbikash.com for the students of class nine to ten from their English first part NCTB textbook for multimedia class.
The document summarizes key events of the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. It describes how Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League won democratic elections in Pakistan in 1970 but power was not transferred. The Pakistan military launched a violent crackdown in Bangladesh, leading Bangladesh to declare independence on March 26, 1971. India supported Bangladesh and 10 million Bangladeshis sought refuge in India, straining resources. After international failures to resolve the crisis, India intervened militarily in December 1971, achieving a swift victory and the liberation of Bangladesh.
The document summarizes the events of the 1947-48 Kashmir War between Pakistan and India over control of the princely state of Kashmir. It describes how initially in late 1947, Pakistani tribesmen and militias supported by Pakistani officials gained control of parts of Kashmir, including capturing Muzaffarabad. However, opportunities for further advances towards Srinagar were lost due to disagreements among Pakistani leaders and the tribesmen stopping to celebrate Eid, allowing India to airlift troops to Srinagar and stabilize the front. While Pakistan had initial geographical and other advantages, failures of leadership and coordination prevented them from capitalizing on opportunities to win control of all of Kashmir early in the conflict.
The document provides background on Pakistan's use of proxy forces and low-intensity conflicts dating back to independence from Britain. It summarizes that Pakistan viewed Afghanistan as a "massive proxy reservoir" to counter India. When the U.S. withdrew support in 1989, Pakistan aligned with China and continued supporting Taliban proxies in Afghanistan. The author draws on first-hand experiences in Afghanistan and insights from military contacts to analyze U.S. strategy and the role of Pakistan.
USAs NONSENSE AND AIMLESS PEACE PLAN IN AFGHANISTANAgha A
FYI – A geo-political analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan/South Asia. He pulls no punches in his opinion.
Similarly in the book I helped major Amin and Colonel Osinski put together it is stated:
…The very idea of USA talking to Taliban is naive...The Taliban do not represent the whole Afghanistan” (Amin, 2009). “The Taliban are politically rejected by nearly the entire non-Pashtun population (Figure 1). Even among the Pashtun they command polling support of less than 6%” (McCaffrey, 2009). “If any settlement has to be negotiated with them Afghanistan would have to be divided. What the Taliban signify is not acceptable to at least 50 % of Afghans...Any U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in totality would be a great U.S. strategic failure. Even if the USA withdraws it must retain bases because the Afghans respect B 52 s and fear Allah although I doubt the second assertion somewhat. U.S. or NATO withdrawal would lead to a renewed war between the Northern Alliance supported by Russia, India and Iran and the Good Taliban supported by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. There would be no Taliban occupation of Kabul or Mazar (Figure 9). Although the Taliban may practice their brand of Islam at Kandahar and Ghazni Provinces in Afghanistan (Figure 5), the Afghan war would continue as long as the Indian - Pakistani issue is not decided militarily” (Amin 2009). Therein lays a major problem
The document discusses obstacles and steps taken to improve relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some initial obstacles included Afghanistan not recognizing Pakistan, a border dispute, Afghanistan supporting separatist movements in Pakistan and breaking diplomatic relations multiple times. However, both countries also took steps like high-level visits in 1956 and 1973 to improve relations. Pakistan also accommodated Afghan refugees and allowed transit access.
These reports have been made by me and my classmates at IBA Karachi. The sole purpose of putting these reports here is to help the free flow of knowledge to everyone.
Pakistan and China established diplomatic relations in 1947 after Pakistan gained independence. However, they could not become strong allies initially due to Pakistan's alliance with the US and China being a communist state. Relations strengthened in the 1960s as China supported Pakistan in its territorial disputes with India and provided economic assistance. China also aided Pakistan militarily during its wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Cooperation between the two countries continued to grow in subsequent decades, including the building of the Karakoram Highway connecting them and increased nuclear cooperation.
This document provides background information and key details about the 1965 war between India and Pakistan over the disputed Kashmir region. It discusses the causes of the war, including territorial disputes and Pakistan's desire to take Kashmir by force. It describes some major battles between Indian and Pakistani forces, and notes that the war ended in a stalemate. The aftermath saw international pressure and a ceasefire negotiated in Tashkent that restored the pre-war status quo.
A mediocre narrative from a commader assigned with a great strategic responsi...Agha A
- The document discusses Pakistan's strategic concept of "Defence of East Pakistan lies in the West" formulated in the late 1950s. It analyzes weaknesses in this concept, including a lack of clarity in execution plans and not accounting for India's growing military superiority.
- Pakistan failed to preserve its "freedom of manoeuvre" by not launching a counteroffensive in the West early in the 1971 war. This allowed India to conquer East Pakistan without facing pressure elsewhere.
- Even if launched, Pakistan's planned counteroffensive by 1 Corps held no guarantee of success and may have resulted in heavy losses, without relieving pressure on East Pakistan. Other offensive options may have had a better chance of threatening Indian
National defence university of pakistan and other pakistani military mattersAgha A
This document provides a lengthy critique of Aqil Shah's book "The Army and Democracy" which analyzes the relationship between the Pakistani military and democracy. The critique argues that Shah's analysis is overly simplistic and makes numerous factual inaccuracies. It disagrees with many of Shah's arguments, such as his views on Jinnah and the inevitability of military coups in Pakistan. The critique takes issue with Shah overlooking the destabilizing impact of the 1916 Lucknow Pact and argues the military was not the sole factor influencing Pakistan's political development.
The 1962 Sino-Indian War was fought between China and India along their disputed border. China defeated India's ill-prepared forces in the high altitude terrain of Ladakh. This war had significant consequences for regional geopolitics. It weakened India's non-alignment policy and led it to seek allies among foreign powers. Pakistan supported China in the conflict and their alliance strengthened. The war also impacted the India-Pakistan relationship over Kashmir. Long term, China's influence in South Asia rose as it gained an important ally in Pakistan.
This document provides an overview of the history of Afghanistan and Pakistan-Afghanistan relations from 1947 to post-9/11. It discusses the phases of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan over time, covering events like the Durand Line agreement, opposition to Pakistan's formation, and periods of cooperation and conflict, including Pakistan's support for the mujahideen against the Soviets and the Taliban government. After 9/11, the document notes Pakistan aligned with the US against al-Qaeda but tried to mediate for a peaceful solution, and continued supporting Afghanistan's government and elections.
1) The document discusses Pakistan's foreign policy and alliances in the 1960s under President Ayub Khan. It describes how Pakistan initially aligned closely with the US but then began developing relations with other countries like China and the Soviet Union, which angered the US.
2) It outlines US pressure and threats to cut economic assistance if Pakistan did not change its foreign policy. This came to a head during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, when Pakistan accepted a ceasefire under pressure from the international community, especially the US.
3) The document criticizes Pakistan's submission to external pressures and demands during this time period and argues the country should pursue its national interests instead of trying to please international powers like the US
1. Afghanistan has borders with Pakistan, former Soviet republics, Iran, and a short border with China. It became a unified state in the 1700s but remained poor and underdeveloped.
2. In the 20th century, Afghanistan had shifting alliances with Britain and the Soviet Union. A communist coup in 1978 installed a pro-Soviet government and led to a Soviet invasion in 1979 to support the new regime.
3. The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 was followed by a civil war and the rise of the Taliban regime in the 1990s. Al Qaeda attacks from Afghanistan in 2001 prompted a U.S.-led invasion that overthrew the Taliban.
The document outlines the changing diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1988. It began with Pakistan refusing Soviet aid and aligning with the US in the 1950s. Relations fluctuated depending on various geopolitical events and alignments, with periods of both cooperation and deterioration. They hit a low point in the late 1970s and 1980s due to Pakistan supporting US efforts in Afghanistan while the Soviet Union occupied the country.
The document summarizes Pakistan and US relations from 1947 to 1971. It discusses how the US was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic ties with Pakistan in 1947. It also explores why Pakistan joined Western alliances like CENTO and SEATO rather than aligning with the Soviet Union, due to factors like its weak economy and need for military and economic assistance. However, the document notes that in the 1965 and 1971 wars, the US did not provide assistance to Pakistan as promised in their agreements, straining relations between the two countries during this time period.
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948 was fought between India and Pakistan over the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu. On October 22nd, 1947, Muslim tribal militias crossed into Kashmir from Pakistan, claiming to suppress a rebellion. The ruler of Kashmir signed an Instrument of Accession to India in exchange for military aid. Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar and defeated the invading forces. The war involved attacks and counterattacks along the ceasefire line, with both sides gaining and losing territory until a UN-mediated ceasefire took effect in January 1949. The ceasefire line later became the Line of Control dividing Kashmir between India and Pakistan.
The document summarizes the 1965 war between Pakistan and India over the disputed region of Kashmir. It provides background on the establishment of Pakistan and conflicts over Kashmir. It describes India's attacks on multiple fronts on September 6, 1965 and the heroic response of the Pakistani military and people in defending their country against overwhelming odds for 17 days, guided by Islamic teachings. It highlights Major Raja Aziz Bhatti's martyrdom during the war and notes that both Pakistan and India awarded their countries' highest military honors to heroes who fought in the war.
The 1962 Sino-Indian War was caused by a dispute over the Himalayan border between China and India. India claimed the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh regions were part of Kashmir, while China saw them as parts of Xinjiang. In 1962, India's forward policy led its army to cut Chinese supply lines and occupy disputed border areas, prompting China to launch attacks. Though China proposed a negotiated settlement and ceasefire, negotiations broke down, and fighting continued until China achieved its objectives and withdrew from the contested regions.
The document summarizes the events at Hot Springs, a disputed border region between India and China, where 10 members of the Indian Central Reserve Police Force were killed in an ambush by Chinese forces on October 21, 1959. It provides background on the territorial dispute and increasing tensions between India and China. It then describes the ambush at Hot Springs in detail and lists the names of the 10 police officers who were killed in action while defending India's border. Every year on October 21st, Martyr's Day is commemorated across India to honor the sacrifice of these police officers. Their memorial at Hot Springs continues to be an important pilgrimage site.
Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) played a key role in supporting Allied forces during the Myitkyina campaign in northern Burma from 1944 to 1945. As the only ground force involved in all parts of the campaign, Detachment 101 evolved from an intelligence collection and sabotage unit to an effective guerrilla force that supported the 5307th Composite Unit, 10th Air Force, and other Allied troops. This article discusses Detachment 101's role in the first two phases of the campaign, where it infiltrated north Burma in advance and then supported efforts to capture the strategic Myitkyina airfield from February to May 1944.
This powerpoint presentation is created by Gyanbikash.com for the students of class nine to ten from their English first part NCTB textbook for multimedia class.
The document summarizes key events of the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. It describes how Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League won democratic elections in Pakistan in 1970 but power was not transferred. The Pakistan military launched a violent crackdown in Bangladesh, leading Bangladesh to declare independence on March 26, 1971. India supported Bangladesh and 10 million Bangladeshis sought refuge in India, straining resources. After international failures to resolve the crisis, India intervened militarily in December 1971, achieving a swift victory and the liberation of Bangladesh.
The document summarizes the events of the 1947-48 Kashmir War between Pakistan and India over control of the princely state of Kashmir. It describes how initially in late 1947, Pakistani tribesmen and militias supported by Pakistani officials gained control of parts of Kashmir, including capturing Muzaffarabad. However, opportunities for further advances towards Srinagar were lost due to disagreements among Pakistani leaders and the tribesmen stopping to celebrate Eid, allowing India to airlift troops to Srinagar and stabilize the front. While Pakistan had initial geographical and other advantages, failures of leadership and coordination prevented them from capitalizing on opportunities to win control of all of Kashmir early in the conflict.
The document provides background on Pakistan's use of proxy forces and low-intensity conflicts dating back to independence from Britain. It summarizes that Pakistan viewed Afghanistan as a "massive proxy reservoir" to counter India. When the U.S. withdrew support in 1989, Pakistan aligned with China and continued supporting Taliban proxies in Afghanistan. The author draws on first-hand experiences in Afghanistan and insights from military contacts to analyze U.S. strategy and the role of Pakistan.
USAs NONSENSE AND AIMLESS PEACE PLAN IN AFGHANISTANAgha A
FYI – A geo-political analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan/South Asia. He pulls no punches in his opinion.
Similarly in the book I helped major Amin and Colonel Osinski put together it is stated:
…The very idea of USA talking to Taliban is naive...The Taliban do not represent the whole Afghanistan” (Amin, 2009). “The Taliban are politically rejected by nearly the entire non-Pashtun population (Figure 1). Even among the Pashtun they command polling support of less than 6%” (McCaffrey, 2009). “If any settlement has to be negotiated with them Afghanistan would have to be divided. What the Taliban signify is not acceptable to at least 50 % of Afghans...Any U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in totality would be a great U.S. strategic failure. Even if the USA withdraws it must retain bases because the Afghans respect B 52 s and fear Allah although I doubt the second assertion somewhat. U.S. or NATO withdrawal would lead to a renewed war between the Northern Alliance supported by Russia, India and Iran and the Good Taliban supported by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. There would be no Taliban occupation of Kabul or Mazar (Figure 9). Although the Taliban may practice their brand of Islam at Kandahar and Ghazni Provinces in Afghanistan (Figure 5), the Afghan war would continue as long as the Indian - Pakistani issue is not decided militarily” (Amin 2009). Therein lays a major problem
This document discusses Pakistan-Afghanistan relations from 1947 to 1992 over 4 phases:
Phase 1 (1947-1963) saw tensions over the Durand Line and Afghanistan's opposition to Pakistan joining the UN. Phase 2 (1963-1973) saw improved relations as Afghanistan supported Pakistan in its wars against India. Phase 3 (1973-1978) was marked by regime changes in Afghanistan and the rise of communist influence. Phase 4 (1979-1992) was defined by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US assistance to Pakistan and mujahideen, and eventual Geneva peace accord.
This document discusses Pakistan and Afghanistan relations from 1947 to 1992 over 4 phases. It outlines the key events in each phase including the disputed Durand Line border, opposition to Pakistan's UN membership, speeches antagonizing Pakistan, and assassinations negatively impacting relations. It also discusses both countries allying against a common enemy during wars and Afghanistan hosting anti-Pakistan groups threatening stability. Overall relations fluctuated from hostility to cooperation depending on the political leadership and regional dynamics in each era.
Myths ,Distortions and Misconceptions of India Pakistan HistoryAgha A
1) The document provides instructions for reviewing a digital proof of a book, focusing on formatting, grammar, design issues, and content.
2) It recommends reviewing the proof three times, focusing on different aspects each time, before approving it to move forward in the publishing process.
3) Additional details are provided on how to print the proof and what to check such as headers, page numbers, images, and grammar.
Pakistan and Afghanistan have a long and complex relationship dating back to their independence in 1947. Relations were initially fraught as Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's independence and membership in the UN. Tensions eased from 1963-1973 as Afghanistan supported Pakistan in its wars with India. The overthrow of Afghanistan's monarchy in 1973 deteriorated relations further. The Soviet invasion of 1979 and Pakistan's support for the mujahideen resistance dominated relations until 1992. Since 9/11, Pakistan has walked a fine line between supporting US counterterrorism efforts while maintaining ties to Afghan factions.
Us military effectiveness in future wars some Liddell Hart to understand alsoAgha A
The document discusses the geopolitical importance of Afghanistan and argues that it provides strategic advantages to the US against China and Russia. It makes three key points:
1) Afghanistan's location allows the US to threaten the "soft underbelly" of China and Russia, as described by geographer Halford Mackinder in 1904. Maintaining a presence in Afghanistan disrupts China's efforts to gain access to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan.
2) Afghanistan can be used as a base to destabilize Central Asian countries and Russia's Siberian corridor, undermining their power.
3) Continued US involvement in Afghanistan counters Pakistani influence and allows the US to support smaller ethnic groups in both Afghanistan and
This document provides summaries of two books about Pashtuns:
1) "The Pashtuns" by Abu Bakar Siddique attempts to capsulate Pashtun history into 271 pages but provides brevity over substance due to the ambitious scope. It is difficult for Pashtun authors to admit how Pashtuns have been manipulated throughout history.
2) "Dynamics of Nations and Pakhtun Politics" by Pukhtoon Khan boldly reinterprets Pashtun history and exposes how Pashtuns have long been used and misused by various rulers and states including the Pakistani establishment to achieve political agendas at the expense of Pashtuns. The book offers a solution for Pashtun eman
This document summarizes Afghanistan's history of foreign occupation and resistance, as well as its complex relationships with regional actors like Pakistan, India, Iran, China, and Russia. It notes that Afghanistan has historically been a battleground for imperial powers and a target of militancy. More recently, regional countries have competed for influence in Afghanistan but now recognize the need for cooperation. The future stability of Afghanistan depends on finding a regional solution that incorporates the Taliban and addresses Pakistani security concerns regarding India.
1) The document analyzes the 10 phase history of Indo-Pak Muslims from the initial Muslim conquest of India in the 8th century through modern times.
2) It discusses how Muslim primacy was challenged by the Marathas in the 17th-18th centuries, leading Muslims to rediscover Islam, and how the Muslim elite later used Islam as a political tool to achieve advantages like the creation of Pakistan.
3) The document argues that the misuse of Islam as a political slogan by Pakistani politicians and the military inadvertently fostered Islamic extremism, and the contradiction of abandoning this strategy has led to the current civil war in Pakistan.
using-islam-for-political-power-job-quotas-and-us-dollarsAgha A
This document provides a 10-phase history of Indo-Pakistani Muslims from the initial Muslim attacks on India in 711 AD to the current use of Islam as a political tool. It summarizes each phase, including the establishment of Muslim rule over much of India by 1600; the challenges to Muslim power from 1670-1737; the re-discovery of Islam from 1761-1857 as Muslim dominance declined; the creation of Pakistan in 1947 and the struggle for power between East and West Pakistan; the various attempts to use Islam as a political tool from 1958-2001; and the current civil war resulting from the abandonment of an Islamic ideology. The document concludes that Islamic extremism was inadvertently created by the mis
A Lot of Assorted Nonsense About Afghanistan From Eric MargolisAgha A
This document provides commentary and analysis regarding the British Empire's involvement in Afghanistan. It discusses the failed British invasion of Afghanistan in the 19th century and the recent US-led NATO mission in Afghanistan. Major points made include:
- The British retreat from Kabul in 1842 involved a brigade of 700 British troops and 4,500 Indian troops retreating in harsh conditions and being attacked by over 30,000 Afghans.
- The US goal in Afghanistan was to gain bases near Central Asian oil and block China, but after 11 years and $1 trillion, this effort failed, representing a military and political defeat for the US.
- Remaining US troops in Afghanistan after 2014 withdrawals may face attacks from Pasht
Presentation on War on Terror in FATA, PakistanUroojilyas3
This presentation talks about the history of the war on terror in Federally Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan. This Presentation helps with how to apply Conflict Profiling and do conflict analysis.
This document provides an analysis of the 1965 war between India and Pakistan in three parts. It discusses how the British colonial legacy influenced both the Pakistani and Indian armies, including their outdated equipment, inter-arm rivalry, and lack of leadership tradition among Indian officers. The analysis seeks to separate myth from reality in examining how the Pakistani army performed based on this colonial inheritance. It aims to provide a detached perspective on the qualitative efficiency of the Pakistani military during the 1965 war.
Mazhar Aziz's book provides a new perspective on civil-military relations in Pakistan by introducing the concept of "institutional path dependency", however it fails to precisely define this concept. The reviewer argues that the book misses important factors that have influenced Pakistan's military interventions, such as the colonial legacy of British rule in Punjab and the role of the US in manipulating the Pakistani military to achieve geopolitical aims. While the military has acted out of institutional interests at times, the reviewer asserts that personal motivations and class interests of top generals have been more influential in driving regime changes. Defeat in war may be the only way to reduce the military's oversized role in Pakistan's politics.
The document provides an overview of United States-Pakistan relations from 1947 to 2016. Some key points covered include:
- The initial years after Pakistan's independence saw it adopt a pro-Western stance and ally with the US against the Soviet Union.
- Relations strengthened under Ayub Khan from 1958-1969 as Pakistan joined regional defense pacts and received increased US aid.
- Tensions arose under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto from 1971-1979 as the US opposed Pakistan's nuclear program.
- The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca renewed US interest in improving relations with Pakistan.
The document discusses the foreign policy of Pakistan from 1947-1948. It provides an overview of Pakistan's historical foreign relations and alliances. Pakistan's key alliances included joining the CENTO and SEATO military alliances in the 1950s and becoming a major non-NATO ally of the US in 2004. Pakistan also has close relations with China and Saudi Arabia but rivalry with neighboring India and Afghanistan over territorial disputes. The document outlines Pakistan's diplomatic relations and involvement in international organizations.
Foreign policy of pakistan under musharraf regimeusman ali
General Pervez Musharraf pursued an active foreign policy both before and after 9/11. Prior to 9/11, he focused on improving relations with India and Afghanistan. After 9/11, Pakistan strongly aligned with the US in the war on terror in exchange for economic and military aid. Musharraf also tried to improve ties with India, though tensions remained over Kashmir. Pakistan maintained close relations with China but also strengthened cooperation with the US.
The document discusses the roles of Punjab and Baluch regiments in the 1971 war. It was published on September 2023 with a DOI number and was written by Agha H Amin.
Major Agha H. Amin was commissioned in the old PAVO Cavalry in 1983. He served in various command, staff, research, logistics and instructional positions over his military career. In his civilian career, he performed projects in infrastructure and transmission lines in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan. He has authored over 120 books and journals on military topics. The document goes on to describe a battle of Pandu fought by the 4/10 Baluch battalion against India in the 1947-48 Kashmir war, and criticizes the omission of accurate accounts of the battle from official Pakistani military histories.
Battles of Najafgarh , Gangiri and Delhi RidgeAgha A
- The 6th Dragoon Guards regiment arrived in Bengal, India from England in November 1856 and was stationed in Meerut at the time of the 1857 rebellion.
- During the rebellion, the regiment saw action at Ghaziabad, Badli Ki Serai, Delhi, and helped destroy a rebel battery at Eidgah with no reported casualties.
- It lost a few men at the battles of Ghaziabad, Badli Ki Serai, and in minor actions in July 1857 but overall emerged from the rebellion relatively lightly compared to other British units.
- However, the limited historical sources available in Pakistan make it difficult for researchers there to find all details on the regiment's role and casualties during
The battalion was part of an infantry brigade deployed at Sulaimanke Headworks during the 1965 war with India. It saw little serious action as it primarily engaged Indian border police posts that were no match for regular Pakistani army battalions. The battalion suffered only 3 fatal casualties for the entire war, showing it faced little militarily credible opposition. While the battalion performed well, it must be remembered that it faced inferior Indian border police rather than other army units.
This document summarizes the performance of the 9 Punjab battalion during the 1965 war with India. The battalion was part of the 12th Division of the Pakistan Army and was tasked with capturing the town of Chhamb. Despite having significant superiority in tanks and artillery, the 12th Division failed to cross the Tawi River on the first day. The 9th Punjab battalion suffered 15 killed and 31 wounded but managed to form a bridgehead across the Tawi. After the war, the battalion was praised for its performance and received several awards, though its strategic impact was limited due to the overall failure of Operation Grand Slam.
The battalion was deployed as a guard battalion but parts saw action in 1965 war including C Company commanded by Major Anis. C Company withdrew from its position exposing the rear of 16 Punjab to Indian attack, effectively sealing 16 Punjab's fate. C Company's withdrawal doomed 16 Punjab and was described as cowardly and the cause of 16 Punjab's debacle. While most of 8 Punjab saw no action, C Company under Major Anis performed poorly and was to blame for 16 Punjab's defeat.
1) The battalion was deployed as part of 11 Division along the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor according to maps.
2) The battalion faced a brigade-level attack from the Indian army using three infantry battalions and a tank squadron.
3) A captain from the Pakistani artillery played a crucial role by engaging the attacking forces with 60 medium shells, repulsing the Indian attack.
The battalion was deployed in September 1965 as part of Operation Grand Slam, relieving the 13th Punjab battalion near Dalpat-Chak Kirpal. According to Brigadier Rizvi, the battalion attacked towards Fatwal along with 13 Lancers, advancing up to 6 miles near Kasur and suffering 9 killed and 21 wounded. However, records list the battalion as losing either 9, 11, or 10 killed. The battalion had little impact as it joined the war late when the focus had shifted, and did not receive any awards despite actions in the Rann of Kutch prior to the war.
NORTH LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT IN 1857-59 BATTLESAgha A
This document provides biographical and career details of Major Agha.H.Amin, who was commissioned in the old PAVO Cavalry in March 1983. It discusses his education, various military and civilian positions held over his career, publications authored, and contact information. The document also briefly describes a study aid about British infantry battalions that participated in the battles of 1857-59 in India, including their roles, operations, casualties, and contributions to the outcome of the war.
The 2nd Battalion of the Punjab Regiment fought in the 1965 war against India. While it received several gallantry awards, the document argues that its role was exaggerated and it did not actually face most of the major Indian attacks. Only one company saw direct fighting on the first day, and it dispersed against heavy odds. The battalion was deployed away from the main sites of battle and did not face significant enemy forces apart from this initial engagement. Its impact on the decisive Battle of Chawinda was marginal.
This document provides information about Major Agha.H.Amin, including his military and civilian career experiences. It notes that he was commissioned in the old PAVO Cavalry in March 1983, attended Saint Marys Academy Lalazar and Forman Christian College Lahore, and served in various command, staff, research, logistics and instructional positions in the military. It also lists some of his civilian career projects and publications. The document provides his contact email addresses.
1ST BATTALION WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT IN 1857-59 BATTLES.pdfAgha A
- 1st Battalion HM 8th Foot was stationed in India when the 1857 rebellion broke out. It was involved in securing areas around Delhi.
- At the siege of Delhi in September 1857, it suffered 46 of its total 57 fatal casualties and played a marginal role in the assault.
- Overall it saw minor action in other battles, with limited casualties. The majority of its casualties occurred at the decisive battle of Delhi.
Northumberland Fusiliers in 1857-59 Battles.pdfAgha A
The 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment of Foot (Northumberland Fusiliers) was stationed in Mauritius when it was called to reinforce British forces in India during the 1857 uprising. The battalion arrived in Calcutta in July and August 1857. It participated in key battles including relieving Arrah where it suffered two casualties, the first relief of Lucknow where it suffered heavy losses and helped ensure the relief's success, the defense of the Lucknow garrison, and operations through 1858. The battalion performed outstandingly and suffered high casualties of 62 men, including five officers killed in action, primarily during the relief of Lucknow. Its role was pivotal in some of the major battles, but relatively minor in others
43 BALUCH IN 1971 AND INDIAN OFFICER WHO SAW THEMAgha A
1) The document analyzes the performance of the 43rd Baluch battalion in the 1971 war, which suffered heavy casualties after being poorly employed by incompetent commanders in the 88th Brigade.
2) When the 5th East Bengal battalion defected to the Indian side, the 43rd Baluch battalion was brought in to replace it, even though they were inexperienced and unprepared for the situation.
3) In an attack by Indian forces guided by defectors, the 43rd Baluch battalion suffered the highest fatalities of any battalion on the western front due to being put into a vulnerable position by the failed leadership of the 88th Brigade commander and 10th Division commander.
Battle of Gangiri-Heavy Price paid by HM 6 Dragoon Guards for Gallantry Agha A
Battle of Gangiri-Heavy Price paid by HM 6 Dragoon Guards for Gallantry https://www.academia.edu/52632772/Battle_of_Gangiri_Heavy_Price_paid_by_HM_6_Dragoon_Guards_for_Gallantry via @academia
4th Punjab Infantry now 9 FF Pakistan Army and 42 Highlanders led the Final ...Agha A
The 4th Punjab Infantry battalion arrived in Calcutta in November 1857, meaning it missed the decisive battles of the war, including the siege of Delhi and the relief and evacuation of Lucknow. The battalion's participation in the battle of Cawnpore was minimal and it suffered no casualties. The battalion played a significant role in the final assault on Lucknow in March 1858, leading the assault on Martiniere with the 4th Punjab Infantry while the 42nd Highlanders and 90th Foot attacked frontally. The British enjoyed overwhelming artillery superiority, evidenced by the 42nd Highlanders suffering only 10 fatal casualties over 10 days of operations culminating in the final capture of Lucknow.
WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OR INDIAN ARMY CAN NEVER PRODUCE A MUSTAFA KAMAL- SOMETHING...Agha A
WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OR INDIAN ARMY CAN NEVER PRODUCE A MUSTAFA KAMAL- SOMETHING SERIOUSLY WRONG IN THE GENES
April 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20723.27689
Project: MILITARY HISTORY
Agha H Amin
Global Situational Awareness of A.I. and where its headedvikram sood
You can see the future first in San Francisco.
Over the past year, the talk of the town has shifted from $10 billion compute clusters to $100 billion clusters to trillion-dollar clusters. Every six months another zero is added to the boardroom plans. Behind the scenes, there’s a fierce scramble to secure every power contract still available for the rest of the decade, every voltage transformer that can possibly be procured. American big business is gearing up to pour trillions of dollars into a long-unseen mobilization of American industrial might. By the end of the decade, American electricity production will have grown tens of percent; from the shale fields of Pennsylvania to the solar farms of Nevada, hundreds of millions of GPUs will hum.
The AGI race has begun. We are building machines that can think and reason. By 2025/26, these machines will outpace college graduates. By the end of the decade, they will be smarter than you or I; we will have superintelligence, in the true sense of the word. Along the way, national security forces not seen in half a century will be un-leashed, and before long, The Project will be on. If we’re lucky, we’ll be in an all-out race with the CCP; if we’re unlucky, an all-out war.
Everyone is now talking about AI, but few have the faintest glimmer of what is about to hit them. Nvidia analysts still think 2024 might be close to the peak. Mainstream pundits are stuck on the wilful blindness of “it’s just predicting the next word”. They see only hype and business-as-usual; at most they entertain another internet-scale technological change.
Before long, the world will wake up. But right now, there are perhaps a few hundred people, most of them in San Francisco and the AI labs, that have situational awareness. Through whatever peculiar forces of fate, I have found myself amongst them. A few years ago, these people were derided as crazy—but they trusted the trendlines, which allowed them to correctly predict the AI advances of the past few years. Whether these people are also right about the next few years remains to be seen. But these are very smart people—the smartest people I have ever met—and they are the ones building this technology. Perhaps they will be an odd footnote in history, or perhaps they will go down in history like Szilard and Oppenheimer and Teller. If they are seeing the future even close to correctly, we are in for a wild ride.
Let me tell you what we see.
Beyond the Basics of A/B Tests: Highly Innovative Experimentation Tactics You...Aggregage
This webinar will explore cutting-edge, less familiar but powerful experimentation methodologies which address well-known limitations of standard A/B Testing. Designed for data and product leaders, this session aims to inspire the embrace of innovative approaches and provide insights into the frontiers of experimentation!
The Building Blocks of QuestDB, a Time Series Databasejavier ramirez
Talk Delivered at Valencia Codes Meetup 2024-06.
Traditionally, databases have treated timestamps just as another data type. However, when performing real-time analytics, timestamps should be first class citizens and we need rich time semantics to get the most out of our data. We also need to deal with ever growing datasets while keeping performant, which is as fun as it sounds.
It is no wonder time-series databases are now more popular than ever before. Join me in this session to learn about the internal architecture and building blocks of QuestDB, an open source time-series database designed for speed. We will also review a history of some of the changes we have gone over the past two years to deal with late and unordered data, non-blocking writes, read-replicas, or faster batch ingestion.
Analysis insight about a Flyball dog competition team's performanceroli9797
Insight of my analysis about a Flyball dog competition team's last year performance. Find more: https://github.com/rolandnagy-ds/flyball_race_analysis/tree/main
Learn SQL from basic queries to Advance queriesmanishkhaire30
Dive into the world of data analysis with our comprehensive guide on mastering SQL! This presentation offers a practical approach to learning SQL, focusing on real-world applications and hands-on practice. Whether you're a beginner or looking to sharpen your skills, this guide provides the tools you need to extract, analyze, and interpret data effectively.
Key Highlights:
Foundations of SQL: Understand the basics of SQL, including data retrieval, filtering, and aggregation.
Advanced Queries: Learn to craft complex queries to uncover deep insights from your data.
Data Trends and Patterns: Discover how to identify and interpret trends and patterns in your datasets.
Practical Examples: Follow step-by-step examples to apply SQL techniques in real-world scenarios.
Actionable Insights: Gain the skills to derive actionable insights that drive informed decision-making.
Join us on this journey to enhance your data analysis capabilities and unlock the full potential of SQL. Perfect for data enthusiasts, analysts, and anyone eager to harness the power of data!
#DataAnalysis #SQL #LearningSQL #DataInsights #DataScience #Analytics
06-04-2024 - NYC Tech Week - Discussion on Vector Databases, Unstructured Data and AI
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https://www.meetup.com/unstructured-data-meetup-new-york/
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State of Artificial intelligence Report 2023kuntobimo2016
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a multidisciplinary field of science and engineering whose goal is to create intelligent machines.
We believe that AI will be a force multiplier on technological progress in our increasingly digital, data-driven world. This is because everything around us today, ranging from culture to consumer products, is a product of intelligence.
The State of AI Report is now in its sixth year. Consider this report as a compilation of the most interesting things we’ve seen with a goal of triggering an informed conversation about the state of AI and its implication for the future.
We consider the following key dimensions in our report:
Research: Technology breakthroughs and their capabilities.
Industry: Areas of commercial application for AI and its business impact.
Politics: Regulation of AI, its economic implications and the evolving geopolitics of AI.
Safety: Identifying and mitigating catastrophic risks that highly-capable future AI systems could pose to us.
Predictions: What we believe will happen in the next 12 months and a 2022 performance review to keep us honest.
Predictably Improve Your B2B Tech Company's Performance by Leveraging DataKiwi Creative
Harness the power of AI-backed reports, benchmarking and data analysis to predict trends and detect anomalies in your marketing efforts.
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This is the webinar recording from the June 2024 HubSpot User Group (HUG) for B2B Technology USA.
Watch the video recording at https://youtu.be/5vjwGfPN9lw
Sign up for future HUG events at https://events.hubspot.com/b2b-technology-usa/
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3. 3
US Army in Afghanistan:
Black and White Low Price
Edition at Zero Profit
distributed in public
interest Paperback – July 22,
2017
https://www.amazon.com/US-Army-Afghanistan-distributed-
interest/dp/1548823139/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1502948552&sr
=1-2&keywords=agha+h+amin+US+Army+in+afghanistan
16. 16
Introduction
This is a personal as well as historical
account.
Personal in the sense that I saw closely
Afghanistan from 29 June 2004 till todate
17. 17
permanently being based in Kabul as a
consultant.
During this period I met many Americans
as well as Europeans and closely saw US
Army Operations in Kandahar and Helmand
where many of my projects were located.
Being a student of history I first studied US
Army in detail from 1983 .During this study
“Crisis in Command” a book by two US
Army officers remained the bible of my
analysis.
Accounts of civilians like Carlotta Gall
were useful but devoid of true
understanding of the nature of the US
Army.
What I saw of the US Army in Afghanistan
once again proved the solid worth of
analysis carried out by Richard A .Gabriel
and Paul L.Savage initially published in
1978.
The higher cadre in the US Army as proven
in Afghanistan remains plagued by
18. 18
careeristic opportunism and continue to
regard the rank and file useful cannon
fodder for their personal advancement.
As a second generation Pakistan Army
officer I closely saw Pakistan Army from
the earliest age till March 1994 when I
retired as a major.
Countless conversations with my relative
and friend Colonel Salman who trained all
the major so called Jihadis from
Hekmatyar and Massoud till Osama Bin
Laden made me understand the ISI
mindset.
My dear coursemate and friend Major
General Asif Khattak was another great
aide in understanding the ISI mindset.
Countless other ISI officers that I met
enabled me to understand , how they think
and how the ISI operates.
This account is a summary of those
observations grounded in the initial period
19. 19
1947-79 and reinforced by direct
observations from 1979 till todate.
This small book is written and distributed
in public interest and has no profit motive.
Since I have no faith in nationalism or
narrow religion of any kind there is no
ideological axe to grind in this short work.
It is hoped that this work will act as a
primer of more detailed studies.
Major Agha H Amin (Retired)
Chapter One
Background
Low Intensity conflict was inherited by
Pakistan from the British Indian Empire.
Low Intensity conflict remained the central
part of Pakistani history from the earliest
days.
20. 20
The Pakistani state waged the first Low
Intensity war in Kashmir with major inputs
by British officers civilian and military
serving in Pakistan after independence.
In the 1960s the ISI supervised small low
intensity conflicts in Indias North East
Frontier areas.
The greatest experiment however took
place when the Afghan war commenced in
1978 initially with British support and from
1979 with US support and Pakistan
became a massive Proxy base against the
USSR forces in Afghanistan.
While the USA withdrew in 1979 the ISI
inherited a huge proxy war base that was
maintained and diverted to other fronts
like Indian held Kashmir as well as civil
war plagued Afghanistan.
The huge Afghan proxy war base was now
remodeled to support Pakistani proxies in
Afghanistan.
21. 21
The so called Afghan Mujahideen proxies
of USA and Pakistan and the west were
now divided on ethnic basis with non
Pashtuns and moderate Muslim Pashtuns
becoming US/Western/Indian/Russian
proxies and Pashtuns/extremist Muslims
becoming Pakistani proxies.
In 1994 Pakistan midwife the so called
Taliban movement which captured Kabul
with Pakistani.
The Pakistani establishment saw
Afghanistan as a massive proxy reservoir
with which Pakistan could redress and
balance the strategic grievance that it was
with India over the Jammu and Kashmir
state since 1947.
The USA had strategically abandoned
Pakistan after 1989 and came close to
declaring Pakistan a terrorist state by
1999.
The Pakistani establishment searched for
alternatives and by 1999-2002 came to the
22. 22
conclusion that China was Pakistans best
strategic choice.
Traditionally the Muslims of India and
Pakistan were saved from total
subjugation and political extinction by
Hindus and Sikhs by the English East India
Companys arrival in 1803-49 , when English
East India Company destroyed the Hindu
Marathas and the Sikhs in the period
mentioned.
After Independence Pakistani ruling
establishment searched for strategic allies
and saviours and found the USA in the
period 1947-54.So Pakistan became a US
concubine in return for US economic and
military aid.
The Pakistani US love affair lasted till 1971
after which Pakistans charismatic civilian
Premier courted with idealism in shape of
quest for nuclear weapons ,Islamic bloc
and third world.This romantic experiment
collapsed in 1977 with a US bank rolled
23. 23
agitation movement and a coup detat by a
US cultivated Pakistani army general.
Pakistan again became a US concubine
and a massive proxy base for US led Soviet
Afghan Proxy war.
The USA abruptly left the scene in 1989
practically surrendering Afghanistan to
the Pakistani state.
In 2001 when the USA occupied
Afghanistan it did not invade the Taliban
but Pakistans strategic backyard.
This important fact was not fully grasped
and understood by the USA.
Meanwhile Ironically for the USA , during
the Soviet Afghan War the USA had
deliberately turned a blind eye to
Pakistans nuclear program as the USA
regarded its development as best deterrent
against a USSR ground invasion of
Pakistan.
24. 24
Thus by 1984-87 Pakistan had acquired a
nuclear weapon capability thanks to US
policy of not interrupting Pakistans nuclear
program and the shuffling juggling game
between Symington and Pressler
amendments.
It was a twist of fate for the USA that
when it occupied Afghanistan in 2001
,Pakistan had acquired a complete nuclear
weapon capability and USA was in no
position to invade Pakistan.
This remained USAs strategic dilemma all
along and the USA did not find any solution
to this strategic dilemma to date.
Meanwhile the USA in order to satisfy its
public opinion resorted to drone strikes in
Pakistans wild west FATA region where
actually the USA was attacking absolute
non entitites , with the secret agreement
of Pakistans Punjabi dominated
establishment, while the “ Real Enemy” of
the USA presence in Afghanistan all along
25. 25
was the Pakistani state as correctly
defined and the term coined by Carlotta
Gall.
But the USA had failed to arrive at any
solution how to deal with the real enemy ,
hence the surge which was in reality a bad
tactical response to attacking the tail of a
snake ,because the USA had allowed the
snake to acquire the Nukes and was in no
position to attack the head of the snake.
Chapter Two
Understanding Pakistans Geopolitical
architecture
In 1974-75 my father attended the armed
forces war course.He wrote a paper on
Pakistans geopolitics.
26. 26
The conclusion as taught at the National
Defence College was that Pakistans
geopolitical heartland was the triangle
Rawalpindi Lahore Faisalabad.
While other areas had some relevance and
value the heartland was North Punjab.
Thus 6 of Pakistans nine corps were
guarding this triangle.
The map below gives an idea of what it is
like.
27. 27
On the other hand Pakistans Strategic
missile groups defend it against far bigger
threats.
28. 28
In the US Afghan war US forces were thus
strategically degraded into carrying out
puny pin pricks against FATA with drones
29. 29
and against Afghan Taliban proxies of
Pakistan in the so called surge.
In reality both these players were minor
players while the centre of gravity of
Afghan war was the Pakistani
establishment in Islamabad and
Rawalpindi.
Since North Punjab was Pakistans
heartland Pakistans military usurper
Musharraf had no sympathy with the tribal
Pashtuns who were regarded by Pakistans
establishment as lesser beings .
When my father attended the basic military
engineering officers course in 1955 at
Military College of Engineering Risalpur he
described Royal Pakistan Air Force ( Royal
was dropped in 1956) bragging in the
Risalpur Club in the eveing about how
many tribal Pashtuns they had killed in
straffing in North Waziristan till as late as
1954.They bragged that whole North
Waziristan Agency was their firing range.
30. 30
At that time an operation was being
conducted against Faqir of Ippi which
ended in 1954-55.
But US leverage in carrying out drone
strikes was limited to the FATA tribal area
or some outlying parts of KP province as
this province was regarded as an outer
appendage of Pakistan.
The Pakistani establishment had regarded
tribal Pashtuns as useful proxies and had
deliberately kept their FATA region under
developed and subject to a very harsh
medieval type British law known as
Frontier Crime Regulations.
Thus allowing US drone strikes in FATA or
Pashtun areas of KP Province was not
regarded as a political risk by Pakistans
establishment as these were minority
ethnic groups.
Pakistans power structure was dual with
the Nuclear weapons ,Afghan and Indian
31. 31
policy controlled by the army headquarters
and ISI since 1977.
Afghanistan was seen by the Pakistani
military as Pakistans strategic depth and
the balancing factor against India with
which Pakistan was involved in a major
land dispute of Jammu and Kashmir since
1947.
US occupation of Afghanistan was viewed
by the Pakistani military establishment
(Army + ISI) controlling major part of
Pakistans foreign policy as an occupation
of Pakistan.
While fear of a joint Indian US nut cracker
destroying Pakistan forced General
Musharraf to be a US ally or subsidiary ,
the Pakistani Military was fully resolved
not to abandon the Afghan Taliban proxies
cum vassals cum minor allies.
This important strategic fact was not fully
grasped by the US ruling establishment
and decision makers.
32. 32
The key to engage or win Pakistan was to
solve its basic dispute with India ie
Kashmir Dispute and to respect Pakistans
special role and dominance in Afghanistan
which the US itself had practically
surrendered to Pakistan in 1989-92.
The US government in DC did not realize
this central strategic reality .The key to
winning Afghan war was held by the
politicians ruling USA in DC.
A military solution itself in Afghanistan
was not practicable unless Pakistan was
politically engaged or won over.
The second option was to invade Pakistan
and make it submit to US policy.This was
impossible as Pakistan was a nuclear
armed state.
Further the USA lacked the resolution to
confront Pakistan or to pressurize it to
abandon its support of Taliban.
On the other hand things were very
complicated as the Pakistani military junta
33. 33
while professing to be a US ally was
supporting the Afghan Taliban all along.
There was something wrong with US
political objectives in Afghanistan where
the USA wanted to totally eliminate the
Taliban politically .This was an unrealistic
objective , unless Pakistan was engaged or
Afghanistan partitioned with US presence
in the north which supported USA and a
Taliban Bantuistan or Botswana type land
in the south where the Pashtun population
was more anti US or dominated and
intimidated by the Pakistani Afghan
Taliban proxies.
Further Pakistan with more Pashtuns than
Afghanistan could influence Afghan
politics more effectively than the Afghan
government in Kabul.
All these political realities were not
understood in DC .
There was no military solution to the
Afghan War by conducting any type of
34. 34
surge unless the Pakistan problem was
solved either by accommodating Pakistan
or destroying Pakistan ! As both solutions
were beyond the political (former) and
military (latter) capability of the US
government.
A third solution could be searched for in
weakening Pakistan by encouraging
irredentist/separatist tendencies in
Pakistan in areas like Baluchistan or Sindh
but this too was beyond the shallow
political maturity of the USA.
The USA wasted 5 years in Afghanistan in
a state of indecision vacillation and
procrastination thrusting a foreign made
proportional representation solution of
democracy in Afghanistan.
The cardinal fact that Afghanistan had
been ruled by the gun coupled with a lose
system of tribal customs was not
understood by the USA and its NATO allies.
35. 35
Finally the US Armys junior ranks were
made the scapegoats in the so called
surge where ambitious selfish generals
like Mc Chrystal and Petraeus , sent some
1400 US soldiers into pointless death.
As Anatol Rappooport while editing Carl
Von Clausewitz wrote that war is actually
a failure of policy . Afghanistan war was
thus a failure of US policy.
The US unlike the USSR had a far safer
entry in Afghanistan and for first four years
viewed positively , it lost the initiative
after it refused to accept the hard political
reality of Afghanistan ‘ i.e Pakistans army
and the ISI as well as their proxies the
Taliban.
These three parties had to be
accommodated and if it was done a
solution was possible .
Failure to accommodate Pakistans military
and their proxies was to be the main
reason for US failure.
36. 36
This did not require total surrender but an
acceptance of Pakistani influence in the
Pashtun south while USA could easily
control the more moderate north and retain
a small military presence there.
Pakistans military establishment
understood that the USA would get fed up
with its small war like the USSR had done
and would leave one day.
This would form the corner stone of the ISI
led Afghan insurgency with General
Musharraf in control.
The Musharraf template would be followed
by his military successors.
This is not to imply that Afghanistan is a
total US failure.
A compromise solution is still possible if
the above mentioned reality is understood .
As they say nothing is inevitable in history.
Chapter Three
37. 37
The Fallacy about non state actors
There is a huge fallacy about non state
actors in the ongoing Afghan war in
particular and about the many so called
Islamist wars in the world.
In reality as far as I have studied and
observed non state actors account for less
than 10 percent of all so called insurgents
while 90 % of all insurgents are proxy of
some state , USA in lead ,followed by
Pakistan,Iran ,Russia,Israel,India,Saudi
Arabia,Turkey,NATO states etc.
Thus Al Qaeda all along has been a
marginal player in Af Pak.
However it is politically simpler and easier
for USA and all states to blame non state
actors as well as attack them as the
fallout is very limited.
On the other hand it requires far greater
strategic resolution to attack state actors ,
especially when these are nuclear armed
like Pakistan or North Korea.
38. 38
As this map shows the larger and major
groups are state proxies like Mulla Omar
group and Haqqani etc while the TTP etc
shown in white are much smaller, and the
so called non state actors.
39. 39
In pragmatic terms for the USA Mulla Omar
group although a Pakistani proxy was a
much smaller actor and it was politically
far more convenient to attack it than Mulla
Omars strategic base in Pakistani
Balochistan.
Similarly it was far more convenient and
least risky to attack small time players in
Pakistans FATA and satisfy the US public
that we are attacking the Al Qaeda than
attacking or droning nuclear armed
Pakistans ISI headquarters in Islamabad or
Quetta.
These harsh strategic realities were never
understood by the US public.
41. 41
Chapter Four
US occupation of Afghanistan
The US occupation of Afghanistan in itself
was a mickey mouse affair.
The US did not lose a single soldier in
occupying Afghanistan in real fighting less
an over enthusiastic CIA civilian who died
because of his own rashness at Mazar
Sharif.
42. 42
What happened was that the Taliban
simply carried out a strategic retreat into
Pakistani Balochistan.
45. 45
Understanding what had happened was the
first strategic failure of the USA , and
above all visualizing what all this would
finally lead to .
From 2001 to 2006 US officials in DC ,
Kabul and Islamabad simply slept while
the Taliban reorganized and recouped in
Pakistan.
These were no non state actors but
Pakistani strategic proxies but all along US
officials kept talking about Al Qaeda and
non State actors who in reality were
mickey mouse minor players.
48. 48
Chapter Five
Musharraf Deception
Pakistans military usurper ruler General
Musharraf carried out a brilliant strategic
deception which was understood and
known to y very few in Pakistan and least
understood or known to those who
mattered in US decision making circles.
Musharraf housed the retreating Taliban in
Pakistani Balochistan and other provinces
while he diverted US attention towards
Pakistans FATA region which Musharraf
painted as the centre of all evil and the
Scorpions deadly tail.
In reality the so called Scorpions tale was
a totally bogus threat and a diversion.
49. 49
Musharraf was an ISI commando officer
trained by professionals like Brigadier
Syed Raza Ali.
50. 50
While outwardly US occupation of
Afghanistan was a major strategic snub for
Pakistan, Musharraf in words of an Indian
observer “ snatched victory out of the jaws
of defeat” by running with the foxes
(Afghan Taliban) and chasing with the
hounds (USA).
In Pakistan he was much criticized for a U
Turn and a volte face and for stabbing the
Taliban in the back.But in reality Musharraf
saved Pakistan and the Taliban from a
major defeat.
Like a bold and audacious poker player
Musharraf housed Osama Bin laden in
Pakistan while professing to be the best
US strategic ally and milked the US tax
payer of some 25 Billion US Dollars
although he did not deploy a single
battalion to interdict the Afghan Taliban
from infiltrating and attacking US troops
all along the 1500 Km border of Pakistani
province of Balochistan with Afghanistan.
51. 51
The same Musharraf strategy was blindly
followed by his successor General Ashfaq
Pervez Kiani in 2008-13 when the US surge
took place and Kiani supervised a massive
Afghan Taliban infiltration in Afghanistan
that accounted for 90 percent US fatal
casualties in Afghanistan.
53. 53
Chapter Six
Hibernation and Calm and the reason for
Pakistani decision to escalate in the south
In 2001 Pakistan had signed a strategic
agreement with China to develop the port
as a future Chinese short cut to Middle
East oil without reliance on the far longer
and vulnerable sea route via Strait of
Malacca.
This action was seen by pakistans ethnic
Baloch minority as ademographic attack
by Pakistans Punjabi dominant
establisgment aimed at turning the Baloch
into a minority in their own province.
A guerrilla insurrection had thus
commenced in Balochistan in 2002.
The insurrection was indigenous but
supported by Pakistans arch enemy India
from bases in Afghanistan.The insurrection
assumed alarming proportions by 2006.
54. 54
This led General Musharraf into taking a
strategic decision to step up Taliban
guerrilla operations in Southern
Afghanistan.
55. 55
Although the Americans were not directly
aiding the Baloch insurrection in
Afghanistan , the impact of Indian support
to Baloch insurgents in Pakistan was not
assessed by American decision makers in
Kabul or Islamabad , thus this was a major
US strategic failure.
But the US decision makers lacked the
strategic resolution to do that.
Another Machiavellian but far more
effective approach by the US could have
been to massively reinforce the Baloch
insurrection thus arm twisting Pakistan
into not supporting its Afghan Taliban
proxies surge in Afghanistan.But the US
decision makers lacked the long term
vision or talent to attempt any such
political genius to do that.
Chapter Seven
56. 56
Understanding Strategy and major US
errors
Strategy as defined by Clausewitz is the
theory of the use of combats for the object
of the war.
Strategy deals with combination of
different actions or combats with a view to
the ultimate object of the war. Strategy
deals with battles to gain end of the war.
Clausewitz also stated that in strategy
everything moves very slowly and much
more strength of will is required to make a
decision in strategy than in tactics.
From 2001 to 2006 when the Taliban surge
started things moved slowly and USA failed
to devise any strategy.It failed to assess
and foresee the Taliban resurgence.It
failed to devise any plan to pressurize
Pakistan into not reasserting in
Afghanistan.
57. 57
It failed to hit at the drug trade that
provided the financial muscle to Taliban.
58. 58
2002 was an eventless year in which
nothing strategic occurred.Minor company
level actions were fought.
63. 63
2003 was yet another eventless year
where US small units fought small actions
but US commanders sitting in Kabul and
Arlington failed to see the strategic
picture.
US military culture was dominated by a
philosophy that passed the buck to small
units so that higher commanders did not
have to waste their time with strategic
assessments.
64. 64
2004 was another eventless year.
1 Fleischer,
Jacob R.
Deh Rawood P ROVINCE NOT M ENTIONED WHICH SHOWS
C A RELESSNESS. KU NNAR URUZGAN
65. 65
2 Fracker Jr.,
Dale E.
Deh Rawood
3 Kearney III,
James C .
Salerno P ROVINCE NOT M ENTIONED KHOST
4
Gomez, Billy
Landstuhl Reg. M ed. C enter, Landstuhl, Germany-NOT STUPIDLY
C LARIFIED BY MILITARY T IMES T HAT HE DIED IN PAKTIKA
P ROVINCE
5
Hobbs, Brian
S.
M iam Do –NOT STUPIDLY CLARIFIED BY M ILITARY T IMES O R
IC ASUALTIES T HE ACTUAL P ROVINCE WAS FOB LAGHMAN IN
LA GHMAN P ROVINCE
6
Fernandez,
Kyle Ka Eo
M iam Do NO T STUPIDLY C LARIFIED BY M ILITARY T IMES OR
IC ASUALTIES T HE ACTUAL P ROVINCE WAS FOB LAGHMAN IN
LA GHMAN P ROVINCE
7 Wells, Wesley
R.
Naka NOT STUPIDLY C LARIFIED BY M ILITARY TIMES OR
IC ASUALTIES T HE ACTUAL P ROVINCE WAS PAKTIKA.
8 O laes, T ony B. Shkin M O ST STUPIDLY SITED POST
9 Goodwin,
Robert S.
Shkin
10 Beasley, Bobby
E.
Ghazikel NOT STUPIDLY C LARIFIED BY M ILITARY TIMES OR
IC ASUALTIES T HE ACTUAL P ROVINCE WAS WA RDAK
11 C herry, C raig
W.
Ghazikel NOT STUPIDLY C LARIFIED BY M ILITARY TIMES OR
IC ASUALTIES T HE ACTUAL P ROVINCE WAS WA RDAK
12 T hacker,
Juston T yler
Barikowt P ROVINCE NOT M ENTIONED WHICH SHOWS
C A RELESSNESS. KU NNAR
13 M cClenney,
Daniel B.
Barikowt
14 Fraise, David
M .
Deh Rawood U RU ZGAN
15 O uellette,
Brian J.
Q alat
16 Jeffries, Joseph
A .
Q alat
17 M ogensen,
Robert J.
Q alat
18 Eggers, Daniel
W.
Q alat
19 P rice, Bruce E. Kajaki
20 P ayne Jr.,
Ronald R.
T awara P ROVINCE NOT M ENTIONED WHICH SHOWS
C A RELESSNESS. HELMAND
21 Lagman,
A nthony S.
O ruzgan province
22 Esposito, Jr.,
M ichael J.
O ruzgan province
23 Golding,
Nicholes
Darwin
Ghazni P rovince
66. 66
2005 was a major turning point as the US
fatal casualties from enemy action jumped
from 23 in 2004 to 66 in 2005.
Some 20 of these however occurred due to
air crashes attributed to enemy action and
many observers attributed these to over
confidence on part of US pilots , severely
underestimating the enemy factor.
67. 67
The writing on the war was clear but US
commanders in Kabul as well as in the
Pentagon lacked that rare clarity
described by Carl Von Clausewitz as “An
intellect which can operate in
circumstances where 75% data is
unavailable” ! These were ordinary minds
with ranks of generals who lacked that
intellect “ which ,even in the midst of this
intense obscurity, is not without some
traces of the inner light, which lead to the
truth ! ”
68. 68
They probably had read Dale Carnegies
books that teach you that flattery will
certainly take you to high ranks and places
but had not digested the essence of Vom
Kriege !
69. 69
2006 was yet another study in how not to
command an army.
While US commanders and Pentagon
should have been droning Chaghai district
in Pakistan opposite Helmand and
Kandahar , all that these musketeers did
was “ Do Nothing” !
2006 again did not justify the future US
surge of troops in Helmand and US lost
only 5 soldiers killed in Helmand in this
year.
71. 71
The US/NATO conduct was most irrational
in 2006 in establishing Camp Bastion in
Helmand in 2006 which attracted insurgent
attention and caused pointless UK
casualties in 2006-8 finally leading to US
jumping in the mess and causing highest
US casualties in 2009 and 2010.
This is despite the fact that US lost just 1
soldier in Helmand in 2005 and
establishment of Camp Bastion in 2006
was the most stupid thing that USA and UK
did in whole Afghan war.
72. 72
On the other hand the decision to go for
the so called surge by the USA was also a
strategic failure as this led to pointless US
casualties.
76. 76
Robert Gates described choice of Helmand
for US surge as desire of marines to
operate independently under sole marine
command which is an amateur way of
conducting war.
Now this is a rather amateur way to
conduct war as Gates stated in his
memoirs that Marines Commandant
General Jim Conway wanted marines to
fight in one area , under one command , so
a rather sick reasoning to dump US
marines into a slaughterhouse called
Helmand .
The Taliban based in Pakistani Baluchistan
were presented on a platter a very easy
77. 77
target distributed in gift pack penny
packets all across Helmand to be killed at
leisure by IEDs brought from the
Kharotabad IED market across an Afghan
Pakistan border that was most non
chalantly unmonitored by USA.
Helmand was a vast desert and the Soviets
never deployed more than a regiment in
Helmand.
The decision to distribute US soldiers in
penny packets in Helmand was no doubt a
non sensical decision which led to
maximum US casualties in Afghan war
without any strategic objective being
achieved.
Since most of US casualties were due to
IEDs, Taliban casualties were far lower
than US casualties.
78. 78
2008 was another year of vacillation ,
procrastination on part of the US/NATO
command in Afghanistan
The butchers bill for 2008 was as below :--
79. 79
The US/NATO commanders acted like
glorified clerks and doing nothing remained
their cardinal command attribute !
80. 80
2009 was a fateful year for the US Army in
Afghanistan as a general well described in
the book Crisis in Command entered the
scene.
One described on page .85 as obsessed
with selfish , promotion oriented behavior.
General Mc Chrystal preferred playing with
lives of US soldiers rather than looking the
Pakistani state straight into the
eyes.Brave in tactical gambling and
extremely timid in strategic resolution.
81. 81
As per US journalist Michael Hastings ,
later murdered in ambiguous
circumstances for being too upright bold
and iconoclastic , General Mc Chrystal
simply dismissed the CIA assessment that
the Taliban centre of gravity was the
Quetta Shura.
82. 82
The most important job of the higher
commander is to make assessments where
we enter the realm of strategy.
As described by Carl Von Clausewitz “ the
Commander in War must commit the
business he has in hand to a corresponding
space which his eye cannot survey, which
the keenest zeal cannot always explore,
and with which, owing to the constant
changes taking place, he can seldom
become property acquainted.”
83. 83
It should have been clear to the US/NATO
commanders that the USA/NATO were
fighting a proxy war where the Pakistani
state was seeing both USA/NATO as an
existential threat.
85. 85
generous incentive or worse come to worst
to intimidate Pakistani the state !
All three were not tried or done !
General Mc Chrystal was the ultimate
macho man ! Ran five miles by day as
eulogized by a sycophant New York Times
journalist ! Aggressive where it meant
dividing US soldiers into penny packets
and launching them piecemeal against an
IED player enemy who killed US soldiers by
IED remote as if playing the game mortal
combat.
86. 86
But when it came to strategic resolution
like confronting the Pakistani state Mc
Chrystal was an absolute mouse.
The fate of the US soldier was “ Ordered to
Die” so that Mc Chrystals glory was
reinforced and Mc Chrystal was not
required to take any strategic decision
87. 87
that may cause him any degree of
dissonance !
Mc Chrystals greatest inner fear was the
friction that confronting Pakistani state
may cause to his personal serenity or to
his spotless career.
88. 88
The right US response should have been to
attack the Taliban base in Balochistan, if
not by crossing the border with ground
troops then at least by drones.
93. 93
Chapter Eight
Pakistan’s FATA War
Pakistans FATA war has been the most
ignored part of US decision making.No
threat for the USA existed in Pakistans
FATA region.
94. 94
It appears that General Musharraf
conceived a brilliant albeit Machiavellian
deception plan to deceive the Americans.
Gist of the plan appears to be as following
:--
Convince the US decision makers that
FATA was the centre of gravity of all
terrorism.
Provide secret sanctuary to Afghan
Taliban in Pakistani Balochistans
where they ethnically and culturally
blended with the local population and
could not be identified.
Launch a military action in FATA to
convince the USA that Musharraf was
USAs best ally in so called war on
terror and to milk the USA to grant
more military aid.
A subtle campaign was launched by
Pakistani media under manipulation by
the Pakistani state that FATA region
95. 95
was the source of all terrorism and
needs to be reformed .
A military action was thus launched by
General Musharraf in 2003 in Waziristan
without any provocation of tribals part.
Even US casualties in Afghanistan did
not justify any operation.
104. 104
Chapter Nine
The Use of Islam as a tool by Pakistani
state exposed
In every fight , tactical or strategic both
opponents lose something , suffer some
superficial but many internal damages.
Pakistans General Musharrafs strategic
deception was also therefore a mixed
affair.
Musharraf milked the USA of some 25
Billion USD and did nothing to help the USA
. But even then the Pakistani military lost
its credibility with the Islamists in
particular and with its population in
general.
The Muslim elite had misused Islam as a
cheap tool to galvanise the Muslim masses
from earliest history of Islam in general
and in Indo Pak sub continent in particular.
When Musharraf succumbed to US
pressure and became a US ally at least
105. 105
outwardly , a “ Confusion in Principle” was
introduced in Pakistans body politics.
For first time in history of Pakistan , the
Pakistan Army and ISI were resisted and
attacked in Pakistans key provinces of
Sindh , Punjab and NWFP ( now KPK).
Musharrafs strategic courting of China in
response to US presence in Afghanistan
and as a counter balance to US opposition
to Pakistan since 1989 led to an ethnic
insurrection in Baluchistan that continues.
While Pakistani military deceived the USA ,
in the process it was forced to fight the
tribal Pashtuns since 2002 and the crisis
has not ended.
For first time in Pakistans history senior
army commanders like the corps
commander in Karachi were attacked in
2004, the Pakistani army headquarters was
attacked in 2009 and ISI headquarters
were attacked in Lahore,Multan and other
places.
106. 106
Pakistani military was shaken and is still
looking for a solution to this dilemma
created as a result of US arrival in
Afghanistan and Musharrafs forced
decision , however brilliant to align with
the USA.
This particular phenomenon holds many
opportunities for the USA and any power
that wants to destabilize Pakistan.
Chapter Eleven
The Surge and careerism of Mc Chrystal
and Petraeus
The USA regarded the Afghan war as a
small war and regarded Afghanistan as a
minor threat.
While USA under the force of historical
circumstances occupied Afghanistan , it
showed no seriousness in stabilizing
Afghanistan or in engaging Pakistan by
solving Pakistans strategic dilemmas i.e
its strategic rivalry with India or solving
107. 107
Pakistans economic problems by creating
tariff free zones etc.
The bill of the tariff free zones still lies in
the US congress and is a classic case of
US political indecision.
The so called surge of 2009-12 was
basically a cheap political attempt by a
social climber lawyer turned president of
USA whose statesmanship was of a very
low caliber.
Like a short term vision politician Obama
decided to hoodwink the US public by
ordering a temporary troop surge with a
promised withdrawal frame for US troops
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The surge thus had no viable military aim.
30,000 additional US troops could not
achieve anything.
The US lacked the resolution to confront
Pakistan , lacked the vision to
accommodate Pakistan and stabilize
108. 108
Afghanistan , it decided to attempt the
third best solution, i.e fool its public by
false promises and sacrifice some 1400
young soldiers and officers in a waste land
of drug mafia called Helmand.
General Mc Chrystal who supervised the
surge was a simple ambitious careerist
who saw it as a stepping stone to the next
rank.
He was described by US journalist Michael
Hastings who just wanted his picture on
the front page.
Characters like Mc Chrystal and Petraeus
were well identified by two brilliant US
authors of the book Crisis in Command in
1974 or so.
The surge was a pointless massacre of US
troops divided in penny packets sent to
certain deaths by sneaky enemies who
killed them with triggers of IEDs from a
safe distance and whose faces were never
seen by the US troops.
109. 109
While the so called surge was not a
formula to victory both Mc Chrystal and
Petraeus failed to carry out certain actions
which could have reduced US casualties to
one fourth.
118. 118
All along drone strikes were carried out in
an area which had nothing to do with 90
percent US deaths in Afghanistan.
If instead drone strikes were carried out in
Pakistani Baluchistan on the Taliban base
area Pakistan could have been pressurized
into reducing its support to its Taliban
proxies.
Chapter Twelve
The US Drone program
This was the biggest scam in US history
designed to fool the US public that USG
was very harsh with the so called
terrorists in the great war on terror.
I am not against drone strikes in particular
but I am against drone strikes in two small
districts which had little to do with US
deaths in Afghanistan.
137. 137
Chapter Thirteen
Pakistani claims about sacrifices in so
called war on Terror
Pakistans claims about having suffered in
so called war on terror were by and large a
case of shedding crocodiles tears.
It is a documented fact that Pakistans
economy saw record economic growth in
Soviet Afghan war and in US Afghan war.
Prices of property and real state rose from
10 to 20 times in Pakistans Punjabi
heartland as well as in urban areas of
Karachi and Hyderabad.
Yes the Pashtuns and Baluch suffered but
these are regarded as second rate citizens
138. 138
by Pakistans ruling North Punjabi
establishment.
Pakistans ruling establishment is the main
culprit in Pakistans two strategic problems
i.e not constructing hydel power mega
projects which was entirely possible
during Soviet Afghan War and US Afghan
war and not taxing the rich.
Both the issues had no connection with
Pakistans so called sacrifices as US ally in
so called war on terror.
Chapter Fourteen
Future options
There is nothing inevitable in history and it
would be incorrect to state that
Afghanistan war is a lost war.
Conversely some 65 % of the population
wants the USA to stay.
140. 140
A political solution can be holding
referendum under UN supervision in all
Afghan districts whether they want Taliban
rule or want to be ruled by Kabul de facto
and de jure Afghan state.
A massive tariff free status for Afghanistan
and Pakistans border district to export all
types of manufactured goods to EU and
USA without any quota controls or tariffs
can be a very workable incentive.
Pakistan must be engaged and allowed
some influence in Taliban controlled area
so that its fears about Indian penetration
are addressed.
The USA had three broad options and still
has them .
The first is the MONGOL option which is
EXTERMINATION , which is neither
desirable nor advisable .
The second is the MACHIAVELLIAN option
which can work if combined with a third
option of a MARSHALL PLAN.
141. 141
President Bush went one fourth distance
towards a MARSHALL PLAN but got
entangled in the IRAQ war and dissipation
of effort.
Obama tried an apology of a MONGOL
option and was bound to fail , in the
process sacrificing 1400 US military lives
pointlessly.
142. 142
Nothing is lost even now if MACHIAVELLI
and MARSHALL are combined
imaginatively and the TRUMP
administration can do it if hard work is put