This document provides a firsthand account of British Army operations in Afghanistan from 2004-2014 as seen by the author, a consultant who worked in Afghanistan during that time. It describes how the British operations lacked clear strategy and purpose, with troops sent into Helmand province in small, vulnerable groups ("penny packets") without sufficient consideration for the local conditions and threat of the Taliban. This approach directly played into the hands of the Taliban and resulted in needless British casualties. Political leaders like Tony Blair sent the troops to Afghanistan without a coherent strategic aim, simply to appease the US, while ignoring local dynamics and making the soldiers targets.
This document provides a summary of the British Army's operations in Afghanistan during the Fourth Afghan War from the perspective of the author, who worked as a consultant in Afghanistan from 2004-present. Some key points:
- The author witnessed British Army operations firsthand and argues they lacked clear strategy, with troops sent into Helmand province in small groups without adequate consideration of risks.
- Political motivations like currying favor with the US and opportunities for career advancement led to poor military decisions by British leaders.
- Troops were vulnerable to ambush walking into traps set by the Taliban, who stepped up operations in Helmand in response to the British presence.
- Without proper strategy or understanding of local dynamics,
Ambush survey afghanistan,british army and FM 31 21Agha A
1) The document discusses the background leading up to Britain's involvement in Afghanistan, known as the Fourth Afghan War. It notes that the US trained and funded Pakistani special forces (SSG) and intelligence (ISI) from 1955-1979, which later fought against Western forces.
2) General Musharraf deceived the US while preserving Pakistani Taliban assets and extracting $25 billion from the US as an "ally". Britain followed the US without a clear strategic aim, sending troops to Helmand in 2006 to "win hearts and minds" under the misleading politician Tony Blair.
3) British troops in Helmand were vulnerable targets divided into small groups, walking into a trap as their presence threatened Pakistan over Baluch
The document provides background on Pakistan's use of proxy forces and low-intensity conflicts dating back to independence from Britain. It summarizes that Pakistan viewed Afghanistan as a "massive proxy reservoir" to counter India. When the U.S. withdrew support in 1989, Pakistan aligned with China and continued supporting Taliban proxies in Afghanistan. The author draws on first-hand experiences in Afghanistan and insights from military contacts to analyze U.S. strategy and the role of Pakistan.
This document provides an introduction and background to the author's account of the US Army in Afghanistan. The author has observed Afghanistan closely since 2004 as a consultant based in Kabul. Drawing from his experience in the Pakistani military and conversations with ISI officers, the author analyzes the geopolitical factors influencing the US presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan's view of its "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. The author argues that the real obstacle to US goals in Afghanistan has been the Pakistani establishment centered in Rawalpindi and Islamabad, not minor players attacked by drones or in the Afghan surge.
National defence university of pakistan and other pakistani military mattersAgha A
This document provides a lengthy critique of Aqil Shah's book "The Army and Democracy" which analyzes the relationship between the Pakistani military and democracy. The critique argues that Shah's analysis is overly simplistic and makes numerous factual inaccuracies. It disagrees with many of Shah's arguments, such as his views on Jinnah and the inevitability of military coups in Pakistan. The critique takes issue with Shah overlooking the destabilizing impact of the 1916 Lucknow Pact and argues the military was not the sole factor influencing Pakistan's political development.
General Musharraf carried out a brilliant strategic deception of the US after their occupation of Afghanistan. The US failed to understand key realities, including that Pakistan saw Afghanistan as strategic depth and its proxies like the Taliban controlled much of the Pashtun south. The US wasted years with unrealistic objectives and failed to address the core issues of Pakistan's role and its dispute with India over Kashmir. As a result, the US surge was futile and they suffered unnecessary casualties while the Taliban recovered in Pakistan. A compromise respecting Pakistani influence may have avoided US failure in Afghanistan.
This document discusses the decline of British imperial power and manipulation over the 19th and 20th centuries. It argues that Britain's power was challenged by Russia in 1863 and that Germany broke the backbone of the British Empire in World War 1 and World War 2. It also discusses how Britain's resolve to hold onto India was broken by World War 2 and the naval mutiny of 1946. The document analyzes current geopolitical realities and argues that manipulation through war is no longer possible due to nuclear weapons. It contends that Western alliances like NATO have become ineffective while countries like Russia, China, and India have emerged as major powers.
Mattis is strategically clueless more naieve than naievest milkmaidAgha A
General Mattis' comments about broadening common ground with Pakistan are criticized by the author. The author argues that Mattis and other high-ranking US military officials primarily seek to advance their own careers rather than make strategic decisions in the best interests of the US. Additionally, the author asserts that Pakistan's military establishment, including the ISI, have been the real opponents of the US in Afghanistan, having used the country as a proxy battleground, while the US has failed to recognize and address this strategic reality. The author believes the US occupation of Afghanistan has been a failure of US policy due to its unwillingness to accommodate Pakistani influence in the region.
This document provides a summary of the British Army's operations in Afghanistan during the Fourth Afghan War from the perspective of the author, who worked as a consultant in Afghanistan from 2004-present. Some key points:
- The author witnessed British Army operations firsthand and argues they lacked clear strategy, with troops sent into Helmand province in small groups without adequate consideration of risks.
- Political motivations like currying favor with the US and opportunities for career advancement led to poor military decisions by British leaders.
- Troops were vulnerable to ambush walking into traps set by the Taliban, who stepped up operations in Helmand in response to the British presence.
- Without proper strategy or understanding of local dynamics,
Ambush survey afghanistan,british army and FM 31 21Agha A
1) The document discusses the background leading up to Britain's involvement in Afghanistan, known as the Fourth Afghan War. It notes that the US trained and funded Pakistani special forces (SSG) and intelligence (ISI) from 1955-1979, which later fought against Western forces.
2) General Musharraf deceived the US while preserving Pakistani Taliban assets and extracting $25 billion from the US as an "ally". Britain followed the US without a clear strategic aim, sending troops to Helmand in 2006 to "win hearts and minds" under the misleading politician Tony Blair.
3) British troops in Helmand were vulnerable targets divided into small groups, walking into a trap as their presence threatened Pakistan over Baluch
The document provides background on Pakistan's use of proxy forces and low-intensity conflicts dating back to independence from Britain. It summarizes that Pakistan viewed Afghanistan as a "massive proxy reservoir" to counter India. When the U.S. withdrew support in 1989, Pakistan aligned with China and continued supporting Taliban proxies in Afghanistan. The author draws on first-hand experiences in Afghanistan and insights from military contacts to analyze U.S. strategy and the role of Pakistan.
This document provides an introduction and background to the author's account of the US Army in Afghanistan. The author has observed Afghanistan closely since 2004 as a consultant based in Kabul. Drawing from his experience in the Pakistani military and conversations with ISI officers, the author analyzes the geopolitical factors influencing the US presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan's view of its "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. The author argues that the real obstacle to US goals in Afghanistan has been the Pakistani establishment centered in Rawalpindi and Islamabad, not minor players attacked by drones or in the Afghan surge.
National defence university of pakistan and other pakistani military mattersAgha A
This document provides a lengthy critique of Aqil Shah's book "The Army and Democracy" which analyzes the relationship between the Pakistani military and democracy. The critique argues that Shah's analysis is overly simplistic and makes numerous factual inaccuracies. It disagrees with many of Shah's arguments, such as his views on Jinnah and the inevitability of military coups in Pakistan. The critique takes issue with Shah overlooking the destabilizing impact of the 1916 Lucknow Pact and argues the military was not the sole factor influencing Pakistan's political development.
General Musharraf carried out a brilliant strategic deception of the US after their occupation of Afghanistan. The US failed to understand key realities, including that Pakistan saw Afghanistan as strategic depth and its proxies like the Taliban controlled much of the Pashtun south. The US wasted years with unrealistic objectives and failed to address the core issues of Pakistan's role and its dispute with India over Kashmir. As a result, the US surge was futile and they suffered unnecessary casualties while the Taliban recovered in Pakistan. A compromise respecting Pakistani influence may have avoided US failure in Afghanistan.
This document discusses the decline of British imperial power and manipulation over the 19th and 20th centuries. It argues that Britain's power was challenged by Russia in 1863 and that Germany broke the backbone of the British Empire in World War 1 and World War 2. It also discusses how Britain's resolve to hold onto India was broken by World War 2 and the naval mutiny of 1946. The document analyzes current geopolitical realities and argues that manipulation through war is no longer possible due to nuclear weapons. It contends that Western alliances like NATO have become ineffective while countries like Russia, China, and India have emerged as major powers.
Mattis is strategically clueless more naieve than naievest milkmaidAgha A
General Mattis' comments about broadening common ground with Pakistan are criticized by the author. The author argues that Mattis and other high-ranking US military officials primarily seek to advance their own careers rather than make strategic decisions in the best interests of the US. Additionally, the author asserts that Pakistan's military establishment, including the ISI, have been the real opponents of the US in Afghanistan, having used the country as a proxy battleground, while the US has failed to recognize and address this strategic reality. The author believes the US occupation of Afghanistan has been a failure of US policy due to its unwillingness to accommodate Pakistani influence in the region.
MOUNTBATTEN AND NEHRU'S FOLLY IN IMPULSIVELY AND THOUGHTLESSLY REJECTING FIEL...Agha A
MOUNTBATTEN AND NEHRU'S FOLLY IN IMPULSIVELY AND THOUGHTLESSLY REJECTING FIELD MARSHAL AUCHINLECLS PROPOSAL TO RETAIN BRITISH TROOPS TO CONTROL 1947 INDIA PAKISTAN PARTITION RIOTS https://www.academia.edu/69652589/MOUNTBATTEN_AND_NEHRUS_FOLLY_IN_IMPULSIVELY_AND_THOUGHTLESSLY_REJECTING_FIELD_MARSHAL_AUCHINLECLS_PROPOSAL_TO_RETAIN_BRITISH_TROOPS_TO_CONTROL_1947_INDIA_PAKISTAN_PARTITION_RIOTS via @academia
Pakistan and Afghanistan have a long and complex relationship dating back to their independence in 1947. Relations were initially fraught as Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's independence and membership in the UN. Tensions eased from 1963-1973 as Afghanistan supported Pakistan in its wars with India. The overthrow of Afghanistan's monarchy in 1973 deteriorated relations further. The Soviet invasion of 1979 and Pakistan's support for the mujahideen resistance dominated relations until 1992. Since 9/11, Pakistan has walked a fine line between supporting US counterterrorism efforts while maintaining ties to Afghan factions.
The document discusses obstacles and steps taken to improve relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some initial obstacles included Afghanistan not recognizing Pakistan, a border dispute, Afghanistan supporting separatist movements in Pakistan and breaking diplomatic relations multiple times. However, both countries also took steps like high-level visits in 1956 and 1973 to improve relations. Pakistan also accommodated Afghan refugees and allowed transit access.
British Strategic Manipulation Defeats USSR and Dictates Pakistans Foreign Po...Agha A
1) In 1950, the Soviet Union's acting ambassador in Iran desperately sought a meeting with Pakistan's third secretary, Saad Rashidul Khairi, to request that Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan first visit the USSR before traveling elsewhere, as it would be in Pakistan's interest.
2) However, British agents in Pakistan's government, including Foreign Secretary Ikramullah, successfully convinced Liaquat Ali Khan to first visit the United States after being invited, causing the USSR to view this as a snub and become sworn enemies with Pakistan.
3) As a result of British manipulation, Pakistan's foreign policy from its early years was firmly directed by British and
Osama bin Laden grew up in Saudi Arabia, the son of a Yemeni immigrant who became wealthy through construction contracts. Bin Laden traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to join the mujahideen resistance against the Soviet invasion. The CIA provided financial and military support including Stinger missiles to the mujahideen, including bin Laden's forces. After the Soviet withdrawal, bin Laden formed al-Qaeda and declared war on the United States, carrying out attacks such as the 1998 US embassy bombings in Africa.
Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda and the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, was killed by US Navy SEALs in a covert operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan on May 1, 2011. The operation, called Operation Neptune Spear, involved SEAL Team 6 flying covertly into Pakistan and raiding the compound where bin Laden had been living. Bin Laden was shot and killed during the raid. The death of bin Laden was announced by President Obama and was met with both relief and satisfaction by many, though some argued the "war on terror" would continue.
Bales robert (sniper-goggles&night stalkermurder)VogelDenise
Staff Sgt. Robert Bales was transported to Fort Leavenworth military prison in Kansas after being accused of killing 16 Afghan civilians. Bales served four combat deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 10 years. He allegedly left his base in Afghanistan in the middle of the night and killed 16 people, mostly women and children. Bales faces 16 counts of murder and could face the death penalty if convicted.
Osama Bin Laden is considered the most dangerous terrorist in the world by the U.S. government. He is believed to have plotted or inspired attacks such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Saudi National Guard training center bombing, and the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda hijackers flew planes into the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, with Bin Laden issuing a "fatwa" motivating these attacks. While only about 15% of Muslims are fundamentalists, Bin Laden's message resonates with young Muslims longing to restore Islam's former glory.
Mazhar Aziz's book provides a new perspective on civil-military relations in Pakistan by introducing the concept of "institutional path dependency", however it fails to precisely define this concept. The reviewer argues that the book misses important factors that have influenced Pakistan's military interventions, such as the colonial legacy of British rule in Punjab and the role of the US in manipulating the Pakistani military to achieve geopolitical aims. While the military has acted out of institutional interests at times, the reviewer asserts that personal motivations and class interests of top generals have been more influential in driving regime changes. Defeat in war may be the only way to reduce the military's oversized role in Pakistan's politics.
sepoy perceptions about military effectiveness of english east india companyAgha A
Sepoy Perceptions about EEIC Military Effectiveness
The Bengal Army was the brain child of Lord Clive's military genius. The Bengal sepoys related to each other by blood relationship and caste bonds had served the EEIC for some 100 years when they rebelled in 1857. These men had a very close contact with the British and had observed them from very close quarters. Any neutral and unbiased account of the events of 1857 clearly proves that the Britisher as an officer was never disliked by the sepoys. As an officer who served in Pakistan Army I can state with conviction that the British provided excellent leadership to the Indians. They definitely knew how to lead and inspire the Indian, leading them from the forefront which I am afraid few of at least our native post 1947. Generals did either in Burma or in 1965 or in 1971. The sepoy admired and revered the British officer. In 1857 he was rebelling against the system instituted by the EEIC. Against policies formulated by men constituting a board of directors in far off England. The greasing of cartridges with pig or cow fat similarly was also an administrative decision. The sepoy perceived the British officer as a fair and brave leader and many British officers reciprocated these feelings. One of the British commanding officer committed suicide when his native infantry regiment was disbanded. Many others resisted disbandment of their units. One troop of 3rd Light Cavalry the most crucial unit of Bengal Army Sepoys as a matter of fact loyally fought for the British in 1857.
Success of Jinnah and Zia in Pakistan and failure of others.M Akram Niazi
1) The document analyzes why religious leaders like Jinnah and Zia had success in Pakistan while more recent non-religious leaders like Musharraf and Zardari have failed.
2) It attributes the success of Jinnah and Zia to their strong commitment to Islam and serving the interests of Muslims, which gained them trust and support among the people.
3) In contrast, leaders like Musharraf and Zardari are seen as lacking ideology and insincerity towards Islam and the people. Their policies are argued to have destabilized Pakistan and damaged its institutions and integrity.
Osama bin Laden was the founder and leader of al-Qaeda, a militant Sunni Islamist organization. He was born in Saudi Arabia in 1957 and studied economics and business administration. Bin Laden orchestrated numerous terrorist attacks against Western targets and declared war against the United States in 1996. Most notably, he was the mastermind behind the September 11 attacks in 2001 which killed nearly 3,000 people. After nearly a decade on the run, bin Laden was killed by U.S. special forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011.
The Taliban in Afghanistan/ US withdrawal from AfghanistanMisbah shaheen
The US spent $2.26 trillion in Afghanistan since 2001 but the country still has high poverty levels. In August 2021, US troops began withdrawing and the last soldier left on September 15th, leading to the fall of the US-backed government. Afghanistan has been invaded by various empires over centuries but gained independence in the early 20th century. However, internal conflicts erupted in the late 1970s when communists took power, leading to civil war and the Soviet invasion. The Soviets withdrew in 1989 but Afghanistan remained unstable, leading to the US invasion in 2001 after 9/11.
reflections on British Indian Army recruitment as discussed by family eldersAgha A
reflections on British Indian Army recruitment as discussed by family elders
July 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21931.26408
Project: MILITARY HISTORY
Agha H Amin
A Lot of Assorted Nonsense About Afghanistan From Eric MargolisAgha A
This document provides commentary and analysis regarding the British Empire's involvement in Afghanistan. It discusses the failed British invasion of Afghanistan in the 19th century and the recent US-led NATO mission in Afghanistan. Major points made include:
- The British retreat from Kabul in 1842 involved a brigade of 700 British troops and 4,500 Indian troops retreating in harsh conditions and being attacked by over 30,000 Afghans.
- The US goal in Afghanistan was to gain bases near Central Asian oil and block China, but after 11 years and $1 trillion, this effort failed, representing a military and political defeat for the US.
- Remaining US troops in Afghanistan after 2014 withdrawals may face attacks from Pasht
MOUNTBATTEN AND NEHRU'S FOLLY IN IMPULSIVELY AND THOUGHTLESSLY REJECTING FIEL...Agha A
MOUNTBATTEN AND NEHRU'S FOLLY IN IMPULSIVELY AND THOUGHTLESSLY REJECTING FIELD MARSHAL AUCHINLECLS PROPOSAL TO RETAIN BRITISH TROOPS TO CONTROL 1947 INDIA PAKISTAN PARTITION RIOTS https://www.academia.edu/69652589/MOUNTBATTEN_AND_NEHRUS_FOLLY_IN_IMPULSIVELY_AND_THOUGHTLESSLY_REJECTING_FIELD_MARSHAL_AUCHINLECLS_PROPOSAL_TO_RETAIN_BRITISH_TROOPS_TO_CONTROL_1947_INDIA_PAKISTAN_PARTITION_RIOTS via @academia
Pakistan and Afghanistan have a long and complex relationship dating back to their independence in 1947. Relations were initially fraught as Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's independence and membership in the UN. Tensions eased from 1963-1973 as Afghanistan supported Pakistan in its wars with India. The overthrow of Afghanistan's monarchy in 1973 deteriorated relations further. The Soviet invasion of 1979 and Pakistan's support for the mujahideen resistance dominated relations until 1992. Since 9/11, Pakistan has walked a fine line between supporting US counterterrorism efforts while maintaining ties to Afghan factions.
The document discusses obstacles and steps taken to improve relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some initial obstacles included Afghanistan not recognizing Pakistan, a border dispute, Afghanistan supporting separatist movements in Pakistan and breaking diplomatic relations multiple times. However, both countries also took steps like high-level visits in 1956 and 1973 to improve relations. Pakistan also accommodated Afghan refugees and allowed transit access.
British Strategic Manipulation Defeats USSR and Dictates Pakistans Foreign Po...Agha A
1) In 1950, the Soviet Union's acting ambassador in Iran desperately sought a meeting with Pakistan's third secretary, Saad Rashidul Khairi, to request that Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan first visit the USSR before traveling elsewhere, as it would be in Pakistan's interest.
2) However, British agents in Pakistan's government, including Foreign Secretary Ikramullah, successfully convinced Liaquat Ali Khan to first visit the United States after being invited, causing the USSR to view this as a snub and become sworn enemies with Pakistan.
3) As a result of British manipulation, Pakistan's foreign policy from its early years was firmly directed by British and
Osama bin Laden grew up in Saudi Arabia, the son of a Yemeni immigrant who became wealthy through construction contracts. Bin Laden traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to join the mujahideen resistance against the Soviet invasion. The CIA provided financial and military support including Stinger missiles to the mujahideen, including bin Laden's forces. After the Soviet withdrawal, bin Laden formed al-Qaeda and declared war on the United States, carrying out attacks such as the 1998 US embassy bombings in Africa.
Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda and the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, was killed by US Navy SEALs in a covert operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan on May 1, 2011. The operation, called Operation Neptune Spear, involved SEAL Team 6 flying covertly into Pakistan and raiding the compound where bin Laden had been living. Bin Laden was shot and killed during the raid. The death of bin Laden was announced by President Obama and was met with both relief and satisfaction by many, though some argued the "war on terror" would continue.
Bales robert (sniper-goggles&night stalkermurder)VogelDenise
Staff Sgt. Robert Bales was transported to Fort Leavenworth military prison in Kansas after being accused of killing 16 Afghan civilians. Bales served four combat deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 10 years. He allegedly left his base in Afghanistan in the middle of the night and killed 16 people, mostly women and children. Bales faces 16 counts of murder and could face the death penalty if convicted.
Osama Bin Laden is considered the most dangerous terrorist in the world by the U.S. government. He is believed to have plotted or inspired attacks such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Saudi National Guard training center bombing, and the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda hijackers flew planes into the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, with Bin Laden issuing a "fatwa" motivating these attacks. While only about 15% of Muslims are fundamentalists, Bin Laden's message resonates with young Muslims longing to restore Islam's former glory.
Mazhar Aziz's book provides a new perspective on civil-military relations in Pakistan by introducing the concept of "institutional path dependency", however it fails to precisely define this concept. The reviewer argues that the book misses important factors that have influenced Pakistan's military interventions, such as the colonial legacy of British rule in Punjab and the role of the US in manipulating the Pakistani military to achieve geopolitical aims. While the military has acted out of institutional interests at times, the reviewer asserts that personal motivations and class interests of top generals have been more influential in driving regime changes. Defeat in war may be the only way to reduce the military's oversized role in Pakistan's politics.
sepoy perceptions about military effectiveness of english east india companyAgha A
Sepoy Perceptions about EEIC Military Effectiveness
The Bengal Army was the brain child of Lord Clive's military genius. The Bengal sepoys related to each other by blood relationship and caste bonds had served the EEIC for some 100 years when they rebelled in 1857. These men had a very close contact with the British and had observed them from very close quarters. Any neutral and unbiased account of the events of 1857 clearly proves that the Britisher as an officer was never disliked by the sepoys. As an officer who served in Pakistan Army I can state with conviction that the British provided excellent leadership to the Indians. They definitely knew how to lead and inspire the Indian, leading them from the forefront which I am afraid few of at least our native post 1947. Generals did either in Burma or in 1965 or in 1971. The sepoy admired and revered the British officer. In 1857 he was rebelling against the system instituted by the EEIC. Against policies formulated by men constituting a board of directors in far off England. The greasing of cartridges with pig or cow fat similarly was also an administrative decision. The sepoy perceived the British officer as a fair and brave leader and many British officers reciprocated these feelings. One of the British commanding officer committed suicide when his native infantry regiment was disbanded. Many others resisted disbandment of their units. One troop of 3rd Light Cavalry the most crucial unit of Bengal Army Sepoys as a matter of fact loyally fought for the British in 1857.
Success of Jinnah and Zia in Pakistan and failure of others.M Akram Niazi
1) The document analyzes why religious leaders like Jinnah and Zia had success in Pakistan while more recent non-religious leaders like Musharraf and Zardari have failed.
2) It attributes the success of Jinnah and Zia to their strong commitment to Islam and serving the interests of Muslims, which gained them trust and support among the people.
3) In contrast, leaders like Musharraf and Zardari are seen as lacking ideology and insincerity towards Islam and the people. Their policies are argued to have destabilized Pakistan and damaged its institutions and integrity.
Osama bin Laden was the founder and leader of al-Qaeda, a militant Sunni Islamist organization. He was born in Saudi Arabia in 1957 and studied economics and business administration. Bin Laden orchestrated numerous terrorist attacks against Western targets and declared war against the United States in 1996. Most notably, he was the mastermind behind the September 11 attacks in 2001 which killed nearly 3,000 people. After nearly a decade on the run, bin Laden was killed by U.S. special forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011.
The Taliban in Afghanistan/ US withdrawal from AfghanistanMisbah shaheen
The US spent $2.26 trillion in Afghanistan since 2001 but the country still has high poverty levels. In August 2021, US troops began withdrawing and the last soldier left on September 15th, leading to the fall of the US-backed government. Afghanistan has been invaded by various empires over centuries but gained independence in the early 20th century. However, internal conflicts erupted in the late 1970s when communists took power, leading to civil war and the Soviet invasion. The Soviets withdrew in 1989 but Afghanistan remained unstable, leading to the US invasion in 2001 after 9/11.
reflections on British Indian Army recruitment as discussed by family eldersAgha A
reflections on British Indian Army recruitment as discussed by family elders
July 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21931.26408
Project: MILITARY HISTORY
Agha H Amin
A Lot of Assorted Nonsense About Afghanistan From Eric MargolisAgha A
This document provides commentary and analysis regarding the British Empire's involvement in Afghanistan. It discusses the failed British invasion of Afghanistan in the 19th century and the recent US-led NATO mission in Afghanistan. Major points made include:
- The British retreat from Kabul in 1842 involved a brigade of 700 British troops and 4,500 Indian troops retreating in harsh conditions and being attacked by over 30,000 Afghans.
- The US goal in Afghanistan was to gain bases near Central Asian oil and block China, but after 11 years and $1 trillion, this effort failed, representing a military and political defeat for the US.
- Remaining US troops in Afghanistan after 2014 withdrawals may face attacks from Pasht
German assessment of islam and nonsense theories of pan islamismAgha A
This document contains a long analysis critiquing overly simplistic views of pan-Islamism and arguing that history, ethnicity, and geopolitics are more complex realities that are often ignored. It discusses how certain historical Muslim figures are portrayed differently by different groups and eras. It also notes how religion alone has rarely been the sole basis for statehood, giving examples of how ethnicity and national interests often outweighed religious solidarity between states. The document advocates for a more nuanced understanding of history that considers these various factors rather than only focusing on abstract religious concepts.
USAs NONSENSE AND AIMLESS PEACE PLAN IN AFGHANISTANAgha A
FYI – A geo-political analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan/South Asia. He pulls no punches in his opinion.
Similarly in the book I helped major Amin and Colonel Osinski put together it is stated:
…The very idea of USA talking to Taliban is naive...The Taliban do not represent the whole Afghanistan” (Amin, 2009). “The Taliban are politically rejected by nearly the entire non-Pashtun population (Figure 1). Even among the Pashtun they command polling support of less than 6%” (McCaffrey, 2009). “If any settlement has to be negotiated with them Afghanistan would have to be divided. What the Taliban signify is not acceptable to at least 50 % of Afghans...Any U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in totality would be a great U.S. strategic failure. Even if the USA withdraws it must retain bases because the Afghans respect B 52 s and fear Allah although I doubt the second assertion somewhat. U.S. or NATO withdrawal would lead to a renewed war between the Northern Alliance supported by Russia, India and Iran and the Good Taliban supported by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. There would be no Taliban occupation of Kabul or Mazar (Figure 9). Although the Taliban may practice their brand of Islam at Kandahar and Ghazni Provinces in Afghanistan (Figure 5), the Afghan war would continue as long as the Indian - Pakistani issue is not decided militarily” (Amin 2009). Therein lays a major problem
LETTERS TO STAFF COLLEGE QUETTA AND WHAT IS WRONG WITH PAKISTAN ARMY SYSTEMSAgha A
1. The document discusses the British colonial legacy and its influence on the Pakistan Army's performance and conduct in the 1965 war with India. It argues that both the pre-1947 Indian Army and post-1947 Pakistani and Indian armies were products of 190 years of British rule in India and were influenced by British military traditions and systems.
2. Specifically, it notes that the British Indian Army that the Pakistan and Indian armies descended from was deliberately kept outdated by the British compared to European armies. It also lacked strong indigenous leadership traditions due to the British policy of not allowing native Indians to become commissioned officers until late. These British colonial legacies continued to influence the armies' conduct negatively.
The document discusses the negative influence of the British colonial legacy on the Pakistan Army. Some key influences included:
1) The British Indian Army that the Pakistan Army descended from was deliberately kept outdated, focusing more on imperial policing than combat effectiveness. It lacked modern equipment, training, and reforms.
2) There was no strong leadership tradition in the Indian/Pakistani armies, as British policy prevented Indians from becoming officers for many years. This created officers who saw the army only as a career.
3) British military doctrine was extremely conservative. The British Indian Army focused on outdated tactics and saw little need for reform even as other armies modernized. Staff work and combined arms coordination were weak areas that continued in
LETTERS TO STAFF COLLEGE QUETTA AND WHAT IS WRONG WITH PAKISTAN ARMYAgha A
1. The document discusses the British colonial legacy and its influence on the Pakistan Army's performance and conduct in the 1965 war with India. It argues that both the pre-1947 Indian Army and post-1947 Pakistani and Indian armies were products of the 190-year British rule in India and were influenced by British military traditions and systems.
2. Specifically, it notes that the British Indian Army that the Pakistan and Indian armies descended from was deliberately kept outdated by the British in terms of equipment, training, and modernization compared to British and other armies. It also lacked strong indigenous leadership traditions due to British policies of excluding Indians from becoming commissioned officers.
3. These British colonial legacies, including inter-arm rivalry and compartment
Fatal Strategic Mistakes of President Bush in 2001 and hopeless performance o...Agha A
There is no good luck or bad luck but consequences
Fatal Strategic Mistakes of President Bush in 2001 and hopeless performance of US drone when called to support operations
Us drone wipes out 36 ak platoon in indus valleyAgha A
1) The document provides instructions for reviewing a digital proof of a book titled "Intelligence Review-Volume Seven" authored by Agha Humayun Amin before approving and moving forward in the publishing process.
2) It recommends reviewing the proof three times, focusing on formatting, grammar, and design issues in each review.
3) Once satisfied, the proof can be approved to advance to the next publishing step. The 70-page book covers topics like the IED war in Pakistan and intelligence games played by actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
1. The document discusses the British colonial legacy's influence on the Pakistan Army, specifically examining its impact on the army's performance in the 1965 war.
2. It notes that both the Indian and Pakistan Armies inherited organizational structures, tactics, and traditions from nearly 190 years under British rule in India.
3. The British Indian Army was deliberately kept outdated compared to European armies, with outdated equipment, training focused on fighting tribes rather than modern warfare, and slow introduction of Indian officers, resulting in both armies lacking modern military doctrines and traditions after independence.
Pan islamism and its dangers assessed in 2000Agha A
This document provides a lengthy analysis of geopolitical issues related to Pan-Islamism, Iran, Afghanistan, and Chechnya from a historical perspective. The author argues that Pan-Islamism overlooks important geographical, ethnic, and historical realities. Religious affiliation alone is not enough to unite states or peoples. National interests and ethnic identities are also important factors. The author also criticizes the oversimplified view that the Afghan war was a triumph of Islam over communism, arguing instead that it was a proxy conflict manipulated by outside powers for their own interests.
Why Military Defeat in 1971-The Qualitative Destruction of Pakistan Army betw...Agha A
The document provides background information on Major General Yahya Khan who became the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army in 1966 and later seized power in 1969. It discusses Yahya Khan's career and qualifications, noting that he was seen as professionally competent but selected for political reasons by Ayub Khan. After becoming Army Chief, Yahya Khan oversaw reorganizations of the army including establishing new corps headquarters and divisions to address shortcomings revealed in the 1965 war with India.
IED,Drones and Suicide Bomber Warfare in Afghanistan and PakistanAgha A
The document provides instructions for reviewing a digital proof of a book. It recommends reviewing the proof three times, focusing on different aspects each time: format, grammar, and design. Once satisfied, the proof can be approved to advance to the next publishing step. Specific instructions include checking headers, footers, page numbers, spacing, table of contents, images, and grammar. The document also provides printing recommendations and contact information for the digital proofer.
British exaggerations myths of indo pak history part 6Agha A
Was The Rebellion Inevitable
The rebellion was not inevitable but was the result of a series of administrative and policy decisions made in a period of two decades.
Dalhousie’s basic policy was sound. He was administratively annexing regions which had been politically and militarily conquered and defeated long ago.
But Dalhousie’s pace of annexation was fast. His modus operandi of routine administration and dealing with the Indian native princes as well as the British officials was rash. His treatment of the CinC Charles Napier was unjust. His perceptions regarding Oudh were by and large correct but the manner in which he dealt with Oudh was not correct.
Being the man on the spot he should have actively decided that immediate annexation was not the answer. But he suggested to the Directors of EEIC a number of options including annexation which they selected.
Thus he made the Directors take a decision about which they had little first hand knowledge. Sleeman had prophetically warned Dalhousie that annexation of Oudh would have a very negative effect on the sepoys who were almost 50 to 60% part of the Bengal Infantry.
Despite all this we must not forget that the foundation of an educated and aware Indian middle class was laid essentially by Macaulay and Dalhousie rather than by any Indian Hindu or Muslim.
The three universities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were foundations of an Indian educated middle class. The British had resolved to introduce western education in India before 1857 and both Hindus and Muslims were to acquire if, even if Sayyid Ahmad Khan had died fighting for the rebel cause at Bijnor!
Myths ,Distortions and Misconceptions of India Pakistan HistoryAgha A
1) The document provides instructions for reviewing a digital proof of a book, focusing on formatting, grammar, design issues, and content.
2) It recommends reviewing the proof three times, focusing on different aspects each time, before approving it to move forward in the publishing process.
3) Additional details are provided on how to print the proof and what to check such as headers, page numbers, images, and grammar.
Myths and misconceptions of indo pak history part 8Agha A
Yet in 1857 the Indians or at least a part of them both Hindus and Muslims combined and made one very desperate yet valiant effort to oust the British. Till this time the Hindus acknowledged the Muslim political supremacy since we see the Bengal Army which was predominantly Hindu, fighting for Muslim sovereigns at Delhi and in Oudh!
But when this great rebellion failed there was the parting of the ways! The Muslims of the post-1857 had no choice but to please the British to avoid Hindu domination!
The Hindu’s problems had completely ended!
All they had to do was to play a waiting game.
They knew that one day the British will have to go and then they, the ones who had been ruled and subjugated by a minority from the 12th century till almost the 18th century would dominate the Indo-Pak sub- continent, just like they were about to do around 1799 and till 1803 when the EEIC challenged the Hindu Mahratta rule!
The Muslim post-1857 problems were more complex, they had to escape Hindu domination and they also had to face the British.
The policy they adopted after 1857 was “Loyalty to the British”.
The document discusses the roles of Punjab and Baluch regiments in the 1971 war. It was published on September 2023 with a DOI number and was written by Agha H Amin.
Major Agha H. Amin was commissioned in the old PAVO Cavalry in 1983. He served in various command, staff, research, logistics and instructional positions over his military career. In his civilian career, he performed projects in infrastructure and transmission lines in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan. He has authored over 120 books and journals on military topics. The document goes on to describe a battle of Pandu fought by the 4/10 Baluch battalion against India in the 1947-48 Kashmir war, and criticizes the omission of accurate accounts of the battle from official Pakistani military histories.
Battles of Najafgarh , Gangiri and Delhi RidgeAgha A
- The 6th Dragoon Guards regiment arrived in Bengal, India from England in November 1856 and was stationed in Meerut at the time of the 1857 rebellion.
- During the rebellion, the regiment saw action at Ghaziabad, Badli Ki Serai, Delhi, and helped destroy a rebel battery at Eidgah with no reported casualties.
- It lost a few men at the battles of Ghaziabad, Badli Ki Serai, and in minor actions in July 1857 but overall emerged from the rebellion relatively lightly compared to other British units.
- However, the limited historical sources available in Pakistan make it difficult for researchers there to find all details on the regiment's role and casualties during
The battalion was part of an infantry brigade deployed at Sulaimanke Headworks during the 1965 war with India. It saw little serious action as it primarily engaged Indian border police posts that were no match for regular Pakistani army battalions. The battalion suffered only 3 fatal casualties for the entire war, showing it faced little militarily credible opposition. While the battalion performed well, it must be remembered that it faced inferior Indian border police rather than other army units.
This document summarizes the performance of the 9 Punjab battalion during the 1965 war with India. The battalion was part of the 12th Division of the Pakistan Army and was tasked with capturing the town of Chhamb. Despite having significant superiority in tanks and artillery, the 12th Division failed to cross the Tawi River on the first day. The 9th Punjab battalion suffered 15 killed and 31 wounded but managed to form a bridgehead across the Tawi. After the war, the battalion was praised for its performance and received several awards, though its strategic impact was limited due to the overall failure of Operation Grand Slam.
The battalion was deployed as a guard battalion but parts saw action in 1965 war including C Company commanded by Major Anis. C Company withdrew from its position exposing the rear of 16 Punjab to Indian attack, effectively sealing 16 Punjab's fate. C Company's withdrawal doomed 16 Punjab and was described as cowardly and the cause of 16 Punjab's debacle. While most of 8 Punjab saw no action, C Company under Major Anis performed poorly and was to blame for 16 Punjab's defeat.
1) The battalion was deployed as part of 11 Division along the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor according to maps.
2) The battalion faced a brigade-level attack from the Indian army using three infantry battalions and a tank squadron.
3) A captain from the Pakistani artillery played a crucial role by engaging the attacking forces with 60 medium shells, repulsing the Indian attack.
The battalion was deployed in September 1965 as part of Operation Grand Slam, relieving the 13th Punjab battalion near Dalpat-Chak Kirpal. According to Brigadier Rizvi, the battalion attacked towards Fatwal along with 13 Lancers, advancing up to 6 miles near Kasur and suffering 9 killed and 21 wounded. However, records list the battalion as losing either 9, 11, or 10 killed. The battalion had little impact as it joined the war late when the focus had shifted, and did not receive any awards despite actions in the Rann of Kutch prior to the war.
NORTH LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT IN 1857-59 BATTLESAgha A
This document provides biographical and career details of Major Agha.H.Amin, who was commissioned in the old PAVO Cavalry in March 1983. It discusses his education, various military and civilian positions held over his career, publications authored, and contact information. The document also briefly describes a study aid about British infantry battalions that participated in the battles of 1857-59 in India, including their roles, operations, casualties, and contributions to the outcome of the war.
The 2nd Battalion of the Punjab Regiment fought in the 1965 war against India. While it received several gallantry awards, the document argues that its role was exaggerated and it did not actually face most of the major Indian attacks. Only one company saw direct fighting on the first day, and it dispersed against heavy odds. The battalion was deployed away from the main sites of battle and did not face significant enemy forces apart from this initial engagement. Its impact on the decisive Battle of Chawinda was marginal.
This document provides information about Major Agha.H.Amin, including his military and civilian career experiences. It notes that he was commissioned in the old PAVO Cavalry in March 1983, attended Saint Marys Academy Lalazar and Forman Christian College Lahore, and served in various command, staff, research, logistics and instructional positions in the military. It also lists some of his civilian career projects and publications. The document provides his contact email addresses.
1ST BATTALION WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT IN 1857-59 BATTLES.pdfAgha A
- 1st Battalion HM 8th Foot was stationed in India when the 1857 rebellion broke out. It was involved in securing areas around Delhi.
- At the siege of Delhi in September 1857, it suffered 46 of its total 57 fatal casualties and played a marginal role in the assault.
- Overall it saw minor action in other battles, with limited casualties. The majority of its casualties occurred at the decisive battle of Delhi.
Northumberland Fusiliers in 1857-59 Battles.pdfAgha A
The 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment of Foot (Northumberland Fusiliers) was stationed in Mauritius when it was called to reinforce British forces in India during the 1857 uprising. The battalion arrived in Calcutta in July and August 1857. It participated in key battles including relieving Arrah where it suffered two casualties, the first relief of Lucknow where it suffered heavy losses and helped ensure the relief's success, the defense of the Lucknow garrison, and operations through 1858. The battalion performed outstandingly and suffered high casualties of 62 men, including five officers killed in action, primarily during the relief of Lucknow. Its role was pivotal in some of the major battles, but relatively minor in others
43 BALUCH IN 1971 AND INDIAN OFFICER WHO SAW THEMAgha A
1) The document analyzes the performance of the 43rd Baluch battalion in the 1971 war, which suffered heavy casualties after being poorly employed by incompetent commanders in the 88th Brigade.
2) When the 5th East Bengal battalion defected to the Indian side, the 43rd Baluch battalion was brought in to replace it, even though they were inexperienced and unprepared for the situation.
3) In an attack by Indian forces guided by defectors, the 43rd Baluch battalion suffered the highest fatalities of any battalion on the western front due to being put into a vulnerable position by the failed leadership of the 88th Brigade commander and 10th Division commander.
Battle of Gangiri-Heavy Price paid by HM 6 Dragoon Guards for Gallantry Agha A
Battle of Gangiri-Heavy Price paid by HM 6 Dragoon Guards for Gallantry https://www.academia.edu/52632772/Battle_of_Gangiri_Heavy_Price_paid_by_HM_6_Dragoon_Guards_for_Gallantry via @academia
4th Punjab Infantry now 9 FF Pakistan Army and 42 Highlanders led the Final ...Agha A
The 4th Punjab Infantry battalion arrived in Calcutta in November 1857, meaning it missed the decisive battles of the war, including the siege of Delhi and the relief and evacuation of Lucknow. The battalion's participation in the battle of Cawnpore was minimal and it suffered no casualties. The battalion played a significant role in the final assault on Lucknow in March 1858, leading the assault on Martiniere with the 4th Punjab Infantry while the 42nd Highlanders and 90th Foot attacked frontally. The British enjoyed overwhelming artillery superiority, evidenced by the 42nd Highlanders suffering only 10 fatal casualties over 10 days of operations culminating in the final capture of Lucknow.
WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OR INDIAN ARMY CAN NEVER PRODUCE A MUSTAFA KAMAL- SOMETHING...Agha A
WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OR INDIAN ARMY CAN NEVER PRODUCE A MUSTAFA KAMAL- SOMETHING SERIOUSLY WRONG IN THE GENES
April 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20723.27689
Project: MILITARY HISTORY
Agha H Amin
Codeless Generative AI Pipelines
(GenAI with Milvus)
https://ml.dssconf.pl/user.html#!/lecture/DSSML24-041a/rate
Discover the potential of real-time streaming in the context of GenAI as we delve into the intricacies of Apache NiFi and its capabilities. Learn how this tool can significantly simplify the data engineering workflow for GenAI applications, allowing you to focus on the creative aspects rather than the technical complexities. I will guide you through practical examples and use cases, showing the impact of automation on prompt building. From data ingestion to transformation and delivery, witness how Apache NiFi streamlines the entire pipeline, ensuring a smooth and hassle-free experience.
Timothy Spann
https://www.youtube.com/@FLaNK-Stack
https://medium.com/@tspann
https://www.datainmotion.dev/
milvus, unstructured data, vector database, zilliz, cloud, vectors, python, deep learning, generative ai, genai, nifi, kafka, flink, streaming, iot, edge
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Open Source Contributions to Postgres: The Basics POSETTE 2024ElizabethGarrettChri
Postgres is the most advanced open-source database in the world and it's supported by a community, not a single company. So how does this work? How does code actually get into Postgres? I recently had a patch submitted and committed and I want to share what I learned in that process. I’ll give you an overview of Postgres versions and how the underlying project codebase functions. I’ll also show you the process for submitting a patch and getting that tested and committed.
2. 2
British Army in
Afghanistan
Fourth Afghan War
Maj Agha H Amin Ret
ISBN-13: 978-1548406264
ISBN-10: 1548406260
DISTRIBUTED IN PUBLIC INTEREST AT ZERO
ROYALTY AND ZERO PERSONAL BENEFIT
3. 3
I REGARD EVERY SOLDIER REGARDLESS OF
ETHNICITY OR RELIGIOUS BELIEF AS A
COMRADE IN ARMS AND WHEREVER A
SOLDIER IS LAUNCHED WITHOUT WISDOM
AND FORETHOUGHT , I WILL ENDEAVOUR TO
CONDEMN THIS POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE.
4. 4
Introduction
This is a personal narrative and not a theses or
a research paper sold at zero profit and in pure
public interest.
This is a very personal firsthand account of
British Army operations as I saw as a
consultant working in Afghanistan from 29
June 2004 till to date.
If you attempt to read the vast available data
and literature on British Afghan war , you will
end up clueless , mentally disoriented and
spiritually exhausted and drained.
This is so because most writers have a vested
agenda or have not seen things directly.
This narrative is based on the following
experiences :--
A close and direct association with Afghanistan
as descendant of a family that migrated from
Afghanistan in early nineteenth century but
maintained contact with Afghanistan.My
5. 5
grandfathers brother served as doctor with
Afghan Royal family from 1929 to 1945.My
uncle served as a First Secretary in Pakistan
Embassy from 1969 to 1971.
As a Pakistan Army officer I saw Afghan war
closely from 1981 to 1994.
And finally as a consultant permanently
stationed in Afghanistan from 29 June 1994 till
todate I saw the ongoing Afghan war closely.
Helmand was my area of operations as I was
General manager of RDA an Afghan American
NGO building clinics in Khanishin , Garmser ,
Nad I Ali , Musa Qila etc for the US firm Louis
Burger.
Figure 1 At Khanishin Helmand in August 2004
6. 6
In September 2006 I carried out a survey for
Lebanese firm Pro Sima for the 18 Km road
from Nad I Ali to Camp Bastion and closely saw
British troops at Camp Bastion and in Helmand
in initial stages.
Figure 2 At Dasht i Bakwa Dilaram in 2005 July
In October 2006 to March 2007 I was dealing
with a western hostage kidnapped in Helmand
and saw Helmand closely.
7. 7
Figure 3 In Helmand in September 2006
In 2007-2012 I was engaged in various
projects in Helmand dealing with narcotics and
IEDs and saw Helmand operations closely.
10. 10
The Taliban carried out a highly organized
withdrawal into Pakistan in October –
November 2001 before the US attack on
Afghanistan.
11. 11
The Pakistani state acted as a US proxy
against the USSR in Soviet Afghan war of
1979-89.
However the background was far deeper.
In 1955 a US team led by Colonel Kelly
Thompson with a 15 man training team known
as USTAMP created a covert special force in
Pakistan known as SSG or special services
group.This was a CIA controlled
operation.Pakistani SSG soldiers trained in the
USA at Fort Bragg and other institutions from
1955 till 1989 regularly.
Department of Army 31-21 and many other US
special operations manuals became the Bible of
Pakistan Army Special Services Group trained
and funded by USA.
12. 12
SSG officers and men had a close association
with the ISI involved in covert operations in
Indias North East etc from late 1950s.
When the Soviet Afghan war started an SSG
officer Brigadier Syed Raza Ali pioneered the
Pakistani operations financed by the USA in
Afghanistan.
Thus during a 24 year period from 1955 to
1979 the USA and particularly the CIA did the
capacity building of ISI and SSG in covert
operations of the Pakistan Army SSG and ISI.
13. 13
Ironically in the post 2001 period this capacity
building worked directly against the USA and
UK in Afghanistan when Pakistani trained
proxies known as Afghan Taliban fought
against the USA/UK/NATO forces in
Afghanistan.
All along the Pakistani justification was that
Pakistani proxies were figting against Indian
influence in Afghanistan.
The USA/UK/NATO were seen by Pakistanis as
short term players while the Pakistani strategic
aim was to ensure that any Indian ingress in
Pakistans backyard known as Afghanistan was
countered and checked.
Pakistans military usuper General Musharraf
himself an SSG officer with intensive ISI
tenures conceived a brilliant albeit
Machiavellian plan to deceive the Americans in
Afghanistan.
15. 15
assets while also bleeding the US taxpayer of
some 25 Billion USD extracted from the USA as
an ally in so called war on terror.
Britain was a sadder case.Britains politicians
wanted to please the USA and to gain a piece
in the pie as good greyhounds running with the
US master in the foxchase.
Thus Britains army was sent to Helmand in
2006 without any clear cut strategic aim , with
the stated aim that it was going to win hearts
and minds , restore the authority of a highly
corrupt Afghan civilian government in Kabul
etc.
16. 16
While Britains three Afghan Wars were brilliant
strategic successes and achieved a clear cut
strategic design,Britains Fourth Afghan war
waged by the worst opportunist and most
intellectually dishonest British politician in
history known as Tony Blair had no strategic
aim and was a case of bloody betrayal of the
17. 17
worst kind where young and spirited British
soldiers were sent to pointless death divided
into penny packets by well connected
careerists like Brigadier Ed Butler who were
clever in winning a DSO in circumstances of
zero personal threats but mute and absolutely
passive when confronted with a decision to
take a stand over dividing British troops into
penny packets and sending them to certain
death outnumbered and hampered like sitting
ducks condemned to guard duty in places like
Sangin , Nad e Ali and Musa Qila.
21. 21
Till 2005 Afghanistan was a relatively safe
place. I travelled from Kabul to Herat some
1050 kilometres by road without any personal
22. 22
weapon or body guards in my own vehicle and
found no security issues.
There was a requirement to double the pay of
Afghan border police and increase its strength
by ten times on the Afghan Pakistan border.
But this factor was totally ignored by the USA
led administration in Kabul.
This option would have been far cheaper
financially than sending British troops to
Afghanistan, the salary and finances of one
soldier being more expensive than 100 Afghan
soldiers.
Plus the British soldiers would arouse the Jihadi
appetites of Afghans keen to do battle with the
so called infidel.
But the crafty British politicians invented all
sorts of excuses to go to Helmand.
They were also manipulated by an Afghan fox
called Hamid Karzai whose family was fully
involved in narcotics and wanted a huge share
in the real pie called “ Helmand” .Not only the
largest Afghan province area wise but also
worlds largest single opium and hashish
producing single region !
In 2006 when I visited Helmand for the Nad I
Ali Camp Bastion Road survey I saw British
23. 23
troops who were like an invitation to ambush
for Afghan Taliban.
The situation was complicated by the fact that
a Baloch war of secession had commenced in
Pakistan since 2002 , when General Musharraf
announced Gwadar port which was seen as an
attempt to demographically eliminate the
delicately placed Baloch population by an influx
of non Baloch into the ambitious mega port
city of Gwadar.
By 2006 this insurgency was in full swing and
Pakistan was highly sensitive about
Baluchistan.
Pakistani military saw US/British/NATO
presence in Afghanistan as a threat to
Baluchistan and took a covert decision to step
up the Taliban operations in Afghanistan.
British presence in Helmand was one of the
reasons of this Pakistani decision . Why are the
British coming to Central Helmand ? This
question was highly intriguing in Pakistani
intelligence circles.
Thus the decision to step up the Taliban war in
Helmand.
British Army walked straight into a trap.
24. 24
The American Army was to follow their foot
steps in 2009 when a cheap mixed breed social
climber from Chicago decided to send US Army
into Helmand in strikingly similar penny
packets as the British did in 2006.
Chapter Two
Mechanics of the Operation
As I saw the British operations closely as a
direct observer , there was no strategy in the
British operations which were run on the
whims of the Helmand Provinces Afghan
governor who sent British SOS calls of “
Damsel in distress” and the so called clever
British Brigadier like for eg Ed Butler sent
British forces in penny packets to chase
Taliban.
This was straight as my relative Colonel
Salman nicknamed Faizan the pioneer of ISIs
Afghan War described Pakistans Afghan war
operations in Soviet Afghan War.
Salman was the man who first trained Afghan
guerrillas in 1973 at the SSG School in Cherat
and taught future big names like Ahmad Shah
Massoud,Hekmatyar ,Mulla Omar and Osama
Bin Laden , how to walk in guerrilla warfare
terms.
25. 25
Salman thus recollected, we attacked Kalat I
Ghilzai and when Afghan Army tried to supply
it or relieve we ambushed them in the
standard methodology we had learned and
mastered as taught in US manuals taught at
Cherat and Fort Bragg.
Figure 5 Colonel Salman the master training of Afghans. His father Brigadier
Ahmad won a Military Cross in Burma during WW Two. He also conducted
eminent British writer in Af Pak when he visited the region during Soviet
Afghan War.
26. 26
Now this is what was being repeated
innumerable times at Musa Qila , Nad e Ali and
Lashkargah in 2006-14.
A seemingly intelligent once great power was
duped and let down by over ambitious social
climbers like Tony Blair.
Now this is a social problem . Like all society
deteriorate morally and intangibly Britain too
had deeply rotted in the course of time with
leaders like Tony Blair who regarded British
soldiers as expendable pawns.
This was a marked deterioration from pre 1970
British wars that were planned and conceived
with a clear cut strategic purpose and design.
As I recollect now Britain in Helmand was
deeply let down by over ambitious but
essentially pigmy like characters by Tony Blair.
As a soldier I am deeply pained by the death of
young British soldiers many of whom I saw at
Camp Bastion and at Lashkargah etc.
How can one blame the Taliban or ISI when
Britain was led by characters like Tony Blair ?
27. 27
The British Quixotic ill conceived adventure
was based on a seriously fallacious ,
missionary ideal of winning hearts and minds.
28. 28
Helmand is inhabited by semi professional cold
blooded assasins who predate on any outside
party historically .But the situation gets worse
when this outside party is a European and that
too a Christian power.
Here the going gets rough as any Christian
occupying power , however friendly is seen as
an ideal sniping target in the local Afghan
culture.
So while the British government thought about
hearts and minds here was an ideal
opportunity for Afghans , not all of them
Taliban to kill a Christian soldier and go
straight to the 72 virgins . All this may not
seem rational but this was the mindset in
Helmand where the young British soldiers were
divided into penny packets of 40 or less by
characters like Brigadier Ed Butler and many
others.
Very few British senior officers died , and none
above the rank of major (four ).Characters like
Brigadier Butler never questioned the strategy
of the mission.It is true that Butler later
resigned or asked for retirement , but that
happened much later after the damage had
been done and so many young and spirited
British soldiers survived for no strategic
objective or even an operational one.
29. 29
This raises basic ethical questions that most
British officers did not question the mission.
Even Butlers DSO won in 2002 was
questionable as Britain suffered no casualty in
Afghan war till 2004.
2002
Ironically the first two British casualties in
2002 were the result of a drunken brawl , one
soldier killing another and then committing
suicide.But these two non combat deaths were
still better than the absolutely pointless British
deaths in Helmand.
2004 and 2005
One British soldier died in Kabul due to enemy
action in 2004 travelling in a soft vehicle no
tribute to British war effort , a second died in
Mazar in 2005 due to enemy action.
2006
Captain Philippson, Jim died in Helmand , the
first proof that British soldiers were presented
on a platter to mad blood thirsty Jihadis who
vastly outnumbered the British soldiers in
Helmand.
1 6-12-2006 Philippson, Jim Captain
30. 30
Five British soldiers including a subaltern and
a captain died at Sangin in Helmand where
Britain had nothing to achieve. But Britain sent
them to Sangin as a fire brigade . Straight into
the mouth of death as Colonel Salman
31. 31
described his countless ambushes of Afghan
Army columns on the Kanadahr Kalat I Ghilzai
road.
2 7-05-
2006
Jackson, Damien
Raymond
Private
3 7-01-
2006
Thorpe, Peter Corporal
4 7-01-
2006
Hashmi, Jabron
Lance
Corporal
5 6-27-
2006
Bartlett, Paul Sergeant
6 6-27-
2006
Patten, David Captain
The slaughter had started. A Quetta Pashtun
told me that he was keen to send his young
son to test his newly acquired AK in killing an
infidel in Helmand as I sipped Stolichnaya
Vodka at a dinner with old school days friends
in Quetta.
This is what the brilliant British Scott leader of
Gilgit Rebellion described as an intangible but
weird quality of Pashtuns like frontier
Highlanders of old British history known as “
Blood Lust”.
Nothing to do with Islam but far more with
anthropology and culture.
The room was full of hash smoke and the
guests half drunk with Vodka but the
discussion centred around Helmand where a
32. 32
man described British soldiers as not difficult to
shoot.
This is the Af Pak mindset where characters
like Tony Blair had sent British soldiers to win
hearts and minds.
I would not be surprised if many British
soldiers were casualties of visitors from
Quetta.
7 8-01-2006 Eida, Alex Captain
8
8-01-2006
Nicholls,
Ross
Lance Corporal
9
8-01-2006
Johnson,
Ralph
2nd Lieutenant
Why is Private Cutts killed at Musa Qila on 6th
August 2006 ? What strategic purpose was
achieved and which tactical objective gained ?
10 8-06-2006 Cutts, Andrew Barrie Private
33. 33
Did his heroic death break the back of Taliban .
Certainly not.
Three more British soldiers in isolated battles
in penny packets again .
34. 34
11 9-01-2006 Draiva, Anare Ranger
12 8-27-2006 Hetherington, Jonathan Lance Corporal
13 8-20-2006 Budd, Bryan James Corporal
Some ones son husbands or brothers ?
This is not an anti war narrative but an anti
stupidity narrative.
14 9-04-2006 O’Donnell, Craig Private
If a private dies because of a suicide bomber in
Kabul one can partially justify it but not
soldiers killed at Sangin or Musa Qila.
15 10-18-2006 Wright, Gary Marine
16 9-06-2006 McCulloch, Luke Lance Corporal
17 9-06-2006 Muirhead, Paul Lance Corporal
18 9-06-2006 Wright, Mark William Corporal
And what about soldiers killed by so called “
Friendly fire” of Americans who specialized in
killing own soldiers.
12-05-2006 Wigley, Jonathan Marine
December is a lovely cold crisp month in the
west with preparations of Christmas and a
mood of festivity.
But what happens with relatives of these two
soldiers who died for an extremely vague
mission at Nowzad
35. 35
19 12-27-2006 Dwyer, James Lance Bombardier
20 12-12-2006 Watson, Richard J. Marine
The tally of 2006 being 20 British soldiers
killed due to enemy action. Not to forget 14
killed in air crash which had only something to
do with British incompetence and nothing with
the enemy ad four accidental deaths not to
forget one killed by the friendly but over
efficient Americans.
2007
What sense to make of the first gift of 2007 ,
killed at Kajaki , Garmsir or Sangin in isolated
incidents :--
Date Name Rank Age Unit
1 2-
21-
2007
Holland,
Jonathan
"Dutchy"
Marine 23
45
Commando
2
1-
15-
2007
Ford, Mathew
Lance
Corpor
al
30
45
Commando
Royal
Marines
3
1-
13-
2007
Curry,
Thomas
Marine 21
42
Commando
Royal
Marines
And more soldiers killed in again isolated
incidents :--
4 5-03-
2007
Davison,
Simon
Guardsman 22
1st Battalion
Grenadier
36. 36
Guards
5
4-13-
2007
Gray,
Chris
Private 19
A Company
Group, 1 Royal
Anglian
Battlegroup
6
3-08-
2007
Smith,
Michael
Warrant
Officer
Class 2
39
29 Commando
Regiment
Royal Artillery
7
3-06-
2007
Reddy,
Benjami
n
Marine 22
K Company, 42
Commando
Royal Marines
8
3-03-
2007
McLaugh
lin, Liam
Lance
Bombardier
21
29 Commando
Regiment
Royal Artillery
9
3-03-
2007
Clark,
Ross
Lance
Bombardier
25
29 Commando
Regiment
Royal Artillery
The bravehearts continue to die in isolated
combats which serve Britain no purpose but no
one really cares.
10 12-08-2007 Johnson, Lee Sergeant 33
11 12-04-2007 Sadler, Jack Trooper 21
12 11-14-2007 Mcdermid, John Captain 43
13 10-04-2007 Roberts, Alexis Major 32
14
9-17-2007
Violino, Ivano
"Sean"
Lance
Corporal
29
15 9-08-2007 Botha, Johan Private 25
16 9-08-2007 Brelsford, Craig Sergeant 25
17 9-05-2007 Wright, Damian Private 23
18 9-05-2007 Ford, Ben Private 18
19
8-30-2007
Bridge,
Christopher
Senior
Aircraftman
20
20 8-11-2007 Hicks, David Captain 26
21 8-10-2007 Rawson, Tony Private 27
37. 37
22
7-29-2007 Jones, Michael
Lance
Corporal
26
23 7-27-2007 Keen, Barry Sergeant 34
24 7-26-2007 Atherton, David Guardsman 25
25
7-25-2007 Hawkins, Alex
Lance
Corporal
22
26 7-12-2007 Hickey, Daryl Guardsman 27
27 7-01-2007 Wilkinson, Dave Sergeant 33
28 6-30-2007 Dolan, Sean Captain 40
29 6-24-2007 Wright, Thomas Drummer 21
30
6-09-2007
Downes, Neil
"Tony"
Guardsman 20
31
6-06-2007
Sandford, Paul
"Sandy"
Lance
Corporal
23
32 5-30-2007 Gilyeat, Mike Corporal 28
33 5-28-2007 Bonner, Darren Corporal 31
34 5-26-2007 Probyn, Daniel Guardsman 22
And what about the three British soldiers killed
by friendly fire .
8-23-
2007
McClure,
Aaron
James
Private 19
1st Battalion
The Royal
Anglian
Regiment
8-23-
2007
Thrumble,
John
Private 21
1st Battalion
The Royal
Anglian
Regiment
8-23-
2007
Foster,
Robert
Graham
Private 19
1st Battalion
The Royal
Anglian
Regiment
38. 38
What on earth were British soldiers doing at
Kajaki on the far end of Helmand. Rather than
sitting on the Helmand Pakistan border and
killing Taliban infiltrators.
I met many NATO officers in Afghanistan and
various times we discussed the war and these
officers were absolutely clueless about what
was the NATO strategic aim in Afghanistan.
Militarily NATO was absolutely disjointed and
clueless.
Regarding Pakistan the USA had no clear cut
policy or system to monitor the Pakistan
Afghanistan border opposite South
Afghanistan.
I carried out a study for anti narcotics client in
2007-11 and discovered that Pakistan did not
deploy a single battalion to interdict the entire
1500 Km Afghanistan Pakistan border despite
getting some 25 Billion USD in aid from USA
during the period 2001-8.
Interestingly the USA officials in Pakistan were
so highly incompetent that they did not
institute any mechanism in Pakistan to control
as well as coordinate what Pakistan was
deploying on the southern 1500 Km border
with Afghanistan.
40. 40
The butchers bill for 2007 was thus as
following:--
Total Killed 42
Deaths due to actual
fighting
33
Air crashes related to
enemy action
1
Accidental deaths 5
Friendly Fire 3
Suicides Nil
Murder Nil
Air crashes not related
to enemy action
Nil
Green on blue Nil
2008
2008 saw the same pointless tactical
degradation of British Army in places of zero
military value like Sangin , Kajaki and Musa
Qila.
3-30-
2008
Marsh,
David
Marine 22 Kajaki
3-30-
2008
Thornton,
John
Lieutenant 23 Kajaki
2-20-
2008
Mulvihill,
Damian
Corporal 32 Sangin
2-17-
2008
Lawrence,
Damian
Stephen
Corporal 25 Kajaki
1-20-
2008
Gardiner,
Darryl
Corporal 25 Musa Qaleh
41. 41
The manpower was so limited that two
valuable airmen were lost as they were sent on
patrolling south of Kandahar airfield in Daman
district and killed by an IED.
4-13-
2008
Thompson,
Gary
Senior
Aircraftman
(SAC)
51
Royal
Auxiliary Air
Force
Regiment
4-13-
2008
Livingstone
, Graham
Keter
Senior
Aircraftman
23
Squadron
RAF
Regiment
The British soldiers below died in isolated
incidents working as errand boys for Afghan
government winning hearts and minds of a
hostile drug economy based local population
who saw them as hated infidels :--
12-
31-
200
8
Elms, Liam Corporal 26 Sangin
12-
24-
200
8
Whatley,
Benjamin
Lance
Corporal
20
Nad e-Ali
district
12-
21-
200
8
Deering,
Robert
Corporal 33
Lashkar
Gah
12-
17-
200
8
Nash,
Stuart
Rifleman 21
Zarghun
Kalay, Nad
e Ali District
12- Lewis, Lieutenan 26 FOB,
42. 42
15-
200
8
Aaron t Gereshk
area of
12-
12-
200
8
Davies,
Damian
Marine 27 Sangin
12-
12-
200
8
Manuel,
John Henry
Sergeant 38 Sangin
12-
12-
200
8
Birch, Marc Corporal 26 Sangin
12-
12-
200
8
Fellows,
Steven
Lance
Corporal
26 Sangin
11-
27-
200
8
Evans, Tony Marine 20
Lashkar
Gah
11-
27-
200
8
Sparks,
Georgie
Marine 19
Lashkar
Gah
11-
24-
200
8
Lucas,
Alexander
Marine 24 Kajaki
11-
15-
200
8
Dura,
Krishnabah
adur
Colour
Sergeant
36 Musa Qaleh
11-
12-
200
8
Dunstan,
Neil David
Marine 32
Garmsir
District
11- McKibben, Marine 32 Garmsir
43. 43
12-
200
8
Robert
Joseph
District
11-
04-
200
8
Rai, Yubraj Rifleman 28 Musa Qaleh
10-
15-
200
8
Munday,
James
Trooper 21 Helmand
9-
13-
200
8
Mason,
Nicky
Lance
Corporal
26 Kajaki
9-
12-
200
8
Rawstron,
Jason Lee
Private 23
FOB
Gibraltar
9-
10-
200
8
O'Donnell,
Gary
Warrant
Officer
Class 2
40 Musa Qaleh
9-
04-
200
8
Cupples,
Justin
James
Ranger 29 Sangin
8-
18-
200
8
Dempsey,
Barry
Corporal 29
Gereshk
district
8-
11-
200
8
Bland,
Wayne
Signaller 21 Kabul
7-
29-
200
8
Cowton,
Peter Joe
Private 25 Nahri Sarrj
7- Mathews, Sergeant 35 Marjah
44. 44
28-
200
8
Jonathan
William
7-
24-
200
8
Rowe,
Kenneth
Michael
Lance
Corporal
24 Sangin
7-
22-
200
8
Barnes,
Jason
Stuart
Corporal 25 Kajaki
6-
28-
200
8
Johnson,
James
Lance
Corporal
31
Lashkar
Gah
6-
27-
200
8
Shirley, Dan
Warrant
Officer
2nd Class
32 Helmand
6-
24-
200
8
Williams,
Michael
Sergeant
Major
40 Helmand
6-
24-
200
8
Whittaker,
Joe
Private 20 Helmand
6-
17-
200
8
Stout, Paul
Lance
Corporal
31
Lashkar
Gah
6-
17-
200
8
Bryant,
Sarah
Sergeant 26
Lashkar
Gah
6-
17-
200
8
Larkin,
Richard
Lance
Corporal
39
Lashkar
Gah
6- Reeve, Corporal 28 Lashkar
45. 45
17-
200
8
Sean Robert Gah
6-
12-
200
8
Bateman,
James
Lance
Corporal
29
Upper
Gereshk
Valley
6-
12-
200
8
Doherty,
Jeff
Private 20
Upper
Gereshk
Valley
6-
08-
200
8
Murray,
Charles
David
Private 19
Upper
Sangin
Valley
6-
08-
200
8
Gamble,
Daniel
Private 22
Upper
Sangin
Valley
6-
08-
200
8
Cuthbertson
, Nathan
Private 19
Upper
Sangin
Valley
5-
25-
200
8
Gostick,
Dale
Marine 22 Sangin
5-
19-
200
8
Thompson,
James
Christopher
Not
reported
yet
27 Musa Qaleh
5-
02-
200
8
Babakobau,
Ratu
Trooper 29
Naw Zad
district -
Helmand
Province
4-
21-
200
8
Pearson,
Robert
Trooper 22
Gereshk
district
46. 46
The butchers bill for 2008 was as following:--
Total Killed 51
Deaths due to actual
fighting
50
Air crashes related to
enemy action
Nil
Accidental deaths 1
Friendly Fire Nil
Suicides Nil
Murder Nil
Air crashes not related
to enemy action
Nil
Green on blue Nil
The Taliban were not dealt any major blow but
the British Ministry of Defence continued to
deceive the British public with fancy names like
Operation Moshtarak.
During this time the IED business in Quetta
was booming with Kharotabad market in
Quetta selling hundreds of IEDs daily and
fertilizer used to intensify explosives being
smuggled in thousands of ton to Afghanistan.
47. 47
Over 80 % of British deaths were inflicted by
IEDs by an enemy whose faces they never
saw.
Just because the British politicians want to
punch the holes proving to the USA that they
had done the Afghan mission man while totally
ignoring the human tragedy being experienced
by families of British soldiers who died on the
Afghan errand boy mission in pointless places
like Musa Qila , Kajaki and Sangin.
2009
2009 turned out to be the bloodiest and yet
again a pointless and another indecisive year
in the British mission in Afghanistan.
48. 48
Another bloody calamity had occurred.The USA
was now under a con man clever lawyer who
had no idea about military strategy and yet far
bigger pointless massacre of US troops was
being organized in Helmand and Kunnar known
as surge.
While only 394 US soldiers had died in Bush
era of 7 years in Afghanistan , President
Obama with able assistance of two half trained
cooks known as Generals Mc Chrystal and
Petraeus would now send some 1400 US
soldiers to pointless death in Helmand and
Kunnar in the period 2008-12.
Since the surge occurred in 2009-10 British
Armys bloodiest year in Helmand was 2009.
108 British soldiers died in 2009.
The British Ministry of Defence is extremely
petty and parsimonious about their
photographs .But it is still a must to honour
them by publishing their names in this humble
narrative.
12-
31-
2009
Watson, David Sapper 33
12-
28-
2009
Howell, Aidan Rifleman 19
12- Brown. Tommy Lance 0
49. 49
22-
2009
Corporal
12-
21-
2009
Roney, Christopher
Lance
Corporal
23
12-
20-
2009
Pritchard, Michael David
Lance
Corporal
22
12-
19-
2009
Hornby, Simon Corporal 29
12-
15-
2009
Kirkness, David Leslie
Lance
Corporal
34
12-
15-
2009
Brown, James Stephen Rifleman 18
12-
07-
2009
Drane, Adam Paul
Lance
Corporal
23
11-
30-
2009
Amer, John Paxton Sergeant 30
11-
18-
2009
Loughran-Dickson, Robert
David
Sergeant 33
11-
15-
2009
Marlton-Thomas, Loren
Owen Christopher
Corporal 28
11-
15-
2009
Fentiman, Andrew Rifleman 23
11-
08-
2009
Bassett, John Samuel Rifleman 20
11-
07-
2009
Allen, Philip Rifleman 20
50. 50
11-
05-
2009
Scott, Phillip Serjeant 30
11-
03-
2009
Webster-Smith, Nicholas Corporal 24
11-
03-
2009
Chant, Darren
Warrant
Officer Class
1
39
11-
03-
2009
Major, James Guardsman 18
11-
03-
2009
Boote, Steven
Acting
Corporal
22
11-
03-
2009
Telford, Matthew Sergeant 37
10-
31-
2009
Schmid, Olaf Sean George
Staff
Sergeant
30
10-
25-
2009
Mason, Thomas Corporal 27
10-
22-
2009
Oakland, James Corporal 26
10-
08-
2009
Hill, James
Lance
Corporal
23
10-
05-
2009
Janes, Jamie Guardsman 20
10-
01-
2009
Wojtak, Marcin
Senior
Aircraftman
24
9-27-
2009
Prosser, James Private 21
51. 51
9-21-
2009
Lockett, Michael
Acting
Sergeant
28
9-16-
2009
Hall, Brett Trooper 21
9-16-
2009
McGrath, Stuart
Serjeant
(Acting)
28
9-13-
2009
Dunn-Bridgeman, Jason Kingsman 20
9-09-
2009
Harrison, John Corporal 29
9-03-
2009
Elliott, Gavin Private 19
9-02-
2009
Brandon, Richard James
Lance
Corporal
24
8-31-
2009
Millar, Stuart Sergeant 40
8-31-
2009
Elliott, Kevin Private 24
8-29-
2009
Houltram, Lee Andrew Sergeant 33
8-25-
2009
Bush, Shaun Fusilier 24
8-20-
2009
McAleese, Paul Sergeant 29
8-20-
2009
Young, Johnathon Private 18
8-16-
2009
Fullarton, James
Lance
Corporal
24
8-16-
2009
Annis, Simon Fusilier 18
8-16-
2009
Carter, Louis Fusilier 19
8-15-
2009
Hunt, Richard Private 21
8-15-
2009
Valentine, Simon Sergeant 29
52. 52
8-13-
2009
Hatton, Matthew
Lance
Bombardier
23
8-13-
2009
Wild, Daniel Rifleman 19
8-13-
2009
Hale, Mark Captain 42
8-08-
2009
Williams, Jason George Private 23
8-06-
2009
Mulligan, Kevin Corporal 26
8-06-
2009
Hopkins, Dale Thomas
Lance
Corporal
23
8-06-
2009
Adams, Kyle Private 21
8-04-
2009
Lombardi, Anthony Craftsman 21
7-27-
2009
Lawrence, Phillip Trooper 22
7-27-
2009
Upton, Sean
Warrant
Officer Class
2
26
7-25-
2009
Hopson, Craig Bombardier 24
7-22-
2009
King, Christopher Guardsman 20
7-20-
2009
Shepherd, Daniel Captain 28
7-19-
2009
Etchells, Joseph Corporal 22
7-16-
2009
Toge, Aminiasi Rifleman 26
7-10-
2009
Aldridge, William Rifleman 18
7-10-
2009
Backhouse, James Rifleman 18
7-10- Horne, Jonathan Corporal 28
53. 53
2009
7-10-
2009
Scott, Lee Corporal 26
7-10-
2009
Simpson, Daniel Rifleman 20
7-10-
2009
Murphy, Joe Rifleman 18
7-09-
2009
Brackpool, John Private 27
7-09-
2009
Hume, Daniel Rifleman 22
7-07-
2009
Whiteside, Christopher Trooper 21
7-06-
2009
Babington-Browne, Ben Captain 27
7-05-
2009
Elson, Dane
Lance
Corporal
22
7-04-
2009
Laws, Robert Private 18
7-04-
2009
Dennis, David
Lance
Corporal
29
7-01-
2009
Hammond, Joshua Trooper 18
7-01-
2009
Thorneloe, Rupert
Lieutenant
Colonel
40
6-19-
2009
Birchall, Sean Major 33
6-12-
2009
Mervis, Paul Lieutenant 27
6-11-
2009
McLaren, Robert Private 20
6-02-
2009
Thatcher, Cyrus Rifleman 19
5-30-
2009
Moffett, Nigel
Lance
Corporal
28
5-30- Bolger, Stephen Corporal 30
54. 54
2009
5-28-
2009
Hill, Kieron
Lance
Corporal
20
5-27-
2009
Richards, Robert Martin
Lance
Corporal
24
5-23-
2009
Rossi, Jordan Sapper 22
5-22-
2009
Suesue, Petero "Pat" Fusilier 28
5-14-
2009
Mackie, Jason Marine 21
5-12-
2009
Evison, Mark Lawrence Lieutenant 26
5-07-
2009
Pun, Kumar Corporal 31
5-07-
2009
Ross, Ben Sergeant 34
5-07-
2009
Sheldon, Adrian Rifleman 25
5-07-
2009
Binnie, Sean Corporal 22
4-28-
2009
Fasfous, Tobie
Lance
Sergeant
29
3-15-
2009
Stiff, Graeme Corporal 24
3-15-
2009
John, Dean Corporal 25
3-14-
2009
Harkett, Christopher
Lance
Corporal
22
2-25-
2009
Laski, Michael "Mick" Marine 21
2-25-
2009
Gunn, Jamie Rifleman 21
2-25-
2009
Upton, Paul "Uppers"
Lance
Corporal
31
2-25- Gaden, Tom Corporal 24
55. 55
2009
2-16-
2009
Kingscott, Stephen
Lance
Corporal
22
2-14-
2009
Smith, Darren Marine 27
1-30-
2009
Nield, Daniel "Danny" Corporal 31
1-17-
2009
Robinson, Richard "Robbo"
Acting
Corporal
21
1-15-
2009
Winter, Danny Corporal 28
1-15-
2009
Sawyer, Tom Herbert John Captain 26
1-11-
2009
Mackin, Travis Marine 22
1-01-
2009
Reed, Chris Sergeant 25
The summary of the butchers bill was as
following:--
Total Killed 108
Deaths due to actual
fighting
102
Air crashes related to
enemy action
Nil
Accidental deaths Nil
Friendly Fire Nil
Suicides Nil
Murder Nil
Air crashes not related
to enemy action
1
Green on blue 5
56. 56
About the surge one may sum up that the USA
and the UK did not have the moral courage to
confront the Pakistani state and devise a
strategy to deal with infiltration from Pakistani
Baluchistan but had immense moral courage to
send their own soldiers to certain death,
divided into pointless penny packets and
presented on a platter to be killed by Taliban
with IEDS manufactured in Kharotabad Quetta.
US general Mc Chrystal and Petraeus proved as
spineless and morally feeble as British generals
who had supervised the Helmand Operations
since 2006.
The British and US generals remained
absolutely incompetent in dealing with
57. 57
Pakistani covert interference while exercising
tremendous moral courage in sending their
own soldiers to certain and pointless death.
No thought was given to fencing the 1500 km
vulnerable southern border from where Taliban
infiltration was taking place.
60. 60
Summary of the butchers bill for 2009 was as
below :--
:--
Total Killed 108
Deaths due to actual
fighting
103
Air crashes related to
enemy action
Nil
Accidental deaths Nil
Friendly Fire 1
Suicides Nil
Murder Nil
Air crashes not related
to enemy action
1
Green on blue 5
61. 61
2010
2010 saw the same tactical degradation of
British forces into glorified errand boys.
It is surprising that Britain a once great power
that controlled India at one time in First World
War with just 15,000 Troops was so powerless
and clueless in Helmand ! And this galaxy of so
called super powers included the USA also.
Credit must be given to General Musharraf for
devising a brilliant strategy to deceive the
Americans.Whatever Musharraf did , he acted
in interest of Pakistan.
That USA and UK failed to call Musharrafs bluff
is no credit to USA and UK keadership.The
Musharraf blueprint was followed by his less
able successor General Kiani after Musharraf
resigned in 2008.
2010 saw the UK butchers bill at 103.
To honour the names of the soldiers we are
publishing their names below:--
12-28-
2010
Wood, Charles
Warrant Officer
Class 2
34
12-21-
2010
Dunn, Steven
Thomas
Corporal 27
62. 62
12-05-
2010
Howard, John Private 23
11-17-
2010
Davies,
Christopher
Guardsman 22
11-14-
2010
McCormick, Aaron Ranger 22
11-07-
2010
Hughes, Scott Airman 20
10-30-
2010
Blanchard,
William
Sapper 39
10-19-
2010
Barnsdale, David Acting Corporal 24
10-08-
2010
Rayner, Peter
Anthony
Sergeant 34
10-02-
2010
Gurung, Suraj Rifleman 22
9-25-
2010
Thomas, Matthew Corporal 24
9-18-
2010
Jones, Andrew
James
Sergeant 35
9-18-
2010
Howarth, Andrew
Martin
Trooper 20
9-10-
2010
Deady, Darren Kingsman 22
9-05-
2010
Griffiths, Andrew Captain 25
9-05-
2010
Pool, Joseph
McFarlane
Lance Corporal 26
8-21-
2010
Bancroft, Jordan
Dean
Lance Corporal 25
8-13-
2010
Gurung, Ishwor Sapper 21
8-13-
2010
Foster, Darren Sapper 20
8-12-
2010
Kulung, Remand Rifleman 27
63. 63
8-11-
2010
Sanderson, John
Charles
Lieutenant 29
8-01-
2010
Brown, Adam Marine 25
8-01-
2010
McCallum, Dale
Alanzo
Lance Sergeant 31
7-26-
2010
Smith, Mark Sapper 26
7-21-
2010
Monkhouse,
Stephen Daniel
Lance Corporal 28
7-21-
2010
Stenton, Matthew
James
Corporal 23
7-17-
2010
Monkhouse, David
Thomas
Sergeant 0
7-17-
2010
Linley, Brett
George
Staff Sergeant 29
7-16-
2010
Griffiths, Kinikki
"Griff"
Senior
Aircraftman
24
7-16-
2010
Crookes, David
Thomas
Not yet reported 26
7-13-
2010
Harrison, Matthew Marine 23
7-13-
2010
Pun, Arjun Purja Corporal 33
7-13-
2010
Turkington, Neal Lieutenant 26
7-13-
2010
Bowman, James
Joshua
Major 34
7-08-
2010
Robinson, Samuel
Joseph
Bombardier 31
7-08-
2010
Hart, David
Charles
Marine 23
7-05-
2010
Sephton, Thomas Private 20
7-05-
2010
Leverett, James
Anthony
Trooper 20
64. 64
7-01-
2010
Stephens, Seth Corporal 42
6-27-
2010
Kirkpatrick, Jamie Corporal 32
6-26-
2010
Gilbert, Stephen
Raymond
Bombardier 36
6-23-
2010
Horton, Martyn
Simon
Colour Sergeant 34
6-23-
2010
Ramsden, David Lance Corporal 26
6-23-
2010
Isaac, Alex Private 20
6-23-
2010
Halliday, Douglas Private 20
6-23-
2010
Darbyshire,
Steven William
Sergeant 35
6-22-
2010
Taylor, Michael Lance Corporal 30
6-21-
2010
Warren, Paul Marine 23
6-20-
2010
Hollington,
Richard
Marine 23
6-18-
2010
Smith, Ashley Trooper 21
6-16-
2010
Rogoiruwai,
Taniela Tolevu
Corporal 32
6-15-
2010
Tagitaginimoce,
Ponipate
Kingsman 29
6-14-
2010
Birdsall, Steven
James
Marine 20
6-12-
2010
Breeze, Andrew Lance Corporal 31
6-09-
2010
Monk, Jonathan
Michael
Private 25
6-08-
2010
Chandler, Mark Lance Bombadier 32
65. 65
6-04-
2010
Webster, Terry Corporal 24
6-04-
2010
Cochran, Alan
David
Lance Corporal 23
6-02-
2010
Hotine, Anthony
Dean
Marine 21
5-30-
2010
Taylor, Scott
Gregory
Marine 21
5-26-
2010
Curley, Stephen
Paul
Corporal 26
5-26-
2010
Cusack, Zak Gunner 24
5-21-
2010
Walker, Stephen Corporal 42
5-09-
2010
Harrison,
Christopher Lewis
Corporal 26
5-03-
2010
Buxton, Barry Lance Corporal 21
5-03-
2010
Roy, Daryn Sapper 28
5-02-
2010
Holmes, Harvey
Alex
Corporal 22
4-07-
2010
Burgess, Jonathan
Antony
Fusilier 20
4-04-
2010
Turner, Mark Rifleman 21
4-01-
2010
Sweeney, Michael Not yet reported 19
3-27-
2010
Holkham, Daniel Rifleman 19
3-26-
2010
Woodgate,
Jonathan
Lance Corporal of
Horse
27
3-22-
2010
Campbell, Steven Serjeant 30
3-16-
2010
Grigg, James Private 21
66. 66
3-16-
2010
Hardy, Scott Lance Corporal 26
3-15-
2010
Driver, Martin Captain 31
3-07-
2010
Thompson,
Stephen
Corporal 21
3-07-
2010
Keogh, Tom Lance Corporal 24
3-06-
2010
Maughan, Liam Rifleman 18
3-05-
2010
Allott, Jonothon
Michael
Rifleman 19
3-02-
2010
Green, Richard Corporal 23
3-01-
2010
Apolis, Carlo Rifleman 0
2-26-
2010
Fox, Paul Maurice Not yet reported 34
2-25-
2010
Kinggett, Martin Rifleman 19
2-24-
2010
Southgate, Luke
Senior
Aircraftman
20
2-18-
2010
Dalzell, Douglas Lieutenant 27
2-18-
2010
Walker, David
"Davey"
Lance Sergeant 36
2-15-
2010
Mellors, Guy Sapper 20
2-14-
2010
Dawson, Sean Kingsman 19
2-14-
2010
Marshall, Mark Rifleman 29
2-13-
2010
Greenhalgh, Dave Lance Sergean 25
2-11-
2010
Hicks, Darren Lance Corporal 29
67. 67
2-08-
2010
Markland, David
Warrant Officer
Class 2
36
2-07-
2010
McDonald, Sean Private 26
2-07-
2010
Moore, John Corporal 22
2-01-
2010
Shaw,Graham Lance Corporal 27
2-01-
2010
Riley, Liam Corporal 21
1-24-
2010
Cooper, Daniel Lance Corporal 21
1-22-
2010
Aldridge, Peter Rifleman 19
1-15-
2010
Farmer, Luke Rifleman 19
1-15-
2010
Brownson,
Corporal Lee
Corporal 30
1-11-
2010
Read, Daniel Captain 31
1-03-
2010
Hayes, Robert Private 19
Summary of the butchers bill for 2010 was as
below :--
Total Killed 103
Deaths due to actual
fighting
91
Air crashes related to
enemy action
Nil
Accidental deaths 7
Friendly Fire 1
Suicides Nil
Murder Nil
Air crashes not related 1
68. 68
to enemy action
Green on blue 3
2011
2011 saw drawing down of the war .
Morally corrupt and spineless British
leaders saw the light of the day and the
war was much criticized in Britain.
2011 saw 46 British deaths divided as below:--
Total Killed 46
Deaths due to actual
fighting
42
Air crashes related to
enemy action
Nil
Accidental deaths 3
Friendly Fire Nil
Suicides Nil
Murder Nil
Air crashes not related
to enemy action
Nil
Green on blue 1
The names of soldiers killed in 2011 are as
below:--
12-30-
2011
King, John Private 19
69. 69
12-23-
2011
Downing, Anthony
Squadron
Leader
34
12-22-
2011
Jennings,Tom Captain 29
12-08-
2011
Bond, Elijah Sapper 24
11-27-
2011
Steel, Sheldon Rifleman 20
11-20-
2011
Lake, Thomas Private 29
11-17-
2011
Scanlon, Richard
Lance
Corporal
31
11-17-
2011
Boyce, David Lieutenant 25
11-16-
2011
Eustace, Peter
Lance
Corporal
25
11-09-
2011
Thornton, Matthew Private 28
11-04-
2011
Haseldin, Matthew
James Sean
Private 21
10-15-
2011
Rai, Vijay Rifleman 22
9-19-
2011
Fairbrother, David Marine 24
9-14-
2011
McKinlay, Jonathan
James
Lance
Corporal
33
8-30-
2011
Weston, Barry John Sergeant 40
8-12-
2011
Clack, Daniel Lieutenant 24
8-05-
2011
Wright, James Robert Marine 22
7-18-
2011
Palin, Mark Anthony Corporal 32
7-16-
2011
Watkins, Paul
Lance
Corporal
24
70. 70
7-04-
2011
McLaren, Scott Highlander 20
6-18-
2011
Bellingham, Gareth
Leslie William
Private 22
6-16-
2011
Found, Andrew Craftsman 27
6-16-
2011
Newell, Lloyd Corporal 0
6-05-
2011
Lamb, Martin Jon Rifleman 0
6-05-
2011
Gill, Martin Joseph
Lance
Corporal
42
6-03-
2011
Pike, Michael John Corporal 26
5-27-
2011
Alexander MC, William Marine 28
5-27-
2011
Augustin, Oliver
Richard
Lieutenant 23
5-23-
2011
Fortuna, Kevin Charles
Colour
Sergeant
36
5-15-
2011
Mead, Nigel Dean Marine 19
4-19-
2011
Head, Lisa Captian 29
3-31-
2011
Cameron, Alan
Colour
Sergeant
42
3-23-
2011
Burgan, Mark Terence
Lance
Corporal
28
3-23-
2011
Collins, Matthew
James
Major 38
3-18-
2011
Daniel, Steven Prior Private 27
3-09-
2011
McKee, Stephen
Lance
Corporal
27
3-01-
2011
Tasker, Liam Richard
Lance
Corporal
27
71. 71
2-14-
2011
Hutchinson, Dean Private 23
2-14-
2011
Wood, Robert Private 28
2-14-
2011
Marshall, Kyle Cleet
Lance
Corporal
23
2-09-
2011
Lewis, Conrad Private 22
2-09-
2011
Hendry, Lewis Private 20
2-05-
2011
Beckett, Colin
Warrant
Officer
Class 2
36
2-04-
2011
Dalzell, David Ranger 20
1-25-
2011
Bell, Martin Simon
George
Private 24
1-01-
2011
Vatubua, Joseva
Saqanagonedau
Private 24
2012
2012 saw 44 British deaths . Far less than
preceeding years but still pointless.
A policy decision had been taken that the
whole exercise in Helmand was absolutely
pointless.
Names of soldiers killed are as below :--
11-
11-
2012
Barrie, Walter Reid Captain 41
10- Drummond-Baxter, Lieutenant 29
72. 72
30-
2012
Edward
10-
30-
2012
Kunwar, Siddhanta
Lance
Corporal
28
10-
24-
2012
Day, Channing Corporal 25
10-
24-
2012
O’Connor, David Corporal 27
9-24-
2012
Manley, Carl Captain 41
9-21-
2012
Townley, James
Anthony
Captain 29
9-21-
2012
Kups, Jonathan Eric Sergeant 38
9-15-
2012
Thursby, Gareth Sergeant 29
9-15-
2012
Wroem, Thomas James Private 18
9-14-
2012
Groom, Duane
Lance
Corporal
32
9-09-
2012
Davidson, Lee Paul Sergeant 32
9-07-
2012
Karl Whittle Guardsman 22
8-17-
2012
Shadrake, Jamie Guardsman 20
8-10-
2012
Smith, Matthew David
Lance
Corporal
26
8-10-
2012
Chesterman, Andrew
Robert
Lieutenant 26
7-01-
2012
Tuisovurua, Apete
Saunikalou
Ratumaiyale
Guardsman 28
7-01- Roderick, Craig Andrew Guardsman 22
73. 73
2012
7-01-
2012
Thomas, Leonard
Perran
Warrant
Officer Class 2
(WO2)
44
6-15-
2012
Guy, Alex Corporal 37
6-13-
2012
Ashworth, James
Lance
Corporal
23
6-03-
2012
Stone, Gregg Thomas Private 20
6-01-
2012
Thacker, Michael John Corporal 27
5-26-
2012
Healey, Stephen James Captain 29
5-12-
2012
Davies, Lee Thomas
Lance
Corporal
27
5-12-
2012
McCarthy, Brent John Corporal 25
5-04-
2012
Silibaravi, Ratu Manasa Private 32
5-04-
2012
Roberts,Andrew Steven Corporal 32
4-27-
2012
Roland, Michael Guardsman 23
4-18-
2012
Ray, Connor Sapper 21
4-08-
2012
Stanley, Jack Leslie Corporal 26
3-26-
2012
Foley, Michael
Lance
Corporal
25
3-26-
2012
Taylor, Luke Sergeant 33
3-21-
2012
Bowers, Rupert William
Michael
Captain 27
3-06-
2012
Wilford, Daniel Private 21
74. 74
3-06-
2012
Wade, Daniel Private 20
3-06-
2012
Kershaw, Christopher Private 19
3-06-
2012
Frampton, Anthony Private 20
3-06-
2012
Hartley, Jake Corporal 20
3-06-
2012
Coupe, Nigel Sergeant 33
2-13-
2012
Tomlin, Ryan
Senior
Aircraftman
21
1-27-
2012
Gurung, Gajbahadur
Lance
Corporal
0
1-24-
2012
Sartorius-Jones, Ian
Gerard
Signaller 21
1-02-
2012
Limbu, Sachin Rifleman 23
Summary of the butchers bill was as following
:--
Total Killed 44
Deaths due to actual
fighting
32
Air crashes related to
enemy action
Nil
Accidental deaths 2
Friendly Fire Nil
Suicides 2
Murder Nil
Air crashes not related
to enemy action
1
Green on blue 8
75. 75
2013
The great tragedy that commenced in
2006 was over in 2013.
There were only nine deaths in 2013.
Summary was as below :--
Total Killed 9
Deaths due to actual
fighting
8
Air crashes related to
enemy action
Nil
Accidental deaths Ni
Friendly Fire Nil
Suicides Nil
Murder Nil
Air crashes not related
to enemy action
Nil
Green on blue 1
Names of soldiers killed were as below :--
12-23-
2013
Holloway, Richard Captain 29
11-06-
2013
Fisher, Ian
Warrant Officer
Class 2
42
10-15-
2013
Brynin, James Lance Corporal 22
4-30-
2013
Hetherington,
Robert Murray
Private 25
4-30-
2013
Flint, Samuel Fusilier 21
4-30-
2013
Savage, William
Thomas
Corporal 30
76. 76
3-26-
2013
Webb, Jamie Lance Corporal 24
1-14-
2013
Shaw, David Robert Kingsman 23
1-07-
2013
Walker, Richard
Reginald
Sapper 23
2014
2014 was eventless with no combat death
while 5 soldiers died in air crash not
related to enemy action and one died an
accidental death.
2015
2015 saw two deaths not related to
enemy action but the tragic death of
Corporal Micheal Campbell wounded in
Helmand in 2012.
Thus ended the fourth Anglo Afghan War ,
a most irrational and sad small war fought
by Britain.
The fatal casualties were smaller than
many of Britains long list of wars but the
saddest part of the war was that these
deaths were absolutely pointless.
Conclusion
77. 77
Britain needs to do a serious re-thinking about
the so called COIN wars that it may fight in
Middle East.
Hearts and minds is a lost cause and there can
be no winning of hearts and minds in a half
mad Islamic world where non Muslims are seen
as infidels.
Nevertheless foreign powers can have tangible
aims which can be applied in Afghan like
situations.
Pakistans covert behavior proved how complex
a war can be where a covert contender state is
nuclear weapon armed.
Behaviour of characterless people like Tony
Blair is a saga that needs to be carefully
examined by British people and social
scientists.
Ironically British Army was misused and
degraded to serve the personal interests of a
narco state led by the drug mafia who wanted
to clear the turfs in Helmands drug wars.
There was a striking similarity here with 1775
when the highly degenerate and corrupt
Muslim ruler of Oudh hired a British brigade of
the English East India Company to destroy his
Pashtun rival state Rohailkhand in India.
78. 78
But in 1775 British parliament possessed a
superior moral caliber and this war was much
debated and criticized in British parliament.
By 2006 when Tony Blair started this pointless
war in Helmand Britain was a far more
degenerate state and his successors proved
equally characterless and similar.