Us army in afghanistan

1. 1

2. 2

3. 3

4. 4
The author with dear friend Colonel David
Osinski in front of NATO Headquarters
Kabul 29 June 2010

5. 5
The author with great friend and mentor
Professor Rasul Amin in Kabul November
2007

6. 6

7. 7

8. 8

9. 9

10. 10

11. 11

12. 12

13. 13

14. 14

15. 15
Introduction
This is a personal as well as historical
account.
Personal in the sense that I saw closely
Afghanistan from 29 June 2004 till todate

16. 16
permanently being based in Kabul as a
consultant.
During this period I met many Americans
as well as Europeans and closely saw US
Army Operations in Kandahar and Helmand
where many of my projects were located.
Being a student of history I first studied US
Army in detail from 1983 .During this study
“Crisis in Command” a book by two US
Army officers remained the bible of my
analysis.
Accounts of civilians like Carlotta Gall
were useful but devoid of true
understanding of the nature of the US
Army.
What I saw of the US Army in Afghanistan
once again proved the solid worth of
analysis carried out by Richard A .Gabriel
and Paul L.Savage initially published in
1978.
The higher cadre in the US Army as proven
in Afghanistan remains plagued by

17. 17
careeristic opportunism and continue to
regard the rank and file useful cannon
fodder for their personal advancement.
As a second generation Pakistan Army
officer I closely saw Pakistan Army from
the earliest age till March 1994 when I
retired as a major.
Countless conversations with my relative
and friend Colonel Salman who trained all
the major so called Jihadis from
Hekmatyar and Massoud till Osama Bin
Laden made me understand the ISI
mindset.
My dear coursemate and friend Major
General Asif Khattak was another great
aide in understanding the ISI mindset.
Countless other ISI officers that I met
enabled me to understand , how they think
and how the ISI operates.
This account is a summary of those
observations grounded in the initial period

18. 18
1947-79 and reinforced by direct
observations from 1979 till todate.
This small book is written and distributed
in public interest and has no profit motive.
Since I have no faith in nationalism or
narrow religion of any kind there is no
ideological axe to grind in this short work.
It is hoped that this work will act as a
primer of more detailed studies.
Major Agha H Amin (Retired)
Chapter One
Background
Low Intensity conflict was inherited by
Pakistan from the British Indian Empire.
Low Intensity conflict remained the central
part of Pakistani history from the earliest
days.

19. 19
The Pakistani state waged the first Low
Intensity war in Kashmir with major inputs
by British officers civilian and military
serving in Pakistan after independence.
In the 1960s the ISI supervised small low
intensity conflicts in Indias North East
Frontier areas.
The greatest experiment however took
place when the Afghan war commenced in
1978 initially with British support and from
1979 with US support and Pakistan
became a massive Proxy base against the
USSR forces in Afghanistan.
While the USA withdrew in 1979 the ISI
inherited a huge proxy war base that was
maintained and diverted to other fronts
like Indian held Kashmir as well as civil
war plagued Afghanistan.
The huge Afghan proxy war base was now
remodeled to support Pakistani proxies in
Afghanistan.

20. 20
The so called Afghan Mujahideen proxies
of USA and Pakistan and the west were
now divided on ethnic basis with non
Pashtuns and moderate Muslim Pashtuns
becoming US/Western/Indian/Russian
proxies and Pashtuns/extremist Muslims
becoming Pakistani proxies.
In 1994 Pakistan midwife the so called
Taliban movement which captured Kabul
with Pakistani.
The Pakistani establishment saw
Afghanistan as a massive proxy reservoir
with which Pakistan could redress and
balance the strategic grievance that it was
with India over the Jammu and Kashmir
state since 1947.
The USA had strategically abandoned
Pakistan after 1989 and came close to
declaring Pakistan a terrorist state by
1999.
The Pakistani establishment searched for
alternatives and by 1999-2002 came to the

21. 21
conclusion that China was Pakistans best
strategic choice.
Traditionally the Muslims of India and
Pakistan were saved from total
subjugation and political extinction by
Hindus and Sikhs by the English East India
Companys arrival in 1803-49 , when English
East India Company destroyed the Hindu
Marathas and the Sikhs in the period
mentioned.
After Independence Pakistani ruling
establishment searched for strategic allies
and saviours and found the USA in the
period 1947-54.So Pakistan became a US
concubine in return for US economic and
military aid.
The Pakistani US love affair lasted till 1971
after which Pakistans charismatic civilian
Premier courted with idealism in shape of
quest for nuclear weapons ,Islamic bloc
and third world.This romantic experiment
collapsed in 1977 with a US bank rolled

22. 22
agitation movement and a coup detat by a
US cultivated Pakistani army general.
Pakistan again became a US concubine
and a massive proxy base for US led Soviet
Afghan Proxy war.
The USA abruptly left the scene in 1989
practically surrendering Afghanistan to
the Pakistani state.
In 2001 when the USA occupied
Afghanistan it did not invade the Taliban
but Pakistans strategic backyard.
This important fact was not fully grasped
and understood by the USA.
Meanwhile Ironically for the USA , during
the Soviet Afghan War the USA had
deliberately turned a blind eye to
Pakistans nuclear program as the USA
regarded its development as best deterrent
against a USSR ground invasion of
Pakistan.

23. 23
Thus by 1984-87 Pakistan had acquired a
nuclear weapon capability thanks to US
policy of not interrupting Pakistans nuclear
program and the shuffling juggling game
between Symington and Pressler
amendments.
It was a twist of fate for the USA that
when it occupied Afghanistan in 2001
,Pakistan had acquired a complete nuclear
weapon capability and USA was in no
position to invade Pakistan.
This remained USAs strategic dilemma all
along and the USA did not find any solution
to this strategic dilemma to date.
Meanwhile the USA in order to satisfy its
public opinion resorted to drone strikes in
Pakistans wild west FATA region where
actually the USA was attacking absolute
non entitites , with the secret agreement
of Pakistans Punjabi dominated
establishment, while the “ Real Enemy” of
the USA presence in Afghanistan all along

24. 24
was the Pakistani state as correctly
defined and the term coined by Carlotta
Gall.
But the USA had failed to arrive at any
solution how to deal with the real enemy ,
hence the surge which was in reality a bad
tactical response to attacking the tail of a
snake ,because the USA had allowed the
snake to acquire the Nukes and was in no
position to attack the head of the snake.
Chapter Two
Understanding Pakistans Geopolitical
architecture
In 1974-75 my father attended the armed
forces war course.He wrote a paper on
Pakistans geopolitics.

25. 25
The conclusion as taught at the National
Defence College was that Pakistans
geopolitical heartland was the triangle
Rawalpindi Lahore Faisalabad.
While other areas had some relevance and
value the heartland was North Punjab.
Thus 6 of Pakistans nine corps were
guarding this triangle.
The map below gives an idea of what it is
like.

26. 26
On the other hand Pakistans Strategic
missile groups defend it against far bigger
threats.

27. 27
In the US Afghan war US forces were thus
strategically degraded into carrying out
puny pin pricks against FATA with drones

28. 28
and against Afghan Taliban proxies of
Pakistan in the so called surge.
In reality both these players were minor
players while the centre of gravity of
Afghan war was the Pakistani
establishment in Islamabad and
Rawalpindi.
Since North Punjab was Pakistans
heartland Pakistans military usurper
Musharraf had no sympathy with the tribal
Pashtuns who were regarded by Pakistans
establishment as lesser beings .
When my father attended the basic military
engineering officers course in 1955 at
Military College of Engineering Risalpur he
described Royal Pakistan Air Force ( Royal
was dropped in 1956) bragging in the
Risalpur Club in the eveing about how
many tribal Pashtuns they had killed in
straffing in North Waziristan till as late as
1954.They bragged that whole North
Waziristan Agency was their firing range.

29. 29
At that time an operation was being
conducted against Faqir of Ippi which
ended in 1954-55.
But US leverage in carrying out drone
strikes was limited to the FATA tribal area
or some outlying parts of KP province as
this province was regarded as an outer
appendage of Pakistan.
The Pakistani establishment had regarded
tribal Pashtuns as useful proxies and had
deliberately kept their FATA region under
developed and subject to a very harsh
medieval type British law known as
Frontier Crime Regulations.
Thus allowing US drone strikes in FATA or
Pashtun areas of KP Province was not
regarded as a political risk by Pakistans
establishment as these were minority
ethnic groups.
Pakistans power structure was dual with
the Nuclear weapons ,Afghan and Indian

30. 30
policy controlled by the army headquarters
and ISI since 1977.
Afghanistan was seen by the Pakistani
military as Pakistans strategic depth and
the balancing factor against India with
which Pakistan was involved in a major
land dispute of Jammu and Kashmir since
1947.
US occupation of Afghanistan was viewed
by the Pakistani military establishment
(Army + ISI) controlling major part of
Pakistans foreign policy as an occupation
of Pakistan.
While fear of a joint Indian US nut cracker
destroying Pakistan forced General
Musharraf to be a US ally or subsidiary ,
the Pakistani Military was fully resolved
not to abandon the Afghan Taliban proxies
cum vassals cum minor allies.
This important strategic fact was not fully
grasped by the US ruling establishment
and decision makers.

31. 31
The key to engage or win Pakistan was to
solve its basic dispute with India ie
Kashmir Dispute and to respect Pakistans
special role and dominance in Afghanistan
which the US itself had practically
surrendered to Pakistan in 1989-92.
The US government in DC did not realize
this central strategic reality .The key to
winning Afghan war was held by the
politicians ruling USA in DC.
A military solution itself in Afghanistan
was not practicable unless Pakistan was
politically engaged or won over.
The second option was to invade Pakistan
and make it submit to US policy.This was
impossible as Pakistan was a nuclear
armed state.
Further the USA lacked the resolution to
confront Pakistan or to pressurize it to
abandon its support of Taliban.
On the other hand things were very
complicated as the Pakistani military junta

32. 32
while professing to be a US ally was
supporting the Afghan Taliban all along.
There was something wrong with US
political objectives in Afghanistan where
the USA wanted to totally eliminate the
Taliban politically .This was an unrealistic
objective , unless Pakistan was engaged or
Afghanistan partitioned with US presence
in the north which supported USA and a
Taliban Bantuistan or Botswana type land
in the south where the Pashtun population
was more anti US or dominated and
intimidated by the Pakistani Afghan
Taliban proxies.
Further Pakistan with more Pashtuns than
Afghanistan could influence Afghan
politics more effectively than the Afghan
government in Kabul.
All these political realities were not
understood in DC .
There was no military solution to the
Afghan War by conducting any type of

33. 33
surge unless the Pakistan problem was
solved either by accommodating Pakistan
or destroying Pakistan ! As both solutions
were beyond the political (former) and
military (latter) capability of the US
government.
A third solution could be searched for in
weakening Pakistan by encouraging
irredentist/separatist tendencies in
Pakistan in areas like Baluchistan or Sindh
but this too was beyond the shallow
political maturity of the USA.
The USA wasted 5 years in Afghanistan in
a state of indecision vacillation and
procrastination thrusting a foreign made
proportional representation solution of
democracy in Afghanistan.
The cardinal fact that Afghanistan had
been ruled by the gun coupled with a lose
system of tribal customs was not
understood by the USA and its NATO allies.

34. 34
Finally the US Armys junior ranks were
made the scapegoats in the so called
surge where ambitious selfish generals
like Mc Chrystal and Petraeus , sent some
1400 US soldiers into pointless death.
As Anatol Rappooport while editing Carl
Von Clausewitz wrote that war is actually
a failure of policy . Afghanistan war was
thus a failure of US policy.
The US unlike the USSR had a far safer
entry in Afghanistan and for first four years
viewed positively , it lost the initiative
after it refused to accept the hard political
reality of Afghanistan ‘ i.e Pakistans army
and the ISI as well as their proxies the
Taliban.
These three parties had to be
accommodated and if it was done a
solution was possible .
Failure to accommodate Pakistans military
and their proxies was to be the main
reason for US failure.

35. 35
This did not require total surrender but an
acceptance of Pakistani influence in the
Pashtun south while USA could easily
control the more moderate north and retain
a small military presence there.
Pakistans military establishment
understood that the USA would get fed up
with its small war like the USSR had done
and would leave one day.
This would form the corner stone of the ISI
led Afghan insurgency with General
Musharraf in control.
The Musharraf template would be followed
by his military successors.
This is not to imply that Afghanistan is a
total US failure.
A compromise solution is still possible if
the above mentioned reality is understood .
As they say nothing is inevitable in history.
Chapter Three

36. 36
The Fallacy about non state actors
There is a huge fallacy about non state
actors in the ongoing Afghan war in
particular and about the many so called
Islamist wars in the world.
In reality as far as I have studied and
observed non state actors account for less
than 10 percent of all so called insurgents
while 90 % of all insurgents are proxy of
some state , USA in lead ,followed by
Pakistan,Iran ,Russia,Israel,India,Saudi
Arabia,Turkey,NATO states etc.
Thus Al Qaeda all along has been a
marginal player in Af Pak.
However it is politically simpler and easier
for USA and all states to blame non state
actors as well as attack them as the
fallout is very limited.
On the other hand it requires far greater
strategic resolution to attack state actors ,
especially when these are nuclear armed
like Pakistan or North Korea.

37. 37
As this map shows the larger and major
groups are state proxies like Mulla Omar
group and Haqqani etc while the TTP etc
shown in white are much smaller, and the
so called non state actors.

38. 38
In pragmatic terms for the USA Mulla Omar
group although a Pakistani proxy was a
much smaller actor and it was politically
far more convenient to attack it than Mulla
Omars strategic base in Pakistani
Balochistan.
Similarly it was far more convenient and
least risky to attack small time players in
Pakistans FATA and satisfy the US public
that we are attacking the Al Qaeda than
attacking or droning nuclear armed
Pakistans ISI headquarters in Islamabad or
Quetta.
These harsh strategic realities were never
understood by the US public.

39. 39

40. 40
Chapter Four
US occupation of Afghanistan
The US occupation of Afghanistan in itself
was a mickey mouse affair.
The US did not lose a single soldier in
occupying Afghanistan in real fighting less
an over enthusiastic CIA civilian who died
because of his own rashness at Mazar
Sharif.

41. 41
What happened was that the Taliban
simply carried out a strategic retreat into
Pakistani Balochistan.

42. 42

43. 43

44. 44
Understanding what had happened was the
first strategic failure of the USA , and
above all visualizing what all this would
finally lead to .
From 2001 to 2006 US officials in DC ,
Kabul and Islamabad simply slept while
the Taliban reorganized and recouped in
Pakistan.
These were no non state actors but
Pakistani strategic proxies but all along US
officials kept talking about Al Qaeda and
non State actors who in reality were
mickey mouse minor players.

45. 45

46. 46

47. 47
Chapter Five
Musharraf Deception
Pakistans military usurper ruler General
Musharraf carried out a brilliant strategic
deception which was understood and
known to y very few in Pakistan and least
understood or known to those who
mattered in US decision making circles.
Musharraf housed the retreating Taliban in
Pakistani Balochistan and other provinces
while he diverted US attention towards
Pakistans FATA region which Musharraf
painted as the centre of all evil and the
Scorpions deadly tail.
In reality the so called Scorpions tale was
a totally bogus threat and a diversion.

48. 48
Musharraf was an ISI commando officer
trained by professionals like Brigadier
Syed Raza Ali.

49. 49
While outwardly US occupation of
Afghanistan was a major strategic snub for
Pakistan, Musharraf in words of an Indian
observer “ snatched victory out of the jaws
of defeat” by running with the foxes
(Afghan Taliban) and chasing with the
hounds (USA).
In Pakistan he was much criticized for a U
Turn and a volte face and for stabbing the
Taliban in the back.But in reality Musharraf
saved Pakistan and the Taliban from a
major defeat.
Like a bold and audacious poker player
Musharraf housed Osama Bin laden in
Pakistan while professing to be the best
US strategic ally and milked the US tax
payer of some 25 Billion US Dollars
although he did not deploy a single
battalion to interdict the Afghan Taliban
from infiltrating and attacking US troops
all along the 1500 Km border of Pakistani
province of Balochistan with Afghanistan.

50. 50
The same Musharraf strategy was blindly
followed by his successor General Ashfaq
Pervez Kiani in 2008-13 when the US surge
took place and Kiani supervised a massive
Afghan Taliban infiltration in Afghanistan
that accounted for 90 percent US fatal
casualties in Afghanistan.

51. 51

52. 52
Chapter Six
Hibernation and Calm and the reason for
Pakistani decision to escalate in the south
In 2001 Pakistan had signed a strategic
agreement with China to develop the port
as a future Chinese short cut to Middle
East oil without reliance on the far longer
and vulnerable sea route via Strait of
Malacca.
This action was seen by pakistans ethnic
Baloch minority as ademographic attack
by Pakistans Punjabi dominant
establisgment aimed at turning the Baloch
into a minority in their own province.
A guerrilla insurrection had thus
commenced in Balochistan in 2002.
The insurrection was indigenous but
supported by Pakistans arch enemy India
from bases in Afghanistan.The insurrection
assumed alarming proportions by 2006.

53. 53
This led General Musharraf into taking a
strategic decision to step up Taliban
guerrilla operations in Southern
Afghanistan.

54. 54
Although the Americans were not directly
aiding the Baloch insurrection in
Afghanistan , the impact of Indian support
to Baloch insurgents in Pakistan was not
assessed by American decision makers in
Kabul or Islamabad , thus this was a major
US strategic failure.
But the US decision makers lacked the
strategic resolution to do that.
Another Machiavellian but far more
effective approach by the US could have
been to massively reinforce the Baloch
insurrection thus arm twisting Pakistan
into not supporting its Afghan Taliban
proxies surge in Afghanistan.But the US
decision makers lacked the long term
vision or talent to attempt any such
political genius to do that.
Chapter Seven

55. 55
Understanding Strategy and major US
errors
Strategy as defined by Clausewitz is the
theory of the use of combats for the object
of the war.
Strategy deals with combination of
different actions or combats with a view to
the ultimate object of the war. Strategy
deals with battles to gain end of the war.
Clausewitz also stated that in strategy
everything moves very slowly and much
more strength of will is required to make a
decision in strategy than in tactics.
From 2001 to 2006 when the Taliban surge
started things moved slowly and USA failed
to devise any strategy.It failed to assess
and foresee the Taliban resurgence.It
failed to devise any plan to pressurize
Pakistan into not reasserting in
Afghanistan.

56. 56
It failed to hit at the drug trade that
provided the financial muscle to Taliban.

57. 57
2002 was an eventless year in which
nothing strategic occurred.Minor company
level actions were fought.

58. 58
Operation Anaconda exaggerated to the
level of Battle of Cannae was in reality a

59. 59
puny tactical affair where overwhelming
US airpower reduced a small insurgent
force in Paktia to pulp.The US suffered just
7 fatal casualties.

60. 60
Two US casualties at Shkin in Paktika
occurred because of a most stupidly sited
post

61. 61

62. 62
2003 was yet another eventless year
where US small units fought small actions
but US commanders sitting in Kabul and
Arlington failed to see the strategic
picture.
US military culture was dominated by a
philosophy that passed the buck to small
units so that higher commanders did not
have to waste their time with strategic
assessments.

63. 63
2004 was another eventless year.
1 Fleischer,
Jacob R.
Deh Rawood PROVINCE NOT MENTIONED WHICH SHOWS
CARELESSNESS. KUNNAR URUZGAN

64. 64
2 Fracker Jr.,
Dale E.
Deh Rawood
3 Kearney III,
James C.
Salerno PROVINCE NOT MENTIONED KHOST
4
Gomez, Billy
Landstuhl Reg. Med. Center, Landstuhl, Germany-NOT STUPIDLY
CLARIFIED BY MILITARY TIMES THAT HE DIED IN PAKTIKA
PROVINCE
5
Hobbs, Brian
S.
Miam Do –NOT STUPIDLY CLARIFIED BY MILITARY TIMES OR
ICASUALTIES THE ACTUAL PROVINCE WAS FOB LAGHMAN IN
LAGHMAN PROVINCE
6
Fernandez,
Kyle Ka Eo
Miam Do NOT STUPIDLY CLARIFIED BY MILITARY TIMES OR
ICASUALTIES THE ACTUAL PROVINCE WAS FOB LAGHMAN IN
LAGHMAN PROVINCE
7 Wells, Wesley
R.
Naka NOT STUPIDLY CLARIFIED BY MILITARY TIMES OR
ICASUALTIES THE ACTUAL PROVINCE WAS PAKTIKA.
8 Olaes, Tony B. Shkin MOST STUPIDLY SITED POST
9 Goodwin,
Robert S.
Shkin
10 Beasley, Bobby
E.
Ghazikel NOT STUPIDLY CLARIFIED BY MILITARY TIMES OR
ICASUALTIES THE ACTUAL PROVINCE WAS WARDAK
11 Cherry, Craig
W.
Ghazikel NOT STUPIDLY CLARIFIED BY MILITARY TIMES OR
ICASUALTIES THE ACTUAL PROVINCE WAS WARDAK
12 Thacker,
Juston Tyler
Barikowt PROVINCE NOT MENTIONED WHICH SHOWS
CARELESSNESS. KUNNAR
13 McClenney,
Daniel B.
Barikowt
14 Fraise, David
M.
Deh Rawood URUZGAN
15 Ouellette,
Brian J.
Qalat
16 Jeffries, Joseph
A.
Qalat
17 Mogensen,
Robert J.
Qalat
18 Eggers, Daniel
W.
Qalat
19 Price, Bruce E. Kajaki
20 Payne Jr.,
Ronald R.
Tawara PROVINCE NOT MENTIONED WHICH SHOWS
CARELESSNESS. HELMAND
21 Lagman,
Anthony S.
Oruzgan province
22 Esposito, Jr.,
Michael J.
Oruzgan province
23 Golding,
Nicholes
Darwin
Ghazni Province

65. 65
2005 was a major turning point as the US
fatal casualties from enemy action jumped
from 23 in 2004 to 66 in 2005.
Some 20 of these however occurred due to
air crashes attributed to enemy action and
many observers attributed these to over
confidence on part of US pilots , severely
underestimating the enemy factor.

66. 66
The writing on the war was clear but US
commanders in Kabul as well as in the
Pentagon lacked that rare clarity
described by Carl Von Clausewitz as “An
intellect which can operate in
circumstances where 75% data is
unavailable” ! These were ordinary minds
with ranks of generals who lacked that
intellect “ which ,even in the midst of this
intense obscurity, is not without some
traces of the inner light, which lead to the
truth ! ”

67. 67
They probably had read Dale Carnegies
books that teach you that flattery will
certainly take you to high ranks and places
but had not digested the essence of Vom
Kriege !

68. 68
2006 was yet another study in how not to
command an army.
While US commanders and Pentagon
should have been droning Chaghai district
in Pakistan opposite Helmand and
Kandahar , all that these musketeers did
was “ Do Nothing” !
2006 again did not justify the future US
surge of troops in Helmand and US lost
only 5 soldiers killed in Helmand in this
year.

69. 69

70. 70
The US/NATO conduct was most irrational
in 2006 in establishing Camp Bastion in
Helmand in 2006 which attracted insurgent
attention and caused pointless UK
casualties in 2006-8 finally leading to US
jumping in the mess and causing highest
US casualties in 2009 and 2010.
This is despite the fact that US lost just 1
soldier in Helmand in 2005 and
establishment of Camp Bastion in 2006
was the most stupid thing that USA and UK
did in whole Afghan war.

71. 71
On the other hand the decision to go for
the so called surge by the USA was also a
strategic failure as this led to pointless US
casualties.

72. 72

73. 73

74. 74

75. 75
Robert Gates described choice of Helmand
for US surge as desire of marines to
operate independently under sole marine
command which is an amateur way of
conducting war.
Now this is a rather amateur way to
conduct war as Gates stated in his
memoirs that Marines Commandant
General Jim Conway wanted marines to
fight in one area , under one command , so
a rather sick reasoning to dump US
marines into a slaughterhouse called
Helmand .
The Taliban based in Pakistani Baluchistan
were presented on a platter a very easy

76. 76
target distributed in gift pack penny
packets all across Helmand to be killed at
leisure by IEDs brought from the
Kharotabad IED market across an Afghan
Pakistan border that was most non
chalantly unmonitored by USA.
Helmand was a vast desert and the Soviets
never deployed more than a regiment in
Helmand.
The decision to distribute US soldiers in
penny packets in Helmand was no doubt a
non sensical decision which led to
maximum US casualties in Afghan war
without any strategic objective being
achieved.
Since most of US casualties were due to
IEDs, Taliban casualties were far lower
than US casualties.

77. 77
2008 was another year of vacillation ,
procrastination on part of the US/NATO
command in Afghanistan
The butchers bill for 2008 was as below :--

78. 78
The US/NATO commanders acted like
glorified clerks and doing nothing remained
their cardinal command attribute !

79. 79
2009 was a fateful year for the US Army in
Afghanistan as a general well described in
the book Crisis in Command entered the
scene.
One described on page .85 as obsessed
with selfish , promotion oriented behavior.
General Mc Chrystal preferred playing with
lives of US soldiers rather than looking the
Pakistani state straight into the
eyes.Brave in tactical gambling and
extremely timid in strategic resolution.

80. 80
As per US journalist Michael Hastings ,
later murdered in ambiguous
circumstances for being too upright bold
and iconoclastic , General Mc Chrystal
simply dismissed the CIA assessment that
the Taliban centre of gravity was the
Quetta Shura.

81. 81
The most important job of the higher
commander is to make assessments where
we enter the realm of strategy.
As described by Carl Von Clausewitz “ the
Commander in War must commit the
business he has in hand to a corresponding
space which his eye cannot survey, which
the keenest zeal cannot always explore,
and with which, owing to the constant
changes taking place, he can seldom
become property acquainted.”

82. 82
It should have been clear to the US/NATO
commanders that the USA/NATO were
fighting a proxy war where the Pakistani
state was seeing both USA/NATO as an
existential threat.

83. 83
The response should have been to address
Pakistani fears or offer Pakistan very

84. 84
generous incentive or worse come to worst
to intimidate Pakistani the state !
All three were not tried or done !
General Mc Chrystal was the ultimate
macho man ! Ran five miles by day as
eulogized by a sycophant New York Times
journalist ! Aggressive where it meant
dividing US soldiers into penny packets
and launching them piecemeal against an
IED player enemy who killed US soldiers by
IED remote as if playing the game mortal
combat.

85. 85
But when it came to strategic resolution
like confronting the Pakistani state Mc
Chrystal was an absolute mouse.
The fate of the US soldier was “ Ordered to
Die” so that Mc Chrystals glory was
reinforced and Mc Chrystal was not
required to take any strategic decision

86. 86
that may cause him any degree of
dissonance !
Mc Chrystals greatest inner fear was the
friction that confronting Pakistani state
may cause to his personal serenity or to
his spotless career.

87. 87
The right US response should have been to
attack the Taliban base in Balochistan, if
not by crossing the border with ground
troops then at least by drones.

88. 88

89. 89

90. 90

91. 91

92. 92
Chapter Eight
Pakistan’s FATA War
Pakistans FATA war has been the most
ignored part of US decision making.No
threat for the USA existed in Pakistans
FATA region.

93. 93
It appears that General Musharraf
conceived a brilliant albeit Machiavellian
deception plan to deceive the Americans.
Gist of the plan appears to be as following
:--
 Convince the US decision makers that
FATA was the centre of gravity of all
terrorism.
 Provide secret sanctuary to Afghan
Taliban in Pakistani Balochistans
where they ethnically and culturally
blended with the local population and
could not be identified.
 Launch a military action in FATA to
convince the USA that Musharraf was
USAs best ally in so called war on
terror and to milk the USA to grant
more military aid.
A subtle campaign was launched by
Pakistani media under manipulation by
the Pakistani state that FATA region

94. 94
was the source of all terrorism and
needs to be reformed .
A military action was thus launched by
General Musharraf in 2003 in Waziristan
without any provocation of tribals part.
Even US casualties in Afghanistan did
not justify any operation.

95. 95

96. 96

97. 97

98. 98

99. 99

100. 100

101. 101

102. 102

103. 103
Chapter Nine
The Use of Islam as a tool by Pakistani
state exposed
In every fight , tactical or strategic both
opponents lose something , suffer some
superficial but many internal damages.
Pakistans General Musharrafs strategic
deception was also therefore a mixed
affair.
Musharraf milked the USA of some 25
Billion USD and did nothing to help the USA
. But even then the Pakistani military lost
its credibility with the Islamists in
particular and with its population in
general.
The Muslim elite had misused Islam as a
cheap tool to galvanise the Muslim masses
from earliest history of Islam in general
and in Indo Pak sub continent in particular.
When Musharraf succumbed to US
pressure and became a US ally at least

104. 104
outwardly , a “ Confusion in Principle” was
introduced in Pakistans body politics.
For first time in history of Pakistan , the
Pakistan Army and ISI were resisted and
attacked in Pakistans key provinces of
Sindh , Punjab and NWFP ( now KPK).
Musharrafs strategic courting of China in
response to US presence in Afghanistan
and as a counter balance to US opposition
to Pakistan since 1989 led to an ethnic
insurrection in Baluchistan that continues.
While Pakistani military deceived the USA ,
in the process it was forced to fight the
tribal Pashtuns since 2002 and the crisis
has not ended.
For first time in Pakistans history senior
army commanders like the corps
commander in Karachi were attacked in
2004, the Pakistani army headquarters was
attacked in 2009 and ISI headquarters
were attacked in Lahore,Multan and other
places.

105. 105
Pakistani military was shaken and is still
looking for a solution to this dilemma
created as a result of US arrival in
Afghanistan and Musharrafs forced
decision , however brilliant to align with
the USA.
This particular phenomenon holds many
opportunities for the USA and any power
that wants to destabilize Pakistan.
Chapter Eleven
The Surge and careerism of Mc Chrystal
and Petraeus
The USA regarded the Afghan war as a
small war and regarded Afghanistan as a
minor threat.
While USA under the force of historical
circumstances occupied Afghanistan , it
showed no seriousness in stabilizing
Afghanistan or in engaging Pakistan by
solving Pakistans strategic dilemmas i.e
its strategic rivalry with India or solving

106. 106
Pakistans economic problems by creating
tariff free zones etc.
The bill of the tariff free zones still lies in
the US congress and is a classic case of
US political indecision.
The so called surge of 2009-12 was
basically a cheap political attempt by a
social climber lawyer turned president of
USA whose statesmanship was of a very
low caliber.
Like a short term vision politician Obama
decided to hoodwink the US public by
ordering a temporary troop surge with a
promised withdrawal frame for US troops
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The surge thus had no viable military aim.
30,000 additional US troops could not
achieve anything.
The US lacked the resolution to confront
Pakistan , lacked the vision to
accommodate Pakistan and stabilize

107. 107
Afghanistan , it decided to attempt the
third best solution, i.e fool its public by
false promises and sacrifice some 1400
young soldiers and officers in a waste land
of drug mafia called Helmand.
General Mc Chrystal who supervised the
surge was a simple ambitious careerist
who saw it as a stepping stone to the next
rank.
He was described by US journalist Michael
Hastings who just wanted his picture on
the front page.
Characters like Mc Chrystal and Petraeus
were well identified by two brilliant US
authors of the book Crisis in Command in
1974 or so.
The surge was a pointless massacre of US
troops divided in penny packets sent to
certain deaths by sneaky enemies who
killed them with triggers of IEDs from a
safe distance and whose faces were never
seen by the US troops.

108. 108
While the so called surge was not a
formula to victory both Mc Chrystal and
Petraeus failed to carry out certain actions
which could have reduced US casualties to
one fourth.

109. 109

110. 110

111. 111

112. 112

113. 113

114. 114

115. 115

116. 116

117. 117
All along drone strikes were carried out in
an area which had nothing to do with 90
percent US deaths in Afghanistan.
If instead drone strikes were carried out in
Pakistani Baluchistan on the Taliban base
area Pakistan could have been pressurized
into reducing its support to its Taliban
proxies.
Chapter Twelve
The US Drone program
This was the biggest scam in US history
designed to fool the US public that USG
was very harsh with the so called
terrorists in the great war on terror.
I am not against drone strikes in particular
but I am against drone strikes in two small
districts which had little to do with US
deaths in Afghanistan.

118. 118

119. 119

120. 120

121. 121

122. 122

123. 123

124. 124

125. 125

126. 126

127. 127

128. 128

129. 129

130. 130

131. 131

132. 132

133. 133

134. 134

135. 135

136. 136
Chapter Thirteen
Pakistani claims about sacrifices in so
called war on Terror
Pakistans claims about having suffered in
so called war on terror were by and large a
case of shedding crocodiles tears.
It is a documented fact that Pakistans
economy saw record economic growth in
Soviet Afghan war and in US Afghan war.
Prices of property and real state rose from
10 to 20 times in Pakistans Punjabi
heartland as well as in urban areas of
Karachi and Hyderabad.
Yes the Pashtuns and Baluch suffered but
these are regarded as second rate citizens

137. 137
by Pakistans ruling North Punjabi
establishment.
Pakistans ruling establishment is the main
culprit in Pakistans two strategic problems
i.e not constructing hydel power mega
projects which was entirely possible
during Soviet Afghan War and US Afghan
war and not taxing the rich.
Both the issues had no connection with
Pakistans so called sacrifices as US ally in
so called war on terror.
Chapter Fourteen
Future options
There is nothing inevitable in history and it
would be incorrect to state that
Afghanistan war is a lost war.
Conversely some 65 % of the population
wants the USA to stay.

138. 138
The solution lies in creating a confederal
state with US forces in the north .

139. 139
A political solution can be holding
referendum under UN supervision in all
Afghan districts whether they want Taliban
rule or want to be ruled by Kabul de facto
and de jure Afghan state.
A massive tariff free status for Afghanistan
and Pakistans border district to export all
types of manufactured goods to EU and
USA without any quota controls or tariffs
can be a very workable incentive.
Pakistan must be engaged and allowed
some influence in Taliban controlled area
so that its fears about Indian penetration
are addressed.
The USA had three broad options and still
has them .
The first is the MONGOL option which is
EXTERMINATION , which is neither
desirable nor advisable .
The second is the MACHIAVELLIAN option
which can work if combined with a third
option of a MARSHALL PLAN.

140. 140
President Bush went one fourth distance
towards a MARSHALL PLAN but got
entangled in the IRAQ war and dissipation
of effort.
Obama tried an apology of a MONGOL
option and was bound to fail , in the
process sacrificing 1400 US military lives
pointlessly.

141. 141
Nothing is lost even now if MACHIAVELLI
and MARSHALL are combined
imaginatively and the TRUMP
administration can do it if hard work is put

142. 142
in and statesmanship combined with
carrots of economic incentives.
ANNEXURES

143. 143

144. 144

145. 145

146. 146

147. 147

148. 148

149. 149

150. 150

151. 151

152. 152

153. 153

154. 154

155. 155

156. 156

157. 157

158. 158

159. 159

160. 160

161. 161

162. 162