A mediocre narrative from a commader assigned with a great strategic responsibility

8. Only 27 Brigade had a tank troop of four Indian PT
76 tanks captured in 1965.

11. The 1971 War
An examination of the strategic concept of war
Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN
The strategic concept of Pakistan’s defence i.e.
‘Defence of East Pakistan lies in the West’ was
formulated by Ayub Khan in late fifties and became
the foundation of Pakistan’s defence policy. The
concept envisaged having bulk of the army in the
northern half of the West Wing and was based on the
assumption that this arrangement would force India
to keep bulk of its army/strategic reserves on its
western front. We will analyse the various aspects of
this concept as following:-
a. The interconnection between the internal
and external fronts. The basis of defence and
stability of a country is absolute harmony and in
consonance with the internal and external fronts. The
internal front means ‘morale of the civilian
population’ ‘their belief in the legitimacy and moral
credibility of the political government’ ‘belief in
national aims and ideology of the country’
‘identification with the Armed Forces of the country
as defenders of the country’s integrity’ etc etc.

12. External front includes the country’s Armed Forces,
and its foreign policy. A country’s defence is based
on both and any weakness in one will weaken the
other. This inter-relationship was ignored by
Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership during the
period 1947-71. The Muslim League was initially
dominated by a partnership of refugees from Muslim
minority provinces and later by a combination of
Punjabi Muslims and civil-military bureaucrats. The
Bengalis were alienated first because of the National
language issue and later because of the constitutional
representation issue. The Bengalis were initially
patriotic and only demanded linguistic equality and
had even agreed to political parity in 1956. This
arrangement was seriously disturbed once Ayub
usurped political power in 1958. Immediately after
independence the founder of the nation Mr Jinnah
made an attempt to broaden the army’s recruitment
base by ordering the raising of the East Bengal
Regiment in 1948. This was a purely political
decision taken by Mr Jinnah and implemented by a
British C in C. By December 1948 two battalions of
this unit composed of Bengali Muslims had been
raised. This process was, however, discontinued
once Ayub Khan an intellectually naive and

13. tactically timid man became the Pakistan Army’s C
in C in 1951. Ayub was biased against having
Bengalis in the army. During his tenure an unwritten
policy of not raising any more Bengali infantry
battalions was followed. Ayub also retired the most
promising Bengali officer Major General Majeed
soon after taking over. The East Bengal Regiment
was limited to two units and the expanded Pakistan
Army remained a largely Punjabi dominated army.
The irony of the whole affair was the fact that during
this entire period all the army chiefs were non-
Punjabi! In any case this was the first serious
negation of the concept of having a national army.
The Army was on the other hand firstly viewed as a
Punjabi Army in the East Wing. Secondly and far
more worse; it was viewed as an organisation
designed primarily for the defence of the West
Wing. The 1965 war further convinced the Bengalis
that the army was not a national army but one
designed to defend the West Wing. Thus from 1965
the rift between the internal and external fronts
became much wider and the army was increasingly
viewed as a foreign entity in the East Wing. The
seeds of the events of 1971 were laid during the
Ayub era. The Bengali populace viewed the federal

14. government as a neo colonial government with its
political base in the West Wing. The Army was
increasingly viewed as a coercive instrument which
was aimed at perpetuating the West Wing’s political
and economic exploitation of the East Wing. By
1971 Pakistan’s ‘Internal Front’ was seriously
eroded and this in turn greatly weakened its external
front.
b. The Military Capability to implement the
strategic concept. Till 1962 the military balance
between Pakistan and India was equal. The Sino-
Indian conflict led to a major change in Indian
defence policy and the Indians initiated a major
programme of military expansion. In 1965 when the
second Indo-Pak War took place; the relative Indo-
Pak military capabilities were not as significant; and
Pakistan was better placed at least in terms of
strategic reserves. Stoppage of US military aid in
1965 brought a major change in the military sphere.
Pakistan concluded an alternate defence arrangement
with China but this was not sufficient to redress the
imbalance. India on the other hand more rapidly
expanded her Armed Forces and the gap between
India and Pakistan in terms of infantry formations
became far more wider than in 1965. Thus India’s

15. overall military superiority over Pakistan increased
from 1965 when it was about 20 to 35 in Infantry1 to
15 to 32 in 1971. The situation became far more
worse in terms of strategic reserves since Pakistan’s
armour potential was severely reduced because of
stoppage of US aid. The Indians on the other hand
almost completely replaced their ancient tank fleet
of 1965 with brand new Vijayanta-Vickers or
Russian supplied T-54/55 Tanks. In brief Pakistan
did not possess the military capability to implement
the strategic concept.
c. Pakistan’s Internal Situation. The
military regime of Yahya made an honest attempt to
bring democracy in Pakistan and successfully held
Pakistan’s first ever general elections based on
Universal Suffrage since 1946. The country was
already polarised because of the political legacy of
the Ayub era and the East Wing was on the verge of
secession. This situation was not of Yahya’s making
but inherited by him. The situation demanded
extraordinary political vision which was sadly
missing in the country’s political as well as military
leadership. Yahya although sincere at heart believed
in the power of bayonet and thought that the East
Wing could be kept within the federation through

16. military action. The consequences of the surgical
and brief military action were not fully grasped by
Yahya and most of the West Wing’s politicians. In
1971 the country was divided and in no position to
simultaneously deal with a civil war as well as an
external war. This adverse internal situation nullified
the whole concept.
d. Lack of clarity in the Pakistani Military
Higher Command about the ‘Modus Operandi’
of executing the Strategic Concept. It may be
noted that at least till 1968-69 the Pakistani GHQ
was not clear about ‘what action should be taken in
West Pakistan if an Indian attack was mounted
against East Pakistan’2. In brief the Pakistani
military leadership was confused and vague about
the method of execution of the strategic concept; i.e.
‘Defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan’ as
late as 1968-69 at the time when defence plans were
revised under General Yaqub Khan’s tenure as CGS.
The concept was based on the assumption that
Indian pressure/threat against East Pakistan could be
dealt with by launching a major counter offensive
taking the war inside Indian territory on the Western
Front. This was a very generalized assumption and
was interpreted by different officers in a different

17. manner. General Gul Hasan who took over as CGS
had more clear ideas about the implementation of
this concept; but Gul’s views were not shared by the
higher military leadership. One school of thought led
by the CGS General Gul Hassan felt that this could
be best done by ‘simultaneous launching of
preliminary operations and the counter offensive’ or
‘that the reaction to any Indian invasion of East
Pakistan should be an all out offensive by Pakistan’s
Strike Corps i.e. the I Corps’3. Yahya and his Chief
of Staff General Hameed felt otherwise. They were
of the view that ‘preliminary (local level tactical
attacks) operations by the holding formations should
be launched first and when the preliminary
objectives had been secured and the enemy’s
attention had been diverted, the main counter
offensive should be set in motion.4 Yahya and
Hameed failed to realise that the only chance of
salvation in 1971 when Pakistan was facing serious
odds was in resorting to the boldest measures. Gul’s
views were not accepted and Yahya and Hameed
decided on a vague plan of ‘first launch preliminary
operations followed by counter offensive’. The final
strategic plan was vague and confusing on two
counts; i.e. firstly it did not take into account the fact

18. that the Indians enjoyed overwhelming superiority in
the Eastern Theatre and possessed the potential of
overrunning East Pakistan; secondly no time frame
was fixed for launching the counter offensive of 1
Corps. It may be noted that Pakistan possessed
relatively superior strategic reserves on in the
Western Theatre and its 1 Corps two strike divisions
i.e. 6 Armoured Division and 17 Division had no
offensive role. In brief once Pakistan embarked on
war its strategic plans were confused and vague and
its strike formation was not clear about when it was
to be launched. This conceptual confusion doomed
Pakistan’s strategic plans from the onset.
The Validity of the Chinese Card
The Chinese card on which so much hope was based
had limited and seasonal validity! The Himalayan
snow fall blocked the passes through which China
could militarily influence the war! This seasonal
factor was never incorporated as an important factor
in the Pakistani strategic plan. If China was to be
involved or Chinese friendship tested the ideal time
to launch a pre-emptive attack on India was mid-
June or mid-July or even September. Manekshaw the
Indian Chief realised this and forced Indira to wait

19. till December when the Himalayan snowfall had
completely nullified chances of Chinese overland
intervention and had freed India’s Mountain
Divisions facing China for the attack on East
Pakistan.
The Fate of Pakistan Army’s Strategic Plan in
Actual Execution
Foch defined two broad essentials of strategy i.e.
‘Economy of Force’ and ‘Preservation of Freedom
of Manoeuvre’. The Pakistani GHQ did well in case
of the first and created a strong strategic reserve by
new raisings and by economising sectors which were
relatively less vulnerable. Its response to the East
Pakistan insurgency in the first phase in March 1971
was praised even by Indian military writers as ‘a
remarkable performance on Pakistan’s part’5. China
aided Pakistan immensely and two new infantry
divisions were raised to replace the 9 and 16
Divisions which were Pakistan’s strategic reserve till
March 1971. In addition Pakistan raised 18 and 23
Division in June July 1971 and the 33 and 37
Division on the eve of the war. It may be noted that
apart from this Pakistan had also raised two
independent armoured brigades in 1970 by

20. withdrawing the integral armoured regiments of
some of its existing infantry divisions.6 All these
measures gave the Pakistani commanders a
significant strategic reserve to implement the official
strategy of launching a counter offensive on the
Western Front aimed at ensuring that the Indians
could not concentrate their entire strength and over
run East Pakistan. However, the Pakistani GHQ
failed in the actual execution of this strategic plan.
It was in preservation of ‘Freedom of action’ that the
Pakistani GHQ failed. This freedom of action could
be preserved and denied on the other hand to the
Indians only if Pakistan launched its counter
offensive immediately after the war started. If this
had been done it was possible that the Indians could
have been forced to pull out some of their
formations from the Eastern Theatre; thereby
reducing the pressure on Pakistan’s Eastern
Command. Since no such counter offensive was
launched; India was allowed to invade and conquer
East Pakistan at leisure. In the meantime two
Pakistani armoured divisions; one independent
armoured brigade (3 Armoured Brigade-Lahore) and
three infantry divisions (17, 7 and 37) remained
uncommitted during the entire war.

21. Once the war started the Indians were extremely
cautious. Once they realised that Pakistan was
irresolute; they became more audacious and stepped
up their offensive operation. In Shakargarh for
example the Indian 1 Corps Commander had
initially earmarked five of his nine infantry brigades
for a holding role. Once he realised by 7th
September that Pakistan was not launching any
major attack in his area of operations he switched
three of his holding infantry brigades into an
offensive role. This increased pressure, forced the
Pakistani GHQ to pull out one armoured regiment
from its 23 Division attack in Chamb and to commit
half of its 33 Division (a part of the strategic reserve)
to defence of Shakargarh. In addition the other half
of 33 Division was committed to the defence of the
Southern Sector once the 18 Division attack towards
Loganewala failed. As a result of this increased
pressure the Indians were unable to impose their will
on the Pakistani GHQ in strategic terms.
This was despite the fact that Pakistan had a
relatively better offensive potential in the Western
Theatre.

22. Yahya Khan based the entire Pakistani plan on the
wishful thought that the Indians would never invade
East Pakistan. Once the Indians did so he became
indecisive and kept on delaying the decision of
launching Pakistan’s strategic reserve in order to
reduce Indian pressure on the Eastern Command. He
only decided to launch the counter offensive on 16
December when the Eastern Command had
surrendered. Thus the strategic concept i.e. defence
of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan; whatever it
was worth in words of General K.M Arif was never
tried or implemented.
Chances of Success of Pakistani I Corps
Offensive
We will examine in brief the chances of success of
the Pakistani 2 Corps offensive; in case it had been
launched in brief. The Strike Force consisted of one
armoured division (T-59/T-54/55 Tanks) and two
infantry divisions (7 and 37 Division) which were
based in area Arifwala-Pirowal-Burewala-
Bahawalnagar. This strike corps was to launch the
main attack inside Indian territory from general area
Sadiq Ganj-Amruka-Minchinabad and thrust
towards Bhatinda; thereafter, swinging north

23. towards Ludhiana. The Indians were relatively well
placed in this area and had their 1st Armoured
Division in Muktsar area consisting of four
armoured regiments (Vijayantas) and three
mechanised infantry battalions. Apart from this they
had two covering troop forces i.e. the ‘Mike Force’
(T-54 and T-55) comprising one tank regiment and
one tank regiment minus, one squadron in area in
Ganganagar area. This force was tasked to threaten
the flanks of Pakistani 1st Armoured Division in
case it attacked India while the 1st Indian Armoured
Division manouvred into action. In addition the
‘Foxtrot Force’ (T-54/55) consisting of one tank
regiment and another tank regiment less one
squadron was already under command 67
Independent Brigade tasked with defence of Fazilka.
The above mentioned dispositions meant that force
wise the Indians were well poised to defend the area
where Pakistan’s main counteroffensive was to be
launched. The result would surely have been a fierce
clash of armour which may have led to a draw or
one side inflicting relatively greater losses on the
other without making much headway in the final
reckoning.

24. This means that the 1 Corps attack even if launched
held no guarantee of success in terms of relieving
the pressure on East Pakistan or in terms of
capturing a strategic objective. There was, however,
one guarantee of success for Pakistan’s 2 Corps too!
This was in case Pakistan launched a pre-emptive
attack on India in early October. This would have
been a good option. Pakistan in any case had been
condemned for human right violations and genocide
and this allegation is levelled even today.
Unfortunately its leadership remained obsessed with
diplomatic niceties and hairsplitting and tried to play
an all correct conduct game. Thus this golden chance
was lost.
Other Offensive Options
Pakistan had other offensive options to relieve
pressure on East Pakistan. These included
employment of its northern strike corps i.e. the 1
Corps (6 Armoured Division and 17 Division) to
launch a thrust in the far more vulnerable Indian
belly between Pathankot and Chamb; thereby
threatening the lifeline of four Indian divisions in
Kashmir; forcing the Indians to switch their 1st
Armoured Division north of Beas River. This was a

25. far better option since an advance of 15 to 20 miles
would have enabled Pakistan to sever the Indian line
of communication. In the case of 2 Corps counter
offensive the operation involved an advance of more
than 60 miles in face of an Indian armoured division.
In 1 Corps area the Indians had two armoured
brigades as against one Pakistani Armoured Division
and one independent armoured brigades. The
Pakistani GHQ, however, made no plans for any
offensive employment of 1 Corps, offensive
employment and this formation was left unutilised
throughout the war. Initially two of its armoured
regiments were employed in the 23 Division attack
in Chamb and after 10 December once, one of its
armoured regiments reverted back to it; it was given
no other task except to be prepared to launch a
counterattack in Zafarwal.
Pakistani Military Leadership’s Dilemma. It became
fashionable after the war to heap all the blame on
Yahya and his cronies. Yahya, as a matter of fact
was a far more capable chief than Musa. He
inherited a situation which was of Ayub’s making.
Yahya did his best to remedy the serious military
imbalances; raised new formations; improved plans
where none as a matter of fact had existed. He was

26. faced with a hostile neighbour having full support of
USSR; while at the same time facing a civil war
created because of ambition of two crafty politicians.
The odds with which Yahya was faced were high
and demanded the strategic vision of Moltke and the
operational talent of a Rommel or Manstein. There
were some Rommels like General Eftikhar but no
Moltke’s to give higher strategic direction. Yahya
was initially dynamic but successively became more
timid and cautious at a time when the only salvation
was in resorting to the boldest measures. Even the
Indians praised Yahya’s initial conduct. One author
thus wrote: ‘Nevertheless Yahya showed a good
sense in taking decisions and his command decisions
were generally well deliberated upon and sound. He
had been thrown into a rotten situation, which had
come into being the day Pakistan came into being
with its two wings. His only hope lay in somehow
getting round Mujeeb and getting him to see reason,
he tried that... he had perhaps achieved a measure of
success too... but the cyclone of 12/13 November
destroyed everything... the elections gave the
Bengalis an overwhelming majority. The Six Points
would have meant a virtual dismemberment of
Pakistan. This could not be permitted. So the only

27. course open was to hold military rule and restore the
law and order if necessary by force’7. Kissinger in
his White House Years has asserted that it was
USA’s intervention which saved West Pakistan from
being overrun by India. This is a vague statement. It
is doubtful whether India was willing to invade West
Pakistan in force after the fall of East Pakistan.
The answer to Pakistan’s dilemma was a bold attack
and only a bold all out attack could have forced
India to drop the idea of invading East Pakistan.
Long ago Clausewitz well summed up the solution
for states like Pakistan in 1971 when he said
‘Offensive war, that is the taking advantage of the
present moment, is always commanded when the
future holds out a better prospect not to ourselves
but to our adversary’. In this case the future had
better prospects for India and Pakistan’s only hope
was an all out offensive posture. Clausewitz defined
the solution in yet more detail in the following
words ‘Let us suppose a small state is involved in a
contest with a very superior power, and foresees that
with each year its position will become worse:
should it not; if war is inevitable, make use of the
time when its situation is furthest from worst? Then
it must attack, not because the attack in itself ensures

28. any advantages Ñ it will rather increase the disparity
of forces-but because this state is under the necessity
of either bringing the matter completely to an issue
before the worst time arrives or of gaining at least in
the meantime some advantages which it may
hereafter turn to account’8.
Indian General Candeth who commanded the Indian
Western Command made a very thought-provoking
remark in his memoir of 1971 war which proves that
Pakistan’s only chance lay in offensive action.
Candeth thus wrote:-
‘The most critical period was between 8 and 26
October when 1 Corps and 1 Armoured Division
were still outside Western Command. Had Pakistan
put in a pre-emptive attack, during that period, the
consequences would have been too dreadful to
contemplate and all our efforts during the war would
have been spent in trying to correct the adverse
situation forced on us’.9
Conclusion
Only a Napoleon or a Frederick could have saved
Pakistan in 1971 from being divided and humiliated
and cut to size! There were potential Napoleons and

29. Fredericks in the Pakistan Army in 1947-48 but
these were systematically sidelined or weeded out
from 1950 to 1958. A conspiracy against originality
and boldness! Ironically the political situation that
the Pakistan Army inherited was created once the
West Pakistan Civil servants and the then army C in
C had ganged up in the period 1951-58 to keep the
much despised Bengali in his place! The civilians
did well in creating the 1956 Constitution which
solved all major political problems of Pakistan. The
politicians were, however, never allowed to
implement this constitution since its implementation
through holding of a general elections in 1959 may
have led to a East Bengali victory, thus seriously
reducing the civil-military dominance of Pakistani
politics. Thus martial law was imposed in 1958 to
avoid a general election! Ironically the army finally
saw the light of the day a bit too late once a martial
law was imposed in 1969 to hold a general election !
The tide of history in these 11 years had become
irreversible! Strategic insight could at best have
averted total humiliation! But there was no strategic
insight since Ayub Khan had ensured from 1950 to
1969 that no strategic insight should be groomed and
cultivated!

30. 1In 1965 Pakistan had 20 Infantry Brigades
(including 4 AK Brigades) as against 35 Indian
Infantry Brigades. It had 756 Tanks as against 608
Indian tanks. In addition its M-47/48 Tanks were
relatively new and better than the main Indian tank
i.e. Centurion. It had 756 artillery guns as against
608 Indian. (Page-7-War Despatches-Harbaksh
Singh-Lancer-New Delhi-1990). In 1971 the Indians
had 25 Infantry Divisions (including 10 Mountain)
and eight infantry brigades as against fourteen
Pakistani Infantry Divisions and one independent
infantry brigade. In artillery the situation was even
worse since in 1971 India had 2900 Artillery Guns
(400 Medium and 2500 Field) as against 1100 (300
Medium and 800 Field) Pakistani Artillery Guns. In
armour the situation was more adverse. Numerically
in terms of brigades/divisions there was parity; India
having one armoured division and four independent
armoured brigades as against two Pakistani
armoured divisions and two independent brigades.
However, both qualitatively and quantitatively the
situation was markedly in India’s favour. India
having 1650 tanks (200 Centurion, 250 Sherman,
450 T-54/55, 300 Vijayanta, 150 PT-76 and 100

31. AMX-13) as against Pakistan’s 1050 (200 M-47/48,
150T-54/55 tanks and the Vijayanta Tanks. In
addition the Indians had 750 T-54/55/Vijayantas as
against 350 Pakistani T-54/55/59 tanks. (Refers-The
equipment strength in 1971 is based on figures given
in Military Balance-Issue-1971-1972-International
Institute of Strategic Studies-London). Number of
Formations are based on figures given on pages-271
and 272-Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-Fazal
Muqeem Khan-National Book Foundation-Lahore-
1973).
2Page-106-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit.
3Page-112-Ibid and Page-310-Memoirs Gul Hassan
Khan-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1992-The
fact that Gul Hassan was a strong advocate of this
view is also supported by General Fazal Muqeem
(See page-112-Fazal Muqeem Khan-Op Cit).
4Page-308-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit.
5Page-426-The Indian Army after Independence-
Major K.C Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-
1987
6page-107-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit.

32. 7Page-44-Dismemberment of Pakistan-Brigadier
Jagdev Singh-Lancer International-New Delhi-1988.
8Pages-397 and 398-On War-Edited by Anatol
Rapport-Reprinted National Book Foundation-1976.
9Page-28-The Western Front-Lt Gen P.K Candeth-
Allied Publishers-New Delhi-1984.