- 1st Battalion HM 8th Foot was stationed in India when the 1857 rebellion broke out. It was involved in securing areas around Delhi.
- At the siege of Delhi in September 1857, it suffered 46 of its total 57 fatal casualties and played a marginal role in the assault.
- Overall it saw minor action in other battles, with limited casualties. The majority of its casualties occurred at the decisive battle of Delhi.
While valour, operational strategic insight receive great attention, financial aspects, drab albeit extremely significant, are mostly ignored by students of military history. This article aims at highlighting the financial aspect of war with a view to show that there is a great deal of truth in Napoleons saying why bigger battalions, other factors being relatively similar, are more likely to emerge as victorious!
In ancient and medieval history size of armies was relatively small, munitions and armaments were rudimentary and armies lived off the land! As the size of armies increased and warfare became more civilised financial aspects of war became far more complicated.
The period 1550-1650 was a watershed in military history. During this period size of armies radically increased. Around 1631 Gustavus Adolphus commanded armies which were in excess of 100,000. It became difficult to sustain such large armies. The total strength of the Mughal Army of Emperor Akbar was estimated around 38,77,557 matchlockmen and infantry (including militia and zamindars retainers) while the cavalry was estimated to be around 384,758 men.1 In Aurangzeb’s time the strength varied from 240,000 to 300,000 cavalry and around 600,000 infantry.2 In Aurangzeb’s reign Aurangzeb’s Maratha War laid the foundation of financial decline of Mughal Empire. The magnitude of the expenses may be imagined from the fact that Aurangzeb’s military budget was double of Shahjahan’s military budget!3 This expense had serious maritime implications. Because of pre-occupation with the Maratha guerrillas Aurangzeb failed to capture the strategic ports of Bombay and Madras.4 Thus by late 1690s and 1700 Bombay was a prosperous and strongly fortified port and had surpassed Mughal Surat as a port! During this period Mughal land revenue declined due to revolts and civil wars and foreign trade which could have compensated for the shortfall was almost zero, which may be gauged from the fact that custom revenue “yielded less than one percent of the total revenue of the state”.5
sepoy perceptions about military effectiveness of english east india companyAgha A
Sepoy Perceptions about EEIC Military Effectiveness
The Bengal Army was the brain child of Lord Clive's military genius. The Bengal sepoys related to each other by blood relationship and caste bonds had served the EEIC for some 100 years when they rebelled in 1857. These men had a very close contact with the British and had observed them from very close quarters. Any neutral and unbiased account of the events of 1857 clearly proves that the Britisher as an officer was never disliked by the sepoys. As an officer who served in Pakistan Army I can state with conviction that the British provided excellent leadership to the Indians. They definitely knew how to lead and inspire the Indian, leading them from the forefront which I am afraid few of at least our native post 1947. Generals did either in Burma or in 1965 or in 1971. The sepoy admired and revered the British officer. In 1857 he was rebelling against the system instituted by the EEIC. Against policies formulated by men constituting a board of directors in far off England. The greasing of cartridges with pig or cow fat similarly was also an administrative decision. The sepoy perceived the British officer as a fair and brave leader and many British officers reciprocated these feelings. One of the British commanding officer committed suicide when his native infantry regiment was disbanded. Many others resisted disbandment of their units. One troop of 3rd Light Cavalry the most crucial unit of Bengal Army Sepoys as a matter of fact loyally fought for the British in 1857.
Brown bess and enfield rifle in 1857 myths and miconceptions of indian histor...Agha A
The Enfield Rifle played a decisive role in defeating the rebellion of 1857. Much more than the British officers of that time or most British historians since 1947 want anyone to know. This tendency is understandable because it deflates the deliberately cultivated myth of "White Man's Superiority" in the post 1857 sociopolitical scenario. There is no doubt that the British soldier was brave, that their younger officer lot was resolute and that their higher commanders were by and large an assorted bunch of incompetent old men.
S.S. Thorbum was one of those very few Britons who admitted the superiority of the Enfield Rifle and the decisive part it played in the Sepoy defeat in 1857. In the Appendix of Thorburn's book which few people read, Thorburn made a very profound observation, he said, "Had the sepoys accepted the Enfield and mutinied afterwards, our difficulties in suppressing their revolt would have been enormously increased453.
A very simple gauge of this fact is the high proportion of EEIC's Bengal Army casualties in the First and Second Sikh Wars. This happened because the EEIC forces till 1849 were still equipped with the old Brown Bess Musket and the Sikhs were armed with a similar weapon. Thus the British suffered a very high proportion of casualties, in the Sikh wars as compared to the battles of 1857
While valour, operational strategic insight receive great attention, financial aspects, drab albeit extremely significant, are mostly ignored by students of military history. This article aims at highlighting the financial aspect of war with a view to show that there is a great deal of truth in Napoleons saying why bigger battalions, other factors being relatively similar, are more likely to emerge as victorious!
In ancient and medieval history size of armies was relatively small, munitions and armaments were rudimentary and armies lived off the land! As the size of armies increased and warfare became more civilised financial aspects of war became far more complicated.
The period 1550-1650 was a watershed in military history. During this period size of armies radically increased. Around 1631 Gustavus Adolphus commanded armies which were in excess of 100,000. It became difficult to sustain such large armies. The total strength of the Mughal Army of Emperor Akbar was estimated around 38,77,557 matchlockmen and infantry (including militia and zamindars retainers) while the cavalry was estimated to be around 384,758 men.1 In Aurangzeb’s time the strength varied from 240,000 to 300,000 cavalry and around 600,000 infantry.2 In Aurangzeb’s reign Aurangzeb’s Maratha War laid the foundation of financial decline of Mughal Empire. The magnitude of the expenses may be imagined from the fact that Aurangzeb’s military budget was double of Shahjahan’s military budget!3 This expense had serious maritime implications. Because of pre-occupation with the Maratha guerrillas Aurangzeb failed to capture the strategic ports of Bombay and Madras.4 Thus by late 1690s and 1700 Bombay was a prosperous and strongly fortified port and had surpassed Mughal Surat as a port! During this period Mughal land revenue declined due to revolts and civil wars and foreign trade which could have compensated for the shortfall was almost zero, which may be gauged from the fact that custom revenue “yielded less than one percent of the total revenue of the state”.5
sepoy perceptions about military effectiveness of english east india companyAgha A
Sepoy Perceptions about EEIC Military Effectiveness
The Bengal Army was the brain child of Lord Clive's military genius. The Bengal sepoys related to each other by blood relationship and caste bonds had served the EEIC for some 100 years when they rebelled in 1857. These men had a very close contact with the British and had observed them from very close quarters. Any neutral and unbiased account of the events of 1857 clearly proves that the Britisher as an officer was never disliked by the sepoys. As an officer who served in Pakistan Army I can state with conviction that the British provided excellent leadership to the Indians. They definitely knew how to lead and inspire the Indian, leading them from the forefront which I am afraid few of at least our native post 1947. Generals did either in Burma or in 1965 or in 1971. The sepoy admired and revered the British officer. In 1857 he was rebelling against the system instituted by the EEIC. Against policies formulated by men constituting a board of directors in far off England. The greasing of cartridges with pig or cow fat similarly was also an administrative decision. The sepoy perceived the British officer as a fair and brave leader and many British officers reciprocated these feelings. One of the British commanding officer committed suicide when his native infantry regiment was disbanded. Many others resisted disbandment of their units. One troop of 3rd Light Cavalry the most crucial unit of Bengal Army Sepoys as a matter of fact loyally fought for the British in 1857.
Brown bess and enfield rifle in 1857 myths and miconceptions of indian histor...Agha A
The Enfield Rifle played a decisive role in defeating the rebellion of 1857. Much more than the British officers of that time or most British historians since 1947 want anyone to know. This tendency is understandable because it deflates the deliberately cultivated myth of "White Man's Superiority" in the post 1857 sociopolitical scenario. There is no doubt that the British soldier was brave, that their younger officer lot was resolute and that their higher commanders were by and large an assorted bunch of incompetent old men.
S.S. Thorbum was one of those very few Britons who admitted the superiority of the Enfield Rifle and the decisive part it played in the Sepoy defeat in 1857. In the Appendix of Thorburn's book which few people read, Thorburn made a very profound observation, he said, "Had the sepoys accepted the Enfield and mutinied afterwards, our difficulties in suppressing their revolt would have been enormously increased453.
A very simple gauge of this fact is the high proportion of EEIC's Bengal Army casualties in the First and Second Sikh Wars. This happened because the EEIC forces till 1849 were still equipped with the old Brown Bess Musket and the Sikhs were armed with a similar weapon. Thus the British suffered a very high proportion of casualties, in the Sikh wars as compared to the battles of 1857
Battle of Gangiri-Heavy Price paid by HM 6 Dragoon Guards for Gallantry Agha A
Battle of Gangiri-Heavy Price paid by HM 6 Dragoon Guards for Gallantry https://www.academia.edu/52632772/Battle_of_Gangiri_Heavy_Price_paid_by_HM_6_Dragoon_Guards_for_Gallantry via @academia
WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OR INDIAN ARMY CAN NEVER PRODUCE A MUSTAFA KAMAL- SOMETHING...Agha A
WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OR INDIAN ARMY CAN NEVER PRODUCE A MUSTAFA KAMAL- SOMETHING SERIOUSLY WRONG IN THE GENES
April 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20723.27689
Project: MILITARY HISTORY
Agha H Amin
NAIB RISALDAR AKBAR COMMANDING LEFT TANK TROOP OF B SQUADRON 25 CAVALRY LOST HIS WAY IN THE EXCITEMENT OF BATTLE AND WENT TO GENERAL AREA MAHARAJKE ---CHASING WIND MILLS (WILD GOOSE CHASE) WHILE MAJOR AHMAD CONFRONTED AND CHECKED 16 CAVALRY WITH JUST TWO TANK TROOPS
Adjusting primitives for graph : SHORT REPORT / NOTESSubhajit Sahu
Graph algorithms, like PageRank Compressed Sparse Row (CSR) is an adjacency-list based graph representation that is
Multiply with different modes (map)
1. Performance of sequential execution based vs OpenMP based vector multiply.
2. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector multiply.
Sum with different storage types (reduce)
1. Performance of vector element sum using float vs bfloat16 as the storage type.
Sum with different modes (reduce)
1. Performance of sequential execution based vs OpenMP based vector element sum.
2. Performance of memcpy vs in-place based CUDA based vector element sum.
3. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector element sum (memcpy).
4. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector element sum (in-place).
Sum with in-place strategies of CUDA mode (reduce)
1. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector element sum (in-place).
Techniques to optimize the pagerank algorithm usually fall in two categories. One is to try reducing the work per iteration, and the other is to try reducing the number of iterations. These goals are often at odds with one another. Skipping computation on vertices which have already converged has the potential to save iteration time. Skipping in-identical vertices, with the same in-links, helps reduce duplicate computations and thus could help reduce iteration time. Road networks often have chains which can be short-circuited before pagerank computation to improve performance. Final ranks of chain nodes can be easily calculated. This could reduce both the iteration time, and the number of iterations. If a graph has no dangling nodes, pagerank of each strongly connected component can be computed in topological order. This could help reduce the iteration time, no. of iterations, and also enable multi-iteration concurrency in pagerank computation. The combination of all of the above methods is the STICD algorithm. [sticd] For dynamic graphs, unchanged components whose ranks are unaffected can be skipped altogether.
1ST BATTALION WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT IN 1857-59 BATTLES.pdf
1.
2. Major Agha.H.Amin was commissioned in the old
PAVO Cavalry in March 1983.
He was educated at Saint Marys Academy Lalazar
and Forman Christian College Lahore.
He served in various command, staff, research,
logistics and instructional positions in his military
career, including mechanical transport officer of
3. an armoured brigade headquarter, mechanical
transport officer of an armoured regiment ,
general staff officer research trial and publications
at School of Armour , Instructor Class C at Tactical
Wing School of Armour and finally independent
command directly under a major general as
Officer Commanding 5 Independent Armoured
Squadron.
In his civilian career performed projects like
Uzbekistan Kabul Transmission lines concrete
foundations, CASA 1000 Line survey as sub
contractor of SNC Lavalin Canada and
Turkmenistan Mazar transmission line as sub
contractor of Fichtner Gmbh Germany.
Also served as Assistant Editor Defence Journal
Karachi , Executive Editor Globe Karachi , Editor
Journal of Afghanistan Studies financed by Danish
foreign ministry , Editor Intelligence Review ,
Editor Pakistan Military Review , Editor Journal of
Book Reviews, Editor Indian Military Review etc.
4. Authored over 120 books and journals . Articles
published in Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel
Journal of Command and Staff College Quetta.
Established unprecedented and todate unbroken
record of an independent tank squadron
defeating 7 tank regiments in a corps level firing
competition.
Recommended creation of army commands in
Pakistan Army command and staff college Citadel
Journal issue 2/98 in 1998 which was adopted by
the Pakistan Army in 2005-7.
Has advised various states and international
companies on security matters as sub contractor
of Spanish , USA and Hongkong based companies.
Contact e mail :--- mazen@csio-ops.com and
pavocavalry@gmail.com
5. This is a brief study aid for serious students of
military history interested in British infantry
6. battalions which participated in the battles of
1857-59.
Each battalions role is covered with short history
of its operations in India.In addition its individual
as well as net contribution to the outcome of war
is summarized.
Casualties are listed with causes of death ,
locations and names of key persons.
Maps of area where the battalion operated.
Only fatal casualties which occurred due to actual
fighting are listed and fatal casualties due to
medical causes like heatstroke , cholera etc are
not listed.
7.
8. This battalion arrived from Cape of Good Hope at
Calutta on 17th
January 1858 and played no role in
the 1857-59 battles.1
1
Page-28- THE QUARTERLY ARMY LIST OF HER
MAJESTY’S BRITISH AND INDIAN FORCES ON THE
BENGAL ESTABLISHMENT-Corrected to 5th
July 1859-
Published and sold by Messrs R.C Lepage and
Company-British Library -1859
9.
10. Raised as Princess Anne of Denmark’s Regiment in
1685.Renamed as Queen’s Regiment in 1702 ,
Kings Regiment in 1716 and finally 8th
(The King’s)
Regiment in 1751.2
This battalion arrived in British East India Company
ruled India as part of the company’s Bombay Army
on 1st
August 1846.3
It was transferred to the
company’s Bengal Army on 26th
December 1853.4
2
Page- FORCES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE-1914-Op cit.
3
Page-32- THE QUARTERLY ARMY LIST OF HER
MAJESTY’S BRITISH AND INDIAN FORCES ON THE
BENGAL ESTABLISHMENT-Corrected to 5th
July 1859-
Published and sold by Messrs R.C Lepage and
Company-British Library -1859
4
Ibid.
11. 1st
Battalion HM 8th
Foot was stationed at
Jullundhur as above map indicates when the 1857
rebellion broke out.
Initially the battalion was involved in securing
Jullundhur and Phillor fort.
12.
13. Finally the battalions wing about 350 strong under
Colonel Hartley reached Delhi on 22/23 June
1857.5
Two remaining companies of the battalion (250
strong) were holding Jullundhur and Phillor
Fort.These were relieved by companies from HM
24th
Foot in Rawalpindi and reached Delhi on 9th
August 1857.6
It saw action at Delhi where it suffered the lions
share (46 OUT OF 57) of it total fatal casualties in
actual fighting .
As the map below illustrates 250 soldiers of HM 8th
Foot were part of the Second Column assaulting
Delhi and played a marginal role in the assault on
Delhi.
5
Page-353- THE PUNJAB AND DELHI IN 1857- VOLUME
ONE-Rev J.Cave Browne- William Blackwood and Sons-
London 1861
6
Page-138- THE PUNJAB AND DELHI IN 1857- VOLUME
TWO-Rev J.Cave Browne- William Blackwood and Sons-
London 1861
14.
15. Marginal in the sense that the battalion suffered
the lowest casualties in the second column that
assaulted Delhi ON 14TH
September 1857 . 7
FATAL CASUALTIES OF SECOND COLUMN IN
ASSAULT ON DELHI ON 14TH
SEPTEMBER 1857
Unit Fatal
Casualties
HM 8TH
FOOT (250 MEN) 5
1ST
BENGAL EUROPEANS (250 MEN) 38
4TH
SIKH INFANTRY (350 MEN) 7
The battalion’s role in fighting between 15th
and
20th
September 1857 was also zero as it suffered
NIL 8
fatal casualties out of total 52 casualties
suffered by the company’s army.
7
Page—414-Selections from the Letters, Despatches
and Other State Papers, Preserved in the Military
Dept. of the Government of India, 1857-58-Volume 1 -
Edited by George W. Forrest-Military Department
Press-Calcutta-1893.
8
Page—418-Ibid
16. It saw minor action at Bulandshahr in the Doab in
September 1857 where it lost 1 private killed. 9
In total the battalion lost 2 killed in the Doab
battles apart from Bulandshahr.10
Subsequently it participated in defence of
Cawnpore in December 1857 where again its role
was marginal and it suffered nil fatal casualties.It
saw minor action at Lucknow where it lost 4
privates killed.11
On the whole the reader may note that lion’s share
of fighting at Delhi was done by the British
company’s private army battalions both Indian and
European who suffered some 70 percent of all fatal
casualties in the siege of Delhi.
The unit’s performance was outstanding , because
it stood steadfastly to maintain the company’s
9
Page-19- CASUALTY ROLL FOR THE INDIAN MUTINY
1857-59-Op cit.
10
Pages-17,18 and 19-Ibid.
11
Page-18- CASUALTY ROLL FOR THE INDIAN MUTINY
1857-59-Op cit.
17. position at Delhi which was desperate , keeping in
view the heavy odds against the company.
The regiment did well at Delhi , but did not win any
VC . VC necessarily is not the gauge to judge a
battalion’s performance.
The battalion lost four officers in 1857-59 battles
which illustrates that officers were leading from
the front. Following officers of the battalion were
killed in action :--12
• Lieutenant Mounsteven, killed in action at
Delhi on 9th
July 1857.
• Lieutenant W.W Pogson ,severely wounded at
Delhi on 14th
July 1857 and died of wounds on
23rd
July 1857.
12
Page-17- CASUALTY ROLL FOR THE INDIAN MUTINY
1857-59-Op cit.
18. • Lieutenant F.M Vincent killed in action at
Cawnpore on 7th
December 1857.
• Lieutenant Robert Webb mortally wounded at
Delhi on 14th
September 1857 and died of
wounds on 15th
September 1857.
The unit suffered the highest share of its fatal
casualties , 46 out of 57 total killed in all battles of
1857-59 at the siege of Delhi.13
Fortescue placed fatal casualties of HM 8th
Foot in
siege of Delhi at 27 killed .14
This discrepancy is
hard to reconcile as we have researched the figure
of 46 killed from Tavender’s casualty roll. Both
Forrest and Tavenders accounts have various
factual mistakes.
Its 12 other casualties were suffered in :-- 15
13
Pages-17, 18 and 19- CASUALTY ROLL FOR THE
INDIAN MUTINY 1857-59-Op cit.
14
Page-492- Selections from the Letters, Despatches
and Other State Papers, Preserved in the Military
Dept. of the Government of India, 1857-58-Volume 1
–Op cit.
15
Ibid
19. • Doab where it lost 4 killed and at Bulandshahr
where it lost 1 killed.
• It lost 1 killed at battles of Cawnpore (1857) .
• It lost 5 in the battles involving final capture of
Lucknow.
British battalions bore 30 % of casualties at siege of
Delhi regarded as the most decisive siege/action of
all battles of 1857-59. Here the British company’s
private army both European and Indian had an
edge over the British army battalions.
It was granted battle honours of “DELHI” where it
suffered high casualties and “Lucknow” where it
suffered very low fatal casualties.