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UNDERSTANDING THE KNOWN
A9 : USING COMPONENTS WITH KNOWN
VULNERABILITIES
 
BY
ANANT SHRIVASTAVA
ANANT SHRIVASTAVA
Information Security Consultant
Admin - Dev - Security
null + OWASP + G4H
and @anantshri
Trainer / Speaker : Blackhat USA, NullCon, g0s, c0c0n, Clubhack, RootConf
http://anantshri.info
     
WHAT IS A COMPONENT
Any piece of code that is reusable
Paid or OpenSource
Either by same developer or other developers
Its lot more then what you know
PYTHON PACKAGES
Programming Language
RUBY GEMS
Programming Language
MICROSOFT .NET PACKAGES
Programming Language
WORDPRESS PLUGINS
Web Application
CISCO SECURITY MANAGER
Cisco Security Manager
CISCO ASA
Cisco ASA Hardware
AND MANY MORE
WHY COMPONENTS
Unix Philosophy : Do one thing and do it well
Code Reuse : "Less Development Overhead"
"Potentially" Combined and Faster evolution
Higher cost to develop from scratch
IN SHORT
Any component which is not developed by you is a 3rd party package in use
NOT DEVELOPED BY YOU
NOT DEVELOPED BY YOU
1. OpenSSL
2. Bash
3. Apache
4. NGINX
and many more
UNDERSTANDING THE KNOWN
USING COMPONENTS WITH KNOWN
VULNERABILITIES
TWO DISTINCT PROBLEMS
1. Component has known vulnerability
2. Licensing Policies
Talk focus only on the first part
COMPONENT WITH KNOWN
VULNERABILITY
Marked as 9/10 in OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities in 2013
Attacks can range from basic web attacks to Remote Code Execution
SOME EXAMPLES
HEARTBLEED
VULNERABLE VENDOR
Credits: Jake & Kymberlee : Stranger Danger! What Is The Risk From 3rd Party
Libraries? : Blackhat USA 2015
MORE
Credits: Jake & Kymberlee : Stranger Danger! What Is The Risk From 3rd Party
Libraries? : Blackhat USA 2015
REMEMBER
We rely on 3rd party to
1. patch
2. maintain security
3. accept security issues
4. in short "NOT SCREWUP"
WHAT ARE THE CONCERNS
1. Open Source Software
1. Developer has scratched his itch and will not want to work on it
2. Developer doesn't understand security implications and ignore reports
3. Developer is genuinely not in a position to work on project
2. Closed Source Software
1. Company shifted focus
2. Not enough money
WHAT IF THEY DO ALL THE
FIXES IN TIME
PATCH PROCESS
1. Someone disclosed a vulnerability
2. 3rd party vendor fixes code
3. A public advisory is released informing about the update and hopefully security
issue
4. Developer has to update the dependencies in actual project (believe me when i
say its not easy task) (backword compatibility, regression, feature support etc)
5. Sysadmin / user has to update the software to receive the update
LOOKS COMPLEX
ANDROID OTA PROCESS
1. Google released PDK to Vendor for evaluation
2. Google Announces new version
3. Google send source code to Chipset manufacturer and Vendor
4. Chipset manufactures provides drivers and BSP or stops support
5. Vendor evaluates requirement for device if no driver then no update
6. Vendor updates its own softwares (SENSE, TouchWiz etc)
Cont.
ANDROID OTA PROCESS...
1. Vendor works with carrier for modification
2. Final build is submitted for Lab Entry and testing
3. If bug found patch and resubmit.
4. Take approvals from
1. Regulatory
2. Industry
3. Google
5. Prepare OTA for the Device
6. User Downloads OTA and updates the device
BIGGEST QUESTION WHAT WE
CAN DO
3 KEY PLAYERS
1. Component Code Developer
2. Programmer reusing component
3. Enduser/sysadmin using the final program
THEN THERE IS PENTESTER
LETS EVALUATE ONE BY ONE
SYSADMIN / ENDUSER
Monitor your software feeds to ensure you do not miss security updates
never ignore update from shared library
Keep an eye on how shared resources are holding up
DEVELOPERS
(SOFTWARE AND 3RD PARTY)
1. Identify and catalogue your components
2. Never ignore pull requests and security issue bug report
3. Proactively test software and at-least if a fix is released publicly accept security
issue
ANY AVAILABLE TOOLS
VULNERABLE COMPONENT
IDENTIFICATION
IDENTIFICATION
IDENTIFICATION
IDENTIFICATION
IS THIS ENOUGH
1. Not yet
2. We still lack method to track it for every third party library
3. Manual tracking is still required
COMPONENT CODE DEVELOPER
1. Be clear about support status
2. If out of support, release and updated version clearly stating support status
3. Clearly accept the security issues and inform about fix
PENTESTER
1. Follow steps for Admin to identify all components
2. Cross reference with known disclosures (use dependency trackers)
3. Profit
REFERENCES
1. BlackHat 2015 : Stranger Danger! What Is The Risk From 3rd Party Libraries? :
DO CHECK VTEM
2. The Unfortunate Reality of Insecure Libraries: Jeff Williams,Arshan Dabirsiaghi :
March 2012
3.
4.
https://www.gov.uk/service-manual/making-software/dependency-
management.html
http://swreflections.blogspot.in/2013/10/dont-let-somebody-elses-technical-
debt.html
REFERENCES
1.
2.
3.
https://prezi.com/g-01vdbth1co/sonatype-survey-2013/
http://blog.softfluent.com/2011/08/19/leveraging-third-party-components-or-
reducing-dependencies/
https://img.en25.com/Web/SonatypeInc/%7Bb2fa5ed8-938d-4bce-8a9c-
d08ebeba826d%7D_Executive_Brief_-_Study-
_Understanding_Security_Risks_in_OSS_Components-1.pdf
ANY QUESTIONS
ANANT SHRIVASTAVA
Information Security Consultant
Admin - Dev - Security
null + OWASP + G4H
and @anantshri
Trainer / Speaker : Blackhat USA, NullCon, g0s, c0c0n, Clubhack, RootConf
http://anantshri.info
     
THANK YOU

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