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The RSA Algorithm

JooSeok Song
2007. 11. 13. Tue
Private-Key Cryptography
 traditional private/secret/single key
cryptography uses one key
 shared by both sender and receiver
 if this key is disclosed communications are
compromised
 also is symmetric, parties are equal
 hence does not protect sender from receiver
forging a message & claiming is sent by sender

CCLAB
Public-Key Cryptography
 probably most significant advance in the 3000
year history of cryptography
 uses two keys – a public & a private key
 asymmetric since parties are not equal
 uses clever application of number theoretic
concepts to function
 complements rather than replaces private key
crypto

CCLAB
Public-Key Cryptography
 public-key/two-key/asymmetric cryptography
involves the use of two keys:
– a public-key, which may be known by anybody, and
can be used to encrypt messages, and verify
signatures
– a private-key, known only to the recipient, used to
decrypt messages, and sign (create) signatures

 is asymmetric because
– those who encrypt messages or verify signatures
cannot decrypt messages or create signatures

CCLAB
Public-Key Cryptography

CCLAB
Why Public-Key Cryptography?
 developed to address two key issues:
– key distribution – how to have secure communications
in general without having to trust a KDC with your key
– digital signatures – how to verify a message comes
intact from the claimed sender

 public invention due to Whitfield Diffie & Martin
Hellman at Stanford Uni in 1976
– known earlier in classified community

CCLAB
Public-Key Characteristics
 Public-Key algorithms rely on two keys with the
characteristics that it is:
– computationally infeasible to find decryption key
knowing only algorithm & encryption key
– computationally easy to en/decrypt messages when the
relevant (en/decrypt) key is known
– either of the two related keys can be used for
encryption, with the other used for decryption (in some
schemes)

CCLAB
Public-Key Cryptosystems

CCLAB
Public-Key Applications
 can classify uses into 3 categories:
– encryption/decryption (provide secrecy)
– digital signatures (provide authentication)
– key exchange (of session keys)

 some algorithms are suitable for all uses, others
are specific to one

CCLAB
Security of Public Key Schemes
 like private key schemes brute force exhaustive
search attack is always theoretically possible
 but keys used are too large (>512bits)
 security relies on a large enough difference in
difficulty between easy (en/decrypt) and hard
(cryptanalyse) problems
 more generally the hard problem is known, its
just made too hard to do in practise
 requires the use of very large numbers
 hence is slow compared to private key schemes
CCLAB
RSA
 by Rivest, Shamir & Adleman of MIT in 1977
 best known & widely used public-key scheme
 based on exponentiation in a finite (Galois) field
over integers modulo a prime
– nb. exponentiation takes O((log n)3) operations (easy)

 uses large integers (eg. 1024 bits)
 security due to cost of factoring large numbers
– nb. factorization takes O(e log n log log n) operations (hard)

CCLAB
RSA Key Setup
 each user generates a public/private key pair by:
 selecting two large primes at random - p, q
 computing their system modulus N=p.q
– note ø(N)=(p-1)(q-1)

 selecting at random the encryption key e
 where 1<e<ø(N), gcd(e,ø(N))=1

 solve following equation to find decryption key d
– e.d=1 mod ø(N) and 0≤d≤N

 publish their public encryption key: KU={e,N}
 keep secret private decryption key: KR={d,p,q}
CCLAB
RSA Use
 to encrypt a message M the sender:
– obtains public key of recipient KU={e,N}
– computes: C=Me mod N, where 0≤M<N

 to decrypt the ciphertext C the owner:
– uses their private key KR={d,p,q}
– computes: M=Cd mod N

 note that the message M must be smaller than
the modulus N (block if needed)

CCLAB
Prime Numbers
 prime numbers only have divisors of 1 and self
– they cannot be written as a product of other numbers
– note: 1 is prime, but is generally not of interest

 eg. 2,3,5,7 are prime, 4,6,8,9,10 are not
 prime numbers are central to number theory
 list of prime number less than 200 is:
2 3 5 7 11 13 17 19 23 29 31 37 41 43 47 53 59 61
67 71 73 79 83 89 97 101 103 107 109 113 127 131
137 139 149 151 157 163 167 173 179 181 191 193
197 199

CCLAB
Prime Factorisation
 to factor a number n is to write it as a product of
other numbers: n=a × b × c
 note that factoring a number is relatively hard
compared to multiplying the factors together to
generate the number
 the prime factorisation of a number n is when its
written as a product of primes
– eg. 91=7×13 ; 3600=24×32×52

CCLAB
Relatively Prime Numbers & GCD
 two numbers a, b are relatively prime if have
no common divisors apart from 1
– eg. 8 & 15 are relatively prime since factors of 8 are
1,2,4,8 and of 15 are 1,3,5,15 and 1 is the only common
factor

 conversely can determine the greatest common
divisor by comparing their prime factorizations
and using least powers
– eg. 300=21×31×52 18=21×32 hence
GCD(18,300)=21×31×50=6

CCLAB
Fermat's Theorem
 ap-1 mod p = 1
– where p is prime and gcd(a,p)=1

 also known as Fermat’s Little Theorem
 useful in public key and primality testing

CCLAB
Euler Totient Function ø(n)
 when doing arithmetic modulo n
 complete set of residues is: 0..n-1
 reduced set of residues is those numbers
(residues) which are relatively prime to n
– eg for n=10,
– complete set of residues is {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}
– reduced set of residues is {1,3,7,9}

 number of elements in reduced set of residues is
called the Euler Totient Function ø(n)

CCLAB
Euler Totient Function ø(n)
 to compute ø(n) need to count number of
elements to be excluded
 in general need prime factorization, but
– for p (p prime) ø(p) = p-1
– for p.q (p,q prime)
ø(p.q) = (p-1)(q-1)

 eg.
– ø(37) = 36
– ø(21) = (3–1)×(7–1) = 2×6 = 12

CCLAB
Euler's Theorem
 a generalisation of Fermat's Theorem
 aø(n)mod N = 1
– where gcd(a,N)=1

 eg.
–
–
–
–

CCLAB

a=3;n=10;
hence 34 =
a=2;n=11;
hence 210 =

ø(10)=4;
81 = 1 mod 10
ø(11)=10;
1024 = 1 mod 11
Why RSA Works
 because of Euler's Theorem:
 aø(n)mod N = 1
– where gcd(a,N)=1

 in RSA have:
–
–
–
–

N=p.q
ø(N)=(p-1)(q-1)
carefully chosen e & d to be inverses mod ø(N)
hence e.d=1+k.ø(N) for some k

 hence :
Cd = (Me)d = M1+k.ø(N) = M1.(Mø(N))q = M1.(1)q =
M1 = M mod N

CCLAB
RSA Example
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Select primes: p=17 & q=11
Compute n = pq =17×11=187
Compute ø(n)=(p–1)(q-1)=16×10=160
Select e : gcd(e,160)=1; choose e=7
Determine d: de=1 mod 160 and d < 160
Value is d=23 since 23×7=161= 10×160+1
6. Publish public key KU={7,187}
7. Keep secret private key KR={23,17,11}

CCLAB
RSA Example cont
 sample RSA encryption/decryption is:
 given message M = 88 (nb. 88<187)
 encryption:
C = 887 mod 187 = 11

 decryption:
M = 1123 mod 187 = 88

CCLAB
Exponentiation
can use the Square and Multiply Algorithm
a fast, efficient algorithm for exponentiation
concept is based on repeatedly squaring base
and multiplying in the ones that are needed to
compute the result
 look at binary representation of exponent
 only takes O(log2 n) multiples for number n





– eg. 75 = 74.71 = 3.7 = 10 mod 11
– eg. 3129 = 3128.31 = 5.3 = 4 mod 11
CCLAB
Exponentiation

CCLAB
RSA Key Generation
 users of RSA must:
– determine two primes at random - p, q
– select either e or d and compute the other

 primes p,q must not be easily derived from
modulus N=p.q
– means must be sufficiently large
– typically guess and use probabilistic test

 exponents e, d are inverses, so use Inverse
algorithm to compute the other

CCLAB
RSA Security
 three approaches to attacking RSA:
– brute force key search (infeasible given size of
numbers)
– mathematical attacks (based on difficulty of computing
ø(N), by factoring modulus N)
– timing attacks (on running of decryption)

CCLAB
Factoring Problem
 mathematical approach takes 3 forms:
– factor N=p.q, hence find ø(N) and then d
– determine ø(N) directly and find d
– find d directly

 currently believe all equivalent to factoring
– have seen slow improvements over the years
 as of Aug-99 best is 130 decimal digits (512) bit with GNFS

– biggest improvement comes from improved algorithm
 cf “Quadratic Sieve” to “Generalized Number Field Sieve”

– barring dramatic breakthrough 1024+ bit RSA secure
 ensure p, q of similar size and matching other constraints

CCLAB
Timing Attacks
 developed in mid-1990’s
 exploit timing variations in operations
– eg. multiplying by small vs large number
– or IF's varying which instructions executed

 infer operand size based on time taken
 RSA exploits time taken in exponentiation
 countermeasures
– use constant exponentiation time
– add random delays
– blind values used in calculations

CCLAB
Summary
 have considered:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

CCLAB

prime numbers
Fermat’s and Euler’s Theorems
Primality Testing
Chinese Remainder Theorem
Discrete Logarithms
principles of public-key cryptography
RSA algorithm, implementation, security
Assignments
1. Perform encryption and decryption using RSA
algorithm, as in Figure 1, for the following:
a. p = 3; q = 11, e = 7; M = 5
b. p = 5; q = 11, e = 3; M = 9
Encryption
Plaintext
88

887 mod 187 = 11

Decryption
Ciphertext
11

1123 mod 187 = 88

KU = 7, 187
KR = 23, 187
Figure 1. Example of RSA Algorithm

Plaintext
88

2. In a public-key system using RSA, you intercept
the ciphertext C = 10 sent to a user whose public
key is e = 5, n = 35. What is the plaintext M?
CCLAB

31

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The rsa algorithm JooSeok Song

  • 1. The RSA Algorithm JooSeok Song 2007. 11. 13. Tue
  • 2. Private-Key Cryptography  traditional private/secret/single key cryptography uses one key  shared by both sender and receiver  if this key is disclosed communications are compromised  also is symmetric, parties are equal  hence does not protect sender from receiver forging a message & claiming is sent by sender CCLAB
  • 3. Public-Key Cryptography  probably most significant advance in the 3000 year history of cryptography  uses two keys – a public & a private key  asymmetric since parties are not equal  uses clever application of number theoretic concepts to function  complements rather than replaces private key crypto CCLAB
  • 4. Public-Key Cryptography  public-key/two-key/asymmetric cryptography involves the use of two keys: – a public-key, which may be known by anybody, and can be used to encrypt messages, and verify signatures – a private-key, known only to the recipient, used to decrypt messages, and sign (create) signatures  is asymmetric because – those who encrypt messages or verify signatures cannot decrypt messages or create signatures CCLAB
  • 6. Why Public-Key Cryptography?  developed to address two key issues: – key distribution – how to have secure communications in general without having to trust a KDC with your key – digital signatures – how to verify a message comes intact from the claimed sender  public invention due to Whitfield Diffie & Martin Hellman at Stanford Uni in 1976 – known earlier in classified community CCLAB
  • 7. Public-Key Characteristics  Public-Key algorithms rely on two keys with the characteristics that it is: – computationally infeasible to find decryption key knowing only algorithm & encryption key – computationally easy to en/decrypt messages when the relevant (en/decrypt) key is known – either of the two related keys can be used for encryption, with the other used for decryption (in some schemes) CCLAB
  • 9. Public-Key Applications  can classify uses into 3 categories: – encryption/decryption (provide secrecy) – digital signatures (provide authentication) – key exchange (of session keys)  some algorithms are suitable for all uses, others are specific to one CCLAB
  • 10. Security of Public Key Schemes  like private key schemes brute force exhaustive search attack is always theoretically possible  but keys used are too large (>512bits)  security relies on a large enough difference in difficulty between easy (en/decrypt) and hard (cryptanalyse) problems  more generally the hard problem is known, its just made too hard to do in practise  requires the use of very large numbers  hence is slow compared to private key schemes CCLAB
  • 11. RSA  by Rivest, Shamir & Adleman of MIT in 1977  best known & widely used public-key scheme  based on exponentiation in a finite (Galois) field over integers modulo a prime – nb. exponentiation takes O((log n)3) operations (easy)  uses large integers (eg. 1024 bits)  security due to cost of factoring large numbers – nb. factorization takes O(e log n log log n) operations (hard) CCLAB
  • 12. RSA Key Setup  each user generates a public/private key pair by:  selecting two large primes at random - p, q  computing their system modulus N=p.q – note ø(N)=(p-1)(q-1)  selecting at random the encryption key e  where 1<e<ø(N), gcd(e,ø(N))=1  solve following equation to find decryption key d – e.d=1 mod ø(N) and 0≤d≤N  publish their public encryption key: KU={e,N}  keep secret private decryption key: KR={d,p,q} CCLAB
  • 13. RSA Use  to encrypt a message M the sender: – obtains public key of recipient KU={e,N} – computes: C=Me mod N, where 0≤M<N  to decrypt the ciphertext C the owner: – uses their private key KR={d,p,q} – computes: M=Cd mod N  note that the message M must be smaller than the modulus N (block if needed) CCLAB
  • 14. Prime Numbers  prime numbers only have divisors of 1 and self – they cannot be written as a product of other numbers – note: 1 is prime, but is generally not of interest  eg. 2,3,5,7 are prime, 4,6,8,9,10 are not  prime numbers are central to number theory  list of prime number less than 200 is: 2 3 5 7 11 13 17 19 23 29 31 37 41 43 47 53 59 61 67 71 73 79 83 89 97 101 103 107 109 113 127 131 137 139 149 151 157 163 167 173 179 181 191 193 197 199 CCLAB
  • 15. Prime Factorisation  to factor a number n is to write it as a product of other numbers: n=a × b × c  note that factoring a number is relatively hard compared to multiplying the factors together to generate the number  the prime factorisation of a number n is when its written as a product of primes – eg. 91=7×13 ; 3600=24×32×52 CCLAB
  • 16. Relatively Prime Numbers & GCD  two numbers a, b are relatively prime if have no common divisors apart from 1 – eg. 8 & 15 are relatively prime since factors of 8 are 1,2,4,8 and of 15 are 1,3,5,15 and 1 is the only common factor  conversely can determine the greatest common divisor by comparing their prime factorizations and using least powers – eg. 300=21×31×52 18=21×32 hence GCD(18,300)=21×31×50=6 CCLAB
  • 17. Fermat's Theorem  ap-1 mod p = 1 – where p is prime and gcd(a,p)=1  also known as Fermat’s Little Theorem  useful in public key and primality testing CCLAB
  • 18. Euler Totient Function ø(n)  when doing arithmetic modulo n  complete set of residues is: 0..n-1  reduced set of residues is those numbers (residues) which are relatively prime to n – eg for n=10, – complete set of residues is {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9} – reduced set of residues is {1,3,7,9}  number of elements in reduced set of residues is called the Euler Totient Function ø(n) CCLAB
  • 19. Euler Totient Function ø(n)  to compute ø(n) need to count number of elements to be excluded  in general need prime factorization, but – for p (p prime) ø(p) = p-1 – for p.q (p,q prime) ø(p.q) = (p-1)(q-1)  eg. – ø(37) = 36 – ø(21) = (3–1)×(7–1) = 2×6 = 12 CCLAB
  • 20. Euler's Theorem  a generalisation of Fermat's Theorem  aø(n)mod N = 1 – where gcd(a,N)=1  eg. – – – – CCLAB a=3;n=10; hence 34 = a=2;n=11; hence 210 = ø(10)=4; 81 = 1 mod 10 ø(11)=10; 1024 = 1 mod 11
  • 21. Why RSA Works  because of Euler's Theorem:  aø(n)mod N = 1 – where gcd(a,N)=1  in RSA have: – – – – N=p.q ø(N)=(p-1)(q-1) carefully chosen e & d to be inverses mod ø(N) hence e.d=1+k.ø(N) for some k  hence : Cd = (Me)d = M1+k.ø(N) = M1.(Mø(N))q = M1.(1)q = M1 = M mod N CCLAB
  • 22. RSA Example 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Select primes: p=17 & q=11 Compute n = pq =17×11=187 Compute ø(n)=(p–1)(q-1)=16×10=160 Select e : gcd(e,160)=1; choose e=7 Determine d: de=1 mod 160 and d < 160 Value is d=23 since 23×7=161= 10×160+1 6. Publish public key KU={7,187} 7. Keep secret private key KR={23,17,11} CCLAB
  • 23. RSA Example cont  sample RSA encryption/decryption is:  given message M = 88 (nb. 88<187)  encryption: C = 887 mod 187 = 11  decryption: M = 1123 mod 187 = 88 CCLAB
  • 24. Exponentiation can use the Square and Multiply Algorithm a fast, efficient algorithm for exponentiation concept is based on repeatedly squaring base and multiplying in the ones that are needed to compute the result  look at binary representation of exponent  only takes O(log2 n) multiples for number n     – eg. 75 = 74.71 = 3.7 = 10 mod 11 – eg. 3129 = 3128.31 = 5.3 = 4 mod 11 CCLAB
  • 26. RSA Key Generation  users of RSA must: – determine two primes at random - p, q – select either e or d and compute the other  primes p,q must not be easily derived from modulus N=p.q – means must be sufficiently large – typically guess and use probabilistic test  exponents e, d are inverses, so use Inverse algorithm to compute the other CCLAB
  • 27. RSA Security  three approaches to attacking RSA: – brute force key search (infeasible given size of numbers) – mathematical attacks (based on difficulty of computing ø(N), by factoring modulus N) – timing attacks (on running of decryption) CCLAB
  • 28. Factoring Problem  mathematical approach takes 3 forms: – factor N=p.q, hence find ø(N) and then d – determine ø(N) directly and find d – find d directly  currently believe all equivalent to factoring – have seen slow improvements over the years  as of Aug-99 best is 130 decimal digits (512) bit with GNFS – biggest improvement comes from improved algorithm  cf “Quadratic Sieve” to “Generalized Number Field Sieve” – barring dramatic breakthrough 1024+ bit RSA secure  ensure p, q of similar size and matching other constraints CCLAB
  • 29. Timing Attacks  developed in mid-1990’s  exploit timing variations in operations – eg. multiplying by small vs large number – or IF's varying which instructions executed  infer operand size based on time taken  RSA exploits time taken in exponentiation  countermeasures – use constant exponentiation time – add random delays – blind values used in calculations CCLAB
  • 30. Summary  have considered: – – – – – – – CCLAB prime numbers Fermat’s and Euler’s Theorems Primality Testing Chinese Remainder Theorem Discrete Logarithms principles of public-key cryptography RSA algorithm, implementation, security
  • 31. Assignments 1. Perform encryption and decryption using RSA algorithm, as in Figure 1, for the following: a. p = 3; q = 11, e = 7; M = 5 b. p = 5; q = 11, e = 3; M = 9 Encryption Plaintext 88 887 mod 187 = 11 Decryption Ciphertext 11 1123 mod 187 = 88 KU = 7, 187 KR = 23, 187 Figure 1. Example of RSA Algorithm Plaintext 88 2. In a public-key system using RSA, you intercept the ciphertext C = 10 sent to a user whose public key is e = 5, n = 35. What is the plaintext M? CCLAB 31