Iqboljon Qorabayev's presentantion made at the event co-organized by Bilig Brains, Central Asian Studies Center and China & Central Asia Studies Center on December 18, 2017

1. THE BELT & ROAD INITIATIVE AND
CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONALISM
Ikboljon Qoraboyev
Higher School of Economics & Qazaq Institute for
Development Studies, KAZGUU University

2. • This presentation is based on two recent book chapters on
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and it was presented at
the meeting organized by the Bilig Brains in Almaty on
18th December 2017.
❖Qoraboyev I. (2018) One Belt‚ One Road: A Comparative Regionalism Approach.
In: Cheng Y., Song L., Huang L. (eds) The Belt & Road Initiative in the Global
Arena. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore
❖Qoraboyev I., Moldashev K. (2018) The Belt and Road Initiative and
Comprehensive Regionalism in Central Asia. In: Mayer M. (eds) Rethinking the
Silk Road. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore

4. • I- Need for conceptualizing the BRI
• II- Relevance of Comparative Regionalism for studying the
BRI
• III- BRI and Comprehensive Regionalism in Central Asia
• IV- Conclusions

5. I- NEED FOR CONCEPTS

6. • Both China and international community have been
involved in search for analytical and conceptual
frameworks to understand the BRI since its official
launching in 2013.
• Making sense of BRI initiative is subject to most dynamic
debates both in media and scholarly circles.
• Conceptualization and theoretization are important and
needed for future success of BRI

7. • Jia Qingguo: China urgently needs to come to an
understanding of the true meaning of the BRI.
• Nadine Godehart: BRI is China’s most ambitious and
visible foreign policy initiative of the last three years. Still,
BRI is difficult to describe. Explanations often remain
diffuse and vague. The biggest challenge is to use a
language – that works in Chinese as well as in Western
languages.
• Qingguo Jia, “‘Yidai Yilu’ jidai nongqing he lunzheng de ji da wenti,” [One Belt, One Road: Urgent Clarifications and
Discussions of a Few Major Questions] Renmin Luntan, March 28, 2015
• Godehart, N. (2016). No end history: A Chinese alternative concept of international order? SWP Research Paper.

8. What is in the the BRI?
• It lacks a clear definition of
the BRI.
• For Theresa Fallon, “The
precise contours of the
“Belt and Road” initiative
have not been completely
defined. At the moment
the “Belt and Road”
appears to be a versatile
label for China’s foreign
policy in Eurasia”.

9. OUTSIDE-IN
How international community sees the BRI

10. The BRI as a bargaining tool

11. • First, the BRI is seen as instrumental for China to strengthen its
negotiating position in other forums of international politics.
China uses it to push the West to bend to Chinese requests for
increasing its say in global governance. Otherwise, China will
go its own way pushing for further development of its global
tools of leverage like BRI or SCO.
• Shaun Breslin: if reforms of existing structures are not
possible, or slow in emerging then China is prepared to
introduce new structures of governance to coexist
alongside existing ones. The creation of BRICS and the SCO
are both examples of groupings that aim to provide at least
some governance functions in arenas where China can exert
considerable influence.
• Breslin, S. (2016). China’s global goals and roles: Changing the world from second place? Asian Affairs, 47(1)‚ 59–70.

12. BRI as Chinese reaction to US initiatives

13. • Second approach depicts the BRI as a reactionary move by
China to counter comprehensive advances that are being
realized by the US in Asia-Pacific region. Theresa Fallon’s
genealogy of the BRI sums up well this account. Here is her
account of how China came up with BRI initiative:
• “Hillary Clinton first referred publicly to her vision of a “New Silk
Road”, in a speech in Chennai, India on July 20, 2011 […]
Chinese officials were flummoxed to find that she used the term
Silk Road to describe a US policy. According to one Chinese
diplomat, “When the US initiated this we were devastated. We
had long sleepless nights. And after two years, President Xi
proposed a strategic vision of our new concept of Silk Road”.
• Fallon, T. (2015). The new Silk Road Xi Jinping’s grand strategy for Eurasia. American Foreign Policy Interests, 37(3),
140–147.

15. Is it useful in long-term?
• 1) Association of BRI with zero-sum thinking may lead to
increase of skepticism and neglect, a real risk for the success of
BRI as underlined by some Chinese scholars.
• 2) Conception of BRI as a Chinese tool against US or other
great power foreign policy interests will also cause
reluctance/even, resistance on the part of target countries. This
is even more delicate when China needs willing participation of
countries situated along Belt and Road as the BRI is presented
as ‘a systematic project’ which depends on engagement of
countries other than China to succeed.
• 3) More importantly, this exogenous readings of processes
related to BRI will undermine endogenous dynamics and
normative value that it carries for going beyond Western-
centered international relations.
•

16. No to geopolitics: official discourse
• Prospects of geopolitics claiming exclusivity over BRI-
analytics is thus not an outcome desired by its designers.
• Understandably, in March 2015 Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi was felt obliged to reject geopolitical stipulations
by stating that the BRI is ‘the product of inclusive
cooperation, not a tool of geopolitics, and must not be
viewed with an outdated Cold War mentality”

17. INSIDE-OUT
How China presents the BRI to the world

18. China's Vision for the World: A Community of
Shared Future
• China’s vision is based
on three pillars:
• - cooperative security,
• - common
development, and
• - political inclusiveness.

19. A narrative aiming at easing sovereignty concerns and
making forget the ‘Chinese threat’
• The BRI seems to be designed as a practical answer to
decades-long academic and policy discussions around
whether China’s rise a global power would constitute
indeed a ‘Chinese threat’ to the world. The BRI narrative
tries to reject this narrative and replace it with .
• Avoid “strategy” word
• Inclusiveness and flexibility
• Voluntary participation
• Two-way traffic
• International institutional links

20. • For Chinese scholars, the BRI ‘boasts great flexibility,
applicability and operability, I which all countries are equal
participants. Under the principle of voluntary participation
and coordinated progress, all countries carry forward the
ancient Silk Road’s spirit of inclusiveness’.
• This flexibility and inclusive scope helps to ease concerns
for national sovereignty of participating countries and to
avoid disappointment from being excluded.

21. The Belt and Road Initiative: What will China offer the world
in its rise”.
• This is well described by title of Wang
Yiwei’s book which represents the first
comprehensive account of the BRI by
Chinese scholars and is endorsed by the
Central Committee of the CPC.
• It again insists on presenting the BR project
as initiative and it implies that China is ready
to act as responsible actor ready to
contribute positively to several pressing
issues of international community.
• According to Yiwei’s account, the BRI offers
opportunities for regional cooperation;
opportunities for Europe to change the
world; and opportunities for global
development.
• China is not imposing itself, it is just offering
any positive contribution the world needs
and demands to solve problems of
international and regional cooperation.
China is also ready to join Europe-led or
global initiative as part of the realization of
its BRI project.

22. BRI as a powerful narrative
• Picturing of the BRI as a multi-trillion dollar infrastructure
investment project and bulk of them originating from China has
sparked truly global interest in the initiative. Western and even
American companies are exploring opportunities to take part in
this process.
• China has been able to present the BRI in the form of a ‘very
powerful narrative’. International forums are organized regularly
in this perspective.
• Global Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation,
16+1 Forum, China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum or Tbilisi
Belt and Road forum are examples of global and regional
meetings at highest level which contribute to consolidation of
the BRI narrative.
• Asian and Western countries covered by the BRI usually share
the Chinese side’s BRI enthusiasm.

23. • Financial Times reports that ‘with $900bn of planned
investments ranging from ports in Pakistan and Sri Lanka
to high-speed railways in east Africa to gas pipelines
crossing Central Asia, China’s One Belt, One Road project
(Obor) is arguably the largest overseas investment drive
ever launched by a single country’.

24. II- RELEVANCE OF
COMPARATIVE REGIONALISM
Regional premises of the BRI

25. Alternative framework: Regionalism Studies
• Qoraboyev & Moldashev argue that comparative
regionalism studies may well be an apt alternative to
geopolitical readings of BRI.
• The discipline of comparative regionalism studies is
indeed one of main frameworks which endeavor to go
beyond zero-sum thinking to come up with long-term
prospections about socio-political and economic
processes in different parts of the world.

26. Short reminder
• Regionalism was defined as “a state-led or states-led
project designed to reorganize a particular regional space
along defined economic and political lines” (Gamble and
Payne, 1996).
• Regionalism covers both regional integration and regional
cooperation aspects
• As such, this framework is relevant for thee BRI, as it is
meant to transform several regions along the Road and
Belt.
• Gamble, Andrew, and Anthony Payne, eds. Regionalism and world order. London: Macmillan, 1996.
•

27. Regionalism as Lingua Franca
• Nadine Godehart:. The biggest challenge is to use a
language – that works in Chinese as well as in Western
languages.
• Regionalism is the language that resonates with both
China and West: SCO, ASEAN, EU, ASEM, EU-Asia,
etc.

28. Regional premises of BRI
• For President Xi Jinping, who is usually presented as the
leader whose vision was essential in launching of BRI,
building an economic belt along the Silk Road will ‘deepen
cooperation and extend development space in the
Eurasian region’ while 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road will
take China-ASEAN cooperation to new levels.
• According to official position of Chinese government, BRI’s
objective is ‘to promote the connectivity’ of different
regions in Asian, European and African continents and
their adjacent seas.
• “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century
Maritime Silk Road”, issued by National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with
State Council authorisation, March 2015.

29. Regional premises of BRI
• Michael Swain underlines this focus on particular regions
by quoting Chinese sources for whom:
• “Central Asia, Russia, South Asia, and Southeast Asian
countries will be given priority consideration . . . while
Middle Eastern and East African countries are in the
junction” linking the Asian with European countries. The
author adds that over the long term, “Europe, the
Commonwealth of Independent States, and some African
countries may also participate in cooperation.”
• Michale Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the “One Belt, One Road”
Initiative”, China Leadership Monitor, no-47, Summer 2015, p. 6.

32. Objectives sought by BRI: classical regionalism
goals
• Beside geographical scope, objectives outlined by BRI
match well goals traditionally sought by regionalism
• “The initiative […] is aimed at promoting orderly and free
flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of
resources and deep integration of markets; […] and, jointly
creating an open, inclusive and balanced regional
economic cooperation that benefits all”.
•

33. Five factors
• On more deeper level, harmony of BRI is maintained through
‘five links’: unhampered trade, road links, currency circulation,
linked-up policy, and links between people’s hearts.
• This is description given by Michael Swaine. In the official
document, these links are presented with slightly different
wording: policy coordination, interconnectivity, unimpeded
trade, financial integration and people-to-people bond.
• See, Michael Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the “One Belt, One Road”
Initiative”, China Leadership Monitor, no-47, Summer 2015, p. 19.

34. Three generations of regionalism
• Luk van Langenhove and Marchesi elaborated on three
main objectives that are sought by different generations of
contemporary regionalism:
• - economic integration –
• regional governance of public goods
• -regional actorness in international arena.
• While first two objectives are more evident in the list of the
BRI, successful realization of the BRI will surely lead to
increasing importance of several Eurasia and Asian
regional organizations as regional actors in world politics.
• Luk van Langenhove & Daniel Marchesi, “The Lisbon Treaty and the Emergence of third
generation regional integration”, European journal of law reform. Vol. 10, no-4, 2008, pp. 477-
496.

35. Regional mechanisms mentioned within the BRI
framework
• The same document lists several regional cooperation
instruments among mechanisms for realization of BRI:
SCO, ASEAN, APEC, ASEM or CAREC.

36. Functional and physical regions
• Raimo Vayrynen distinguishes between two different types
of regions: physical region and functional regions.
• “physical regions refer to territorial, military, and economic
spaces controlled primarily by states. Functional regions
are defined by non-territorial factors as culture and the
market that are often the purview of non-state actors”.
• Raimo Väyrynen, “Regionalism: Old and New”, International Studies Review, 2003, n° 5, pp. 25-51.

37. BRI as physical/functional region
• First, it is based on physical notion of region. This is because it
aims to link together several physical regions, like Central Asia,
Southeast Asia or Europe.
• BRI depends also on willing cooperation of states which control
these spaces. The relevance of physical regions for BRI is thus
evident.
• However, it is not merely about linking several physical regions.
• Long-term perspective of BRI is to consolidate further these
linkages and to create a functional region, or even a mega-
region. Because, when unfolded completely, BRI will “connect
countries that represent 55 percent of World GNP, 70 percent of
global population, and 75 percent of known energy reserves”. In
another account, Beijing has estimated that the ‘Belt and Road’
will eventually reach 4.4 billion people in more than 65
countries.

38. BRI as physical/functional region
• What will BRI as a functional region aim to accomplish? It
aims to form an extended space of interconnectivity,
unimpeded trade and financial integration as well as a
common space where people-to-people bonds are
consolidated. It will be apt for realization of large-scale
investment projects across countries along BRI. Most
importantly, it wants to become main vehicle for integrating
development strategies of involved countries. In the long
term, will it be able to realize a “region of harmony, peace
and prosperity”, the idea which is behind other projects
sponsored by China, like SCO.

39. • If BRI succeeds its take-off on these premises, many
target countries may well be willing to join in. One
compelling reason may be that BRI projects will help forge
new regional identities along the ‘Road and Belt’.

40. Regional identity vs. Region’s identity
• One of prominent contributions in this perspective is definitely the work on
Annsi Paasi. For him, regional identity is a key element in the making of
regions as social and political spaces.
• “it is useful to distinguish analytically between the identity of a region and the
regional identity of the people living in it or outside of it. […] Regional
identity is, in a way, an interpretation of the process through which a region
becomes institutionalized, a process consisting of the production of territorial
boundaries, symbolism and institutions. [while], identity of region points to
those features of nature, culture and people that are used in the discourses
and classifications of science, politics, cultural activism, regional marketing,
governance and political or religious regionalization to distinguish one region
from others. These classifications are always acts of power performed in order
to delimit, name, and symbolize space and groups of people. Regional
consciousness points to the multiscalar identification of people with those
institutional practices, discourses and symbolisms that are expressive of those
‘structures of expectations’ that become institutionalized as parts of the
process that we call a ‘region”.
• Anssi Paasi, Region and place: regional identity in question, Progress in
Human geography 27, 4 (2003) pp. 475-485.

41. Search for new regional identities
• Many countries along Road and Belt have already been
searching for new regional identities:
• - Central Asia
• - Africa
• Reason: regional identities were mainly forged through
outside-in processes. And, they still continue to be shaped
more from the outside than inside.

42. • From this perspective, target countries and regions of BRI
will engage with the Chinese initiative with enthusiasm if
they are convinced of successful take-off and completion
of it. They would prefer to be perceived, from the outside,
as parts of dynamic space of BRI and thus acquire new
‘clean’ regional identities.

43. III- CENTRAL ASIA AND BRI
Comprehensive regionalism in making?

44. Need for local ownership of the BRI
• The BRI needs local ownerships to succeed. Local
ownership emerges when China listens to target countries,
solicit their views and incorporate their them into future
plans and projections around the BRI. This kind of
interactions may lead to supplant the view of China as sole
owner and beneficiary of the initiative with a view that the
BRI is truly international project

45. • Tommy Koh from Singapore proposed three suggestions
to the Chinese in order to increase chances of success of
the BR:
• “First, China should work harder to explain its proposal and to gain the
understanding and trust of China's neighbours. […] Second, China should
adopt an open and inclusive approach. All countries should be welcome to
participate and no country should be excluded. Third, China should listen to
the region. It should sincerely solicit the views of the countries of the region
and be prepared to take them into account in future iterations of the proposal.
The best outcome is for the proposal to evolve from being seen as a Chinese
project to being the region's project. It is desirable for China to obtain the
region's ownership of the proposal”.

46. Elements for ensuring local ownership in Central
Asia
• For the BRI to succeed in Central
Asia, it has to consider three
important factors to attract support
of domestic actors in the region.
Three crucial factors can be
identified as:
• (1) political independence,
• (2) economic opportunity,
• and (3) a stable security situation.
• The first factor of political
independence requires from any
regionalism project or an external
actor that the sovereignty of
individual Central Asian states
must be respected.
• The second factor of economic
opportunity is a core of the BR
and it is supported by a vast inflow
of Chinese investment into Central
Asian states that started long
before the announcement of this
initiative.
• The third factor that determines
the outcome of regionalism
initiatives in Central Asia is their
contribution to regional security
and stability.

47. Conclusions
• We can view the BRI and Central Asian states’ responses to it
as comprehensive regionalism project with multiple dimensions.
• For the BRI to be successful in Central Asia, it should follow
comprehensive regionalism logic and motivate voluntary
involvement of targeted states through the provision of an
inclusive framework for cooperation.
• This is necessitated by the fact that Central Asian policy-makers
and opinion leaders are not ready to decide among the different
priorities needed to ensure socio-economic coherence and
political independence in the region.
• The BRI thus needs to adopt a multidimensional approach as
political, economic, or societal challenges are intertwined in the
regional context

48. • One of the priorities for the BRI should be the respect and
comprehension around concerns of political
independence, aspirations for economic development, and
the need for security and stability.
• For Central Asian countries, these three factors are
equally important and they cannot be considered
separately from each other.