China - Latin America Relations

1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OF LATIN AMERICA
Topic 5
Extra-Regional Actors
China - Latin America Relations
Dr. Jacqueline LAGUARDIA MARTINEZ
Jacqueline.Laguardia-Martinez@sta.uwi.edu

2. China and Latin America
relationship
What do we know?

3. https://geology.com/world/china-map.gif

4. People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s in the world
• The People’s Republic of China (PRC), commonly called China, was
admitted into the UN in 1971. It holds a permanent seat in the Security
Council
• 1972: China-US relations
• 1989: China-USSR relations
• 1980’s: Promotion of Special Economic Zone (SEZ)
• 1997: Recovery of Hong Kong
• 1999: Recovery of Macao
• 2001: Entry to the WTO. More economic reforms
• 2001: President Jiang Zemin visited Latin America
• 2013: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

5. Economic reforms in China
• Reforms in 1970´s under Deng Xiaoping
• Four modernizations: agriculture, industry, science and technology,
defense
• Counter-agrarian reform: (de)collectivization and semi-privatization; land
lease permit can be transferred; rural workers can be hired;
commercialization of the “surplus” over the plan is allowed
• Special Economic Zones (1979-1980)
• Re-entry to the IMF and WB
• Reforms in 1993: Socialist market economy
• 2000’s: private property is legally recognized

6. China as a global player
• World’s Countries with the Biggest Forex Reserves (USD $3,222.4 billion as of
November 2021).
• China holds more than $1 trillion of the U.S. national debt. That's a large portion
of the $7.6 trillion in Treasury bills, notes, and bonds held by foreign countries.
The rest is owned by either people in the U.S. or by the U.S. government itself
(https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-debt-to-china-how-much-does-it-own-
3306355 )
• Yuan us used as reserve currency in around 50 Central Banks (de-dollarization).
• Second/third largest global issuer of FDI flows.

7. https://blogs.imf.org/2021/12/16/the-worlds-top-recipients-of-foreign-direct-investment/
World’s Top Recipients of Foreign Direct Investment

8. https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest-military-spending/
Countries with the highest military spending worldwide in 2020
(in billion U.S. dollars)

9. https://www.visualcapitalist.com/china-consumes-mind-boggling-amounts-of-raw-materials-chart/
In 2015

10. Variation of China’s energy mix
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319021334_Natural_gas_and_energy_revolution_A_case_study_of_Sichuan-Chongqing_gas_province/figures?lo=1

11. https://www.bbc.com/news/58956714

12. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/chart-of-the-day-these-countries-have-the-largest-carbon-footprints/

13. https://www.statista.com/chart/8301/the-countries-holding-the-worlds-nuclear-arsenal/

14. Key domestic problems
• Urban population represents almost 60% (of which more than 25% live in
precarious conditions).
• Life expectancy of almost 77 years.
• Rising inequality. Gini coefficient around 0.48.
• Inequality between regions.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EsDZPOwgygE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-CZrIz1g6M

15. China’s Foreign Policy
• Refusal to IR Realism approaches
(not to seek hegemony by
violent domination).
• Promotion for a more just
multilateral order, peace and
harmonious development of all
nations. More inclined to IR
Liberalism.
• Foreign Policy based on the Five
Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence.
• Request to counterparts to
recognize the “One China”
principle.
The Five Principles
(the Sino–Indian Agreement 1954)
1. mutual respect for each other's territorial
integrity and sovereignty
2. mutual non-aggression
3. mutual non-interference in each other's
internal affairs
4. equality and co-operation for mutual
benefit
5. peaceful co-existence

16. “One China” policy
In 2004, the phrase was coined by Joshua
Cooper Ramo to frame China’s development
model as an alternative to the Washington
Consensus.
Applied to foreign policy, it means:
1. Business based on the interests of the
parties and without generic or principled
conditionalities
2. Friendship, cooperation, and mutual
respect.
3. Structural development
4. Infrastructure, economic development, and
then social and civic affairs.
5. Respect for each country's internal policies
The Beijing Consensus
• There is only one sovereign state under
the name China.
• Taiwan is a part of China.
• In LAC, the following countries have
diplomatic relations with Taiwan:
1. Belize
2. Guatemala
3. Haiti
4. Honduras
5. Paraguay
6. Saint Kitts and Nevis
7. Saint Lucia
8. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

17. China’s South-South cooperation
1.Trade
2.Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
3.Loans
4.Grants
5.Financing of infrastructural development
“ the Chinese model of engagement is attractive for a number of
reasons, including cost, speed of execution and lack of political
meddling in exchange for loans or infrastructure ” (World Politics
Review, 2015).

18. Major principles of China’s foreign policy
1. Promoting cooperation with other countries in all fields
based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
2. Participating in multilateral affairs by supporting the United
Nations, the G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
BRICS, and other multilateral organizations.
3. Advocating peaceful settlement of international and regional
disputes, rejecting all forms of hegemonism and power
politics, and refraining from interfering in other countries’
internal affairs.
4. Encouraging public diplomacy as well as people-to-people
and cultural exchanges.
Outlined by Hu Jintao at the 18th Communist Party of China (CPC) Congress, 2012

19. https://www.cadtm.org/A-critical-look-at-China-s-One-Belt-One-Road-initiative

20. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china%E2%80%99s-string-of-pearls-strategy/

21. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lRHvHA1LMZk
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4bZ1rpCGt8
To watch

22. Narratives about China and China – Latin America relationship
• China as an emerging economy
• China as a developing economy part of the “Global South”
• China as LA strategic partner
• China as a counter-hegemonic actor vis-à-vis the US
• China as a modern imperialism to colonize Latin America (Sino-dependency)
• China aspires to rule the world based in its economic and demographic domination
• Chinese goods have poor quality
• China promotes unfair business practices
• China pollutes and harms the environment
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UuTzcwO9sVo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rolH5mrGcb4
Threat or opportunity?

23. Sino-Latin American relations in five stages
since the founding of the PRC in 1949 (Xiaoping, 2015)
1. 1949-1969: People-to-people relations. Due to the U.S. hostility against China and the ideological prejudice of
LA governments, China had only diplomatic relations with Cuba. Relations were limited to people-to-people
(commercial) relations, unofficial circles. The China-Latin America Friendship Association was created in 1960.
2. 1970-1978: Boom in the establishment of diplomatic relations. As relations between China and the United
States thawed, there was a boom in the establishment of China’s diplomatic relations: Mexico, Chile, Peru,
Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil (Mexican President Luis Echeverria’s speech before the United Nations in 1971,
which argued for the expulsion of Taiwan and the admission of China in its place, rallied the vote for China’s
entry into the UN later that same year).
3. 1978-1992: Expansion of relations. ‘Reform and Opening’ since 1978 and the readjustment of its policy towards
Latin America, China expanded its relations with the countries of the region.
4. 1993-2000: Building strategic cooperation relations. In 1993, China established strategic cooperation relations
with Brazil, beginning the building of a framework of cooperation with LA by expanding mutual interests and
spheres of cooperation.
5. 2000 - : Rapid development in depth and breadth. “Go Out” strategy since 1999. Rise in meetings between
presidents both during official visits and meetings in the framework of multilateral events such as the G20,
APEC, BRICS. China has established high-level governmental commissions and strategic dialogue mechanisms as
a political consultation mechanism with LA foreign ministers as well as with subregional organizations such as
Mercosur, the Andean Community, CELAC.

24. China – Latin America relationship
• Asymmetries.
• Latin America is a mosaic of countries whose international behaviors have varying degrees of
relative autonomy.
• China’s advances are facilitated by the vacuum left by the United States in LA (more attention to
the Indo-Pacific area). However, the gravitation of the U.S. in Latin America's foreign and domestic
policy is much more relevant than that of China even if China’s rise has helped LA to diversify its
relations and reduced the political and economic influence of the United States : Latin America
seems caught in a triangular dynamic: US-China-LA.
• Ideological variables are not the main driver to understand LA-China relationship but political
culture and values matter (East vs. West; liberal democracy vs. State-centralism).
• Economic, cultural, political, diplomatic and military factors impact on how China understands its
policy towards Latin America.
• Chinese/Asian migration in LA.
• In a region as LA already characterized by hyper presidentialism, China is indirectly eroding the
checks and balances on executive power (corruption).

25. China and LAC % in World Goods Trade (Prazeres et al. 2021)

26. https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/how-latin-america-can-navigate-the-china-us-trade-wars/

27. https://china.usc.edu/investing-latin-america

28. https://china.usc.edu/investing-latin-america

29. China’s Share of LAC Imports, 2016
(Koleski et al., 2018)

30. (Koleski et al., 2018)
Share of LAC Exports to China, 2016

31. https://china.usc.edu/investing-latin-america

32. https://china.usc.edu/investing-latin-america

33. https://china.usc.edu/investing-latin-america

34. FTA and BIT China-LA countries
• 2006: Chile FTA
• 2008: Chile (Services agreement)
• 2010: Peru FTA (Custom cooperation
agreements and labor agreement)
• 2011: Costa Rica FTA (Investment
Promotion and Protection Agreement in
2016)
• FTA in negotiation: Colombia, Panama,
Uruguay
• Lack of FTA: Mexico, Argentina and Brazil
Traditional trade patterns
NEOEXTRACTIVISM – REPRIMARIZATION – RECOMMODIFICATION
Infrastructure and support services
• 1992: Argentina BIT
• 1992: Bolivia BIT
• 1993: Uruguay BIT
• 1994: Chile BIT
• 1994: Peru BIT
• 1994: Ecuador BIT
• 1995: Cuba BIT
• 2007: Costa Rica BIT
• 2008: Colombia BIT
• 2008: Mexico BIT
• 2014: Chile BIT

35. China: Free Trade Agreements with Chile, Peru And Costa Rica, by Chapter
(Rosales and Kuwayama, 2012)

36. China: Free Trade Agreements with Chile, Peru And Costa Rica, by Chapter
(Rosales and Kuwayama, 2012)

37. (Koleski et al., 2018)
Share and Composition of Chilean, Brazilian, and Peruvian Exports to
China, 2006, 2011, and 2016

38. https://china.usc.edu/investing-latin-america
• Since 2005, the China Development Bank and China Export-Import Bank have loaned more than
US$137 billion to Latin American and Caribbean countries and state-owned firms.
• Venezuela has received the most, with 17 loans totalling $US62 billion (US$55 billion into energy
projects).
• Brazil is the second largest recipient with US$29 billion in loans (US$26 billion into energy).

39. (Koleski et al., 2018)
Chinese Financing to Latin America by Industry and by Country, 2005–2017

40. By Enrique Dussel Peters, Jan. 25, 2021
• Since 2005 up to 2018, Chinese state policy banks have provided over $150 billion in
loans to the region, exceeding the combined lending from the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank and the CAF Development Bank.
• Chinese firms have participated in 91 LAC infrastructure projects.
(Koleski et al., 2018)

41. High Biodiversity Areas, Indigenous Territory, and Chinese Investment
(Ray and Gallagher, 2015)

42. https://twitter.com/theeiu/status/1387753545378762753

43. LAC population fully and partially vaccinated, 31 December 2021
(% of the total population)
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/47719/1/S2100654_en.pdf

44. Latin America for China
• Expand economic ties by access to raw materials and larger markets for exports.
• Asserting the principle of “One China”.
• Add support to its projection as a major global player that defends multilateralism and
promotes South-South cooperation.
China for Latin America
• A partner with the capacity to provide funds for development projects and investments, while
diversifying trade and financial ties.
• China, by identifying itself as a developing country belonging to the global South, is perceived as a
spokesperson for multilateralism capable of promoting the interests of less developed countries.
• It counterbalances the dependence on the United States and the former European colonial powers.
• China is not part of the group of countries with a colonizing past in the region.
• China’s policy of neutrality, non-interference in domestic affairs and absence of ideological
conditioning factors.
• China as market for LA products (more Chinese consumers)

45. How China Ranks Its Partners in LAC (The Dialogue, 2021)
• Comprehensive Strategic
Partnerships: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, Venezuela.
Brazil’s stands out from the rest as the
first-ever “strategic partnership” to be
established by China, back in November
1993, followed by Ukraine in 1995.
• Strategic Partnerships: Bolivia, Uruguay,
Costa Rica and Ecuador.
• LAC countries have special designations
not shared by any other country in the
world: Cuba and Trinidad & Tobago.
• China’s partnership system reflects
Beijing’s historical rejection of security-
based alliances. https://www.thedialogue.org/blogs/2021/02/how-china-ranks-its-partners-in-lac/

46. China’s Partnership with LAC Countries (up to 2015) (Shixue, 2015)

47. • 2001: President Jiang Zemin visited Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Uruguay, and Venezuela
• 2002: President Jiang Zemin visited Mexico
• 2004: President Hu Jintao visited Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Cuba
• 2005: President Hu Jintao visited Mexico
• 2008: President Hu Jintao visited Costa Rica, Cuba, and Peru
• 2008: First official policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean
• 2009: Vice-president Xi Jinping visited Brazil, Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela
• 2010: President Hu Jintao visited Brazil
• 2011: Vice-president Xi Jinping visited Chile, Cuba, and Uruguay
• 2013: President Xi Jinping visited Mexico, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago (to meet with eight Caribbean leaders)
• 2014: President Xi Jinping visited Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Cuba (VI BRICS Summit in Fortaleza and Brasília)
• 2016: Second official policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean
• 2016: President Xi Jinping visited Ecuador, Peru and Chile (APEC Forum Summit in Lima)
• 2018: President Xi Jinping visited Argentina and Panama (G20 Summit in Buenos Aires)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=chyegY6Q-BE
China’s high-level visits to LAC countries in the 21st century

48. New multilateralism based on South-South cooperation in LA
China partnerships and provided loans and/or other funding are:
• Inter-American Development Bank as non-borrowing member since 2009
• Caribbean Development Bank as non-borrowing member
• CAF Development Bank of Latin America
• Observer in the Pacific Alliance since 2013, Latin American trade bloc formed by Chile,
Colombia, Mexico and Peru
• Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay
• Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): Chile, Peru and Mexico
• BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) since 2015
• BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement since 2015 to provide protection against global
liquidity pressures
• Observer status at the Organization of American States (OAS) since 2004

49. Key CELAC meetings and actions in the dialogue with China
Year CELAC – China meetings
2012 • Establishment of a Dialogue Mechanism with the Foreign Ministers of the CELAC Troika.
2013
2014 • Launching of the China – CELAC Forum during the China – Latin America and Caribbean
Summit, Brasilia.
• Launching of the China – Latin American and the Caribbean Cooperation Plan 2015-2019.
2015 • First Ministerial Meeting of the China – CELAC Forum, Beijing.
• China-CELAC Cooperation Plan (2015-2019).
2016
2017 • First High-Level China – CELAC Academic Forum, ECLAC headquarters in Santiago de Chile.
2018 • Second Ministerial Meeting of the China – CELAC Forum, Santiago de Chile.
• Announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative, Santiago de Chile.
• Launching of the China-CELAC Cooperation Plan (2019-2021).
2019 • Seventh Dialogue of Foreign Ministers of China and the Quartet, UN headquarters, NY.
2020 • Launching of the Cyber Secretariat of the China – CELAC Forum (online).
2021 • Third Ministerial Meeting of the China – CELAC Forum (online).
• Second High-Level China – CELAC Academic Forum (online).
• Launching of the China –CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2022-2024).

50. China – CELAC Forum
• For China to develop its relationship with all the countries in the region, whether if
they have diplomatic relations with China or not, and beyond their ideological
differences.
• To contribute to a broad and comprehensive coordination on global governance
• China has developed some coordination and cooperation with Brazil, Argentina,
and Mexico within the framework of BRICS, the UN, the WTO.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AekZisACy48

51. New multilateralism based on South-South cooperation in LA
People-to-people exchanges in politics, media, and educational exchanges
• Around 40 Confucius Institutes and a dozen of Confucius classrooms in Latin America
• Government scholarships to study in China
• Cultural agreements
• More than one hundred pairs of sister city and sister province relationships
• Sending artists to Latin America and organizing cultural exhibitions
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VWMoql5SPHg

52. LAC votes at the UNGA (Piconne, 2017)

53. China’s military engagement in Latin America
• Military sales and exchanges of items like transport aircraft and anti-tank missiles.
• Increase on sales in the last two decades of more sophisticated equipment such as
aircraft, radar, and air-to-air missiles to Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina.
• Military exercises, trainings, forums, and humanitarian missions, including Chinese naval
participation in the 2014 and 2016 Rim of the Pacific exercises organized by the U.S.
Pacific Command alongside navies from Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru.
• As a nuclear-free zone, Latin America stands apart from China in its strong advocacy of
nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation and arms control agreements.
• In 2004, for the first time in history, the Chinese government sent police forces to the
Western Hemisphere to participate in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUNTAH), pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1529/04 and 1542/04.

54. (Koleski et al., 2018)
China’s Personnel Exchanges and Military Exercises with LAC
2003–2016

55. (Koleski et al., 2018)
China’s Arms Sales to LAC Countries, 2007–2017

56. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OM3dG_8Oxyk&list=PLPNnLfxJ2ybA6rP-_-v9BYSU-9JfSWlFb&index=3
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjNiulXIBVc&list=PLPNnLfxJ2ybA6rP-_-v9BYSU-9JfSWlFb&index=7
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=40LKTfN7PNs&list=PLPNnLfxJ2ybA6rP-_-v9BYSU-9JfSWlFb&index=8
China’s Outer Space Cooperation with Latin America (Klinger, 2018)
• For China and various Latin American states, outer space is a critical site for national
development, in which the projection of sovereignty and geopolitical power serves as a
democratizing mechanism in global fields of science, technology, and strategy.
• Space cooperation enabled to independently develop satellites and generate Earth
observation data without relying on the United States, Russia or the EU for imagery
essential to monitoring weather, environmental changes, and territories.
• Outer space cooperation among Latin American and Chinese counterparts is viewed as
essential to fulfilling multiple development and diplomatic agendas.
• Neither Costa Rica nor Colombia currently cooperate on outer space with China,
despite partnerships in other sectors.

57. Major Latin American Space Agreements with China (Klinger, 2018)

60. US-China (Beckley, 2012)
• US (strategic?) decline: history of world politics can be characterized as a “succession of
hegemonies,” as the recurrent “rise and fall of the great powers,” as an “observable pattern of
great power emergence,” or as a series of “long cycles.” The Habsburg, French, and British
Empires were defeated and surpassed by rising challengers. It is therefore natural for America’s
“unipolar moment” to be similarly consigned to the ash-heap of history.
• But: The United States is not like Britain; rather, its “combination of quantitative and
qualitative material advantages is unprecedented, and it translates into a unique geopolitical
position.” Moreover, China is not like past rising challengers; “its emergence is occurring in the
context of a transformation in the manner in which production is organized, a shift that makes
China’s rise categorically different from that of predecessors such as Germany, Japan, and
South Korea.”
Since 2006: The mechanism for China-U.S. consultation meeting on Latin American affairs.
It is part of the part of bilateral consultation mechanism for regional issues under the
framework of China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue.