One Belt One Road Greater Mekong Subregion-Economic Corridors and Myanmar

16 | The Region
The Newsletter | No.74 | Summer 2016
News from Northeast Asia continued
One Belt, One Road strategy and Korean-Chinese
cooperation
Tai Hwan Lee
One Belt, One Road: a Japanese perspective
Hidehito Fujiwara
THE ASIAN Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was
established under the leadership of China for the purpose
of putting into reality the country’s economic vision of One
Belt, One Road. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration
has been consistently skeptical about the AIIB, pointing
to the lack of transparency in its management and financing,
as well as other issues. Even Vietnam and the Philippines, who
are in a harsh territorial conflict with China in the South China
Sea, joined the AIIB along with European powers; but Japan,
keeping in step with the US, has chosen to stay out.
However, given Japan’s position in Asia, its continuous
dismissive attitude to the One Belt, One Road initiative may
hurt the country’s economic interests and even diminish
its presence as a major power in the region. In fact, from
an economic standpoint, it makes more sense for Japan to
welcome One Belt, One Road. The reason why the Japanese
government has failed to do so lies in its strained relationship
with China.
Japan has been suffering from an economic depression
for a long time. In contrast, China, despite the shadows cast
on its growth these days, has already grown to become the
world’s second largest economic superpower, and its military
CHINA’S ONE BELT, ONE ROAD (一帶一路, land- and
sea-based Silk Road) strategy is part of the country’s
grand strategy for realizing the Chinese dream of the
‘great national rejuvenation’. Achievement of the world’s
second largest GDP in 2010 boosted China’s confidence,
and the Xi Jinping administration put forward a new foreign
strategy of dimensions completely different from those
of the past. Looking ahead to the next 35 years until the
hundredth anniversary of New China in 2049, the initiative
seeks to create a new growth engine by developing
infrastructure and increasing trade along the land- and
sea-based Silk Road, linking Asia with Europe and Africa.
The idea of the Silk Road Economic Belt (絲綢之路經濟帶)
was first mentioned by Secretary Xi during his visit to Kazak-
hstan in September 2013 and developed into his proposal,
in Indonesia in October of the same year, to jointly build
a Maritime Silk Road. On 28 March 2015, China’s National
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce together released
a detailed plan for the strategy implementation, titled
“Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic
Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”.
The strategic intentions behind the initiative are to satisfy
the demand of neighboring countries by utilizing China’s
foreign reserves of 4 trillion USD, to resolve the problem of
overproduction of steel and cement in China through trade,
and to expand China’s global influence in concert with over 60
nations of the Silk Road. The demand in neighboring countries
for the construction of infrastructure (social overhead capital)
facilities through loans is enormous. It is estimated that in
Asia alone the demand for infrastructure development until
2020 will amount to 8 trillion USD and the investment in
transportation infrastructure in the regions beyond Asia will
total 5 trillion USD. To bring the One Belt, One Road initiative
into fruition, China created the 40 billion USD ‘Silk Road Fund’
in 2014 and led the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB). The investment of a large part of China’s
4 trillion USD foreign reserves into infrastructure develop-
ment is expected to facilitate the use of yuan internationally
and contribute to its advancement to the rank of one of the
key currencies in the world.
Another important strategic objective is energy security.
To China, securing energy is crucial for continuous growth.
For this reason, “Vision and Actions” clearly states that com-
munication in procuring and transporting energy is a major
goal of the One Belt, One Road strategy. It is worth pointing
out that the plan calls for increased cooperation in the
connectivity of energy infrastructure and sets forth “work
in concert to ensure the security of oil and gas pipelines and
other transport routes”. China’s dependence on foreign oil
and gas is so high that the document refers to it as “security
of oil and gas transport routes”. 80 percent of crude oil
imports, 50 percent of natural gas imports, and 42.6 percent
of the entire imports and exports of the country are trans-
ported through the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, obtaining
reliable transport routes and diversifying transport routes
by procuring oil and natural gas from the energy-rich Central
Asian region through the construction of the land-based
Silk Road is of critical importance to China’s energy security.
From this perspective, the Silk Road Economic Belt and
Maritime Silk Road projects can be likened to two wing axes
of the rising China.
The success or failure of the initiative will ultimately
depend on the progress in China’s relations with its neigh-
bors. Although the initiative is welcomed in the Asian and
African countries with high demand for infrastructure
development, the US and other great powers along with
a number of regional players are concerned that China
is using this opportunity to expand its sphere of influence.
Several nations, including the US, Japan, and India, regard
One Belt, One Road as a Chinese solo performance rather
than a choral performance and are wary of it.
Especially worthy of observation is the reaction of the
US. During her tour of four countries in Central Asia in 2011,
then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed building a
New Silk Road economic zone by investing in the countries of
the region in order to increase the American influence there.
The Chinese strategy can be seen as countering that plan.
There is also an opinion that One Belt, One Road is not intended
to directly challenge the US policy of rebalancing Asia, but to
thwart it indirectly by expanding China’s sphere of influence.
At the time of establishing the AIIB, the US assessed it as an
attempt to build a new financial order led by China and, to foil
the plan, took a stand opposing membership in the bank by
American allies and countries of Western Europe. The US failed,
however, as the UK, Germany, France, South Korea, Australia,
and other countries joined the AIIB. The subsequent change
in US attitude – the welcoming remarks and promises of
cooperation by the Governor of the World Bank and expression
of support by Washington – is a positive sign. Nevertheless, we
have yet to see how American-Chinese relations over the issue
unfold in the future, since building an international political and
economic order is a long process and the One Belt, One Road
initiative is no more than a step toward it.
Recognizing such concerns, Beijing emphasized in the
“Vision and Action” implementation plan (made public at the
Boao Forum in March 2015) that One Belt, One Road is not
China’s version of the Marshall Plan but a strategy of mutually-
beneficial regional cooperation evolving through joint efforts
of participating nations. In reality, for One Belt, One Road to
succeed, it needs support of not only neighboring developing
countries but developed countries as well. Given that the
number of neighboring nations in the initiative exceeds
60 countries with a total population of 4.4 billion people
(63 percent of the world’s population) and an economic scale
amounting to 29 percent of the global economy, the strategy
can hardly succeed in the format of a Chinese solo perfor-
mance. Secretary Xi Jinping himself emphasized in his keynote
speech at the Boao Forum that the programs of development
“will be a real chorus” and “not a solo for China itself.”
Korea, too, hopes that the initiative is realized as a chorus.
What effect will the joint implementation of One Belt, One
Road have on the Korean Peninsula and how will South Korea
and China cooperate? There is no doubt that the initiative
provides economic opportunities for the Korean Peninsula
and Northeast Asia. According to the “Vision and Actions” plan,
three northeastern provinces (Liaoning, Jilin, and Jeilongjiang)
are to become sea-land ‘windows’ linking Russia, Mongolia, and
other areas in the Far East. In this light, there are many points
for cooperation with the Eurasia Initiative of the Korean govern-
ment and ways in which One Belt, One Road can contribute to
building a Northeast Asian economic zone.
One of the key projects of the Eurasia Initiative is the
construction of the Silk Road Express with a trans-Korea
railway and transcontinental railroads as its basic axes, to
promote peace on the Korean Peninsula. China is already
pushing forward with or examining several business projects
related to transportation infrastructure – such as roads and
railways – in North Korea, so there is the possibility of South
Korea’s participation in those projects. However, with the
relationship between South and North Korea strained by
North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, the Silk Road Express
remains an unattainable dream.
Nevertheless, both South Korea and China have the will
to connect One Belt, One Road and the Eurasia Initiative.
Even if the construction of a trans-Korea railway cannot
be realized due to the North Korean nuclear development
problem, there are many other ways for South Korean-
Chinese cooperation. Korea can take part not only in building
infrastructure in developing countries but also join efforts
with China in distribution, development of resources and new
industries. Such cooperation is beneficial to both parties,
but it is also desirable for the future of Northeast Asia because
it contributes to creating a regional economic zone.
To summarize, One Belt, One Road is China’s grand
strategy for the next 35 years, which envisions building
a Datong (大同, Great Unity) society in Asia. Its success is
indispensable for the attainment of the Chinese dream as
propagated by Secretary Xi Jinping. China estimates that
it will take the strategy at least 8 to 10 years to bear fruit.
For One Belt, One Road to be successful in the three north-
eastern provinces and the Korean Peninsula during that
period, the most desirable and necessary task is achieving
unification of the peninsula through the joint efforts of
Korea and China. I hope the sound of the One Belt, One
Road chorus spreads loud and wide across Northeast Asia.
Tai Hwan Lee, Director of Center for Chinese Studies,
Sejong Institute (thlee@sejong.org)
presence is also increasing. Consequently, the Japanese are
starting to doubt the sense of superiority they felt over China
for many years after the end of World War II. The antagonism
over the perception of history, the Senkaku Islands, and other
issues cannot be ignored, either. According to the “Survey of
Public Opinion on Foreign Relations” released by the Cabinet
Office on 12 March 2016, the percentage of respondents who
had “no positive feelings” toward China recorded the highest
value since 1978: 83.2 percent.
During the first Abe administration, Prime Minister Abe
agreed with his Chinese counterpart on the need to build a
mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic
interests between the two countries. At the time, he received
high praise from the Chinese. However, after the Liberal
Democratic Party’s (LDP) landslide victory in the 2012 general
election and Abe’s return to office, Japanese-Chinese relations
froze due to his visits to Yasukuni Shrine and his demonstra-
tion of a defiant attitude toward China. Afterward, the Abe
administration joined the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) and announced an independent plan to provide
110 billion USD in aid for Asian infrastructure projects
– an amount that exceeds the capitalization of the AIIB.
By maintaining a posture of unmasked defiance
toward China, the Abe administration is garnering support
from many Japanese who feel no affinity toward China.
On the other hand, in the aforementioned survey, 73.3
percent of the respondents agreed that “the development
of Japanese-Chinese relations is important for the
Asia-Pacific region”. In other words, they consider relations
with China as essential, even if they don’t have positive
feelings toward the country.
China evaluates positively the leading role that Japan
has played in regional economic cooperation in Asia and
is requesting Japanese participation and support for the
One Belt, One Road initiative and the AIIB. China wants
to learn from the expertise Japan has acquired throughout
the years. In this situation, Japan should not turn its
back on China but start cooperating in feasible areas.
That is the way to build a mutually beneficial strategic
relationship.
Hidehito Fujiwara (藤原秀人),
Journalist, Asahi Shimbun (朝日新聞社国際報道部記者).
(fujiwara-h@asahi.com)

10/6/2017 Japan and 'One Belt, One Road' | The Japan Times
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/06/24/editorials/japan-one-belt-one-road/#.WdcqilSCwdU 1/5
OPINION
EDITORIALS
Japan and ‘One Belt, One Road’
JUN 24, 2017ARTICLE HISTORY
Reversing his position, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has indicated that Japan is ready to cooperate with China’s “One Belt, One Road”
(OBOR) initiative for cross-continental infrastructure development under certain conditions. He is also now willing to consider Japan
joining the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) — of which Japan, along with the United States, sat out when it
was set up in 2015 — once doubts about its governance and operation are cleared. While these shifts may be motivated by concerns that
Tokyo could be left behind as Beijing and Washington move closer in trying to restrain North Korea, it’s time that Japan also take steps to
rebuild its strained ties with China, and cooperating with the Chinese initiatives should be a good start.
After Tokyo nationalized the disputed Senkaku Islands in 2012, relations with China plunged to their lowest point since the two
countries normalized ties in 1972. China’s aggressive maritime posture in the South China Sea, such as its large-scale construction of
islands in disputed areas, have added to bilateral tensions. Efforts toward rebuilding the frigid ties have been slow, and top-level
contacts remain sporadic.
In a speech in Tokyo earlier this month, Abe lauded the OBOR initiative — put forth by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 to
facilitate massive investments that would connect a land-based economic belt modeled on the ancient Silk Road and a maritime
corridor stretching from China to Southeast Asia, India, Africa and Europe — as having the “potential to connect East and West as well
as diverse regions found in between.”
Abe said Tokyo is “ready to extend cooperation” with the initiative on condition it will be in “harmony with a free and fair trans-Pacific
economic zone,” that the infrastructure to be built will “be open to use by all” and “developed through procurement that is transparent
and fair,” and that the projects will “be economically viable and financed by debt that can be repaid, and not harm the soundness of the
debtor nations’ finances.”
Abe’s remarks followed his dispatch of Toshihiro Nikai, secretary-general of the Liberal Democratic Party and known as a leading pro-
China figure within the LDP, to a major international conference that Xi organized in Beijing in mid-May to promote the OBOR
initiative. In his meeting with Xi, Nikai hand-delivered an Abe letter calling for mutual visits by top leaders of the two countries. Xi
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10/6/2017 Japan and 'One Belt, One Road' | The Japan Times
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/06/24/editorials/japan-one-belt-one-road/#.WdcqilSCwdU 2/5
reportedly expressed his willingness toward improving bilateral ties and stressed that his initiative will be a “new platform” for
cooperation between China and Japan.
Xi pushed for creation of the AIIB to finance infrastructure investments in the OBOR scheme, and called for participation by countries
around the world in establishing the new multinational institution. Skeptics have viewed these initiatives as China’s bid to challenge the
post-World War II international order that had long been dominated by U.S.-led Western powers. Japan opted to stay out of the AIIB
when it was set up, citing concerns over the bank’s governance and operation. However, the number of countries and regions that have
signed on has reached 77 — outnumbering the 67 that have joined the Asia Development Bank, whose operation is led by the U.S. and
Japan. Japan and the U.S. are the only Group of Seven powers that have not joined the AIIB. About 130 countries around the world sent
delegates to the Beijing conference in mid-May, including 29 government leaders. Japanese firms also see business opportunities in Xi’s
initiative.
There are views that the shift in Tokyo’s position toward Xi’s initiative and the AIIB has been driven by its concern that the
administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, whose summit with Xi in April led to a rapprochement as they try to deal with North
Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs, may leave Japan behind by moving ties forward with China. Either way, China
welcomed Abe’s recent statement, noting that participation in the OBOR initiative can be a “testing field for China and Japan to achieve
mutually beneficial cooperation and common development.”
The government is reportedly seeking a meeting between Abe and Xi when they attend the Group of 20 summit in Germany next
month. It has also begun exploring an Abe trip to China and a Xi visit to Japan next year. It would be a positive development if Abe’s
remarks on the OBOR initiative and AIIB indicate that his administration is serious about rebuilding relations with China. While
concerns remain about both the initiative and the AIIB, Japan can do little to address them by staying out. The government should
positively consider its participation as leverage to restore its relations with China.
The Japan Times
[Editorial] Japan and ‘One Belt, One Road’
1KCookie policy
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Earlier this month, the leaders of Japan and India paused to lay the
foundation stone for a high-speed railway. Shinzo Abe was visiting
Narendra Modi’s home state, where a 500-kilometer bullet train
using Japanese financing and technology will link Mumbai and the
industrial city of Ahmedabad. Modi called Japan “a true friend” and
the train a “symbol of new India.” Abe agreed, saying, “The project
symbolizes India-Japan friendship.” It also illustrates the high-stakes
competition underway to connect the Eurasian supercontinent.
Hovering over the ceremony was a specter driving Japan and India
closer together: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Xi Jinping’s
signature foreign policy vision aims to forge new connections
across the region and beyond. It promises over $1 trillion in new
infrastructure projects, trade agreements, people-to-people ties, and
coordination of policy in areas from health to agriculture. China says
68 countries and organizations have signed on to the effort, including
the World Health Organization and programs within the United Nations.
China has stolen the spotlight, but other regional powers are not standing still. Japan, India, and the European
Union are central to the region’s future, and they are advancing their own visions for connectivity. Even some of
the countries most active in China’s BRI are still hedging their bets. If the region remains the world’s “decisive
geopolitical chessboard,” as the late Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote, it is a match with many players and no pawns.
For decades, Japan has been heavily involved in Asia’s infrastructure efforts, especially in Southeast Asia, where
many roads and ports service the needs of Japanese corporate supply chains. The Japanese-led Asian Development
Bank (ADB) quietly celebrated its 50th anniversary this year. Though China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB) now has more members than the ADB, in financial and operational terms the AIIB is still an infant, lending
a total of $1.7 billion last year, roughly a tenth of the ADB’s spending on infrastructure during the same period.
In 2015, Abe unveiled the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, now a $200 billion effort to persuade countries to
pay more up-front for projects that advance sustainability goals and cost less over their lifetime. Japan’s Foreign
Ministry is requesting a 10 percent increase in development assistance in next year’s budget, a large portion of
which would go to infrastructure financing. In the CSIS Reconnecting Asia database, Japan is outspending China on
transport projects in six of nine Southeast Asian countries. But the margins are slim, and China has pulled ahead
in Cambodia, Laos, and Malaysia.
India, meanwhile, is focused on improving its internal connectivity, but its infrastructure activities are growing
in scope and intensity. With its economy expanding 7.1 percent last year, Delhi aims to build 40 kilometers of
new road and 15 kilometers of new railway each day. Strategic concerns reinforce these economic drivers. After
decades of leaving its border areas with China relatively undeveloped, India has built 27 of what it calls “strategic
roads” in these areas since 2006, and it aims to develop 46 more by 2022. Chinese road construction on the Doklam
plateau—where India, Bhutan, and China meet—sparked a military standoff with India earlier this year. The situation
deescalated in late August, but for some Indian officials, it underscored the need to expedite these border roads.
India is also pursuing several efforts beyond its borders. Modi’s “Act East” policy aims to strengthen ties with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), through new projects that will provide India’s landlocked northeast
with better access to southern ports and connect India to Thailand via Myanmar. In June, Modi and President Vladimir
Putin of Russia reiterated their support for the North-South Transport Corridor, a multimodal effort that stretches
1616 rhode island avenue nw, washington dc, 20036 | www.csis.org
jonathan hillman and matthew p. goodman
asia’s competing visions
Global Economics Monthly
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
simon chair in
political economy
volume vi | issue 9 |september 2017
Upcoming Events
■■ September 28: Competing Visions: How
Infrastructure is Reshaping the Eurasian
Supercontinent (CSIS)
■■ October 4: 2nd KORUS Special Session
(Washington, D.C.)
■■ October 11–15: 4th Round of NAFTA
Re-Negotiation Talks (Washington, D.C.)
■■ October 12: Asian Architecture Conference (CSIS)
■■ October 18: 19th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China Begins
(Beijing, China)

global economics monthly | 2
from St. Petersburg to Mumbai via Tehran. India hopes
the corridor will complement its investment in Iran’s
Chabahar Port, which is located just over a hundred
miles from Gwadar Port, the southern terminus of the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Chabahar may even become part of a broader India-
Japan partnership. Indian officials have been courting
Japanese funding for the port. Another example of
deeper cooperation is the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor,
which explicitly seeks to link Modi’s “Act East” policy
and Abe’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure. India’s
appetite for investing beyond its borders is limited, but
it can provide prime access to the Indian Ocean, where
Chinese military activities are on the rise. Japan lives on
the periphery of that maritime competition but could
offer financial firepower and technical knowhow.
On the supercontinent’s western flank, the European
Union aims to extend its well-developed transport
network. Its Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)
includes nine corridors, five of which extend into the
Eurasian landmass and its maritime periphery. Two
corridors extend into Ukraine, which has been isolated
from east-west trade since conflict in its Donbass region
ignited in 2014. One corridor extends into Turkey,
historically a key land bridge between east and west,
and one connects with Russia. The network could be
extended in the coming years to include the Arctic,
reflecting the European Union’s key role in developing
the region. The EU-China Connectivity platform was
established in 2015 to help coordinate TEN-T and BRI.
As China’s biggest trading partner and the natural
terminus for many BRI routes, the European Union could
make or break China’s overland ambitions. Officials in
Brussels have expressed qualified support for BRI. In May,
an EU delegation reminded China of the need to ensure
that BRI “adheres to market rules, EU and international
requirements and standards, and complements EU
policiesandprojects.”TheEuropeanInvestmentBankhas
proposed eight principles for connecting Asia and Europe,
including open, rules-based tenders, environmental
standards, and reciprocal benefits for all. As Chinese
investment in Central and Eastern Europe has risen, so
has Brussels’ focus on these concerns.
Other powers are playing the game as well. ASEAN’s
Master Plan on Connectivity 2025 aims to strengthen
physical, institutional, and people-to-people linkages
among its 10 member countries. South Korea’s ambitions
encompass railways to Europe, Arctic shipping, and
fiber-optic networks. Turkey’s Vision 2023 Initiative
asia’s competing visions (continued)
marks a century of independence with thousands of
kilometers of new roads and railways. With sanctions
lifting, Iran is rekindling its ancient roots as a trade hub
and plans to add nearly 2,000 kilometers of railway each
year. Russia is pursuing several high-profile projects—a
bridge into Crimea, new pipelines around Ukraine into
Europe, and Arctic ports—and is a critical gatekeeper
for Asia-Europe land routes, many of which must pass
through its Eurasian Economic Union.
For now, the United States is mainly a spectator in all
this. In May, the White House took a positive step toward
greater engagement by sending a delegation to the BRI
Forum in Beijing. But overall, U.S. policymakers have
yet to shift from awareness to coordinated action. Vice
President Mike Pence and Deputy Prime Minister Taro
Aso are leading an economic dialogue that includes a
working group on infrastructure, but the process has
been slow. Though physically separated from Eurasia,
the United States has significant interests at stake, from
preventing the rise of a Eurasian hegemon to ensuring
commercial opportunities for U.S. infrastructure-
related companies.
The United States can still advance its interests without
committing large sums of money. With Japan, India, the
European Union, and other partners such as Australia
expressing similar concerns about the BRI, interests are
aligning. Working through multilateral development
banks and other international organizations like the G20,
Washingtoncouldbuildconsensusaroundkeyissuessuch
as open procurement processes, sound environmental
and social safeguards, and debt sustainability. It could
help prepare the ground for more bankable projects in
the region, unleashing trillions of dollars of long-term
U.S. assets looking for reliable returns.
Today, there is no shortage of ambitious visions for
reconnectingAsia.What’sneededisgreatercoordination
and agreement on common principles. Only then is this
competition likely to produce an outcome greater than
the sum of its parts.
Jonathan Hillman is a fellow with the CSIS Simon Chair in Political Economy
and director of the Reconnecting Asia Project. Matthew P. Goodman is senior
adviser for Asian economics and holds the William E. Simon Chair in Political
Economy at CSIS. Global Economics Monthly is published by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution
focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan
and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly,
all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be
understood to be solely those of the author. © 2017 by the Center for Strategic
and International Studies. All rights reserved.

1
Economic Corridor Development:
The Greater Mekong Subregion Experience
G-20 Global Infrastructure Connectivity Forum
Singapore
April 27, 2016
Alfredo Perdiguero
Asian Development Bank

Outline
I. GMS Economic Corridors
II. GMS Framework for Economic Corridor
Development
III.Economic Corridor Development Projects,
Progress and Impacts in the GMS
IV. Way Forward for Economic Corridor Development
2

GMS Economic Cooperation Program
4
• Countries: Cambodia, People’s
Republic of China (Yunnan Province
and Guangxi Autonomous Region),
Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and
Viet Nam
• Strategic Priorities:
o Vision – a more integrated,
prosperous, and harmonious
subregion
o “3Cs” – Connectivity,
Competitiveness, Community
o Economic Corridor
Development
• Size:
o $15 billion (1/3 from ADB)
o 80% in transport connectivity

Transform some of the
9 transport
corridors…
Developing Economic Corridors
is a Strategic Priority for the GMS
…into economic
corridors to boost
cross-border trade
and investment and to
stimulate jobs and
growth.

6
• North-South
Economic
Corridor
(NSEC)
• East-West
Economic
Corridor
(EWEC)
• Southern
Economic
Corridor
(SEC)

Evolution of Transport Corridors into
Economic Corridors
1 2 3 4 5
1. Transport Corridor – Physical Infrastructure
2. TTF Corridor – Cross-border transport operations and efficient
border formalities
3. Logistics Corridor – Broader trade facilitation (behind-the-
border) and developed cross-border logistics services
4. Urban Development Corridor – Improved economic
infrastructure and enhanced capacities of corridor towns for public-
private partnerships
5. Economic Corridor – Increased private investment, well-
developed production chains

Zone II
National +
Broad
Zone IV
Regional +
Broad
Zone I
National +
Narrow
Zone III
Regional +
Narrow
B
r
o
a
d
N
a
r
r
o
w
National Regional
A Framework for Corridor Development (P. Srivastava)
Road construction,
upgrading
TTF, logistics
Urban, SMEs, Rural
Roads
CBEZ, Integrated
regional border plan

II. GMS FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC
CORRIDOR DEVELOPMENT
9

Economic Corridor Development Approach
Adopted in 1998 in the GMS:
• Practical response to maximize impact of limited
resources for regional projects
• Cluster regional projects along corridors
• Catalyze investment from within and outside region
• Facilitate prioritization of regional projects and
coordination of national projects with regional
implications
2

The Economic Corridor Development
Approach
• Infrastructure was developed in specific
geographical areas based on economic potential.
Initially transport links; subsequently improving “software”
and then other infrastructure investments for urban
development, SEZ, agriculture
• Successful Economic Corridors:
• Link major markets/nodal points;
• Ensure cheap, fast and reliable transport and trade
• Catalyze private investment
• Benefit the local population living nearby the
corridors;
11

GMS Economic Corridors Forum
• Established in 2008. Seven already organized
• ECF is held annually at the Ministerial level.
• A Provincial Governors Forum linked to the ECF.
“The ECF shall serve as the main advocate and promoter of
economic corridors in the GMS. It shall raise the profile and increase
awareness of the needs and priorities of GMS economic corridor
development, and enhance collaboration among various
stakeholders in the development of GMS economic corridors.”
12

GMS Strategies and Action Plans for
Economic Corridor Development
13

Formulation Process for
Strategies and Action Plans
• Stakeholder consultations: national & local
• Confirming configuration and alignment
• Preparing corridor assessments
- Socio-economic characteristics
- Development potential
- Comparative advantages
- Constraints and challenges
- Opportunities for cooperation
• Preparing strategic directions and action plans for each
corridor

15
Strategic Framework for the NSEC Action Plan
Focal SectorsUltimate GoalsVision
Environment
Infrastructure
Trade and transport
facilitation
Human resource
development
Institutional
development
Dynamic, well-
integrated
Engine for socio-
economic
development
Attract investment
Gateway for
ASEAN-PRC
trade
Objectives
Generate higher
income
Increase employment
opportunities
Reduce income
disparities
Improve living
conditions
Address social and
environmental
concerns
Strengthen physical
infrastructure
Facilitate cross-border
trade and transport
Promote investment
Address human
resource constraints
Enhance institutional
arrangements
Investment promotion
72 projects in the NSEC Action Plan
For each project or activity:
Expected outcomes/results
Progress indicators
Implementing bodies/agencies
Timeframe
Status

Assessment of
GMS Corridor Development
Around 75% of planned projects completed or ongoing
• Notable achievements are in road transport
infrastructure
• Rail and power sectors requires more attention
• Good progress in tourism, social & environment
sectors
• More efforts required for cross-border transport and
trade facilitation, investment promotion, private
sector participation

18
Lessons learned from the economic
corridors SAP
• Provided a strategic macro-planning framework for
corridor development
• Promoted a multi-sector approach
• Encouraged participation of local authorities in
corridor development
• Economic corridor planning process could have been
strengthened by more regular monitoring , and
greater engagement with the private sector.
• There is a need to translate SAPs into implementation
plans for specific sections of the corridors with high
development potential

III. ECONOMIC CORRIDOR
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, PROGRESS
AND IMPACTS IN THE GMS
19

20
LAO: East-West Corridor
(Phin-Dene Savanh)
VIE: East-West Corridor
(Lao Bao-Dong Ha)
JBIC-assisted 2nd
Mekong International
Bridge
JBIC-assisted Hai Van
Tunnel Construction and
Da Nang Port
Improvement
With assistance from
the Royal Thai
Government i
Project under
preparation with ADB
assistance i

2121
Upgrading completed
in 2006.
Completed
Completed with
ADB assistance
Upgraded with JBIC
assistance; in good
condition
Completed in 2013
with financing from
PRC, Thailand and
ADB
Recently upgraded with
Govt financing
4th Mekong
international bridge
completed
Completed in
Dec. 2005
North-South Economic
Corridor
Expressway
completed
in2014 with ADB
assistance

2222
Mostly 4-lane highways;
not a constraint to cross-
border traffic.
Upgrading completed
with ADB and Japan
assistance.
Mekong bridge
completed in 2015 with
financing from Japan
Mostly 4-lane highways;
not a constraint to cross-
border traffic
Upgrading completed in
2007 with Thailand,
Korea, World Bank and
ADB assistance.
Upgrading to be completed
by 2010 with ADB, Korean,
and Australian assistance.
Upgrading completed
with PRC assistance.
In good condition
Upgrading completed
ADB and Japan
assistance.
Upgrading of a section in
Cambodia (70 km)
completed with assistance
from Viet Nam; financing
requested for remaining
sections.
GMS Southern Economic Corridor

23
Phnom Penh-Ho Chi Minh
City Highway Improvement
Project
Examples of Development Impacts of Improved
Connectivity: Southern Economic Corridor
In 1999 (Before upgrading road)
• Travel time from Phnom Penh to HCM
City: 9-10 hours;
• Cross-border trade at Moc Bai (Viet
Nam) – Bavet (Cambodia): $ 10
million / year
In 2014 (After both hardware and
software are implemented)
• Travel time reduced to 5-6 hours;
• Cross border trade at Moc Bai –
Bavet: $ 708 million / year
• Trang Bang Industrial Park (in Moc
Bai) : 41 projects, $ 270 million in
new investments and 3,000 jobs
created

IV. WAY FORWARD FOR ECONOMIC
CORRIDOR DEVELOPMENT
24

Developing GMS Economic Corridors
1. Requires a multi-sector approach to maximize
the economic benefits of physical infrastructure:
a. Cross-border and Special Economic Zones
b. Corridor Town Development
c. Logistic and agro-processing Centers, Dry Ports
2. Requires private sector participation to identify
investment opportunities and contribute to project
financing (viable PPPs)
3. Focus on the “software” side of Economic
Corridors (eg. Transport and Trade Facilitation)
4. Need to realign corridors to include Myanmar, link all
GMS capitals and deep ports to the corridor network
and align with trade flows
5. Prepare “section-specific corridor concept plans”

We are committed to continue our joint efforts to transform the GMS transport
corridors into economic corridors... Implementation of the SAPs should focus
on selecting priority sections along the corridors which offer the greatest
potential for attracting investment and yielding long-term development benefits.
For these corridor sections, the identification of investment needs and
opportunities should draw upon inputs from provincial and local
government officials, the private sector and community residents.
-GMS Leaders at the 5th GMS Summit; Bangkok Thailand
December 20, 2014

A Pilot Initiative for Economic Corridors
Section Specific Concept Plans
1. Initiate planning processes for conceptual development plans
focused on three prioritized sub-sections of the GMS Economic
Corridors.
2. Promote a bottom-up, participatory planning process
which solicits views and ideas about each corridor's strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities and constraints (SWOT analysis) from
local stakeholders, including provincial and local officials, the
private sector and community representatives.
3. By adopting a broad, multisectoral approach the resulting
concept plans can serve as a basis for future regional planning, a
model for other cross-border planning in the GMS, and provide
inputs to the current projects in the corridors.

Three Pilot Locations Along Major GMS
Economic Corridors
• SEC: Bavet,
Cambodia-
Moc Bai, Viet
Nam
• EWEC: Mae
Sot, Thailand –
Myawaddy,
Myanmar
• NSEC:
Jinghong, PRC-
Luang Namtha,
Lao PDR

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1613938645392329&s
et=pb.100003286286938.-
2207520000.1507268096.&type=3&theater
Kyi Zaw Myint
October 2 2017 ·
“ တရုတ္ရင္းႏးျတးႏ္ပ့တ္းျတတပ်မးျတင္မႏွံမ္ရင္းႏးျတးႏ္ပ့တ္းျတတပ်ပွ္းႏမ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတတႏင္မႈျံ္တျု
္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတတႏင္မႈျံ္တျုတ္မရင္ ျုင္ပ်မရျတးျျုင္ပွႏို္ ္းႏမ”
တရုတ္းျျုင္ငတ္မOBOR သွႏို္မအ္ရတးျတင္မအ္အရျတမတ ္ ္္းႏတႏင္မအရတျ
အရတျမ္ရ ္္ံမ္အ ္ံ္သွႏို္ညမOBOR သွႏို္အအွျမ္တႏင္မအ္ရတတႏင္မပ
ပံ္ဝင္သွႏို္မးျျုင္ငတငတးႏမကီးမးျျုင္ငတမရျတံ္သွႏို္ညမွတျုညပတ္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတ
ႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတမးျတင္မအျးျျ္းျျုင္ငတတျုညမ္အ ္ံ္သွႏို္ညမသျုညါသ္္မ္အုမႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္
ႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္မတရုတ္္မOBOR တႏင္မံ္ဝင္ရမ္မ တင္မ
ါ ္င္ရႏတ္ ္္ံ ္အ ္သွႏို္ညမ ္ါံပွႏို္မႏွံမ္မဝင္ပွႏို္ံတု တသွႏို္မတ ္ပွျ့းႏမ္အ ္သွႏို္
္အ ္သွႏို္ညမတရုတ္္မOBOR တႏင္မံ္ဝင္ပွႏို္မအါ္အအတမအါ ္တ္အအတုမရင္
ရင္းႏးျတးႏ္ပ့တ္းျတတပ်ပွ္းႏတႏင္ တအွျမ္ တွႏို္မ္းႏတျုမတျုင္တႏ္္္ံးႏမဝင္ါရ္တ္ပွႏို္မံတု တ
ံတု တ္အ ္သွႏို္ညမအ ္္ါငတ္င္ ျုါသ္္မအ္ရတးျျုင္ငတမါတ္္ါတ္္ပွ္းႏပွ္းႏ္မ
Institution ပွ္းႏတႏင္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတအါမ္အင္မႈ့ႈ့ဝင္ဝင္မံ္ဝင္မံ္တ္သ
ံ္တ္သတ္ါမသွႏို္ပတ္မငတ္္ံမ္အ ္သွႏို္ည
ႈျုညါငတ္င္မ္အုးျတ ္တႏင္မOBOR ္မASEAN-ASIA Forum တျုမ
တၤ္ံးျျု္င္ငတတႏင္မတွင္းႏံပွႏို္္အ ္္ံးႏမအ္ျတမံ္ဝင္ ္သွႏို္ပတ္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတ
ႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတမ္အ ္ါမါငတ္င္းႏမါတႏညရံ္သွႏို္ည

OBOR ္မEconomic Corridors (၆းမအုတႏင္မအါရတ႕ါတ္င္မအ္ရတးျတင္မံ္
ံ္တ္သတ္သွႏို္မChina-Indochina Peninsular Economic Corridor ျု္ံးႏမံ္
ံ္ရျတံ္သွႏို္ညမအ္ျတမအ္းႏ္အင္မတရုတ္းျျုင္ငတမတပင္းႏပတမ ္အျုးျျုင္ငတတျုမ္အတ္မံမႈျု
္အတ္မံမႈျုင္းႏးျျုင္ငတမံမပါ းႏရတ္းႏးျျုင္ငတမတျုညတျုမ္အတ္္ံးႏမ တၤ္ံးျျုင္ငတ
တၤ္ံးျျုင္ငတတျုညမးျတင္မ တ္သႏ္္ပွႏို္မသ္္္ံျုညါ ္င္ါရးႏမ ပ္းႏပငတးႏ
ပ္းႏပငတးႏမတ ္အုမတွႏို္ါ ္တ္ရမ္မ္အ ္ံ္သွႏို္ညမႈျုင္းႏးျျုင္ငတမ မ္ါတ္တ္တႏ
မ္ါတ္တ္တႏင္မ ပ္းႏ တုအ္အ ္ႈ္းႏတ္မအါရတ႕သျုညမ ျုံ္တမတါပ
တါပၻ္ းႏ္္းႏးျျုင္ငတမးျတင္မွ္တ္မပ္းျျုင္ငတသျုညမ ွႏို္းႏါတ္င္းႏံမအါမ္တ္ တ္ ျု
အါမ္တ္ တ္ ျုံ္တမ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတသျုညမ ွႏို္းႏါတ္င္းႏမ္ံမ္ ွႏို္မအႏ့ႈႏတ္သႏ္းႏ
အႏ့ႈႏတ္သႏ္းႏပွႏို္မတ္းႏ ပ္းႏံမအ္ပမ္ရႈ္းႏ ပ္းႏမ ပတတျမ္းႏပွ္းႏမံ္ဝင္ံ္သွႏို္ည
အ ျုံ္မEconomic Corridor သွႏို္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတမ ျတ္ဝင္ ္းႏသွႏို္မADB ္မ
GMS Economic Corridor ပွ္းႏႈ့ပတမအ ျတ္အံျုင္းႏတ ္အုမ္အ ္ါမံ္သွႏို္ညမႈျု
ႈျုအအ္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္မ အတျုင္းႏမါမ္မပရါတ္ါံညမအ ္္ါငတ္
အ ္္ါငတ္င္ ျုါသ္္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္ ွႏို္းႏမါတ္င္တရုတ္မံင္ ္္မပတါ
ံင္ ္္မပတါမ္မအျးျျ္မသပု ရ္သျုညမ ျတ္အွရ္ံးႏမတုမ္တွ ရျတ္မသ
သတ္သ္သွႏို္မ ပ္းႏါငတ္င္းႏတျုမရတ္ါအႏါမသွႏို္မးျျုင္ငတတ ္အုမ္အ ္ါသ္ါငတ္င
္အ ္ါသ္ါငတ္င္ံင္ညမႈျုညါငတ္င္မADB ္မGMS Economic Corridor
ပွ္းႏတႏင္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္မGMS East-West Economic Corridor တျုမ
ႏမ္ ႏ္ပတမ ျတ္ဝင္ ္းႏသွႏို္မးျျုင္ငတမ္အ ္ါတ္သွႏို္ညမအ ျုံ္မGMS East-West
Economic Corridor သွႏို္မါတ္င္တရုတ္မံင္ ္္တပ္းႏါ္အ္ပျ့႕မ္အ ္သ
္အ ္သွႏို္မွ္တ္မပ္းျျုင္ငတမ ္မမ္းႏပတမ တင္္ံးႏမတါပၻ္ းႏ္္းႏးျျုင္ငတမးျတင္မႈျုင္းႏးျျုင္ငတ
းျတင္မႈျုင္းႏးျျုင္ငတတျုညတျုမ္အတ္တ္မအျးျျ္သပု ရ္မသျုညမ ႏ္္တ ႏ္

သႏ္းႏ ္းျျုင္သွႏို္မ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတမါပ္္ ္ပျ့င္သျုညမါရ္တ္ရျတပွႏို္မ္အ ္သွႏို္ညမသျု
္အ ္သွႏို္ညမသျုညါသ္္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္မအ ျုံ္မEconomic Corridor တျုမ
ါပ္္ ္ပျ့င္တႏင္မပရံ္ါတ္ံ့မရမ္တုမ္မသ ဝ္ႈျမ ႏ့
ႏ့ႈုတ္ ျုတ္ံ္ါတ္သွႏို္ညမႈျုညအ္ံင္မါမ္တ္တ င္မအါမ္အင္မအ ျုံ္မ
Economic Corridor သွႏို္မ ႏၤ ္းႏံင္ ္္တပ္းႏ္အ ္သွႏို္မ
ငရုတ္ါတ္င္းႏႈျမ ႏ့ႈုတ္တ္မါတ္င္တရုတ္မံင္ ္္မးျတင္မအျးျျ္မသပု ရ္
သပု ရ္တျုညတျုမ တ္သႏ္္ပွႏို္မတုမ္းႏ ပ္းႏပငတးႏတ ္အုမအ္အ ္မတ င
တ င္္အင္းႏမအါတ္င္အႈွႏို္မါအ္ရမ္မ ပတအွတ္မႈ္းႏါမါငတ္င္းႏမါတႏညရံ္
ါတႏညရံ္သွႏို္ညမႈျုအအွျမ္တႏင္မတရုတ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္မNorth – South Economic
Corridor အ္အ ္မOBOR အါမ္အင္မဝင္ ္သွႏို္မအအွျမ္တႏင္မႏွ
ႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္ ွႏို္းႏမသ္မ ပတအွတ္အတႏင္းႏမတရုတ္္မ ပတအွတ္တျုမႈွႏို္သႏ
ႈွႏို္သႏင္းႏတ္မါ ္င္ရႏတ္ရမ္မ စ္ရံ္ါတ္သွႏို္ည
အႈတ္ံ္မအါငတ္င္းႏတရ္းႏပွ္းႏါငတ္င္မ္အုတွင္းႏံပွႏို္မASEAN-ASIA
Forum တႏင္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္မအ္ျတမံ္ဝင္ ္ရံ္ါတ္သွႏို္ညမ္အု္ံ့
္အု္ံ့ ုံ္ပွႏို္မForum တႏင္မအ္ျတမါ ႏးႏါးျႏးႏရမ္မါံးႏႈ္းႏသွႏို္မအအွတ္ပွ္းႏ
အအွတ္ပွ္းႏတႏင္မႈးႏ္အ္းႏသွႏို္မအအွတ္တ ္အွတ္မံ္ဝင္ ္ံ္သွႏို္ညမႈျုမအအွ
အအွတ္ပတ္မသတ္ ျုင္းျျုင္ငတပွ္းႏမအါမ္အင္မတရုတ္းျျုင္ငတ္မရင္းႏးျတးႏ္ပ့တ္မတတ
ရင္းႏးျတးႏ္ပ့တ္မတတပ်ပွ္းႏးျတင္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတ္မရင္းႏးျတးႏ္ပ့တ္းျတတပ်ပွ္းႏ
ရင္းႏးျတးႏ္ပ့တ္းျတတပ်ပွ္းႏအ္းႏမပွႏို္သျုညမံးႏါံ္င္းႏါ ္င္ရႏတ္းျျုင္ပွႏို္ ျုံ္တမ
ါအ္င္္ပင္ပ်မရရျတးျျုင္ါငတ္င္းႏတျုမါ ႏးႏါးျႏးႏရမ္မံ္ရျတ ္္အင္းႏမ္အ ္ံ္သွႏို္ညမ္အု္ံ့ ု
္အ ္ံ္သွႏို္ညမ္အု္ံ့ ုံ္ပွႏို္မForum ္မအ္ျတမအအွတ္ဟုမ ျုးျျုင္ံ္သွႏို္ညမႈျု
ႈျုအအွတ္တျုမငတွႏို္္အင္းႏအ္းႏ္အင္မတရုတ္းျျုင္ငတမးျတင္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတတျု
ႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတတျုညသွႏို္မးျျုင္ငတါရးႏအရမႈျံ္တျုတ္ါတႏည တုပ်ပွ္းႏမရျတါသ္္ ွႏို္းႏမးျတ ္

ရျတါသ္္ ွႏို္းႏမးျတ ္းျျုင္ငတမအတွျ့းႏအတႏတ္မ းႏံႏ္းႏါရးႏတႏင္မံးႏါံ္င္းႏရမ္
ံးႏါံ္င္းႏရမ္မအါ္အရတ္ ျုါငတ္င္းႏမါတႏညရံ္သွႏို္ည
အႈတ္ံ္မါပးႏအႏမ္းႏတျုမ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတမအါမ္အင္မံႈဝးျျုင္ငတါရးႏမအါမအႈ္းႏမအ
အါမအႈ္းႏမအရမတရုတ္းျတင္မႏွံမ္တျုည္မရင္
ရင္းႏးျတးႏ္ပ့တ္းျတတပ်ပွ္းႏသွႏို္မ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတတႏင္မအအွင္းႏအွင္းႏမႈျံ္တျုတ္ရင္ ျု
ႈျံ္တျုတ္ရင္ ျုင္ပ်မမွႏို္းႏ္ံးႏမသးႏ္အ္းႏ ါသ္္ ွႏို္းႏါတ္င္းႏံမံးႏါံ္င္းႏ္
ံးႏါံ္င္းႏ္ါသ္္ ွႏို္းႏါတ္င္းႏမါ ္င္ရႏတ္းျျု္င္ါငတ္င္းႏတျုမါအ္တ္ံ္အတျုင္းႏမသတ
ါအ္တ္ံ္အတျုင္းႏမသတုးႏသံ္ ျုတ္ံ္သွႏို္ည
(၁းမGeopolitics ံႈဝးျျုင္ငတါရးႏမအရ
တရုတ္းျျုင္ငတမသွႏို္မ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတမါ္ပ္တ္ံျုင္းႏတျုသ္မ ျတ္ဝင္ ္းႏ္ံးႏ
ႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္မ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတမါတ္င္ံျုင္းႏတျုသ္မ ျ္တ္ဝင္ ္းႏံ္သွႏို္ည
ႈျုညါငတ္င္မံႈဝးျျုင္ငတါရးႏအရမ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတတႏင္မတရုတ္းျျုင္ငတးျတင္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတတျု
ႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတတျုညမသွႏို္မႈျံ္တျုတ္မါတႏည တုပ်မမွႏို္းႏပွႏို္မ္အ ္သွႏို္ည
(ီးမElectricity Sector တွံ္ ္မတ႑
္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတတႏင္မ တွံ္ ္တ႑အတႏတ္မFour Grid Strategy ျုသွႏို္မ
Northern Grid ံမEastern Grid ံမSouthern Gridမးျတင္မWestern Grid ျု္ံးႏမ
ပတအွတ္ရျတံ္သွႏို္ညမႈျုအႈ့တႏင္မတရုတ္မးျျုင္ငတသွႏို္မNorthern and Eastern
Grids တျုသ္မ ျတ္ဝင္ ္းႏ္ံးႏမႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္မSouthern Grid တျုသ္မ
ျတ္ဝင္ ္းႏပ်မရျတံ္သွႏို္ညမႈျုညါငတ္င္မ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတ္မ တွံ္

တွံ္ ္တ႑တႏင္ ွႏို္းႏမတရုတ္းျတင္မႏွံမ္မးျတ ္းျျုင္ငတမတျုညမသွႏို္မႈျံ္တျုတ္
ႈျံ္တျုတ္ါတႏည တုပ်မပရျတးျျု္င္ါံည
(၃းမOil & Gas Sectorမါရမတးျတင္မသ ္ဝ္္တ္ါငႏညမတ႑
တရုတ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္မအ ျုံ္တမတ႑တျုမBay of Bengal တႏင္ံ့မ ျတ္ဝင္မ ္းႏပ်မ
ရျတသွႏို္ညမႏွံမ္သွႏို္မProduction ျုသွႏို္မႈုတ္ ုံ္ါရးႏတျုမ ျတ္ဝင္ ္းႏပ်မမွႏို္
မွႏို္းႏ္ံးႏမTrading ျုသွႏို္မါရမတ္္တုႈႏတ္တုမ္မါရ္င္းႏဝ္္ါရးႏတျုသ္မ ျတ္ဝ
ျတ္ဝင္ ္းႏပ်မရျတသွႏို္ညမႈျုညါငတ္င္မ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတ္မအ ျုံ္မတ႑တႏင္
တ႑တႏင္ ွႏို္းႏမတရုတ္းျျုင္ငတးျတင္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတတျုညသွႏို္မႈျံ္တျုတ္
ႈျံ္တျုတ္ါတႏညရမ္မပရျတးျျုင္ါံည
(၄းမConnectivity တ္သႏ္္ါရးႏမတ႑
(တးမRoad Infrastructure အါ္အအတမ ပ္းႏအါ ္တ္အအတုတ႑
တရုတ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္မ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတမါ္ပ္တ္ံျုင္းႏတျုံ့မ ျတ္ဝင္ ္းႏ္ံးႏမ ႏၤ ္းႏမံင္
ႏၤ ္းႏမံင္ ္္မါအ္္သျုညမႈႏတ္ါံ္တ္တျုသ္မသးႏ ္းႏါံးႏမရင္းႏးျတးႏ္ပ့
ရင္းႏးျတးႏ္ပ့တ္းျတတပ်မ္ံ့ ုံ္ံ္သွႏို္ည
ႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတသွႏို္မ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတမါတ္င္ံျုင္းႏတျုသ္မ ျတ္ဝင္ ္းႏ္ံးႏမရမ္တုမ္္ပျ့
ရမ္တုမ္္ပျ့႕မးျတင္မသ ဝ္မSEZ တျုသ္မ ျတ္ဝင္ ္းႏံ္သွႏို္ညမႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတ္မအ္ျ
အ္ျတမရွႏို္ရႏ္္အွတ္ပတ္မႈျုင္းႏးျျုင္ငတမ မ္ါတ္တ္တႏင္ရျတါသ္မႏွံမ္မ တ္ရတုပွ္းႏ
တ္ရတုပွ္းႏသျုညမ ျုအံ္သွႏို္မ တ္ံ ပွႏို္းႏမအ ျတ္အံျုင္းႏပွ္းႏတျုမတင္ံျု
တင္ံျုညးျျုင္ါရးႏအတႏတ္မEast-West Economic Corridor တျုသ္မအါ းႏႈ္းႏမ

ံ္သွႏို္ညမGlobal Supply Chain တျုမသးႏတွႏို္သ္အင္မႈျံ္တျုတ္ရင္ ျုင္ပ်မမ
မွႏို္းႏံ္သွႏို္ည
အႈတ္ံ္အတျုင္းႏမသတုးႏသံ္ံ္တမ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတတႏင္မတရုတ္းျျုင္ငတ
တရုတ္းျျုင္ငတ္မရင္းႏးျတးႏ္ပ့တ္းျတတပ်ပွ္းႏးျတင္မႏွံမ္းျျုင္ငတ္မရင္းႏးျတးႏ္ပ့တ္မတတပွ္းႏသွႏို္
ရင္းႏးျတးႏ္ပ့တ္မတတပွ္းႏသွႏို္မႈျံ္တျုတ္မရင္ ျုင္ရမ္မအအႏင္အါ
အအႏင္အါရးႏမွႏို္းႏ္ံးႏမသးႏ္အ္းႏါသ္္ ွႏို္းႏါတ္င္းႏံမံးႏါံ္င္းႏ္မ
ံးႏါံ္င္းႏ္မါသ္္ ွႏို္းႏါတ္င္းႏမါ ္င္ရႏတ္္အင္းႏ္အင္မ္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတမအါ
္ပမ္ပ္းျျုင္ငတမအါမ္အင္မအတွျ့းႏရျတါ ါရးႏတျုမါ ္င္ရႏ
ါ ္င္ရႏတ္သင္ံ္ါငတ္င္းႏမတင္္ံ ျုတ္ရံ္သွႏို္ည

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Logistics Development in the Greater Mekong
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Logistics Development in the Greater
Mekong Subregion
RUTH BANOMYONG
DIRECTOR, CENTRE FOR LOGISTICS RESEARCH
THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY

AGENDA
Ò Background
Ò Corridor Conceptual framework
Ò GMS Economic Corridor Analysis
Ò GMS Logistics Characteristics
É Infrastructure
É Institution
É Logistics Service Providers
É Traders
Ò GMS Logistics Development Policy

BACKGROUND
Ò The improvement of the GMS regional logistics
systems can provide the foundation for further
economic integration in the GMS.
Ò Inadequate transport infrastructure and high logistics
costs have constrained economic corridor integration.
Ò Adequate logistics and communications facilities are
considered major support determinants of competitive
trade performance.

4
4
Thailand
Land area: 513 thou sq km
Population: 65.8 M
GDP per capita: US$3,133
Cambodia
Population: 14.1 M
GDP per capita: US$510
Myanmar
Population: 54.8 M
GDP per capita: US$255 (2005)
People’s Republic of China
Population: 97.3 M
GDP per capita: US$1,135
(figures for Yunnan and Guangxi only)
Viet Nam
Population: 84.1 M
Lao PDR
Population: 5.7 M
The GMS in 2006
Land area: 2.6 M sq km
Population: 323 M
GDP per capita: US$1,453*
* excludes Myanmar
The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS)The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS)

5
5
199219922006200620152015
GMS Outputs:GMS Outputs:
CONNECTIVITYCONNECTIVITY
FacilitatingFacilitating SubregionalSubregional
trade and investmenttrade and investment
RoadsRoads
TelecommunicationsTelecommunications
Power TransmissionPower Transmission
LineLine

GMS CORRIDOR CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Ò Assessment will reveal corridor development level.
7
• Transport corridor: Corridor that physically links
an area or region
• Multimodal corridor: Corridor that physically
links an area or region through the integration of
various modes of transport.
• Logistics corridor: Corridor that not only
physically links an area or a region but also
harmonise the corridor institutional framework
to facilitate the efficient movement and storage
of freight, people and related information.
• Economics corridor: Corridor that is able to
attract investment and generate economic
activities along the less developed area or region.
Physical linkages and logistics facilitation must be
in place in the corridor as a prerequisite.

CORRIDOR @ SUPPLY CHAIN
“A corridor is only as strong as the weakest link.”
8
Corridor Conceptual Framework

NSEC LOGISTICS CORRIDOR MODELLING: COST (2006)

NSEC Logistics corridor modelling: time (2006)

CORRIDOR @ SUPPLY CHAIN
“A corridor is only as strong as the weakest link.”
11
Corridor Conceptual Framework

Ò From a cost-perspective, 42.6% (787 USD) of the total 1,847
USD occurs at border checkpoints and customs.
EWEC Logistics corridor modelling: cost (2007)

Ò Further analysis of the route between Danang to Tak, shows that
43.5% (18 hrs) of the total 41.3-hrs time movement are at
customs or border checkpoints.
Ò Pure transport operations would take less than 24 hours.
EWEC Logistics corridor modelling: time (2007)

LINKING LAND/IWT WITH THROUGH CORRIDORS
Kunming
Nanning

GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT?

GMS CORRIDOR SUMMARY
Ò Infrastructure (hardware) still lacking but
improving.
Ò Rules & regulations (software) in place but
not totally implemented.
Ò Border crossings are still the weakest link in
the corridors.
Ò Transit trade flows minimal compared to
border trade.
Ò No GMS economic corridor only transport
corridors are in place

MACRO LOGISTICS SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
Infrastructure
Logistics
System
Service
Providers
Institutional
Framework
Traders/
Manufacturers

1. GMS LOGISTICS CHARACTERISTICS
Road Port IWT Airport Railway
Guangxi (PRC) Fair/Good Fair Fair Good/Fair Good/Fair
Cambodia Fair/Poor Fair Fair Fair Poor
Lao PDR Fair/Poor Poor Fair/Poor Poor Poor
Myanmar Poor Poor Fair Poor Fair
Thailand Good Fair Fair Good/Fair Poor
Vietnam Fair/Poor Fair Fair Fair Fair
Yunnan (PRC) Fair/Good Fair Fair Good/Fair Good/Fair
Source: Compiled from industry survey data

2. GMS INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Ò Domestics Logistics Activities
É Private sector driven
É Key role played by Ministry of Trade & Ministry of
Transport
É Some overlapping jurisdiction related to
warehouse/distribution centre establishment
Ò International Logistics Activities
É State Agencies such as Customs, Trade and Transport
play a key facilitating role
É Documents needs to be processed by almost all
related agencies
É There exist authority overlaps in the provision of
international logistics related services

3. GMS LSPS ISSUES
Ò Competition is strong between LSPs in the
GMS, between local and multinational LSPs
Ò Lack of cooperation network within GMS
between local LSPs
Ò Distribution centre network is limited in the
region
Ò Difficult to guarantee Logistics Service Quality
levels

4. GMS TRADERS/MANUFACTURERS
Ò Export usually easier than import.
Ò China seems to be the less restrictive.
Ò Lao PDR seems to be the most restrictive.
Ò Not much difference between Cambodia,
Thailand and Vietnam.
Ò Limited data for Myanmar.
Source: adapted from http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/TradingAcrossBorders

4. GMS TRADERS ISSUES
Ò Export
É Average export processing time: 26 days
É Average export processing cost: 882US$/TEU
Ò Import
É Average import processing time: 28 days
É Average import processing cost: 1,030US$/TEU
Source: adapted from http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/TradingAcrossBorders

GMS LOGISTICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Ò GMS countries are at different level of logistics
development.
Ò A common strategy is needed to support GMS
logistics development direction in order to
sustain GMS competitiveness.
Ò National logistics development framework need
to support GMS logistics strategy on key
development themes or issues.

GMS LOGISTICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Definition:
“Logistics development policy is the process of
planning, facilitating, implementing, integrating
and controlling the efficient, effective flow and
storage of freight, people, vehicles and
information within and between logistics
systems, for the purpose of enhancing traders’
competitiveness in order to increase national
and/or regional competitive advantage.”
Banomyong et. al., 2008

7.3
7.2
6
6
54321
Accelerate logistics integration to increase regional
competitiveness
Vision
Objectives
• Develop awareness of logistics concept
• Finalise physical connectivity & linkages
• Implement regional facilitating agreements
Implementation
Principles
Strategic
Agenda
Infrastructure
Institutional
Framework
Logistics Service
Providers
Traders/
Manufacturers
Human
Capacity
Building
• Reduce logistics cost and time
• Increase reliability and security
• Enhanced regional cooperation
Common GMS logistics strategy??
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One Belt One Road Initiative
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk
Road, better known as the One Belt and One Road Initiative (OBOR),
The Belt and Road (B&R) and The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
(OBOR) is a development strategy proposed by China's paramount
leader Xi Jinping that focuses on connectivity and cooperation between
Eurasian countries, primarily the People's Republic of China (PRC), the
land-based Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the oceangoing
Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The strategy underlines China's push to take
a larger role in global affairs with a China-centered trading
network.[2][3] It was unveiled in September and October 2013 for
SREB and MSR respectively. It was also promoted by Premier Li
Keqiang during the state visit to Asia and Europe and the most
frequently mentioned concept in the People's Daily in 2016.[4] It was
initially called One Belt and One Road, but in mid-2016 the official English name
was changed to the Belt and Road Initiative due to misinterpretations of the
term one.[5] In the past three years, the focuses were mainly on infrastructure
investment, construction materials, railway and highway, automobile, real
estate, power grid, and iron and steel.[6]
Contents
1 Vision
China in red, Members of the AIIB in orange, the
six corridors[1] in black

丝绸之
路经济
带和21
世纪海
上丝绸
之路
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu
Pinyin
Sīchóu zhī lù
jīngjìdài hé èrshíyī
shìjì hǎ ishàng
sīchóu zhī lù
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutping si1 cau4 zi1 lou6
ging1 zai3 daai3
wo4 ji6 sap6 jat1
sai3 gei2 hoi2
soeng6 si1 cau4 zi1
lou6
Southern Min
Hokkien
POJ
si-tiû-chi-lo͘ keng-
chè-tài hô jī-si̍p-it
sè-kí hái-siōng si-
tiû-chi-lo͘
One Belt, One Road
Traditional Chinese ⼀帶⼀
2 Infrastructure networks
2.1 Bridging the 'infrastructure gap' in Asia and beyond
2.2 Silk Road Economic Belt
2.3 Maritime Silk Road
2.3.1 East Africa
2.4 Closely related networks
2.5 China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
3 Financial institutions
3.1 AIIB
3.2 Silk Road Fund
4 The geoeconomics of continental integration
4.1 A new kind of multilateralism
4.2 Leveraging China’s infrastructure
5 Culture and education
5.1 University Alliance of the Silk Road
6 Oversight
7 Motivation and controversy
7.1 Motivation
7.2 In Hong Kong
8 See also
9 Further reading
10 References
11 External links

路
Simplified Chinese 一带一
路
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu
Pinyin
Yídài yílù
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutping jat1 daai3 jat1
lou6
Southern Min
Hokkien
POJ
It-tài It-lō͘
Vision
The Belt and Road initiative is geographically structured along 6 corridors, and
the maritime silk road.[7]
New Eurasian Land Bridge, running from Western China to Western Russia
China–Mongolia–Russia Corridor, running from Northern China to Eastern
Russia
China–Central Asia–West Asia Corridor, running from Western China to
Turkey
China–Indochina Peninsula Corridor, running from Southern China to
Singapore
China–Myanmar–Bangladesh–India Corridor, running from Southern China to Myanmar
China–Pakistan Corridor, running from South-Western China to Pakistan
Maritime Silk Road, running from the Chinese Coast through Singapore to the Mediterranean
Infrastructure networks
The coverage area of the initiative is primarily Asia and Europe, encompassing around 60 countries. Oceania
and East Africa are also included. Anticipated cumulative investment over an indefinite timescale is variously
put at US$4 trillion or US$8 trillion.[8][9] The initiative has been contrasted with the two US-centric trading
arrangements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.[9]

A prime example of the network is the Silk Road Railway departed in 2013, which goes through China’s
Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany as a land connection between
Asia and Europe.
Bridging the 'infrastructure gap' in Asia and beyond
The Belt and Road Initiative is expected to bridge the 'infrastructure gap' and thus accelerate economic
growth across the Asia Pacific area and Central and Eastern Europe: World Pensions Council (WPC) experts
estimate that Asia excluding China will need up to $900 billion of infrastructure investments per year during
the next 10 years, mostly in debt instruments. They conclude that current infrastructure spending on the
continent is insufficient by 50%.[10] "The gaping need for long term capital explains why many Asian and
Eastern European heads of state "gladly expressed their interest to join this new international nancial
institution focusing solely on ‘real assets’ and infrastructure-driven economic growth".[11] The Global Times
hosts a news desk dedicated to the Belt and Road Initiative.[12]
Silk Road Economic Belt
When Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Central Asia and Southeast Asia in
September and October 2013, he raised the initiative of jointly building the
Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.
Essentially, the 'belt' includes countries situated on the original Silk Road
through Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The initiative
calls for the integration of the region into a cohesive economic area through
building infrastructure, increasing cultural exchanges, and broadening trade.
Apart from this zone, which is largely analogous to the historical Silk Road,
another area that is said to be included in the extension of this 'belt' is South
Asia and Southeast Asia. Many of the countries that are part of this belt are
also members of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
North, central and south belts are proposed. The North belt would go
The Belt and Road Economies from its
initial plan[13]

through Central Asia, Russia to Europe. The Central belt goes through Central Asia, West Asia to the Persian
Gulf and the Mediterranean. The South belt starts from China to Southeast Asia, South Asia, to the Indian
Ocean through Pakistan. The Chinese One Belt strategy will integrate with Central Asia through Kazakhstan's
Nurly Zhol infrastructure program.[14]
Maritime Silk Road
The Maritime Silk Road, also known as the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" (21世纪海上丝绸之路) is a
complementary initiative aimed at investing and fostering collaboration in Southeast Asia, Oceania, and North
Africa, through several contiguous bodies of water – the South China Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, and the
wider Indian Ocean area.[15][16][17]
The Maritime Silk Road initiative was first proposed by Xi Jinping during a speech to the Indonesian Parliament
in October 2013.[18] Like its sister initiative the Silk Road Economic Belt, most countries in this area have
joined the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
East Africa
In May 2014, Premier Li Keqiang visited Kenya to sign a cooperation agreement with the Kenyan government.
Under this agreement, a railroad line will be constructed connecting Mombasa to Nairobi. When completed,
the railroad will stretch approximately 2,700 kilometers (1677.70 mi.) costing around 250 million USD.[19]
In September 2015, China's Sinomach signed a strategic, cooperative memorandum of understanding with
General Electric. The memorandum of understanding set goals to build wind turbines, to promote clean energy
programs and to increase the number of energy consumers in sub-Saharan Africa.[20]
Closely related networks

Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank
The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic
Corridor are officially classified as "closely related to the Belt and Road Initiative".[21] In coverage by the
media, this distinction is disregarded and the networks are counted as components of the initiative. The CPEC,
in particular, is often regarded as the link between China's maritime and overland silk road, with the port of
Gwadar forming the crux of the CPEC project.
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (Chinese: 中国-巴基斯坦经济走廊; Urdu:
‫راہﺪاری‬ ‫اقتصﺎدی‬ ‫پﺎكستﺎن-ﭼیﻦ‬; also known by the acronym CPEC) is a
collection of infrastructure projects currently under construction throughout
Pakistan. Originally valued at $46 billion, the value of CPEC projects is now
worth $57 billion.[22][23][24] CPEC is intended to rapidly modernize Pakistani
infrastructure and strengthen its economy by the construction of: modern
transportation networks, numerous energy projects, and special economic
zones.[25][26][23][24] On 13 November 2016, CPEC became partly operational
when Chinese cargo was transported overland to Gwadar Port for onward
maritime shipment to Africa and West Asia.[27]
Financial institutions
AIIB
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, first proposed by China in October
2013, is a development bank dedicated to lending for projects regarding
infrastructure. As of 2015, China announced that over one trillion yuan ($160
billion US) of infrastructure projects were in planning or construction.[28]
Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang witnessed the
signing ceremony of CPEC, 22 May 2013

Prospective members
(regional)
Members (regional)
Prospective members (non-
regional)
Members (non-regional)
The primary goals of AIIB are to address the expanding infrastructure needs
across Asia, enhance regional integration, promote economic development
and improve the public access to social services.[29] Board of Governors is
AIIB’s the highest decision-making body under the Asian Infrastructure
Development Bank Articles of Agreement.[30]
On 29 June 2015, the Articles of Agreement of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB), the legal framework was signed in Beijing. The
proposed multilateral bank has an authorized capital of $100 billion, 75% of
which will come from Asian and Oceania countries. China will be the single
largest stakeholder, holding 26% of voting rights. The bank plans to start
operation by year end.[31]
Silk Road Fund
In November 2014, Xi Jinping announced plans to create a 40 billion USD development fund, which will be
distinguished from the banks created for the initiative. As a fund its role will be to invest in businesses rather
than lend money for projects. The Karot Hydropower Project in Pakistan is the first investment project of the
Silk Road Fund, [32] and is not part of the much larger CPEC investment.
In January 2016, Sanxia Construction Corporation began work on the Karot Hydropower Station 50 kilometres
(31 mi) from Islamabad. This is the Silk Road Fund's first foreign investment project. The Chinese government
has already promised to provide Pakistan with at least 350 million USD by 2030 to finance the hydropower
station.[33]
The geoeconomics of continental integration
A new kind of multilateralism

In his 29 March 2015 speech at the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) annual conference, President Xi Jinping said:
[T]he Chinese economy is deeply integrated with the global economy and forms an important driving
force of the economy of Asia and even the world at large. […] China's investment opportunities are
expanding. Investment opportunities in infrastructure connectivity as well as in new technologies,
new products, new business patterns, and new business models are constantly springing up. […]
China's foreign cooperation opportunities are expanding. We support the multilateral trading system,
devote ourselves to the Doha Round negotiations, advocate the Asia-Pacific free trade zone, promote
negotiations on regional comprehensive economic partnership, advocate the construction of the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), boost economic and financial cooperation in an all-round
manner, and work as an active promoter of economic globalization and regional integration[34]
Xi also insisted that, from a geoeconomic standpoint, the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank would foster "economic connectivity and a new-type of industrialization [in the Asia Pacific
area], and [thus] promote the common development of all countries as well as the peoples' joint enjoyment of
development fruits."[35]
Leveraging China’s infrastructure
The deliberate underinvestment in transportation infrastructure in the industrialized world after 1980 and the
pursuit of short-termist export-oriented neoliberal development policies in most Asian and Eastern European
countries[36][37] has allowed China to develop quietly its preeminence in civil works and modern land
transportation technology including high speed rail.[38]
World Pensions Council (WPC) experts have argued the Belt and Road initiative constitutes a natural
international extension of the infrastructure-driven economic development framework that has sustained the
rapid economic growth of China since the adoption of the Chinese economic reform under chairman Deng

Xiaoping,[34] which could eventually reshape the Eurasian economic continuum, and, more generally, the
international economic order.[39]
Culture and education
University Alliance of the Silk Road
A university alliance centered at Xi'an Jiaotong University aims to support the Belt and Road initiative with
research and engineering, and to foster understanding and academic exchange.[40][41] The network extends
beyond the economic zone, and includes law school alliance to "serve the Belt and Road development with
legal spirit and legal culture." [42]
Oversight
The Leading Group for Advancing the Development of One Belt One Road was formed sometime in late 2014,
and its leadership line-up publicized on February 1, 2015. This steering committee reports directly into the
State Council of the People's Republic of China and is composed of several political heavyweights, evidence of
the importance of the program to the government. Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli, who is also a member of the 7-
man Politburo Standing Committee, was named leader of the group, with Wang Huning, Wang Yang, Yang
Jing, and Yang Jiechi being named deputy leaders.[43]
In March 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang called for accelerating the Belt and Road Initiative along with the
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in his
government work report presented to the annual meeting of the country's legislature.
Motivation and controversy

Motivation
Practically, developing infrastructural ties with its neighboring countries will reduce physical and regulatory
barriers to trade by aligning standards.[44] Additionally China is also using the Belt and Road Initiative to
address excess capacity in its industrial sectors, in the hopes that whole production facilities may eventually be
migrated out of China into BRI countries.[45]
A report from Fitch Ratings suggests that China's plan to build ports, roads, railways, and other forms of
infrastructure in under-developed Eurasia and Africa is out of political motivation rather than real demand for
infrastructure. The Fitch report also doubts Chinese banks' ability to control risks, as they do not have a good
record of allocating resources efficiently at home, which may lead to new asset-quality problems for Chinese
banks that most of funding is likely to come from.[46]
The Belt and Road Initiative is believed by analysts Tom Miller, Christopher Balding and Chenggang Xu[47] to
be a way to extend Chinese influence at the expense of the US, in order to fight for regional leadership in
Asia.[48] China has already invested billions of dollars in several South Asian countries like Pakistan, Nepal, Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan to improve their basic infrastructure, with implications for China's trade
regime as well as its military influence. China has emerged as one of the fastest-growing sources of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) into India – it was the 17th largest in 2016, up from the 28th rank in 2014 and 35th
in 2011, according to India’s official ranking of FDI inflows.
Analysis by the Jamestown Foundation suggests that OBOR also serves Xi Jinping's intention to bring about
“top-level design” of economic development, whereby several infrastructure-focused state-controlled firms are
provided with profitable business opportunities in order to maintain high GDP growth.[49] Through the
requirement that provincial-level companies have to apply for loans provided by the Party-state to participate
in regional OBOR projects, Beijing has also been able to take more effective control over China's regions and
reduce "centrifugal forces".[49]
In Hong Kong

During his 2016 policy address, Hong Kong chief executive CY Leung's announced his intention of setting up a
Maritime Authority aimed at strengthening Hong Kong’s maritime logistics in line with Beijing's economic
policy.[50] Leung mentioned "One Belt, One Road" no fewer than 48 times during the policy address,[51] but
the small amount of detail presented, in addition to the macro-economic measures related to the initiative, led
commentators to complain of the address's irrelevance to Hong Kong people because it skirted over matters of
importance to them.[52][53] Leung's alleged overemphasis was seen as a sycophantic promotion of Xi Jinping's
concept, and was widely lampooned.
See also
Asian Highway Network
Trans-Asian Railway
Further reading
World Pensions Council (WPC) policy paper: Chinese Revolution Could Lure Overseas Investment (https://
www.fnlondon.com/articles/chinese-revolution-could-lure-overseas-investment-nicholas-firzli-20151012),
Dow Jones Financial News, October 12, 2015
New York Times - Behind China's $1 Trillion Plan (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/china-r
ailway-one-belt-one-road-1-trillion-plan.html), May 13, 2017
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51. "We get it, CY ... One Belt, One Road gets record-breaking 48 mentions in policy address" (http://www.sc
mp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/1901017/one-belt-one-road-gets-record-breaking-48-mentions-h
ong-kong). South China Morning Post. 13 January 2016.
52. "【政情】被「洗版」特首辦官員調職瑞士" (http://news.now.com/home/local/player?newsId=165175).

External links
Belt and Road Portal (https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/)
Belt and Road Initiative - Hong Kong (http://www.beltandroad.gov.hk/)
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=One_Belt_One_Road_Initiative&oldid=804003057"
This page was last edited on 6 October 2017, at 01:46.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may apply.
By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark
of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.
53. "2016 Policy Address: too macro while too micro" (http://www.ejinsight.com/20160114-2016-policy-addre
ss-too-macro-while-too-micro/). EJ Insight.

Drivers of Forest Change in the Greater Mekong
Subregion
Myanmar Country Report

i
USAID Lowering Emissions in Asia’s Forests (USAID
LEAF)
Drivers of Deforestation in the Greater Mekong Subregion
Myanmar Country Report
Maung Maung Than
September 2015

ii
The USAID Lowering Emissions in Asia’s Forests (USAID LEAF) Program is a five-year
regional project (2011-2016) focused on achieving meaningful and sustainable reductions in
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the forest-land use sector across six target countries:
Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea.
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), or of the USAID Lowering Emissions in Asia’s
Forests (USAID LEAF) Program concerning the legal or development status of any country,
territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or
boundaries. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not
these have been patented or trademarked, does not imply that these have been endorsed or
recommended by FAO or USAID LEAF in preference to others of a similar nature that are not
mentioned. The views expressed in this information product are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views or policies of FAO or USAID LEAF or its Board of Governors, or
the governments it represents. Neither FAO nor USAID LEAF guarantees the accuracy of the
data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use.

One Belt One Road Greater Mekong Subregion-Economic Corridors and Myanmar

One Belt One Road Greater Mekong Subregion-Economic Corridors and Myanmar

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