State and society in the process of democratization

State and Society in the Process of Democratization
By: Jose Magadia S.J.
The Philippine policy cases analyzed in the previous chapters are not unique in the
developing world. They are empirical manifestations of the recent global phenomenon of
the encounter between reinvigorated civil societies and governments struggling to reorder
political institutions in a more liberalized ambit. On the one hand, the break-down of many
authoritarian regimes in the 1980s led to the resurgence of democratic rule, in one or
another of many versions that varied in their degrees of openness to strategies for societal
demand articulation and participation. On the other hand, the various types of civilian
mass movements and organizations that accompanied or facilitated the transitions have
had to reconstitute themselves in the aftermath, and discover new ways of relating with
the state in the liberalized political setting. As these two elements come into play in the
democracies that have recently emerged or reemerged, new and often creative modes of
state-society relations have arisen.
State and society actors have come together to form and implement policy, lay out plans
for contingencies, bargain for redistribution of resources, provide auxiliary services, run
programs for education, agree on terms of negotiation, negotiate for the settlement of
disputes, and others. One finds societal organizations participating at various stages of
policy making and in distinct policy areas. For instance, Colombia’s Centro de
Cooperacion al Indigena (CECOIN), an NGO, has facilitated communication between
indigenous communities and public agencies, for such tasks as land titling, administration
of natural resources, and the provision of technical resources (Ritchey-Vance 1991, 71ff).
In Argentina, the Movimiento Comunitario was formed in 1987, bringing together
cooperatives from several cities into a national federation community to further a
governmental housing policy for self-construction and to access public funds for this
purpose (Silva and Schuurman 1989, 58). In Peru, the Centro de Estudios Para el
Desarrollo y la Participacion (CEDEP), a large organization with projects on the national
and local levels, has coordinated with government in organizing rural projects for farmers
in the Cajatambo region (Theunis 1992, 97). Other cases presented in the 1997 volume
edited by Chalmers et al. present a similar picture.
These examples point to the pervasiveness of a new politics of interaction between state
and society. For governments, this has led to a widening of perspectives in the integration
of societal actors as participants in extra electoral political activities, and a shifting from a
politics of co-optation to one of devolution. For societal organizations, this has expanded
the repertoires of demand making, moving from a politics of protest and contention to one
of influence and reform.
Significantly, the participation and influence of societal organizations are more manifested
on the level of local government and in the implementation phase of policy making. This
is understandable, since in many developing countries, subnational levels of government,
and of the bureaucracy in particular, enjoy less access to resources and welcome all
forms of external help. Complementarily, societal organizations at this level have
emphasized parallel alternative project-based activities, often not incompatible with local

government objectives. These have included organizations for relief and welfare
provision, technology transfer, human development (self-help, education, income
generation), and community organizing (cooperatives, cause-oriented and/or sector-
based advocacy groups). In some cases, societal organizations have even cooperated
with local governments and subnational bureaucratic offices in implementing various
developmental projects.
Yet, as the Philippine cases show, it is possible for societal organizations to expand their
influence up to the level of national policy making, even in a generally in hospitable
context. Indeed, even as experiences of consolidation differ, the glaring and continuing
socio-economic and political inequalities in many of these countries cast serious doubts
on representativeness within political institutions. Worse still for the poorer sectors that
together constitute the vast majorities in these countries, the hegemony of the neoliberal
orientation has produced policies that have failed to adequately address basic human
needs, even as they are rationalized by classical long-term trickle-down economics. While
the failures of extensive state interventionism and the challenges of a more liberalized
economic and political environment have taught politicians to survive, the right policy mix
still has to be found, to balance the free market with social responsibility.
In the political arena, inequality is manifest in the societal organizations’ lack of access to
policy decision making. The split between policy deliberation and decision-making is a
phenomenon shared by many of the new democracies in the developing world. Thus, if
one were to just analyze policy decision making, it would seem adequate to focus mainly
on the decisions and orientations of policy elite actors. These elite actors would be those
who could afford to launch expensive campaigns to win seats in national policy-making
bodies, who jealously hold on to these powers, who enjoy a high degree of autonomy as
they are largely unaccountable to any grassroots interest, and who negotiate and bargain
with each other to maximize their gains within conventional political institutions. To break
into this elite domain, societal outsiders still often resort to various protest strategies which
continue to be a valid, effective, and even necessary means of articulating alternative
demands.
What the Philippine cases highlight is that new modes of state-society relations are
possible, even on the highest level of national policy making, and even in political settings
dominated by structural inequality. On the one hand, the informal consensus of recent
times as to the minimum features of democracy has provided the impetus for
governments to make ample room for citizens’ groups which act autonomously of
conventional political institutions like political parties, and which are given voice, short of
voting power, in national policy-making bodies. Hence, alternative arenas for state-society
interaction have arisen. On the other hand, societal organizations have correspondingly
been able to employ new skills, as well as media and technology, to express their ideas
and preferences, to explore new avenues of dialogue and networking, and to negotiate
with government agencies and representatives. Characterized by rhetorical and
communicative rationality in both substance and strategy, the new approach to
government by such societal organizations has given them greater leverage in bargaining

with power holders. The variation in the activities of state and society actors with regard
to specific issues creates the political context for interaction.
The findings of this study suggest that for similar cases of national policy making in other
emerging democracies, the extent of societal participation can be explained precisely by
this conjunction of factors. Moreover, the cases also suggest the institutionalization of
civil society, not so much in terms of the consolidation of societal organizations, but more
in terms of the regularity of their input into political processes. Even while accepting that
societal organizations have not yet become more influential in terms of substantial policy
output, their acceptance within conventional political institutions as autonomous dialogue
partners makes possible more substantial influence in policy making in the future.
The Democratizing State
The post authoritarian experience of the recognition, inclusion, and acceptance of
autonomous societal actors as participants in political processes leads to an
understanding of some of the strengths and weaknesses of the democratizing state, vis-
a-vis the new politics of interaction. Highlighted as well are the implications as to what
must take place in government, if these democratizing developments are to be maintained
and even expanded. These are discussed below under four headings: democracy as
ideology, democratic institutions, building state capacity, and redefining the role of the
state.
Democracy as Ideology. Prior to actual transition, a renewed understanding,
redefinition, and reevaluation of democracy took place in many authoritarian-ruled
developing countries. This is part of what Chalmers et al. (1997) speak of as political
learning, undergone by those who led the opposition against authoritarian rule, and who
subsequently assumed leadership roles in the new democracy. The experience of
oppression and the denial of civil rights made democracy the rallying point for resistance,
and the envisioned endpoint of the planned-for transitions.
Consequently during the authoritarian period, the learning was taking place when
opposition leaders clarified to themselves the meaning of democracy as an overall
political system, and as a set of corresponding processes, strategies, and tactics. Thus
began the ideological hegemony of democracy that would subsequently lead to its
becoming “the only game in town,” to use the Linz/Stepan definition of consolidation. Just
as this vision and its hegemony have been sources of strength in the state’s pursuit of
democratization, its ongoing review and reaffirmation are necessary for its survival and
expansion.
A central feature in this ongoing evaluation is the provision for consultation mechanisms.
Regardless of whether they are traditional or innovative, these mechanisms demand a
heightened responsiveness to societal signals. These signals are communicated by such
conventional political activities as electoral exercises, as well as less conventional ones
such as mass mobilizations; they are also transmitted through different mass media that
have been truly liberated from any form of state censorship. Moreover, the mechanisms

call for openness to the inclusion of nontraditional actors in the determination of political
outcomes.
After the authoritarian breakdown in the Philippines, for instance, the incorporation of
these nontraditional actors was realized in various ways: the appointment of civil society
leaders to government positions, the creation of new government offices for consultation,
and the general acceptance of nonstate actors as participants in policy processes. The
institution of functional representation as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution was an
important innovation, one of the important institutional developments that have to be not
only preserved but also expanded. Such an expansion and consolidation would signal the
effective institutionalization of civil society, and maximized measures for more effective
societal participation which would make possible more substantive policy influence from
these nonconventional political actors.
Democratic Institutions. The foregoing discussion of mechanisms for consultation and
representation also form part of the continuing complementary task of establishing stable
institutions that correspond to democratic ideals. In this respect, redemocratizing
societies like the Philippines enjoy an advantage over brand-new democracies in that
they already had much of the bureaucratic infrastructure set in place, thus easing the
establishment of consultative mechanisms and contributing to their effectiveness. In
addition, empirical historical models and ideals were available for easy reference in the
process of democratic restoration. Such foundational institutions as elections, a
constitution, a system of checks and balances among distinct and autonomous branches
of government, and basic civil and human rights were speedily restored.
Accompanying the restoration of these institutions was a reopening of the state to a
plurality of actors and ideas and dynamics that manifested a certain degree of systemic
integrity, such that developments in one or another level or branch of government
influenced developments in others. For instance, in the cases presented, the
incorporative ability of executive line agencies in the three policy areas prompted the
legislature to include societal inputs in social reform issues. Relations between executive
and legislative leaders and institutions were thus positive enough to maintain spaces for
the participation of nonstate actors.
One of the ironies of the Philippine experience is that the intrinsic weakness of its political
party system has opened the state to the new politics of interaction. In the absence of
strong mass-based, ideologically distinct political parties with clear programmatic
platforms, and with the consequent party switching by traditional politicos seeking to stay
in power, societal organizations have been able to fill a political gap. They have been
accepted by traditional elite power holders and technocrats as autonomous partners in
some of the processes involved in governance. This differentiates the Philippines (as well
as Brazil and Ecuador) from countries like Chile, where stronger political party systems
have led to the co-optation of civil society organizations by parties and their apparent
demobilization (Oxhorn 1995, 272ff; Schneider 1995, 19lff; Taylor 1998, 104ff).

Ironically, as this study has shown, this source of support for the new politics of interaction
also has its downside. Indeed, one of the processes that the elite have jealously reserved
to themselves is the critical phase of decision-making, which has remained closed to more
direct participation by societal organizations. This is an area for further liberalization in
the future. If democratization is to move on, clearer links will have to be established
between societal organizations and political parties. An ideal that does not depend on
short-term tactical bargains would be the development of political parties toward some
form of ideological position and the programmatic strategies this will entail. This need not,
however, lead to co-optation and demobilization of societal organizations, which could
still maintain their autonomy if they are careful about the substance and manner of their
links to such parties.
Clearer links between societal organizations and more programmatic parties could also
contribute to the institutionalization of openings in government that were initiated in a
seemingly ad hoc manner. For instance, the informal openings that manifested the
democratization of the Philippine Congress, and other such temporary measures, might
be accepted as part of regular procedures. Further democratization would then not only
be facilitated; it would also be fortified by new institutions for coordinating multiple levels
and actors of policy making that can offer a more efficient alternative to old and bankrupt
systems such as centralized political party control or various corporatist arrangements.
Finally, these links, along with ideological development, would strengthen the
representational quality of political parties. Here, one of the more recent models is Brazil’s
Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers’ Party; cf. Keck 1992; Sandoval 1993). Should
this take place in the Philippines, the participation of societal organizations would be
moving beyond policy deliberation to actual and substantial influence on decision-making.
State Capacity. A third area of concern has to do with the continuing rationalization of
government functions and structures. This refers to two corollary tasks that would
enhance a politics of interaction: the reduction of corruption in government, and the
building of state capacity for more effective, efficient, and responsive administration.
Grindle (1997) has called this “good government,” not referring to an expansion of the
public sector but, rather, its streamlining for maximum effectiveness.
Negatively, this calls for a check on corruption; positively, this means institutional reform
and human resource development within institutions. For as long as state efficiency and
consistency are impaired by rent-seeking agents in government, the gains of
democratization are minimized, substantial and procedural productivity is stunted, prompt
action is made difficult, and state-society interaction is strained and obstructed. To
remedy this lack of efficiency, every government agency should make sure that every
office designed to integrate inputs from civil society actors is utilized to the full. Also
central is a rational system for the implementation and follow-up of legislation or of
executive administrative directives. Limiting rhetoric is not only inadequate; it can also
seriously erode the credibility of even the most progressive policy statement.

The Role of the State. To preserve and strengthen a politics of interaction, the state will
have to more actively assume a supervisory role for the various subprocesses that have
been enabled in new democracies. This is not a return to what Touraine (1994, 46ff) calls
“the mobilizing state,” associated with various forms of centralized control (e.g. through a
centralized planned economy, or through an authoritarian-based technocracy). In this
mobilizing model, objectives of political integration, economic growth, and social
redistribution were brought together into a single unified model designed by the state, and
not negotiated by the various social partners involved in the processes. The complexity
and multiplicity of forms and objectives in this model hid some major in- consistencies,
sending countries into economic and political crises and exposing the model’s inherent
instability.
Instead of this bankrupt model, the alternative that a politics of interaction implies moves
toward reinvention, where state supervision consists in striking a balance between
guardianship and enabling of autonomous subprocesses, and the maintenance of a rule
of law on the one hand, and social responsibility on the other. Bradford (1994, 23)
describes this in terms of vision articulation, support mobilization, and policy prioritization.
Specifically, for instance, in the context of blind neoliberal market-oriented proposals, the
provision of an overall and consistent social agenda is a necessity. In the Philippine
cases, for instance, President Aquino’s narrow option for political institutional restoration
unnecessarily excluded a comprehensive and coherent overall social agenda. Thus in the
area of social policy, her administration proceeded in an ad hoc, circumstance-driven
manner. Her hands-off policy in agrarian reform was a glaring contrast to the involved
and consistent support of the generic drugs initiative by her Health secretary, Alfredo
Bengzon. This lack of consistency highlighted the absence of an integrated framework
for socioeconomic reform necessary for long-term democratic survival.
Societal Organizations in the New Democracies
The other collective participant of a politics of interaction is composed of those actors
identified with civil society. In this study, the relevant collective actor identified is the
societal organization, whose contribution to democratization in the Philippines and in
many other developing countries has proven indispensable. Clearly, the system is still in
flux, as both positive and negative features of the societal organizations have at times
cancelled each other out. For a politics of interaction to take fuller effect, some of the
features of societal organizations that this study encountered have to be further
strengthened, while others have to be downplayed, corrected, or even gradually
eliminated. These are discussed in this section under two headings: positive legacies
from authoritarian rule; and reformism and a strategic repertoire.
Continuities: Positive Legacies from the Authoritarian Period. Jelin (1998) speaks of
new forms of interest expression that have emerged in many recently restored
democracies in Latin America. She points out that these new forms of collective action
coincided with opposition to authoritarian regimes. In the absence of conventional
democratic institutions for demand articulation (e.g. political parties, a free press,

autonomous legislatures, electoral exercises), and in a context of state repression and
nonresponsiveness, these alternative organizations were set up as fora for criticism of
government, and as the main mechanism for catalyzing the transition from authoritarian
rule. Here, as in many other experiences, the Philippines conforms to Latin American
patterns. Confirming Jelin’s observations, in the Philippines and in many other new or
newly restored democracies, these organizations have proven more resilient than
anticipated. In other words, societal organizations have shown that they are here to stay.
Moreover as mentioned above, in countries like the Philippines and Brazil, characterized
by weak patronage-driven party systems, these societal organizations have continued to
be effective alternative channels for the expression of collective demands in restored
democracies, addressing themselves to the state, while acting independently of traditional
political parties. These new forms of interest expression have effectively protected
themselves from co-optation and subsequent demobilization.
Consequently, their continued efforts at the grassroots organizing for demand making and
policy implementation have become necessary for an authentic politics of interaction,
especially in expanding areas of concern, and a broadening concept of citizenship. The
Philippine cases have shown how central the theme of participatory citizenship is for
consolidation of democracy.
Democratic Reformist Orientation and an Expanding Strategic Repertoire. A critical
societal feature that has enabled engagement was a reorientation toward reformism,
involving a sacrifice of more drastic and speedy social solutions and, for some extremists,
the abandonment of sweeping ideological projects of state takeover. Just as the
ideological hegemony of democracy among the elite was the result of political learning
from the experience of repressive authoritarianism, so, too, was the turn toward reform,
which was a reaffirmation of the same renewed understanding of democracy on the part
of societal actors at the grassroots.1 The learning was an acknowledgment that long-term
development cannot be achieved by coercion, and cannot compromise basic civil and
human rights.
Along with this reaffirmation of such basic democratic ideals was an acceptance of
democratic strategies which were likewise reformist. This meant a willingness to
concentrate on more specific objectives and demands, and to adopt more minimal
procedural compromises as medium-term objectives, without necessarily giving up a
more substantial vision of social democracy. This also meant willingness to work with
traditional elite, including those in political parties, even while safeguarding autonomy.
Through these, the vibrancy of civil society can be preserved.
This is akin to what Adler and Webster (1995, 80) call “radical reform,” a strategic use of
power “that combines a radical vision with a strategy of reform” that keeps in mind longer-
term goals as piecemeal reform victories are pursued through legal struggles. While Adler
and Webster’s use of radical reform is applied to the positive role of South African labor
unions during a transition, the Philippine experience shows how the same strategy can
be pursued in a new democracy. Confirming some of Adler and Weber’s hunches (1995:

99), this study has shown that indeed the influence of societal organizations depends
partly on the organizations’ strength and ability to marshal their resources strategically,
and take advantage of openings in the new democratic state.
The application of radical reform in the Philippine policy cases shows how clear objectives
can facilitate innovation and creativity in reform-oriented societal organizations. In the
case of agrarian reform, for instance, the impressive variety of strategies employed was
important to CPAR’s cause. Yet more significantly, it was clear to CPAR that these
substrategies were centered on the reformist objective of passing a more redistributive
law. All the demonstrations, rallies, marches, signature campaigns, etc. were
acknowledged as secondary to, and auxiliaries of, the main activity—programmatic
demand making and advocacy before Congress.
What is important is that further innovation follows from a fundamental willingness to
engage government and to participate in conventional political activities. While this does
not preclude the use of protest, an expanded repertoire nevertheless communicates an
openness to dialogue and discussion. On the part of societal organizations, it also calls
for familiarity with policy-making institutions and processes. The case of CPAR was
exemplary; but its example still has to be emulated in other policy areas.
The above discussion is linked to what Hipsher (1998, 157) describes as an
institutionalization of dissent or protest in restored democracies, where societal demand
makers more greatly rely “on negotiations, the electoral process, and working through
government institutions and agencies.” The Philippine experience follows what Hipsher
describes as the Brazilian pattern of political parties and overall political systems that are
open to demand-making societal pressures, resulting in the inclusion of autonomous
societal organizations in the various political processes. This openness, Hipsher (1998:
171) points out, deepens the democratization process and strengthens a democracy by
incorporating, instead of marginalizing, autonomous societal pressures. Moreover, this
deepening is also achieved, since links with the state and with parties function as a
countercheck on societal organization, and a protection against dangers associated with
their lack of clear institutional and societal accountability.2 It is also possible that such
links of societal organizations with a weak party system will facilitate the development of
parties which would be more programmatic and less patronage- or personality-oriented.
What the Philippine cases further suggest is that such institutionalization can still combine
conventional forms of collective action with activities that might even be disruptive and
threatening, like mobilizations. This combination is but another manifestation of the
expanded repertoire that increases the effectiveness of societal organizations and can
help protect their autonomy. Katzenstein (1998, 195ff) points out that the distinction
between institutional and protest politics is overdrawn. In conventional social movement
theory, when a societal movement or organization shifts from street politics to more
conventional forms of political activism (lob-bying, voting), a threshold is crossed from
protest to institutional politics that constitutes a deradicalization. Katzenstein emphasizes
that such a sharp demarcation sidesteps the need to demonstrate and explain their
linkage. It tends to ignore the oft-stated reminder of the difficulty of locating where state

begins and society ends. Finally, it also generalizes to the point of brushing aside more
subtle variations in the experiences of different social movements.
Another Look at Democratic Consolidation
In the extensive and still growing collection of works on democratic transition and
consolidation, many subtopics have been analyzed. These include popular legitimization,
the institutionalization of electoral and political party systems, civilian supremacy over the
military, state decentralization, judicial reform, the regularization of political processes in
the different levels of government, the instilling of democratic values, social democratic
reform, the reinstatement of the rule of law, the protection of economic and political
freedoms and rights, the rationalization of the bureaucracy, and others. There is no doubt
that each of these deserves the attention that both scholars and political leaders have
already given and continue to give them. Still, however, a continuing tension owing to the
unpredictability of outcomes cannot be avoided. Not only is eventual consolidation
dependent on events that cannot be completely anticipated; but the final form as well of
such a consolidation cannot be adequately foreseen or prepared for. The policy
experiences related in this study may prove to be the beginnings of a true “thickening” of
civil society (Fox 1998, 120ff), in a new reincarnation of democracy in a developing
setting; but then again, it may also be just another signal of continuing no consolidation.
In the end, the results can only be borne out in time, and this study has aimed to contribute
to data analysis to help social scientists understand these dynamics.
Focusing on political context and the degree of political catalysis, this work suggests a
framework that is able to integrate the double concern of disaggregation and the
incorporation of nongovernmental public arenas. It is able to bring into the consolidation
purview such integral themes as social movements and civil society, state-society
relationships, public policy processes, and interest representation.
Guide Questions:
1. How did societal organizations participate in the redemocratization process of the
Philippines (post-1986)?
2. What are the challenges of this expanded role?
3. How can the Philippine state maintain these gains?

State and society in the process of democratization

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Similar to State and society in the process of democratization

Similar to State and society in the process of democratization (20)

More from Maryjoydailo

More from Maryjoydailo (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

State and society in the process of democratization