Smart Grids
are for
Dumb People
Over 40% of 2012 incidents were
energy related as documented by
DHS. The risks of a smart grid are
undoubtedly higher than traditional
2015 cyber attack on Ukranian
infrastructure leaves a quarter million
International Bankers are pushing countries such as Ukraine to commit to investing in
increased vulnerability of critical infrastructure that can endanger millions of lives!
DISTRIBUTED RENEWABLES
DON’T FIX THE PROBLEM
Resources such as wind and solar are highly variable in output and
require compensation by FACTS and natural gas turbine backup.
FLEXIBLE AC
TRANSMISSION
SYSTEMS
Compensation opens up
the grid to instabilities!
• Actuated Systems
• Switched Impedance
• Synchronous Condenser or
STATCOM
• Stabilization
• Power Flow Control
• Phase Shift Transformer
• Tap Changing Transformer
• Dispatchable Generators
Wind causes severe
frequency fluctuations both
above and below 60 Hz as
higher variability causes
inadvertent energy
exchange.
We are observing the
gradual destabilization
of the critical
infrastructure that
allows developed
nations to have high
standards of living.
We must return our
grids to hydro, coal,
and nuclear power.
3 Kinds of Attacks
- Spoofing sensor data
- Denial of service
- Control
Reconfiguration
Suppliers of PMUs
Schweitzer Engineering Labs
Relab Software - Arbiter Systems -
GE Multilin - ABB - Siemens
Identifying Phase
Measurement Units
Current
Transformer
(3 phase)
Potential
Transformer
(2 Phase)
US Deployment of PMUs (publically available information)
It is so easy to spoof the
unauthenticated input of GPS
systems, that it is used to hack
PokeMon Go.
1.Identify local or
regional PMUs
2.Determine required
GPS spoofer power & deployment
3.Synchronize spoofer network to GPS satellite
4.Begin broadcasting without tripping PLL
5.Shift phase synchronization clocks as required
(1 degree per 46.1 us timeshift)
Frequency-Domain
Analysis of
Electromechanical
Disturbances in
Electric Power
Systems
S. Mohapatra, H.
Zhu, T.J. Overbye
Causing phase angle
disturbances of ~25
degrees regionally
would trigger significant
contingent actions by
smart grid systems.
What about the other attacks??
- In general, the vast majority of SCADA based grid control
systems were not designed with security in mind.
- Access points are ubiquitous. Once you are in the master-
slave network you can map and attack!
PROTOCOL PORT
MODBUS 502
DNP 19999
DNP3 (IEEE815-2012)20000
FIELDBUS 1089-91
ETHERNET/IP 2222
ETHERCAT 34980
PROFINET 34962-64
GOOSE 102
Andrew Dodson - Smart grids are stupid ideas
Andrew Dodson - Smart grids are stupid ideas
Andrew Dodson - Smart grids are stupid ideas

Andrew Dodson - Smart grids are stupid ideas

  • 1.
  • 2.
    Over 40% of2012 incidents were energy related as documented by DHS. The risks of a smart grid are undoubtedly higher than traditional
  • 3.
    2015 cyber attackon Ukranian infrastructure leaves a quarter million
  • 4.
    International Bankers arepushing countries such as Ukraine to commit to investing in increased vulnerability of critical infrastructure that can endanger millions of lives!
  • 5.
    DISTRIBUTED RENEWABLES DON’T FIXTHE PROBLEM Resources such as wind and solar are highly variable in output and require compensation by FACTS and natural gas turbine backup.
  • 6.
    FLEXIBLE AC TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS Compensation opensup the grid to instabilities! • Actuated Systems • Switched Impedance • Synchronous Condenser or STATCOM • Stabilization • Power Flow Control • Phase Shift Transformer • Tap Changing Transformer • Dispatchable Generators
  • 8.
    Wind causes severe frequencyfluctuations both above and below 60 Hz as higher variability causes inadvertent energy exchange.
  • 9.
    We are observingthe gradual destabilization of the critical infrastructure that allows developed nations to have high standards of living. We must return our grids to hydro, coal, and nuclear power.
  • 10.
    3 Kinds ofAttacks - Spoofing sensor data - Denial of service - Control Reconfiguration
  • 11.
    Suppliers of PMUs SchweitzerEngineering Labs Relab Software - Arbiter Systems - GE Multilin - ABB - Siemens
  • 12.
    Identifying Phase Measurement Units Current Transformer (3phase) Potential Transformer (2 Phase)
  • 13.
    US Deployment ofPMUs (publically available information)
  • 14.
    It is soeasy to spoof the unauthenticated input of GPS systems, that it is used to hack PokeMon Go.
  • 15.
    1.Identify local or regionalPMUs 2.Determine required GPS spoofer power & deployment 3.Synchronize spoofer network to GPS satellite 4.Begin broadcasting without tripping PLL 5.Shift phase synchronization clocks as required (1 degree per 46.1 us timeshift)
  • 16.
    Frequency-Domain Analysis of Electromechanical Disturbances in ElectricPower Systems S. Mohapatra, H. Zhu, T.J. Overbye Causing phase angle disturbances of ~25 degrees regionally would trigger significant contingent actions by smart grid systems.
  • 19.
    What about theother attacks?? - In general, the vast majority of SCADA based grid control systems were not designed with security in mind. - Access points are ubiquitous. Once you are in the master- slave network you can map and attack!
  • 21.
    PROTOCOL PORT MODBUS 502 DNP19999 DNP3 (IEEE815-2012)20000 FIELDBUS 1089-91 ETHERNET/IP 2222 ETHERCAT 34980 PROFINET 34962-64 GOOSE 102

Editor's Notes

  • #19 US politicians are allocating millions of dollars in an aggressive effort to study the security of cyber-physical systems that comprise the US electrical grid and other critical infrastructure. Inspiration for this measure comes from a December 2015 attack on a Ukrainian power grid that left 225,000 citizens in the dark. Attackers targeted industrial control systems at three energy companies, Bill supporters say the outage could have been worse if Ukraine was not also using manual (dumb) technology to run its grid. Stupid is simply safe…
  • #25 So