The document evaluates the security model of 3G wireless networks. It begins with an overview of 1G and 2G wireless technologies and their limitations. It then describes the key security principles of 3G networks, which were designed to address issues with previous generations like weak encryption algorithms and lack of data integrity. The document outlines both the security architecture and new features of 3G, such as network authentication and stronger encryption, that provide improved security compared to earlier standards.
The key security elements for 4G include key security for authentication between network components, authorization using authentication vectors, and key management for key establishment and distribution. However, 4G networks are susceptible to interference, jamming, location tracking, bandwidth theft, and denial of service attacks due to their open and standardized nature. Proper security mechanisms must be implemented to protect users and critical network infrastructure.
This document summarizes a presentation on 4G network security vulnerabilities from the perspective of hackers. It discusses the transition from earlier mobile network generations to 4G, provides an overview of 4G network architecture and components, and identifies specific vulnerabilities found in Diameter Routing Agents, Packet Data Network Gateways, and Home Subscriber Servers from penetration testing. It emphasizes that 4G networks use many of the same IP-based protocols and components as traditional IP networks, and therefore face similar security issues if best practices are not followed, such as patching systems, network segmentation, access control, and monitoring. The presentation concludes by calling for greater security maturity of 4G network protocols and for vendors and operators to adopt standard IP network security practices.
GSM security features include subscriber identity protection using TMSIs, key management using shared Kis, equipment authentication using IMEIs, and signaling and data encryption using A3, A8, and A5 algorithms. However, these security mechanisms have been weakened over time as the algorithms have been cracked or leaked, allowing for fraud and privacy risks. Potential improvements include using stronger cryptographic algorithms for authentication and encryption and encrypting traffic on the operator's backbone network.
The document discusses the SonicWALL Network Security Appliance Series which provides next generation unified threat management protection utilizing multi-core hardware and patented Reassembly-Free Deep Packet Inspection technology. The NSA Series provides intrusion prevention, anti-virus, anti-spyware, application control and other security features while maintaining high performance. It is available in various models suitable for organizations of different sizes.
The document discusses security mechanisms in GSM networks. It first outlines the goals of security for operators and customers. It then describes the four main security principles of GSM: user authentication, ciphering of data and signals, confidentiality of user identity, and use of the SIM as a security module. The document reviews two papers on vehicle security and anti-theft systems using GSM and GPS. It compares the papers and identifies some shortcomings of such systems, such as weaker connectivity in rural areas. Finally, it concludes the systems can help reduce vehicle theft if implemented widely.
The key security elements for 4G include key security for authentication between network components, authorization using authentication vectors, and key management for key establishment and distribution. However, 4G networks are susceptible to interference, jamming, location tracking, bandwidth theft, and denial of service attacks due to their open and standardized nature. Proper security mechanisms must be implemented to protect users and critical network infrastructure.
This document summarizes a presentation on 4G network security vulnerabilities from the perspective of hackers. It discusses the transition from earlier mobile network generations to 4G, provides an overview of 4G network architecture and components, and identifies specific vulnerabilities found in Diameter Routing Agents, Packet Data Network Gateways, and Home Subscriber Servers from penetration testing. It emphasizes that 4G networks use many of the same IP-based protocols and components as traditional IP networks, and therefore face similar security issues if best practices are not followed, such as patching systems, network segmentation, access control, and monitoring. The presentation concludes by calling for greater security maturity of 4G network protocols and for vendors and operators to adopt standard IP network security practices.
GSM security features include subscriber identity protection using TMSIs, key management using shared Kis, equipment authentication using IMEIs, and signaling and data encryption using A3, A8, and A5 algorithms. However, these security mechanisms have been weakened over time as the algorithms have been cracked or leaked, allowing for fraud and privacy risks. Potential improvements include using stronger cryptographic algorithms for authentication and encryption and encrypting traffic on the operator's backbone network.
The document discusses the SonicWALL Network Security Appliance Series which provides next generation unified threat management protection utilizing multi-core hardware and patented Reassembly-Free Deep Packet Inspection technology. The NSA Series provides intrusion prevention, anti-virus, anti-spyware, application control and other security features while maintaining high performance. It is available in various models suitable for organizations of different sizes.
The document discusses security mechanisms in GSM networks. It first outlines the goals of security for operators and customers. It then describes the four main security principles of GSM: user authentication, ciphering of data and signals, confidentiality of user identity, and use of the SIM as a security module. The document reviews two papers on vehicle security and anti-theft systems using GSM and GPS. It compares the papers and identifies some shortcomings of such systems, such as weaker connectivity in rural areas. Finally, it concludes the systems can help reduce vehicle theft if implemented widely.
The Bluegiga Access Server enables wireless networking between multiple devices and networks. It supports Bluetooth, Ethernet, Wi-Fi and GSM/GPRS connectivity. The device is easy to deploy, manage and remotely upgrade. It is targeted at system integrators and OEMs wanting to deploy a secure, low power wireless network for Bluetooth-enabled devices in applications like marketing, medical devices, and machine-to-machine systems.
This document discusses cryptography in GSM networks. It provides background on common security requirements and introduces cryptography techniques like symmetric-key cryptography, public-key cryptography, and cryptographic hashes. It then discusses cryptography specifically used in GSM networks, including the A5/1 and A5/3 algorithms used for encryption. It notes issues with the security of these algorithms and proposes improving GSM network security.
The document discusses industrial communications solutions from GE Digital Energy, including wireless and fiber optic products. Specifically, it describes MDS industrial wireless systems for data acquisition, LAN extension, and backhaul. It also discusses Lentronics fiber optic multiplexers. The document provides information on applications, features, and positioning of these products for critical infrastructure industries like energy, transportation, and heavy industrial.
Overview brochure of General Electric's Microwave Data Systems Division. World's leading provider of industrial-strength wireless products to transmit data for your mission-critical applications.
The SonicWALL TZ Series appliances provide uncompromising network security performance through SonicWALL's reassembly-free deep packet inspection and unified threat management. The TZ Series delivers comprehensive protection against viruses, spyware, intrusions and other threats at network speeds up to gigabit ethernet. It also offers secure wireless connectivity, VPN access, anti-spam filtering, application controls and other features to protect distributed enterprise networks in a cost-effective appliance.
This paper clarifies the standards defined around LTE network security by standard development organizations including 3GPP, ITU, ETSI, and industry group NGMN. It also examines the different security borders of the mobile network, and delves deeper into the requirements of the Mobile Access Border - the border between the RAN and the core (S1).
The document summarizes GSM security mechanisms. It discusses GSM security objectives of confidentiality, anonymity, and authentication. It then describes some key GSM security mechanisms like TMSI for subscriber identity protection, key management using Ki, and the A3/A8/A5 authentication and encryption algorithms. It also provides details on the SIM card anatomy and its role in the authentication process.
PriveComms PriveIN mesh digital operation field overview 2020Arimo Koivisto
PriveIN provides a secure mesh network communication solution utilizing proprietary encryption. Key features include every user acting as a base station, end-to-end encryption of voice calls, messaging and file transfers between PriveIN terminals, and the ability to automatically reconnect and operate without a central control point. The system is designed for critical communications in harsh tactical environments.
Exploring LTE security and protocol exploits with open source software and lo...EC-Council
The security flaws of legacy GSM networks, which lack of mutual authentication and implement an outdated encryption algorithm, are well understood among the technology community and have been extensively discussed for years. However, my smartphone’s settings do not provide the means to shut down the GSM radio to prevent my phone from connecting to a potentially insecure GSM access point. Instead, I have the option to turn off LTE, the fastest mobile network.
This is not the only confusing aspect of mobile network security. Given LTE’s mutual authentication and strong encryption scheme result, there is a general assumption that LTE rogue base stations are not possible. However, before the connection authentication step, any mobile device implicitly trusts (and exchanges a substantial amount of messages with) any LTE base station, legitimate or not, that advertises itself with the right parameters. Such implicit trust and unprotected messages can be exploited to block mobile devices and track their location.
Finally, it is generally assumed that Stingrays and IMSI catchers are expensive equipment that require downgrading the connection of mobile devices to GSM. However, a basic fully-LTE IMSI catcher can be implemented by means of low-cost software radio and slight modification of a well known open-source implementation of the LTE stack.
This talk will present an exploration of the security of LTE networks, as well as experimentation results of passive eavesdropping threats, LTE protocol exploits to block mobile devices and a location leak that allows tracking mobile devices as the connection is handed off from tower to tower.
Secure WIMAX network demo AFCEA West 2007Jon Marcy
The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego and Nortel Government Solutions established a partnership to create a secure wireless network for military use. They demonstrated this network at the AFCEA West conference by connecting the San Diego Convention Center to SSC SD's facility 5 miles away using WiMAX and WiFi technologies. The network provided telephony, video and data services securely across the wireless link while emulating a ship-to-shore communication scenario. The demonstration proved that hybrid cellular, WiFi and WiMAX networks can securely integrate voice and data communications.
The document discusses security mechanisms in GSM networks. It describes:
1. The SIM card contains authentication algorithms A3/A8 and key Ki. The mobile equipment contains ciphering algorithm A5.
2. The Authentication Centre (AuC) generates random challenges and stores secret keys relating to each subscriber.
3. Authentication involves the mobile station running the received random number through A3/A8 algorithms to produce a signed response, which is verified by the AuC.
4. If authentication succeeds, A8 generates the ciphering key Kc from Ki and the random number to encrypt communications under A5.
The document describes the SonicWALL TZ Series of network security appliances. The TZ Series provides uncompromising security and performance through features such as SonicWALL's Reassembly-Free Deep Packet Inspection, Unified Threat Management, comprehensive anti-spam service, application firewall, and secure wireless connectivity. The all-new TZ Series dramatically outperforms previous models and provides full UTM protection while maximizing network speeds.
GSM security aims to authenticate SIM cards connecting to the network and encrypt wireless communications between mobile phones and the core network. The authentication center authenticates each SIM using authentication triplets to generate an encryption key for encrypting voice and SMS data. While the A5 algorithm encrypts communications, the A3 and A8 algorithms perform authentication and generate session keys, with COMP128 implementing these functions through table lookups and compression. Currently, only the COMP128v1 SIM cards can be cloned, as that version has been cracked, and it accounts for 70% of SIM cards in use.
The document provides specifications for the AP-7131-GR 802.11n adaptive services access point. It has the following key features:
- Provides unmatched security for federal and government agencies through FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation and Common Criteria certification.
- Features dual-band radios that allow it to simultaneously support wireless access, mesh networking, and wireless intrusion prevention system sensing.
- Supports wireless speeds up to 600Mbps and can operate as either a standalone access point or centrally-managed access point for distributed networks.
International Journal of Engineering Research and Development (IJERD)IJERD Editor
This document summarizes a research paper that designed and implemented a Zigbee-based theft monitoring system. The system uses Zigbee modules for wireless data transmission between sensors and a PIC microcontroller. When an object is detected by an IR sensor, the PIC notifies a PC via RS-232. The PC identifies the area using a database and sends an SMS alert to an authorized person via GSM while capturing video of the area with a camera. The system was tested with over 100 Zigbee modules and was able to quickly detect theft occurrences wirelessly.
The document discusses the security mechanisms in GSM cellular networks. It describes how GSM uses encryption algorithms (A3, A5, A8) and a challenge-response mechanism involving a random number (RAND) and signed response (SRES) to authenticate users. While the A5 stream cipher has an effective key length of 40 bits, this provides adequate security for conversations given their short lifespan of weeks. GSM networks are the most secure cellular standard due to using encryption, temporary IDs, and digital signaling compared to analog networks.
The document provides recommendations for securing IP telephony systems, including:
- Establishing separate security zones and controlling traffic between zones
- Using firewalls and application layer gateways to control external connections
- Implementing layer 2 protections, authentication, encryption, and availability measures
- Protecting against denial of service attacks and securing physical infrastructure
- Recommending practices like device management, testing, and physical access controls
CDMA Wireless Intelligent Network for Advanced Short Messaging ServicesShameer KC
This document proposes implementing an intelligent CDMA network framework called WIN-SMS that would allow for advanced SMS services. It details trigger detection points and messaging that would need to be defined to support WIN processing for SMS scenarios. This would provide a common billing platform and ability to implement advanced SMS features similarly to voice call services. Some key benefits include easier development of new services and a unified approach to billing, though it could impact network capacity. The framework would distribute service logic across network components using standardized interfaces.
This document summarizes security features and vulnerabilities across 2G, 3G, and 4G mobile networks. It discusses:
- Security elements in 2G networks like authentication, encryption, and vulnerabilities due to weak encryption algorithms and unsecured terminals.
- New security features in 3G networks like network authentication, explicit integrity checks, switch-based security, and flexibility to enhance security over time.
- 4G network security architecture focusing on network access, domain, user, and application security as well as visibility and configuration of security features.
- Key security risks in 4G like distributed networks, complex business models, and minimizing security spending. Preventative measures discussed include interoperability standards, security audits
5G aims to enable new services through high bandwidth, low latency connectivity. However, some claimed 5G requirements like 100% coverage and five 9's reliability are not actually specified by standards bodies. Realizing 5G's full capabilities will require deploying new cellular infrastructure and upgrading backhaul networks. While 5G introduces innovations in areas like network slicing and mobile edge computing, integrating with web and application communities will depend on 3GPP defining interfaces and networks being upgraded, which can take significant time.
The Bluegiga Access Server enables wireless networking between multiple devices and networks. It supports Bluetooth, Ethernet, Wi-Fi and GSM/GPRS connectivity. The device is easy to deploy, manage and remotely upgrade. It is targeted at system integrators and OEMs wanting to deploy a secure, low power wireless network for Bluetooth-enabled devices in applications like marketing, medical devices, and machine-to-machine systems.
This document discusses cryptography in GSM networks. It provides background on common security requirements and introduces cryptography techniques like symmetric-key cryptography, public-key cryptography, and cryptographic hashes. It then discusses cryptography specifically used in GSM networks, including the A5/1 and A5/3 algorithms used for encryption. It notes issues with the security of these algorithms and proposes improving GSM network security.
The document discusses industrial communications solutions from GE Digital Energy, including wireless and fiber optic products. Specifically, it describes MDS industrial wireless systems for data acquisition, LAN extension, and backhaul. It also discusses Lentronics fiber optic multiplexers. The document provides information on applications, features, and positioning of these products for critical infrastructure industries like energy, transportation, and heavy industrial.
Overview brochure of General Electric's Microwave Data Systems Division. World's leading provider of industrial-strength wireless products to transmit data for your mission-critical applications.
The SonicWALL TZ Series appliances provide uncompromising network security performance through SonicWALL's reassembly-free deep packet inspection and unified threat management. The TZ Series delivers comprehensive protection against viruses, spyware, intrusions and other threats at network speeds up to gigabit ethernet. It also offers secure wireless connectivity, VPN access, anti-spam filtering, application controls and other features to protect distributed enterprise networks in a cost-effective appliance.
This paper clarifies the standards defined around LTE network security by standard development organizations including 3GPP, ITU, ETSI, and industry group NGMN. It also examines the different security borders of the mobile network, and delves deeper into the requirements of the Mobile Access Border - the border between the RAN and the core (S1).
The document summarizes GSM security mechanisms. It discusses GSM security objectives of confidentiality, anonymity, and authentication. It then describes some key GSM security mechanisms like TMSI for subscriber identity protection, key management using Ki, and the A3/A8/A5 authentication and encryption algorithms. It also provides details on the SIM card anatomy and its role in the authentication process.
PriveComms PriveIN mesh digital operation field overview 2020Arimo Koivisto
PriveIN provides a secure mesh network communication solution utilizing proprietary encryption. Key features include every user acting as a base station, end-to-end encryption of voice calls, messaging and file transfers between PriveIN terminals, and the ability to automatically reconnect and operate without a central control point. The system is designed for critical communications in harsh tactical environments.
Exploring LTE security and protocol exploits with open source software and lo...EC-Council
The security flaws of legacy GSM networks, which lack of mutual authentication and implement an outdated encryption algorithm, are well understood among the technology community and have been extensively discussed for years. However, my smartphone’s settings do not provide the means to shut down the GSM radio to prevent my phone from connecting to a potentially insecure GSM access point. Instead, I have the option to turn off LTE, the fastest mobile network.
This is not the only confusing aspect of mobile network security. Given LTE’s mutual authentication and strong encryption scheme result, there is a general assumption that LTE rogue base stations are not possible. However, before the connection authentication step, any mobile device implicitly trusts (and exchanges a substantial amount of messages with) any LTE base station, legitimate or not, that advertises itself with the right parameters. Such implicit trust and unprotected messages can be exploited to block mobile devices and track their location.
Finally, it is generally assumed that Stingrays and IMSI catchers are expensive equipment that require downgrading the connection of mobile devices to GSM. However, a basic fully-LTE IMSI catcher can be implemented by means of low-cost software radio and slight modification of a well known open-source implementation of the LTE stack.
This talk will present an exploration of the security of LTE networks, as well as experimentation results of passive eavesdropping threats, LTE protocol exploits to block mobile devices and a location leak that allows tracking mobile devices as the connection is handed off from tower to tower.
Secure WIMAX network demo AFCEA West 2007Jon Marcy
The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego and Nortel Government Solutions established a partnership to create a secure wireless network for military use. They demonstrated this network at the AFCEA West conference by connecting the San Diego Convention Center to SSC SD's facility 5 miles away using WiMAX and WiFi technologies. The network provided telephony, video and data services securely across the wireless link while emulating a ship-to-shore communication scenario. The demonstration proved that hybrid cellular, WiFi and WiMAX networks can securely integrate voice and data communications.
The document discusses security mechanisms in GSM networks. It describes:
1. The SIM card contains authentication algorithms A3/A8 and key Ki. The mobile equipment contains ciphering algorithm A5.
2. The Authentication Centre (AuC) generates random challenges and stores secret keys relating to each subscriber.
3. Authentication involves the mobile station running the received random number through A3/A8 algorithms to produce a signed response, which is verified by the AuC.
4. If authentication succeeds, A8 generates the ciphering key Kc from Ki and the random number to encrypt communications under A5.
The document describes the SonicWALL TZ Series of network security appliances. The TZ Series provides uncompromising security and performance through features such as SonicWALL's Reassembly-Free Deep Packet Inspection, Unified Threat Management, comprehensive anti-spam service, application firewall, and secure wireless connectivity. The all-new TZ Series dramatically outperforms previous models and provides full UTM protection while maximizing network speeds.
GSM security aims to authenticate SIM cards connecting to the network and encrypt wireless communications between mobile phones and the core network. The authentication center authenticates each SIM using authentication triplets to generate an encryption key for encrypting voice and SMS data. While the A5 algorithm encrypts communications, the A3 and A8 algorithms perform authentication and generate session keys, with COMP128 implementing these functions through table lookups and compression. Currently, only the COMP128v1 SIM cards can be cloned, as that version has been cracked, and it accounts for 70% of SIM cards in use.
The document provides specifications for the AP-7131-GR 802.11n adaptive services access point. It has the following key features:
- Provides unmatched security for federal and government agencies through FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation and Common Criteria certification.
- Features dual-band radios that allow it to simultaneously support wireless access, mesh networking, and wireless intrusion prevention system sensing.
- Supports wireless speeds up to 600Mbps and can operate as either a standalone access point or centrally-managed access point for distributed networks.
International Journal of Engineering Research and Development (IJERD)IJERD Editor
This document summarizes a research paper that designed and implemented a Zigbee-based theft monitoring system. The system uses Zigbee modules for wireless data transmission between sensors and a PIC microcontroller. When an object is detected by an IR sensor, the PIC notifies a PC via RS-232. The PC identifies the area using a database and sends an SMS alert to an authorized person via GSM while capturing video of the area with a camera. The system was tested with over 100 Zigbee modules and was able to quickly detect theft occurrences wirelessly.
The document discusses the security mechanisms in GSM cellular networks. It describes how GSM uses encryption algorithms (A3, A5, A8) and a challenge-response mechanism involving a random number (RAND) and signed response (SRES) to authenticate users. While the A5 stream cipher has an effective key length of 40 bits, this provides adequate security for conversations given their short lifespan of weeks. GSM networks are the most secure cellular standard due to using encryption, temporary IDs, and digital signaling compared to analog networks.
The document provides recommendations for securing IP telephony systems, including:
- Establishing separate security zones and controlling traffic between zones
- Using firewalls and application layer gateways to control external connections
- Implementing layer 2 protections, authentication, encryption, and availability measures
- Protecting against denial of service attacks and securing physical infrastructure
- Recommending practices like device management, testing, and physical access controls
CDMA Wireless Intelligent Network for Advanced Short Messaging ServicesShameer KC
This document proposes implementing an intelligent CDMA network framework called WIN-SMS that would allow for advanced SMS services. It details trigger detection points and messaging that would need to be defined to support WIN processing for SMS scenarios. This would provide a common billing platform and ability to implement advanced SMS features similarly to voice call services. Some key benefits include easier development of new services and a unified approach to billing, though it could impact network capacity. The framework would distribute service logic across network components using standardized interfaces.
This document summarizes security features and vulnerabilities across 2G, 3G, and 4G mobile networks. It discusses:
- Security elements in 2G networks like authentication, encryption, and vulnerabilities due to weak encryption algorithms and unsecured terminals.
- New security features in 3G networks like network authentication, explicit integrity checks, switch-based security, and flexibility to enhance security over time.
- 4G network security architecture focusing on network access, domain, user, and application security as well as visibility and configuration of security features.
- Key security risks in 4G like distributed networks, complex business models, and minimizing security spending. Preventative measures discussed include interoperability standards, security audits
5G aims to enable new services through high bandwidth, low latency connectivity. However, some claimed 5G requirements like 100% coverage and five 9's reliability are not actually specified by standards bodies. Realizing 5G's full capabilities will require deploying new cellular infrastructure and upgrading backhaul networks. While 5G introduces innovations in areas like network slicing and mobile edge computing, integrating with web and application communities will depend on 3GPP defining interfaces and networks being upgraded, which can take significant time.
1) Circuit switching uses dedicated paths that remain in place for the duration of a call, while packet switching shares transmission links between users.
2) Mobile networks have evolved from 2G technologies like GSM to 3G and 4G. IMS aims to support IP-based multimedia services across both fixed and mobile networks.
3) Technologies like DSL, FTTx, WiMAX, and LTE provide broadband access both fixed and wireless. Support systems like OSS and BSS enable service provisioning and management.
In 2020, many telecommunication companies will debut their first commercial 5G networks. The 5G mission has become a hot-button topic for the entire telecom community. But these networks have inherited many threats from their 3G and 4G forebears. Long-known weaknesses in security protocols and algorithms have been baked into new 5G systems. This creates a perfect storm for threat actors to target 5G security weaknesses using their old tricks.
Watch the webinar recording, where PT experts Paolo Emiliani, Head of Pre-Sales Engineering team, and Jun Kim, Managing Director, Korea, help you to navigate the tricky path to 5G deployment and:
explain new 5G trust and service delivery models
assess the evolving 5G threat landscape and privacy issues
explore realms of 5G protection with a focus on real-life cases
discuss new and emerging 5G threats affecting telecom infrastructure and end devices
explain why roaming protection in 5G is a game-changer
underline essential mitigation techniques for 5G security
Follow us on LinkedIn to keep up with our upcoming webinars and events: https://www.linkedin.com/company/positive-tech/
4G is the fourth generation of wireless technology that provides high-speed internet access and improved capabilities over previous generations. It allows for broadband access anywhere and anytime through an IP-based heterogeneous network. 4G provides higher peak data rates up to 100 Mb/s download and 50 Mb/s upload within a 20 MHz bandwidth. It requires increased spectrum efficiency and latency below 10 ms for improved performance. Security is also enhanced in 4G through an extended authentication key agreement and a more complex key hierarchy to prevent threats like spoofing and eavesdropping.
The document discusses the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), which is an architectural framework for delivering internet protocol (IP) multimedia services. IMS allows convergence of voice, video, messaging and other multimedia applications over an IP-based network. It provides a standardized service platform that can enable operators to offer new revenue-generating services to subscribers. Key components of the IMS architecture include the Call Session Control Functions (CSCFs) which handle registration, session management and other core operations using the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). IMS enables delivery of multimedia services to users independent of their access network, whether on fixed or mobile devices.
This document provides an overview of remote access and VPN technologies. It introduces the Westermo team and company. It discusses how remote access has evolved from conventional dial-up to using the internet and VPNs. It covers VPN protocols like IPsec and OpenVPN, and how they establish secure tunnels. It also discusses cellular communications technologies and considerations for cellular networks. Finally, it ties these concepts together by describing Westermo's WeConnect product for remotely connecting to devices in a secure manner using SSL VPN.
4G systems solve problems of 3G by providing high-quality voice, video, and high-data services anywhere via IP networks. 4G uses MIMO and OFDM for high bandwidth, supports seamless handovers, and allows reconfigurable multimode terminals for diverse wireless networks and services. 4G aims to fulfill the vision of personal computing and communication with affordable, high-data connectivity everywhere over wireless.
This document discusses the security measures of cellular communication systems like GSM. It outlines four main security measures in GSM: PIN codes, SIM card authentication, user authentication by the network including encrypting information over the radio interface, and using a temporary mobile subscriber identity instead of the international mobile subscriber identity over the radio interface. It also describes the four main security services provided: anonymity, authentication, signaling protection, and user data protection. Finally, it discusses some limitations of security in GSM systems and the need for periodic review and improvement of technical security features.
The next industrial revolution, sometimes referred to as Industry 4.0, is already ongoing, fueled by technology advancements in big data, automation and cyber physical systems. To achieve their full potential, these new processes and operating models require high-performance connectivity. Ultra-reliable low latency communication (URLLC) is a new set of 5G NR capabilities, expected for 3GPP Release 16, that can enable operators and enterprises to address a diverse range of high-performance industrial use-cases. This webinar will investigate 5G NR, including the support for private industrial networks and URLLC capabilities. Using the "factory of the future" concept as an example, it will show how 5G NR can help to transform industrial IoT by making it more dynamic, flexible and adaptable to market demand.
GSM is a standard for 2G digital cellular networks that was designed to be secure with strong authentication and encryption of over-the-air transmissions. However, due to the ubiquitous wireless medium, GSM networks are more susceptible to security attacks than wired networks. The document discusses GSM security features including encryption algorithms like A5 and key lengths. While GSM provided improvements over analog networks, the encryption used has been broken and more secure algorithms are needed given the hundreds of millions of users.
Unofficial guide to Nokia 5G Associate Certification. Just some exam notes I made for the certification, I would recommend Nokia extensive online training to all.
BL0 100 Nokia 5G Foundation Exam
This document provides an overview of wireless cellular technologies and career opportunities in the field. It discusses the evolution of cellular standards from 2G to 4G, including the technologies, architectures, and frequency bands used. It also covers recent trends like SDN, IoT, NFV, and big data. Finally, the document outlines various career paths in telecommunications networks, equipment manufacturing, software, and other industry domains.
This document provides an overview of wireless cellular technologies and career opportunities in the field. It discusses the evolution of cellular standards from 2G to 4G, including the technologies, architectures, and frequency bands used. It also covers recent trends like SDN, IoT, NFV, and big data. Finally, the document outlines various career paths in telecommunications networks, equipment manufacturing, software, and other industry domains.
Selfconfiguration OF 4G NETWORK TERMINALSBaptist Johny
This document discusses self-configuration of 4G network terminals. It introduces factors affecting self-configuration such as network selection and quality of service. It then proposes a framework called the Terminal Management System (TMS) to address issues of self-configuration and reconfiguration. The TMS would include modules to select networks, manage handovers between networks, and configure devices based on user preferences and system monitoring. Further work is needed to provide more details on the proposed self-configuration and reconfiguration framework.
Security course: exclusive 5G SA pitfalls and new changes to legislationPositiveTechnologies
This document provides information about Positive Technologies, a leading cybersecurity company focused on telecom security. Some key points:
- Positive Technologies has 19 years of experience in enterprise cybersecurity R&D and 9 years focused on telecom security. It has two R&D centers in Europe.
- The company performs over 60 security assessments per year for telecom operators and was the first vendor focused on end-to-end cybersecurity for mobile operators.
- Positive Technologies has a global presence with offices in 10 countries and has performed projects in 41 countries.
- As a pioneer in signaling security research, the company has published numerous reports on vulnerabilities in 2G-5G networks and standards over the past
This document outlines a framework for conducting a security penetration test of the Diameter protocol. It describes the basic equipment needed, including virtual machines running Open Source Diameter software and penetration testing tools. It also discusses setting up simulated 4G network elements like the PCRF, HSS and MME to test Diameter in a more complete network environment. The goal is to identify vulnerabilities in Diameter by developing a taxonomy similar to one created for the SS7 protocol. This will provide much needed security analysis of the widely used Diameter protocol.
LTE is designed with strong cryptographic techniques, mutual authentication between LTE network elements with security mechanisms built into its architecture.
With the emergence of the open, all IP based, distributed architecture of LTE, attackers can target mobile devices and networks with spam, eavesdropping, malware, IP-spoofing, data and service theft, DDoS attacks and numerous other variants of cyber-attacks and crimes.
3GPP Standardisation & Evolution for Digital Infrastucture.pdf21stMilestoneResiden
The document discusses 3GPP, which is the 3rd Generation Partnership Project. 3GPP is a standards organization that develops protocols for mobile telecommunications. It has over 400 individual members including operators, vendors, and regulators. The document outlines 3GPP's history and evolution, including developing standards for 2G networks like GSM, 3G networks like UMTS, and 4G networks like LTE. It also discusses 3GPP's focus on increasing data throughput, lowering latency, improving spectrum flexibility and efficiency for operators.
Unit – 4 discusses file system implementation topics including:
1. Free space management using techniques like linked lists, grouping, counting, and bit vectors to track unused blocks.
2. Methods to improve efficiency and performance such as disk caching, buffer caching, and read-ahead.
3. Recovery from crashes using consistency checking and file system backups to restore lost data.
4. Log structured file systems that record updates to metadata in a log to improve crash recovery.
5. The NFS protocol that allows accessing files over a network in a transparent manner through remote procedure calls.
This document provides an overview of web technology topics including the history of the internet, HTML protocols, and object-based technologies. It discusses the development of packet switching and ARPANET in the 1960s, the establishment of TCP/IP and the domain name system in the 1980s, and the commercialization of the internet in the 1990s. It also covers concepts related to connecting to the internet, web protocols like HTTP, and client-side and server-side scripting languages.
The document provides tips for conserving electricity in lighting in Haryana, India. It discusses how switching from incandescent bulbs to compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) and efficient fluorescent tube lights can significantly reduce electricity usage and costs. CFLs use 75-80% less electricity than incandescent bulbs and last 5-10 times longer. Similarly, efficient T5 tube lights consume less power than regular T12 lights. Making these switches can help close the gap between electricity demand and supply in Haryana.
Security model evaluation of 3 g wireless network1 paper presentationRotract CLUB of BSAU
This document provides an overview of security in 3G wireless networks. It discusses the security features of 2G networks like GSM and how they have known vulnerabilities. It then examines the two main 3G standards - UMTS and CDMA2000, pointing out their security improvements over 2G as well as some remaining issues. The document evaluates the 3G security model based on availability, confidentiality and integrity.
Fredrik Idestam's paper mill in Finland led to the formation of Nokia Corporation in 1865. Nokia became a major industrial force and later diversified into cable, rubber, and electronics. Nokia played a pioneering role in mobile communications through innovations like the Nordic Mobile Telephone network in 1981 and the first digital phone switch in 1982. By focusing on telecommunications and being a key developer of GSM technology, Nokia became the world's dominant mobile phone manufacturer throughout the 1990s and 2000s, introducing many mobile phones, features, and technologies that were industry firsts.
Philippine Edukasyong Pantahanan at Pangkabuhayan (EPP) CurriculumMJDuyan
(𝐓𝐋𝐄 𝟏𝟎𝟎) (𝐋𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐨𝐧 𝟏)-𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐦𝐬
𝐃𝐢𝐬𝐜𝐮𝐬𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐄𝐏𝐏 𝐂𝐮𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐮𝐥𝐮𝐦 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐏𝐡𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬:
- Understand the goals and objectives of the Edukasyong Pantahanan at Pangkabuhayan (EPP) curriculum, recognizing its importance in fostering practical life skills and values among students. Students will also be able to identify the key components and subjects covered, such as agriculture, home economics, industrial arts, and information and communication technology.
𝐄𝐱𝐩𝐥𝐚𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐍𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐩𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐧 𝐄𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐮𝐫:
-Define entrepreneurship, distinguishing it from general business activities by emphasizing its focus on innovation, risk-taking, and value creation. Students will describe the characteristics and traits of successful entrepreneurs, including their roles and responsibilities, and discuss the broader economic and social impacts of entrepreneurial activities on both local and global scales.
This presentation was provided by Racquel Jemison, Ph.D., Christina MacLaughlin, Ph.D., and Paulomi Majumder. Ph.D., all of the American Chemical Society, for the second session of NISO's 2024 Training Series "DEIA in the Scholarly Landscape." Session Two: 'Expanding Pathways to Publishing Careers,' was held June 13, 2024.
This presentation was provided by Rebecca Benner, Ph.D., of the American Society of Anesthesiologists, for the second session of NISO's 2024 Training Series "DEIA in the Scholarly Landscape." Session Two: 'Expanding Pathways to Publishing Careers,' was held June 13, 2024.
Chapter wise All Notes of First year Basic Civil Engineering.pptxDenish Jangid
Chapter wise All Notes of First year Basic Civil Engineering
Syllabus
Chapter-1
Introduction to objective, scope and outcome the subject
Chapter 2
Introduction: Scope and Specialization of Civil Engineering, Role of civil Engineer in Society, Impact of infrastructural development on economy of country.
Chapter 3
Surveying: Object Principles & Types of Surveying; Site Plans, Plans & Maps; Scales & Unit of different Measurements.
Linear Measurements: Instruments used. Linear Measurement by Tape, Ranging out Survey Lines and overcoming Obstructions; Measurements on sloping ground; Tape corrections, conventional symbols. Angular Measurements: Instruments used; Introduction to Compass Surveying, Bearings and Longitude & Latitude of a Line, Introduction to total station.
Levelling: Instrument used Object of levelling, Methods of levelling in brief, and Contour maps.
Chapter 4
Buildings: Selection of site for Buildings, Layout of Building Plan, Types of buildings, Plinth area, carpet area, floor space index, Introduction to building byelaws, concept of sun light & ventilation. Components of Buildings & their functions, Basic concept of R.C.C., Introduction to types of foundation
Chapter 5
Transportation: Introduction to Transportation Engineering; Traffic and Road Safety: Types and Characteristics of Various Modes of Transportation; Various Road Traffic Signs, Causes of Accidents and Road Safety Measures.
Chapter 6
Environmental Engineering: Environmental Pollution, Environmental Acts and Regulations, Functional Concepts of Ecology, Basics of Species, Biodiversity, Ecosystem, Hydrological Cycle; Chemical Cycles: Carbon, Nitrogen & Phosphorus; Energy Flow in Ecosystems.
Water Pollution: Water Quality standards, Introduction to Treatment & Disposal of Waste Water. Reuse and Saving of Water, Rain Water Harvesting. Solid Waste Management: Classification of Solid Waste, Collection, Transportation and Disposal of Solid. Recycling of Solid Waste: Energy Recovery, Sanitary Landfill, On-Site Sanitation. Air & Noise Pollution: Primary and Secondary air pollutants, Harmful effects of Air Pollution, Control of Air Pollution. . Noise Pollution Harmful Effects of noise pollution, control of noise pollution, Global warming & Climate Change, Ozone depletion, Greenhouse effect
Text Books:
1. Palancharmy, Basic Civil Engineering, McGraw Hill publishers.
2. Satheesh Gopi, Basic Civil Engineering, Pearson Publishers.
3. Ketki Rangwala Dalal, Essentials of Civil Engineering, Charotar Publishing House.
4. BCP, Surveying volume 1
3. ABSTRACT
• 3G mobile phone networks are currently the most widely used
wireless telephone networks in the world.
• While being an improvement over earlier analog
systems, active attacks, authentication, encryption, channel
hijack, inflexibility
• 3G mobile phone standards have been designed to address the
issues in 2G and provide a better security model.
• Overview of security in 3G networks along with pointing out
the known problems.
• Security features of 3G systems are presented and solved .
3
4. 1G WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY
Developed in 1980s and completed in early 1990’s
1G was old analog system and supported the 1st generation of
analog cell phones speed up to 2.4kbps
Advance mobile phone system (AMPS) was first launched
by the US and is a 1G mobile system
Allows users to make voice calls in 1 country
4
5. 2G phones using global system for mobile communications
(GSM) were first used in Europe.
GSM provides voice and limited data services and uses digital
modulation for improved audio quality.
Digital AMPS , CDMA were some of the 2G systems.
5
6. To meet the growing demand in network
capacity, rates required for high speed data transfer
and multimedia applications , 3G standards started
evolving.
It is based on the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) family of standards.
3G technologies enable network operators to offer users
a wider range of more advanced services.
Services include wide-area wireless voice
telephony, video-calls and broadband wireless data , all
in a mobile environment.
The data are sent through the technology called
Packet switching.Voice calls are interpreted
through circuit switching.
6
11. GSM Security Elements, 1
Key functions: privacy, integrity and confidentiality
Authentication
Protect from unauthorized service access
Based on the authentication algorithm A3(Ki, RAND)=> SRES
Problems with inadequate algorithms
Encryption
Scramble bit streams to protect signaling and user data
Ciphering algorithm A8(Ki, RAND) => Kc
A5(Kc, Data) => Encrypted Data
Need stronger encryption
Confidentiality
Prevent intruder from identifying users by IMSI
Temporary MSI
Need more secure mechanism
11
12. GSM Security Elements, 2
SIM
A removable hardware security module
Manageable by network operators
Terminal independent
Secure Application Layer
Secure application layer channel between subscriber module and
home network
Transparency
Security features operate without user assistance
Needs greater user visibility
Minimized Trust
Requires minimum trust between HE and SN
12
13. Problems with GSM Security, 1
Active Attacks
Impersonating network elements such as false BTS is possible
Key Transmission
Cipher keys and authentication values are transmitted in clear within and
between networks (IMSI, RAND, SRES, Kc)
Limited Encryption Scope
Encryption terminated too soon at edge of network to BTS
Communications and signaling in the fixed network portion aren’t
protected
Designed to be only as secure as the fixed networks
Channel Hijack
Protection against radio channel hijack relies on encryption.
However, encryption is not used in some networks.
13
14. Problems with GSM Security, 2
• Implicit Data Integrity
No integrity algorithm provided
• Unilateral Authentication
Only user authentication to the network is provided.
No means to identify the network to the user.
• Weak Encryption Algorithms
Key lengths are too short, while computation speed is increasing
Encryption algorithm COMP 128 has been broken
Replacement of encryption algorithms is quite difficult
• Unsecured Terminal
IMEI is an unsecured identity
Integrity mechanisms for IMEI are introduced late
14
15. Problems with GSM Security, 3
Lawful Interception & Fraud
Considered as afterthoughts
Lack of Visibility
No indication to the user that encryption is on
No explicit confirmation to the HE that authentication
parameters are properly used in SN when subscribers roam
Inflexibility
Inadequate flexibility to upgrade and improve security
functionality over time
15
16. New Security Features, 1
Network Authentication
The user can identify the network
Explicit Integrity
Data integrity is assured explicitly by use of integrity algorithms
Also stronger confidentiality algorithms with longer keys
Network Security
Mechanisms to support security within and between networks
Switch Based Security
Security is based within the switch rather than the base station
IMEI Integrity
Integrity mechanisms for IMEI provided from the start
16
17. New Security Features, 2
Secure Services
Protect against misuse of services provided by SN and HE
Secure Applications
Provide security for applications resident on USIM
Fraud Detection
Mechanisms to combating fraud in roaming situations
Flexibility
Security features can be extended and enhanced as required by new
threats and services
Visibility and Configurability
Users are notified whether security is on and what level of security is
available
Users can configure security features for individual services
17
18. New Security Features, 3
Compatibility
Standardized security features to ensure world-wide interoperability and
roaming
At least one encryption algorithm exported on world-wide basis
Lawful Interception
Mechanisms to provide authorized agencies with certain information
about subscribers
18
19. Evolution to 3G
Drivers: Capacity, Data Speed, Cost
Expected market share
TDMA EDGE
EDGE Evolution
3GPP Core
GSM GPRS Network 90%
WCDMA HSDPA/HSUPA
PDC
cdmaOne CDMA2000 10%
1x CDMA2000 CDMA2000
1x EV/DO EV/DO Rev A
2G First Step into 3G 3G phase 1 Evolved 3G
19
20. CONCLUTION
This paper presented a survey of three generations of mobile phone
systems from a security perspective
3G networks standards were evaluated within availability
confidentiality- integrity framework and found to not be secure
Hence New Security Features has been presented and solved.
Finally, there is no experimental data supporting the claim that 3G
systems aren’t secure.
Future work can be geared toward filling those gaps.
21. References
• 3G TS 33.120 Security Principles and Objectives
http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/WG3_Security/_Specs/33120-300.pdf
• 3G TS 33.120 Security Threats and Requirements
http://www.arib.or.jp/IMT-2011/ARIB-spec/ARIB/21133-310.PDF
• Michael Walker “On the Security of 3GPP Networks”
http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/cosic/eurocrypt2000/mike_walker.pdf
• Redl, Weber, Oliphant “An Introduction to GSM”
Artech House, 2010
• Joachim Tisal “GSM Cellular Radio Telephony”
John Wiley & Sons, 2009
• Lauri Pesonen “GSM Interception”
http://www.dia.unisa.it/ads.dir/corso-security/www/CORSO-9900/a5/Netsec/netsec.html
• 3G TR 33.900 A Guide to 3rd Generation Security
ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG3_Security/_Specs/33900-120.pdf
• 3G TS 33.102 Security Architecture
ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/Specs/2000-12/R1999/33_series/33102-370.zip
• 3G TR 21.905 Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications
http://www.quintillion.co.jp/3GPP/Specs/21905-010.pdf
21