W I L L I A M J . D U I K E R : S A C R E D W A R
Chapter 6
Defeating Vietnamization
Background
 1968: Tet offensive – turning point?
  long way to go.
 Nixon stated during the presidential campaign, that
he had a “secret plan” to bring an end to Vietnam
War
 Military force could be used to bring about some
form of political settlement
The Road to Disengagement
 Nixon was adopting the strong anticommunist line that
he had held as vice president during 1950s
 Nixon’s foreign policy: improve relations with China
while reducing confrontation with the USSR.
 Five-point strategy
 Turning the war gradually over to the South Vietnamese
 Training them to handle their own self-defense
 Diplomatically isolating Hanoi from its sponsors in Moscow
and Beijing
 Continuing the peace negotiation with the DRV in Paris
 Engaging in a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops
The Road to Disengagement
 Two possible scenarios:
 A negotiated settlement or a gradual extrication of U.S. forces
 Saigon’s capacity for self-defense increased
 Negotiations: Hanoi insisted on its existing demands
 Total withdrawal of U.S. troops
 The replacement of the Thieu regime by a tripartite coalition
government
 Nixon’s proposal:
 Precise timetable for the mutual and simultaneous withdrawal of all
foreign troops from South Vietnam
 Free elections under international supervision and to an active rola
for the NLF in the South Vietnamese political process.
 North Vietnamese avoided a direct reply.
Countering Vietnamization
 April 1969, the Politburo concluded that it’s forces must
continue to maintain an offensive position on the
battlefield to prevent the United States from settling in
and attempting to prolong the war.
 The 1969 campaign was clearly a disappointment
 COSVN concluded that the immediate goal could no
longer be “victory in a short period of time”.
The Invasion of Cambodia
 Hanoi’s success = neutrality of neighboring Laos and
Cambodia.
 Southern Lao as an infiltration route into South Vietnam ->
extend the HCM Trail through Laos
 Establishing COSVN headquarters inside Cambodian border
 Mid-1960s:
 Before: Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) –
neutralist leader Sihanouk
 After: Pol Pot with Khmer Rouge forces against the Sihanouk
government
 1970: Sihanouk was overthrown by members of his own
government
The Invasion of Cambodia
 New government: PM Sirik Matak
 Immediately demanded the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops
 Hanoi refused -> clashes between Cambodian armed forces and
Vietnamese units operating in the area
 Nixon administration:
 Dilemma  widening the war
 Approving a military assault by both South Vietnamese and U.S.
armed forces across the Cambodian border to seize/destroy COSVN
 Congress forced the administration to withdraw all U.S. forced
 Hanoi:
 Pham Van Dong helped Sihanouk form a new alliance – National
United Front for Kampuchea (FUNK)
Breaking the Stalemate
 Early 1971:
 South Vietnamese forces crossed the border to attack HCM
Trail in southern Laos  retreated in disarray
 By then, Hanoi was waiting out the Americans’ withdrawal.
 Nixon abandoned the demand for mutual withdrawal, but still
must leave Thieu in Power. Hanoi asked U.S. to stop
supporting Thieu. Washington refused.
 U.S improved relations with PRC  China began to
pressure the North Vietnamese to accept a compromise
settlement
The Easter Offensive
 Late 1971:
 Vo Nguyen Giap: “only a decisive defeat on the battlefield,
would convince the Nixon administration and the American
people that there were only two alternatives to negotiated
withdrawal – further escalation or humiliation
 February 1972: Easter holiday attack
 Started at Quang Tri province, south of DMZ
 Crack North Vietnam troops mauled unprepared and
inexperienced ARVN units in the area and drove them in
disarray toward the South.
The Paris Agreement
 Early May 1972:
 Hanoi’s secret negotiator Le Duc Tho returned to Paris to test
the Nixon ad.’s willingness to make concessions for peace
 Nixon reacted strongly to Easter offensive and resumed the
bombing of North Vietnam
 Le Duc Tho’s new proposal: formation of a coalition
government including representatives of both the PRG and the
Thieu regime (first time Hanoi offered a settlement that left
Thieu in power)
 October 1972:
 Tho abandoned coalition government demand and agreed to a
cease-fire in place, followed by the total withdrawal of U.S.
forces and the exchange of prisoners of war.
The Paris Agreement
 December 1972:
 President Thieu balked, since there was no departure of
North Vietnamese in the South.
 Nixon ordered a blockade of Haiphong harbor and
renewed the bombing of DRV.
 January 1973:
 Tho agreed to most of U.S. conditions, Thieu was left in power
 Final agreement was signed.
The Fragile Peace
 The Paris agreement never really came into effect
 ARVN units aggressively sought to expand the area
 North Vietnamese troops engaged in operations of their own in
countryside.
 COSVN: proposal to launch a major campaign during the
spring of 1975
 Politburo approved the plan for a major offensive centered on Ban
Me Thuot, the largest city in the central highlands.
The Final Offensive
 April 1975:
 North Vietnamese units wiped up remnants of South
Vietnamese resistance in the northern and central provinces
and advanced rapidly toward Saigon in 4 weeks.
 Nguyen Van Thieu made a last-minute appeal to Washington,
but the response was negative
 Final victory
W I L L I A M J . D U I K E R : S A C R E D W A R
Chapter 7
Why the Communist Won
The Reasons
 The aura of legitimacy of the Communist Party
 Virtue of its generation of struggle against the French
 Extraordinary leader: Ho Chi Minh
 Rival nationalist parties were consistently unable to
formulate a program that could appeal widely to the
mass of Vietnamese population
 The ineffectiveness of the nationalist movement forced its
political leaders to rely on outside support for their survival
 Communist’s domain of revolutionary strategy
Original Factors
 Communist victory as a consequence of the weakness of
the Vietnamese bourgeoisie under the domination of the
French colonial system.
 Weakness of the Saigon regime had deep historical roots that
transcended the personalities and actions of individual leaders.
 Weakness of the middle class in modern Vietnam was the historic
weakness of the commercial sector during the traditional period.
 Vietnamese Confucianism was closely identified with the
concept of selfless devotion to the cause of the fatherland
 Appeal of Marxist ideas among intellectuals
P R E S E N T E D B Y H A N G N G U Y E N I 3 2 0 3 1
Thank you for listening

Sacred War - Defeating Vietnamization

  • 1.
    W I LL I A M J . D U I K E R : S A C R E D W A R Chapter 6 Defeating Vietnamization
  • 2.
    Background  1968: Tetoffensive – turning point?   long way to go.  Nixon stated during the presidential campaign, that he had a “secret plan” to bring an end to Vietnam War  Military force could be used to bring about some form of political settlement
  • 3.
    The Road toDisengagement  Nixon was adopting the strong anticommunist line that he had held as vice president during 1950s  Nixon’s foreign policy: improve relations with China while reducing confrontation with the USSR.  Five-point strategy  Turning the war gradually over to the South Vietnamese  Training them to handle their own self-defense  Diplomatically isolating Hanoi from its sponsors in Moscow and Beijing  Continuing the peace negotiation with the DRV in Paris  Engaging in a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops
  • 4.
    The Road toDisengagement  Two possible scenarios:  A negotiated settlement or a gradual extrication of U.S. forces  Saigon’s capacity for self-defense increased  Negotiations: Hanoi insisted on its existing demands  Total withdrawal of U.S. troops  The replacement of the Thieu regime by a tripartite coalition government  Nixon’s proposal:  Precise timetable for the mutual and simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Vietnam  Free elections under international supervision and to an active rola for the NLF in the South Vietnamese political process.  North Vietnamese avoided a direct reply.
  • 5.
    Countering Vietnamization  April1969, the Politburo concluded that it’s forces must continue to maintain an offensive position on the battlefield to prevent the United States from settling in and attempting to prolong the war.  The 1969 campaign was clearly a disappointment  COSVN concluded that the immediate goal could no longer be “victory in a short period of time”.
  • 6.
    The Invasion ofCambodia  Hanoi’s success = neutrality of neighboring Laos and Cambodia.  Southern Lao as an infiltration route into South Vietnam -> extend the HCM Trail through Laos  Establishing COSVN headquarters inside Cambodian border  Mid-1960s:  Before: Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) – neutralist leader Sihanouk  After: Pol Pot with Khmer Rouge forces against the Sihanouk government  1970: Sihanouk was overthrown by members of his own government
  • 7.
    The Invasion ofCambodia  New government: PM Sirik Matak  Immediately demanded the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops  Hanoi refused -> clashes between Cambodian armed forces and Vietnamese units operating in the area  Nixon administration:  Dilemma  widening the war  Approving a military assault by both South Vietnamese and U.S. armed forces across the Cambodian border to seize/destroy COSVN  Congress forced the administration to withdraw all U.S. forced  Hanoi:  Pham Van Dong helped Sihanouk form a new alliance – National United Front for Kampuchea (FUNK)
  • 8.
    Breaking the Stalemate Early 1971:  South Vietnamese forces crossed the border to attack HCM Trail in southern Laos  retreated in disarray  By then, Hanoi was waiting out the Americans’ withdrawal.  Nixon abandoned the demand for mutual withdrawal, but still must leave Thieu in Power. Hanoi asked U.S. to stop supporting Thieu. Washington refused.  U.S improved relations with PRC  China began to pressure the North Vietnamese to accept a compromise settlement
  • 9.
    The Easter Offensive Late 1971:  Vo Nguyen Giap: “only a decisive defeat on the battlefield, would convince the Nixon administration and the American people that there were only two alternatives to negotiated withdrawal – further escalation or humiliation  February 1972: Easter holiday attack  Started at Quang Tri province, south of DMZ  Crack North Vietnam troops mauled unprepared and inexperienced ARVN units in the area and drove them in disarray toward the South.
  • 10.
    The Paris Agreement Early May 1972:  Hanoi’s secret negotiator Le Duc Tho returned to Paris to test the Nixon ad.’s willingness to make concessions for peace  Nixon reacted strongly to Easter offensive and resumed the bombing of North Vietnam  Le Duc Tho’s new proposal: formation of a coalition government including representatives of both the PRG and the Thieu regime (first time Hanoi offered a settlement that left Thieu in power)  October 1972:  Tho abandoned coalition government demand and agreed to a cease-fire in place, followed by the total withdrawal of U.S. forces and the exchange of prisoners of war.
  • 11.
    The Paris Agreement December 1972:  President Thieu balked, since there was no departure of North Vietnamese in the South.  Nixon ordered a blockade of Haiphong harbor and renewed the bombing of DRV.  January 1973:  Tho agreed to most of U.S. conditions, Thieu was left in power  Final agreement was signed.
  • 12.
    The Fragile Peace The Paris agreement never really came into effect  ARVN units aggressively sought to expand the area  North Vietnamese troops engaged in operations of their own in countryside.  COSVN: proposal to launch a major campaign during the spring of 1975  Politburo approved the plan for a major offensive centered on Ban Me Thuot, the largest city in the central highlands.
  • 13.
    The Final Offensive April 1975:  North Vietnamese units wiped up remnants of South Vietnamese resistance in the northern and central provinces and advanced rapidly toward Saigon in 4 weeks.  Nguyen Van Thieu made a last-minute appeal to Washington, but the response was negative  Final victory
  • 14.
    W I LL I A M J . D U I K E R : S A C R E D W A R Chapter 7 Why the Communist Won
  • 15.
    The Reasons  Theaura of legitimacy of the Communist Party  Virtue of its generation of struggle against the French  Extraordinary leader: Ho Chi Minh  Rival nationalist parties were consistently unable to formulate a program that could appeal widely to the mass of Vietnamese population  The ineffectiveness of the nationalist movement forced its political leaders to rely on outside support for their survival  Communist’s domain of revolutionary strategy
  • 16.
    Original Factors  Communistvictory as a consequence of the weakness of the Vietnamese bourgeoisie under the domination of the French colonial system.  Weakness of the Saigon regime had deep historical roots that transcended the personalities and actions of individual leaders.  Weakness of the middle class in modern Vietnam was the historic weakness of the commercial sector during the traditional period.  Vietnamese Confucianism was closely identified with the concept of selfless devotion to the cause of the fatherland  Appeal of Marxist ideas among intellectuals
  • 17.
    P R ES E N T E D B Y H A N G N G U Y E N I 3 2 0 3 1 Thank you for listening