Running head VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE REALM1VISIBLE AND INVISI.docx

Running head: VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE REALM 1
VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE REALM 2
Visible and Invisible Realm
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Visible and Invisible Realm
Socrates provided the affinity argument, which was intended to
support the idea that the soul is immortal. Through this
analysis, the concepts of the changing and intangible nature of
the soul are analyzed in relation to the ever-changing nature of
the body. However, there are different views concerning the
arguments made by Socrates, paying close attention to why the
affinity argument is considered weak amongst the philosophers.
Elton (1997) and Apolloni (1996) provide different viewpoints
of Socrates affinity argument, specifically on the difference
between the visible and invisible realms, basing on the Phaedo
and Plato’s claims.
The Views of Apolloni
Apolloni (1996) considers the affinity argument as a week claim
made by Plato and not Socrates. In the article, the author argues
that although the soul may not be a physical object like the
body, it should not be perceived as being incomposite. He
claims that since it is possible to disperse the soul, then the soul
is not immortal and, therefore, it can be dispersed. However, the

soul cannot be dispersed in the same as the body, which is a
physical and tangible object.
Apolloni (1996) has his arguments based on the idea that the
soul is invisible, while the body is visible. He argues that while
the body continually undergoes change, the invisible nature of
the soul ensures that it remains constant. However, the two are
interconnected in that it is through the body that the soul is able
to perceive. Moreover, the author believes that the invisible
nature of the soul can also be attributed to its divine nature.
This writer also presents the thoughts of Plato concerning the
intellect as another invisible part of the soul (Apolloni, 1996).
He, therefore, is convinced that Plato’s views of the Affinity
Argument are more understandable than those of Socrates. That
is, the affinity and invisible nature of the soul can be used to
explain some of the religious beliefs, such as the existence of
ghosts. What is more is that although the soul and the body only
differ through the emotional attachments of the body, people
can experience spiritual fulfillment when the intellect is free
from the desires of the body.
The Views of Elton
On the other hand, Elton (1997) provides a different opinion of
the affinity argument, whereby he holds that the soul is entirely
indissoluble. The author claims that Plato was not in agreement
with the view, based on the analogical forms. Moreover, he
explains that the soul should not be considered immortal,
mainly because the soul ceases to exist.
The difference is the views provided in Elton (1997) are in that
the author basis his claims on the analogical arguments made by
the Cebes and the Simmias. The analogy of the tuning of the
lyre is given, whereby the attunement is the immortal aspect
while the lyre is the mortal part. Thus, it is claimed that if the
strings of the lyre were to break, it would be expected that the
lyre ceases to exist, while the attunement remains. However,
this is never the case because the attunement is no longer there
while the lyre remains visible. Thus, this kind of thinking
should not be encouraged when comparing the invisible and

visible natures of the soul and its relation to the body.
Furthermore, Elton (1997) views Socrates’ views of the visible
and the invisible reams as an appeal to the emotions of the
Simmias and the Cebes. That is it is not a rational philosophical
argument, mostly because it lacks proof. Rather than,
considering Socrates argument as accurate, Elton (1997) use the
Phaedo to show how Socrates’ theory is an example of the
making of mistakes in philosophy.
References
Apolloni, D. (1996). Plato's Affinity Argument for the
Immortality of the Soul. Journal of the History of Philosophy,
34(1), 5-32.
Elton, M. (1997). The Role of the Affinity Argument in the"
Phaedo". Phronesis, 42(3), 313-316.
Plato's Affinity Argument for the Immortality of the Soul
David Apolloni
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 34, Number 1,
January 1996,
pp. 5-32 (Article)
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI:
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https://muse.jhu.edu/article/225860
Plato's Affinity Argument for
the Immortality of the Soul
D A V I D A P O L L O N I
VROM P h a e d o 78b to 8od, Socrates a t t e m p t s to a n s
w e r S i m m i a s ' f e a r that, e v e n
if t h e soul has existed e t e r n a l l y b e f o r e birth, it m i
g h t be d i s p e r s e d a n d this
w o u l d be the e n d o f its existence (77b5). His a n s w e r
is an a r g u m e n t which
a t t e m p t s to s h o w t h a t t h e soul is i n c o m p o s i t
e because it is similar to t h e F o r m s
a n d dissimilar to physical objects. T o date, this a r g u m e n
t - - t h e so-called A f t i n -
ity A r g u m e n t - - h a s n o t r e c e i v e d m u c h s y m p
a t h y f r o m Plato's c o m m e n t a t o r s ,
w h o universally c o n s i d e r it the weakest o f Plato's a r g
u m e n t s f o r t h e i m m o r t a l -
ity o f t h e s o u l ?
T h e lack o f s y m p a t h y a n d e n t h u s i a s m f o r
this a r g u m e n t is n o t difficult to

u n d e r s t a n d . J u s t c o n s i d e r t h e following o u t l
i n e o f the a r g u m e n t . T h e soul is
invisible, t h e r e f o r e t h e soul is m o r e similar to the
Invisible, i.e., t h e F o r m s ,
which a r e always t h e same, t h a n a r e bodies, which a r e
visible a n d which a r e
c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g , a n d which a r e m o r e
similar to t h e Visible t h a n is t h e soul
( 7 9 a - b ) . F u r t h e r , t h e soul is m o r e like the
Always t h e S a m e in that w h e n it
uses t h e b o d y to see o r h e a r o r perceive, it is " d r a g
g e d " by the b o d y into t h e
N e v e r t h e Same, a n d the soul " w a n d e r s a n d is c o
n f u s e d a n d whirls as if
i n t o x i c a t e d " i n s o f a r as t h e soul has c o m e in c
o n t a c t with such t h i n g s ( 7 9 c 5 - 8 ) .
W h e r e a s w h e n t h e soul c o n s i d e r s by itself, it
goes to the r e a l m o f the F o r m s ,
a n d ceases its w a n d e r i n g . T h e r e f o r e t h e soul is
m o r e like the Always t h e S a m e
t h a n t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e (79d). Finally, w h e n t h
e soul is in the b o d y , t h e soul
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the First
Annual Conference of the Minne-
sota Society of Ancient Philosophy, held at the College of St.

Catherine, St. Paul, Minnesota, May
7, 1994. Thanks are due to Martha Beck-Phillips, John Pepple,
and an anonymous referee of the
J l t P for their valuable suggestions and criticisms.
' See Kenneth Dorter, "'Plato's Image of Immortality," The
Philosophical Quarterly 6/lo 5 (Octo-
ber, 1976): ~95-3o4 . Dorter's interpretation is probably the
most sympathetic that I have seen,
and yet he thinks that the argument is "set forth rather casually,
is frequently weakened by
qualifications and hesitancy, and is based merely upon analogy"
('~95)-
[5]
6 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S
O P H Y 34:1 J A N U A R Y 1996
r u l e s t h e b o d y a n d t h e r e f o r e is m o r e like t h
e D i v i n e t h a n is t h e b o d y , w h i c h is
m o r e like t h e M o r t a l .
S o i n t e r p r e t e d , t h e m a i n t h r u s t o f this c h a i
n o f a r g u m e n t s is c l e a r l y v e r y
w e a k . T h a t t h e s o u l is m o r e s i m i l a r t o t h e
F o r m s t h a n it is t o b o d i e s d o e s n o t
e s t a b l i s h h o w it is s i m i l a r . 2 A n d s o it falls s h
o r t o f s h o w i n g t h a t it is s i m i l a r i n
t h a t b o t h t h e s o u l a n d t h e F o r m s a r e i n d e s

t r u c t i b l e o r i n d i s s o l u b l e .
N o r d o e s t h e s i t u a t i o n i m p r o v e w h e n w e c
o n s i d e r t h e i n d i v i d u a l a r g u -
m e n t s i n t h e c h a i n . F o r e v e n i f t h e s o u l is
invisible, this in n o w a y e s t a b l i s h e s
t h a t it is u n c h a n g i n g , like o t h e r t h i n g s w h i c
h a r e invisible. N o r d o e s it f o l l o w
t h a t t h e s o u l is s i m i l a r in a n y i n t e r e s t i n g
w a y t o w h a t is a l w a y s t h e s a m e j u s t
b e c a u s e it s t o p s c h a n g i n g w h e n it c o n t e m p l
a t e s " t h e p u r e , t h a t w h i c h a l w a y s is
b o t h i m m o r t a l a n d t h e s a m e . " N o r d o e s t h
e s u p p o s e d f a c t t h a t t h e s o u l r u l e s
t h e b o d y m a k e it s i m i l a r t o t h e D i v i n e t o s
u c h a n e x t e n t t h a t it w o u l d f o l l o w
t h a t t h e s o u l is i n d e s t r u c t i b l e as t h e D i v i n
e is t h o u g h t t o be.
F i n a l l y , S o c r a t e s ' c o n c l u s i o n f r o m all o f
this at 8 o b 8 - ~ o is t h o u g h t t o b e
d i s a p p o i n t i n g l y w e a k , b u t u n d e r s t a n d a b l
y so: " i f t h e s e t h i n g s a r e so, is it n o t
f i t t i n g f o r t h e b o d y t o q u i c k l y c o m e a p a r
t , b u t t h e s o u l t o b e c o m p l e t e l y
i n d i s s o l u b l e , o r s o m e t h i n g c l o s e t o it [r ~

m g ~t TO6TOU]?" I f t h e c o n c l u s i o n
l e a v e s o p e n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e s o u l
is nearly i n d e s t r u c t i b l e , t h e n it is d e -
s t r u c t i b l e a f t e r all, in w h i c h c a s e t h e a r g u
m e n t falls s h o r t o f e s t a b l i s h i n g w h a t
it w a s s u p p o s e d to.
T h u s t h e a r g u m e n t a p p e a r s t o h a v e f a u l t s
so g l a r i n g t h a t it is h a r d t o t h i n k
t h a t P l a t o t o o k it s e r i o u s l y , a n d a t least o n e
r e c e n t c o m m e n t a t o r g o e s so f a r as
t o s u g g e s t t h a t S o c r a t e s i n a d v e r t e n t l y r e
p u d i a t e s it in t h e f a c e o f o b j e c t i o n s
t h a t his c o m p a n i o n s raise.3 B u t i f t h e a r g u m e
n t is so b a d , w e a r e l e f t w i t h a
s i g n i f i c a n t p u z z l e as t o w h y P l a t o w o u l d t
a k e it s e r i o u s l y e n o u g h t o w r i t e it,
a n d t o w r i t e it a t t h e c e n t e r o f o n e o f his g r
e a t e s t d i a l o g u e s , w h e r e it w o u l d
h a v e a s p e c i a l p l a c e o f h o n o r . 4
I n w h a t f o l l o w s , t h e n , [ w o u l d like t o a r g u e
t h a t t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t is
m o r e t h a n a r h e t o r i c a l f l o u r i s h , a n e m o t i
v e e x p r e s s i o n o f b e l i e f s d e e p l y felt, o r

' David Gallop, Plato: Phaedo (Oxford, 1975), 14o: "But if
'being more similar' means 'having
more features in common', the fact that the soul shares with the
Forms a given feature that the
body lacks would not show that it is 'more similar' to them than
is the body. Even if this were
shown, it would not follow that the soul has all features in
common with the Forms that the body
lacks."
For example, David White, Myth and Metaphysics in Plato's
"Phaedo" (London and Toronto:
Associated University Press, 1989) , 133.
4 Kenneth Dorter, Plato's "Phaedo": An Interpretation (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press,
1982), 7 ~. Dorter (76) thinks that the argument has value as an
articulation of deep feelings that
there is something noble and eternal about us. Thus he thinks
that the Affinity Argument, like
the Argument from Design for God's existence, is logically
defective but very persuasive, and that
this accounts for Plato's inclusion of it in the dialogue.
P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T 7
a weak analogy which Plato put forward only to discard, that it
is a deductive
a r g u m e n t whose conclusion follows from its p r e m i s s e
s - - p r e m i s s e s whose truth
Plato w o u l d have t h o u g h t he had established. As such,
it is an a r g u m e n t o f equal
or greater philosophical merit than either the A r g u m e n t
from Recollection

( 7 3 - 7 6 ) or the Final A r g u m e n t from Opposites ( l o ~
- i o 6 ) . 5 Indeed, the first
and third portions o f it anticipate s o m e m o d e r n
arguments for dualism. 6
1 . T H E A R G U M E N T ' S C O N T E X T W I T H I N
T H E D I A L O G U E
A persistent and crucial t h e m e t h r o u g h o u t the Phaedo
states that the philoso-
pher m u s t detach from the senses and from desires for
physical objects
t h r o u g h rigorous training. We find expression o f this idea
n o t only j u s t after
the Affinity A r g u m e n t ( 8 o e - 8 ld), but also both
earlier, at 6 6 - 6 7 e , and later,
at 1 1 4 d - e . In the latter passage, Plato clearly distinguishes
this idea from all o f
the mythic o n e s elaborated immediately preceding. But even
if it were mythic,
this w o u l d not c o u n t as evidence that Plato himself did
not believe it. For Plato
conceives o f the relationship between a r g u m e n t and myth
as o n e o f loose
evidential s u p p o r t o f the former for the latter (114d).7
But the onlyjustifica-
5 In s u p p o r t o f this statement I can only invite my readers
to compare the Affinity A r g u m e n t
as 1 shall reconstruct it with these o t h e r two a r g u m e n t s
in the Phaedo. I believe that such a
comparison will show that all three approach the definition o f
a great philosophical a r g u m e n t as
one which moves f r o m premisses which everyone considers
obvious to conclusions nobody can
believe. This does not mean that I am trying to establish the

Affinity A r g u m e n t as sound (or
unsound). It, like any o t h e r a r g u m e n t by an ancient
philosopher, makes assumptions that are, in
the end, questionable or would require f u r t h e r revision and
assessment i f a c o n t e m p o r a r y philoso-
p h e r were to try to d e f e n d them. For example, the a r g u
m e n t assumes Plato's T h e o r y o f F o r m s - -
that the world o f the senses is largely composed o f c o m p r
e s e n t opposites but the Forms are not,
that like is attracted to like so that the immaterial soul, when
separated f r o m the body, goes to a
world o f similar objects, whereas if the soul is too attached to
the body, it remains in the world o f
physical objects. C o m p a r e these assumptions with those o f
the A r g u m e n t from Recollection--that
sensible equals somehow "fall short" o f true Equality (Phaedo
7 4 d - e ) , that a priori knowledge is
"forgotten" (76d); or those o f the Final A r g u m e n t - - t h a
t the soul cannot be destroyed because it
has life a n d life cannot receive death (1 o6c-e). For critical
assessment o f both o f these arguments,
and f u r t h e r references, see Gallop, Plato: Phaedo, i 19ff. a
n d 192ff., respectively. See also G.E.M.
Anscombe, " U n d e r s t a n d i n g Proofs," in h e r From
Parmenides to Wittgenaein: Collected Philosophical
Papers, Voi. i (Minneapolis, t981 ), 34-43; Gregory Vlastos,
"Anamnesis in the Meno," Dialogue 4
0965): 146-67.
s See below, n. 48 a n d my Epilogue for this and o t h e r
reasons for a wide interest for the
a r g u m e n t .
7 Following his final mythic description o f the afterlife,
Socrates says here, "Complete affirma-
tion that these things are as I have described is not p r o p e r

for a reasonable person; nonetheless,
that these things are so or something like them [xotct~t' ~trtct]
concerning the soul and its habita-
tion, it seems fitting to me and a p p r o p r i a t e to risk
thinking, since it is manifest [qbcts o~oct]
that t h e soul is immortal. For the risk is a reasonable one
[xcO.6g], and it is necessary f o r me to
chant to myself such things as these, for which reason I have
embellished my account [xct~, ttO3.at
itllxt3vt0 t6v p.~0ov]." T h e s e words make clear that
Socrates takes himself to have established that
the soul is immortal, a n d because he has established this, the
mythic account o f the h e r e a f t e r he
8 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 4 : 1
JANUARY I 9 9 6
t i o n we f i n d in t h e d i a l o g u e is in t h e A f f i n i t
y A r g u m e n t itself, specifically in
t h e p o r t i o n s s h o w i n g t h a t t h e soul is t h e s a
m e a n d (as we shall see) d i v i n e .
W i t h o u t t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t , o n e o f S o
c r a t e s ' m o s t i m p o r t a n t d o c t r i n e s
t h r o u g h o u t t h e d i a l o g u e is g i v e n n o s u p p o
r t p r e c i s e l y w h e r e we w o u l d e x p e c t
t o f i n d it. A n d o n e w o u l d e x p e c t S o c r a t e s
to h a v e d r o p p e d this d o c t r i n e i f t h e
A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t w e r e d e f e a t e d . B u t h e
d o e s n o t d o this.
A n d w h a t a b o u t t h e o b j e c t i o n s o f S i m m i a

s a n d C e b e s ? B o t h o f t h e s e fail, so
t h e y c a n n o t i m p l y t h a t S o c r a t e s g a v e u p t
h e Affinity A r g u m e n t . I n d e e d ,
Cebes" o b j e c t i o n m i s s e s t h e p o i n t . F o r i f i n
d e e d t h e soul is i n c o m p o s i t e , it is n o t
a n a l o g o u s to t h e tailor, w h o / s , a f t e r all, c o m p
o s i t e . S o c r a t e s ' final r e m a r k s a t
9 5 b - c c o n c e r n i n g C e b e s ' o b j e c t i o n 8 s h o w
t h a t at m o s t it h a s a p o i n t a g a i n s t t h e
A r g u m e n t f r o m R e c o l l e c t i o n , a n d w o r k s a
g a i n s t t h e final t h i r d o f t h e a r g u -
m e n t w h i c h c o n c e r n s t h e d i v i n i t y ( a n d " s
t r e n g t h " ) o f soul. O r r a t h e r , it w o r k s
a g a i n s t a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f this p o r t i o n
o f t h e a r g u m e n t . F o r S o c r a t e s h a s
n o t a r g u e d t h a t t h e soul is i m m o r t a l j u s t b e c
a u s e it is d i v i n e - - h e h a s a r g u e d
t h a t it is i m m o r t a l b e c a u s e it is invisible a n d u n
c h a n g i n g , as well as d i v i n e .
I n r e s p o n s e to P h a e d o ' s r e c o u n t i n g t h e
discussion, E c h e c r a t e s m e n t i o n s
o n l y S i m m i a s ' o b j e c t i o n as t h e o n e c o n v i n
c i n g to h i m (88d). So t h e t e x t a g a i n
m a k e s c l e a r C e b e s ' lack o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l a
s t u t e n e s s . O f c o u r s e , S o c r a t e s d o e s
n o t explicitly say this. R a t h e r , p r e s u m a b l y , h e is
v e r y g e n t l y a n d i n d i r e c t l y p o i n t -

i n g it o u t w i t h o u t e m b a r r a s s i n g his f r i e n d ,
w h o is t o o o b t u s e to notice. H e h a s a
g e n t l e r w a y o f t r y i n g to c o n v i n c e C e b e s . T
h u s C e b e s ' o b j e c t i o n is m e r e l y a d r a -
m a t i c i n t r o i t to a n e w , i n d e p e n d e n t a r g u m
e n t f o r i m m o r t a l i t y (9 6 - 1 o 6 ) .
S i m m i a s ' o b j e c t i o n is m u c h m o r e o n t h e m
a r k , f o r it q u e s t i o n s a c r u c i a l
i n f e r e n c e m a d e in t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t ,
i.e., t h a t w h a t is invisible is i n d e -
s t r u c t i b l e . F o r t h e a t t u n e m e n t o f t h e s t r i
n g s o f a l y r e is invisible, b u t is d e -
s t r o y e d w h e n t h e s t r i n g s a r e s n a p p e d . So i
f t h e soul is a n a t t u n e m e n t o f
o p p o s i t e s in t h e b o d y , it c a n n o t s u r v i v e t h
e d e a t h o f t h e b o d y e i t h e r .
has just elaborated o r something like it is reasonable to
believe. Cf. Veda Cobb-Stevens, "Mythos
and Logos in Plato's Phaedo," in A.-T. Tymieniecka, ed., The
Philosophical Reflection of Man in
Literature (Dordrecht, 1982 ), 4o4, who points out that in the
Phaedo, we are not completely
separable from the body in this life; so we must address death in
perceptual, mythical terms. But
the soul must maintain primacy over the body, so the myth is
structured by the conclusions of
reasoned argument. "The basic structure of the philosophical
insight gained by logos must guide
and order the content of the myth. In this way, the myth can
speak directly to the fear which has

its origin in the body, hut speak with the 'hidden meaning' and
calming effect of its logical
structure. Thus the myth, instead of inducing the soul to regress
to the level of the body, speaks to
the body in a language structured by the insights of the soul."
See also Ludwig Edeistein, "The
Function of Myth in Plato's Philosophy,"Journal of the History
of Ideas lo (1949): 463 - 8 l, esp. 466.
s,,To show that the soul is strong and godlike, and even that it
existed before we were born--
all this, you may say, may very well indicate not that the soul is
immortal, but merely that it is long-
lived, and preexisted somewhere for a prodigious period of
time, enjoying a great measure of
knowledge and activity."
As f o r this o b j e c t i o n , t h e r e is n o r e a s o n to
believe t h a t Plato t h i n k s h e has
failed to r e f u t e it, w h a t e v e r o n e thinks o f t h e r e
f u t a t i o n itself.9 A n d to
E c h e c r a t e s ' q u e s t i o n as to w h e t h e r Socrates r e
s c u e d his a r g u m e n t , P h a e d o in
his r o l e as m o d e r a t o r in t h e d i a l o g u e r e s p o n
d s a f f i r m a t i v e l y ( 8 8 e - 8 9 a ) . In-
d e e d , S o c r a t e s has a l r e a d y a n t i c i p a t e d this
o b j e c t i o n because, as we shall see,
his r e s p o n s e to t h e o b j e c t i o n is a m e r e e x p a n
s i o n o f t h e p o r t i o n o f t h e a r g u -
m e n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e divinity o f t h e soul.
So i f Plato d i d n o t t a k e t h e a r g u m e n t seriously,

w h y t h e n d o S o c r a t e s '
i n t e r l o c u t o r s fail to r e f u t e it? I believe, t h e n , t
h a t the a b o v e c o n t e x t u a l r e a s o n s
f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t Plato r e j e c t e d t h e a r g u m e
n t all fail. It r e m a i n s f o r us to
c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r it is a bad a r g u m e n t .
2 . T I I E B A S l C S T R U C T U R E O F T H E A R G
U M E N T
A n y a t t e m p t to u n d e r s t a n d t h e a r g u m e n t m
u s t solve t h e following puzzle. At
7 9 b - c , S o c r a t e s asserts t h a t t h e b o d y is more s
i m i l a r a n d more a k i n to the Visible.
W h y d o e s h e settle f o r this, w h e n h e can assert s o
m e t h i n g s t r o n g e r - - t h a t t h e
b o d y i n d e e d / s visible? F u r t h e r , h e asserts t h a t
t h e soul is invisible ( o v x 6Qctx6v)
a n d h e n c e u n s e e n (&tiS~g). T h e n h e s t r a n g e l
y i n f e r s f r o m this what a p p e a r s to
be a f a r w e a k e r c o n c l u s i o n - - t h a t t h e soul is
m o r e similar t h a n is t h e b o d y to
the U n s e e n , a n d t h e b o d y is m o r e similar t h a n
is t h e soul to t h e Visible
(79 b 1 6 - 1 7 ) . W h y d o e s h e n o t i n f e r instead t h
a t t h e b o d y b e l o n g s to t h e Visible
a n d t h e soul to t h e Invisible?
F u r t h e r , S o c r a t e s m a k e s similar m o v e s in t h e
l a t e r stages o f t h e a r g u m e n t :
at 7 9 d o - e i , S o c r a t e s i n f e r s t h a t the soul is m o
r e similar a n d m o r e a k i n to t h e
Always t h e S a m e w h e n h e has established t h a t t h e
soul is in fact u n c h a n g i n g ;
a n d at 8 o a 6 - 8 , h e i n f e r s t h a t soul is m e r e l y
like t h e Divine, w h e n h e has

e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t its n a t u r e is to r u l e r a t h e r t
h a n to be r u l e d . In t h e s e last two
stages, t h e n , h e o d d l y r e p l a c e s a m o r e specific c
o n c l u s i o n with a v a g u e r , if n o t
w e a k e r , o n e . W h y ?
D o r t e r ' s e x p l a n a t i o n is a p p a r e n t l y t h a t
this shows S o c r a t e s ' " h e s i t a n c y '''~
a n d t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t is n o t m e a n t to be a r i g
o r o u s d e d u c t i o n . ~ H o w e v e r , t h a t
Plato i n t e n d s us to see t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t is n o t
a r i g o r o u s d e d u c t i o n c a n n o t
e x p l a i n w h y S o c r a t e s d e d u c e s that t h e soul is
m o r e like t h e Invisible f r o m t h e
p r e m i s e t h a t t h e soul is invisible. Such a d e d u c t i o
n is r i g o r o u s ; lack o f r i g o r is
n o t t h e p r o b l e m . I f S o c r a t e s is b e i n g
hesitant, we n e e d to k n o w w h y if this is
g o i n g to s e r v e as a n e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e p r o b l
e m is, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e d e d u c t i o n
9 My own assessment of the point of the Socrates' argument
from the "strength" of the soul is
outlined below, pp. 27-29. For a critique of Socrates'
counterarguments against the harmony
theory, see David Bostock, Plato's "Phaedo'" (Oxford, 1986 ),
1~5-34.
,o Dorter, "Plato's Image of Immortality," 295.
" Dorter, Plato's "'Phaedo": An Interpretation, 76.
1 0 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S
O P H Y 3 4 : 1 J A N U A R Y 1 9 9 6

j u s t s e e m s o d d . A n d o d d n e s s i n d i c a t e s t h
a t w e a r e n o t u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e
a r g u m e n t - - n o t t h a t w e s h o u l d t a k e it as a w
e a k a r g u m e n t f r o m a n a l o g y .
S o w e m u s t t r y t o f i n d a n o t h e r a n s w e r . I t
was a c o s m i c p r i n c i p l e w i d e l y
a c c e p t e d b y t h e G r e e k s t h a t like g r a v i t a t e s
t o like. S o c r a t e s utilizes s u c h a
p r i n c i p l e a t 8 1 a , t o e x p l a i n w h y t h e i m p u
r e s o u l r e m a i n s o n t h e e a r t h a n d w h y
t h e p u r i f i e d s o u l g o e s t o h e a v e n . T h i s c o
u l d easily b e a t l e a s t p a r t o f t h e r e a s o n
S o c r a t e s p u t s s o m u c h e m p h a s i s u p o n t h e
s i m i l i t u d e o f t h e s o u l t o t h e I n v i s i -
ble, A l w a y s t h e S a m e , a n d D i v i n e . W i t h i n t
h e a r g u m e n t i t s e l f h e s e e m s t o b e
m a k i n g a s i m i l a r p o i n t a t 8 o c - d - - w h e n t h e
s o u l t a k e s s e r i o u s l y t h e o b j e c t s o f
t h e senses, it is d r a g g e d b y t h e b o d y i n t o t h o s
e t h i n g s w h i c h a r e n e v e r t h e
s a m e a n d like t h e m " w a n d e r s a n d is c o n f u s e
d a n d w h i r l s as i f i n t o x i c a t e d " ;
a n d w h e n it c o n t e m p l a t e s all b y itself, it g o e s
(in t h o u g h t ? ) t o t h e p u r e , a l w a y s
b e i n g , etc., a n d b e c a u s e it is a k i n t o this w o r l d

a n d a l w a y s c o m e s t o b e w i t h it, it
s t o p s its w a n d e r i n g a n d r e m a i n s t h e s a m e .
B u t i f S o c r a t e s h a s s u f f i c i e n t g r o u n d s t o
say t h a t t h e s o u l b e l o n g s t o t h e
I n v i s i b l e b e c a u s e it is invisible, o r t h a t it b e l o
n g s t o t h e A l w a y s t h e S a m e
b e c a u s e it i n s o m e w a y d o e s n o t c h a n g e , w
h y d o e s h e n o t say this? S o I w o u l d
like t o s u g g e s t a n o t h e r a n s w e r as well.
V e r y r o u g h l y s p e a k i n g , t h e a r g u m e n t , as I
will i n t e r p r e t it, r u n s as follows.
T h e r e a r e t w o a n d o n l y t w o k i n d s o f b e i n g
- - ( a ) t h e Visible, N e v e r t h e S a m e a n d
t h e M o r t a l , a n d (b) t h e I n v i s i b l e , t h e A l w a
y s t h e S a m e , a n d t h e D i v i n e . T h e s o u l
will b e l o n g t o w h i c h e v e r k i n d it m o s t c l o s e l
y r e s e m b l e s b y s h a r i n g a t t r i b u t e s
definitive o f t h a t k i n d . S i n c e t h e s o u l m o s t c l
o s e l y r e s e m b l e s (b), it m u s t b e l o n g t o
(b). B u t t h e n it will a l s o h a v e a n o t h e r c h a r a c t
e r i s t i c o f ( b ) - - i n d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y .
T h e a r g u m e n t , so u n d e r s t o o d , is b a s e d u p o
n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e r e a r e
j u s t t h e s e t w o k i n d s w i t h j u s t t h e s e d e f i n

i t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( 7 9 a 6 - 7 ) . S o c r a t e s
d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n t h e A l w a y s t h e S a
m e a n d t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e a t 78c.
T h e f o r m e r a r e likely t o b e c o m p o s i t e a n d a r
e o b s e r v a b l e t h r o u g h t h e
s e n s e s / ' a n d t h e l a t t e r i n c o m p o s i t e a n d c
a n o n l y b e g r a s p e d t h r o u g h r e a s o n
'" Presumably, Socrates means to exclude from the Invisible
objects of all and any of the
senses (cf. 79c2-3). He merely chooses the term "Visible"
because he is taking vision as a represen-
tative of all the senses. The Visible consists, then, not only of
visible objects but sensible objects,
and the Invisible consists not just of objects which cannot be
seen, but which cannot be objects o f
the other senses as well.
One wonders whether objects too small to sense are "invisible"
in Plato's sense. (See Bostock,
P/ato's "Phaed0," 118--19.) Presumably, Plato would not have
thought of Democritus' atoms as
invisible and unchanging as the Forms are. Accordingly, I
suggest that they would be "visible" in
the sense that one could see what turn out to be great numbers
of them together and that they
could be seen individually if human sight were extended to see
smaller objects than it in fact does.
That is to say, the Visible includes any objects it would be
logically possible to perceive through the
senses. On the other hand, what is "invisible" is something
whose nature is such that it is logically
impossible that it could be seen or sensed at all.

Of course Simmias later brings up attunemem as an example of
something which would violate
(79a). T h e m e m b e r s o f t h e f o r m e r c l a s s - - b o
d i e s - - c o n s t i t u t e t h e Visible; a n d
t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e l a t t e r - - S o c r a t e s ' o n l y
e x a m p l e s are F o r m s - - c o n s t i t u t e t h e
Invisible. Since t h e m e m b e r s o f the f o r m e r class are
bodies, visibility, c h a n g e ,
a n d m o r t a l i t y a r e a t t r i b u t e s essential to a n d
definitive o f t h a t class. A n d invisi-
bility, i m m u t a b i l i t y , a n d divinity m u s t t h e n be a
t t r i b u t e s essential to a n d defini-
tive o f t h e latter class as well.
T h u s s o m e o f t h e p r e d i c a t e s d e f i n i n g t h e
Invisible are "always t h e s a m e "
a n d " d i v i n e , " so t h a t l a t e r in t h e a r g u m e n t
these b e c o m e a l t e r n a t i v e n a m e s f o r
t h e Invisible. A n d similarly f o r t h e Visible at 7 9 d 9 - e
l : "~.6 ~t~[ r
~:XovtL" a n d " ~ la/I [r ~:;(o~L]" are clearly a l t e r n a t i v
e n a m e s f o r t h e
Invisible a n d t h e Visible, since Socrates r e f e r s to each
as a " k i n d [e[6et] o f
those talked a b o u t p r e v i o u s l y a n d those talked a b o
u t n o w " a n d the o n l y k i n d s
he has p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d a r e t h e two e[Svl
T6~v 6~c0v at 7 9 a 6 - 7 , which a r e
t h e Invisible a n d t h e Visible. P r e s u m a b l y " t h e
Divine" a n d " t h e M o r t a l " at

8 o a 3 - 8 a r e to be u n d e r s t o o d in the same way.
As it t u r n s o u t , Socrates t h i n k s t h a t the soul is
capable o f s h a r i n g c h a r a c t e r -
istics o f b o t h kinds, b u t at d i f f e r e n t times a n d u n
d e r d i f f e r e n t conditions.'3 So
e v e n t h o u g h Socrates wishes to d e f e n d the idea t h a t
t h e soul is invisible, always
t h e same, a n d d i v i n e - - a t t r i b u t e s antithetical to
those o f physical o b j e c t s - - h e
t h i n k s t h a t t h e soul can take o n s o m e o f t h e n a
t u r e o f physical bodies i f it is in
c o m m u n i o n with t h e m to too g r e a t a d e g r e e ( 8
o c - d ; cf. 67a5).
H o w t h e n d o e s o n e establish t h e k i n d to which t h
e soul really d o e s belong?
Clearly o n e m u s t p r o c e e d by s h o w i n g t h a t t h e
soul h a s ' a t t r i b u t e s which d e f i n e
o n e o f t h e k i n d s a n d which are antithetical to the o t
h e r kind, t a k i n g c a r e to
a r g u e t h a t t h e soul in its o w n n a t u r e is invisible
while u n d e r s o m e c o n d i t i o n s
u n n a t u r a l to it it can take o n physical p r o p e r t i e s .
Each defining a t t r i b u t e t h a t
we can d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e soul shares with o n e
k i n d s u p p o r t s t h e i n f e r e n c e
t h a t t h e soul has all t h e o t h e r a t t r i b u t e s
associated with t h a t kind. I t is n a t u r a l ,
t h e n , to p u t t h e m a t t e r in t e r m s o f similarity--
the soul belongs to w h i c h e v e r
k i n d it is m o s t similar to in t h e sense o f h a v i n g f e
a t u r e s which are definitive o f
t h a t kind.~4
t h e p r o p o s e d k i n d - d i s t i n c t i o n , s i n c e h e s

u p p o s e s it to b e b o t h invisible a n d d e s t r u c t i b l
e . S o c r a t e s
d o e s n o t explicitly a n s w e r this o b j e c t i o n , b u t t
h a t fact d o e s n o t necessarily m e a n t h a t h e t h o u g
h t it
r e f u t e d his d i s t i n c t i o n . W h e t h e r a n a t t u n e
m e n t is visible o r not, it certainly is sensible. A h a r p h a
s
a t t u n e m e n t i f o n e h e a r s it p l a y e d in t u n e .
,s Phaedo 8 ~d: t h o s e souls w h o h a v e c o m m u n e d t
o o closely with t h e Visible s h a r e in t h e Visible
a n d t h u s c a n b e s e e n as a p p a r i t i o n s w a n d e
r i n g a r o u n d m o n u m e n t s a n d graves. S o c r a t e s
is clear,
h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e ( s e p a r a t e d ) soul is invisible
w h e n it is p u r i f i e d o f c o m m u n i o n with t h e o b
j e c t s o f
t h e s e n s e s .
14 C o n s i d e r h o w o n e a r g u e s , f o r e x a m p l e ,
t h a t a g i v e n s h a d e o f grayish g r e e n is g r a y i s h
green
( a n d n o t g r e e n i s h gray). O n e a r g u e s in t e r m s
o f similarities h e r e , so t h a t w h i c h e v e r p u r e c o l
o r t h e
s h a d e r e s e m b l e s t h e m o s t is t h e o n e we say it
is. B u t n o t j u s t a n y similarity is r e l e v a n t . F o r
O P H Y 3 4 : ~ J A N U A R Y ~ 9 9 6
S i m i l a r i t y to a k i n d b y s h a r i n g o n e o f its d e
f i n i n g a t t r i b u t e s is t h u s e v i d e n c e

t h a t s o m e t h i n g b e l o n g s to t h a t kind. A n d this,
I t a k e it, is w h a t S o c r a t e s is
i m p l y i n g w i t h his c o u p l i n g o f t h e w o r d s 6 ~
o l 6 x ~ ) o v a n d ovyye'v~oxe~ov a t
7 9 b 4 - 6 a n d d 9 - e l : i f t h e soul is m o r e s i m i l a
r to t h e I n v i s i b l e by b e i n g invisi-
ble, it follows t h a t i f t h e r e a r e j u s t t h e s e t w o k
i n d s o f b e i n g , t h e soul is m o r e
k i n d r e d w i t h t h e Visible, i.e., it b e l o n g s m o r e
to t h e k i n d t h e Visible.
B u t i f t h e r e a r e o n l y two k i n d s o f b e i n g , as
S o c r a t e s says, t h e n i f t h e s o u l is
invisible it w o u l d follow i m m e d i a t e l y t h a t it s h o
u l d b e l o n g to t h e I n v i s i b l e a n d
h a v e all o f t h e o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e
I n v i s i b l e as well. A n d t h e s a m e c a n
b e said i f t h e soul is u n c h a n g i n g a n d d i v i n e - -
i t s h o u l d i m m e d i a t e l y follow t h a t
t h e s o u l b e l o n g s to t h e A l w a y s t h e S a m e a n
d t h e Divine. A c c o r d i n g l y , we
w o u l d h a v e t h r e e a r g u m e n t s e a c h i n d e p e n
d e n t l y s u p p o r t i n g t h e c o n c l u s i o n ,
i n s t e a d o f o n e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t m a d e u
p o f t h r e e s m a l l e r a r g u m e n t s s u p -
p o r t i n g t h e c o n c l u s i o n t o g e t h e r .

B u t this is n o t t h e w a y t h e a r g u m e n t r u n s . S
o c r a t e s c o n c l u d e s o n l y t h a t t h e
soul is m o r e like t h e I n v i s i b l e t h a n t h e Visible
at 7 9 c 1 6 - 1 7 ; a n d a t 7 9 e ~ - 5 t h e
soul is still said to b e o n l y " m o r e s i m i l a r in e v e r
y way" to t h e A l w a y s t h e S a m e
t h a n t o t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e , o r " m o s t s i m i
l a r " to t h e D i v i n e a n d A l w a y s t h e
S a m e , etc., at 8 o b . T h e s e n s e we g e t f r o m t h e
use o f t h e s e i n c r e a s i n g l y
s t r o n g e r a d j e c t i v e s is t h a t t h e A f f i n i t y A r
g u m e n t is a n a r g u m e n t w h o s e p a r t s
c u m u l a t i v e l y s u p p o r t t h e c o n c l u s i o n .
So we n e e d to r e f i n e o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h
e a r g u m e n t s o m e w h a t . S o c r a -
tes d i v i d e s u p all o f b e i n g i n t o t w o kinds, to b e
s u r e . B u t t h e soul, as we n o t e d ,
is a p u z z l i n g e n t i t y . I t is invisible, a n d y e t S o c
r a t e s t h i n k s t h a t at t i m e s it c a n b e
p h y s i c a l a n d visible. Is it s u b j e c t to c h a n g e a n
d c a n it b e r u l e d b y s o m e t h i n g
else? I f so, it w o u l d s e e m to b e l o n g to a t h i r d k i
n d o f its o w n , a n d n o t to o n e o f
t h e o t h e r two. So S o c r a t e s m u s t first s h o w t h a
t it d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o a k i n d o f
its o w n , t h a t i n d e e d it is in i t s e l f invisible, u n c h

a n g i n g , a n d d i v i n e . All t h a t
follows f r o m t h e first a r g u m e n t f r o m t h e s o u l '
s s u p p o s e d invisibility is t h a t t h e
soul is v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h e Invisible. F o r to say t h a
t it b e l o n g s t o t h e I n v i s i b l e is
to say s o m e t h i n g m u c h s t r o n g e r t h a n t h a t it
is i n v i s i b l e - - i t is to say t h a t it is
invisible a n d u n c h a n g i n g a n d d i v i n e . I t is m o r
e likely t h a t it b e l o n g s to t h e
I n v i s i b l e ( a n d t h e A l w a y s t h e S a m e a n d t
h e Divine) i f it c a n b e s h o w n t h a t it
example, the object to which the greenish grey shade belongs
might resemble in shape and size
gray objects more than green ones, but this would not count as
evidence that it is gray rather than
green. The shade has to be more similar to green in one
essential aspect--i.e., with respect to
color--than it is to gray. These similarities in color are the only
ones that count, so ifa given shade
is more similar in color to green than it is to gray (and one does
not have reason to think of this
shade is a third color distinct from both green and gray) it must
be a kind of green, despite
whatever other similarities or dissimilarities there might be.
And the more color similarities one
finds between this shade and green, the less the likelihood that
it is either gray or a third color.

d o e s n o t c h a n g e s o m e h o w . By t h e e n d o f t h
e t h i r d a r g u m e n t , S o crat es t h i n k s
h e has s h o w n t h a t t h e soul has all t h r e e o f t h e i
m p o r t a n t d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s -
tics o f t h e k i n d w h o s e m e m b e r s a r e i n d e s t r
u c t i b l e . By this time, h e has elimi-
n a t e d t h e possibility t h a t t h e soul d o e s n o t b e l o
n g to a t h i r d kind,~5 so h e has a
r i g h t to c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e soul b e l o n g s to t h e
Invisible, Always t h e S a m e , a n d
Divine, a n d h e n c e is i n d e s t r u c t i b l e . ~6
T h i s leads us to ask a n o t h e r q u e s t i o n . Did Plato i
n t e n d us to t ak e t h e r e to
b e o n l y two k i n d s o f b e i n g ? T h a t h e d i d in
fact m a k e su ch a p a r t i t i o n l a t e r o n
is e v i d e n t f r o m his division b e t w e e n b e i n g a n d
b e c o m i n g o c c u r r i n g in his l a t e r
w r i t i n g s ~ 7 - - a division w h i c h is a r e s t a t e m e n t
o f this o n e . B u t , o f c o u r s e , in t h e
Phaedo itself (~ o 2 f f . ) , h e i n t r o d u c e s a n e n t i t y
wh i ch seems to b e l o n g to n e i t h e r
o f t h e a b o v e k i n d s o f b e i n g - - t h e i m m a n e n
t c h a r a c t e r . T h u s S o c r a t e s ' l a r g e -
ness a n d smallness a r e said to c h a n g e in t h e sense o f
c o m i n g to b e a n d p a s s i n g
away, a n d c l e a r l y t h e y a r e sensible. B u t since t h e
y also n e v e r a d m i t o p p o s i t e s
to t h e m s e l v e s ( ~ o 2 e - ~ o 3 c ) '8 t h e r e is s o m e
r e a s o n to believe t h e y b e l o n g to a
t h i r d k i n d .
H o w e v e r , i f Plato d o e s t h i n k o f i m m a n e n t c
h a r a c t e r s as a t h i r d k i n d , this
n e e d n o t u n d e r m i n e t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n

t , n o r n e e d we i n f e r t h a t Plato
t h o u g h t it did. F o r e v e n if i m m a n e n t c h a r a c t
e r s d o c o n s t i t u t e a t h i r d k in d ,
Plato m a k e s it q u i t e clear, as we shall also see, t h a t t h
e soul c o u l d n o t b e l o n g to
such a k i n d b e c a u s e i m m a n e n t c h a r a c t e r s a r
e d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e i r subjects
f o r t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , a n d t h e soul's "divinity " ru
l es this o u t , ' 9 as d o e s S o c r a t e s '
r e s p o n s e to t h e t h e o r y t h a t t h e soul is a h a r m
o n y (93ff.).
So w h e t h e r o r n o t Plato has a t h r e e f o l d o r t w o
f o l d o n t o l o g y , t h e r e a r e o n l y
two k i n d s which h e c o n s i d e r s r e l e v a n t to t h e
n a t u r e o f s o u l - - o n t h e o n e h a n d ,
t h e Visible, N e v e r t h e Same, a n d Mortal , a n d , o n
t h e o t h e r , t h e Invisible,
Always t h e S a m e , a n d Divine. It follows t h e n f r o m
t h e g r e a t e r similarity o f t h e
soul to t h e l a t t e r k i n d t h a t it b e l o n g s to t h a t
kind, since t h e similarity is in
t e r m s o f p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h a r e essential to t h a
t k i n d a n d n o t t h e o t h e r .
,51 w o u l d s u g g e s t a s i m i l a r e x p l a n a t i o n f o
r w h y t h e h u m a n b o d y is m e r e l y said to b e m o
r e
similar to t h e Visible w h e n it is in fact visible at 79 b, etc.
l f t h e soul, w h i c h is invisible, c a n b e visible
a n d h e n c e s o m e t h i n g a p p a r e n t l y physical w h
i c h r e s e m b l e s t h e b o d y , this m e a n s t h a t t h e
h u m a n
b o d y is also a p u z z l i n g e n t i t y w h i c h m i g h t b
e l o n g to a k i n d o f its o w n o r to t h e s a m e t h i r d

k i n d as
t h e soul. O n l y w h e n h e h a s s h o w n t h a t t h e b
o d y is visible a n d n e v e r t h e s a m e a n d m o r t a l
in t h e
s e n s e o f b e i n g r u l e d c a n S o c r a t e s c o n c l u
d e t h a t it is dissoluble because it is m o s t similar ( a n d
h e n c e
b e l o n g s to) t h e Visible, N e v e r t h e S a m e , a n d
Mortal.
,61 shall a r g u e l a t e r o n t h a t h e d i d in fact c o n c l
u d e this, t h a t " W h a t e v e r k i n d a n e n t i t y m o s
t
r e s e m b l e s is o n e to w h i c h it b e l o n g s " is a p r i
n c i p l e m o r e o r less implicitly u s e d in his a r g u m e
n t .
See below, p p . 1 5 - 1 6 .
17 E.g., Republic 518c, 52 t d ; Timaeus 27dff., Philebus 54ff.
' s O n t h e s e n s e in w h i c h this c o u l d b e said to i n
d i c a t e u n c h a n g e a b i l i t y , s e e below, p p . 1 6 - 1
9 .
,gSee below, p p . ~ 7 - ~ 9 .
O P H Y 3 4 : 1 JANUARY ~ 9 9 6
B u t d o e s S o c r a t e s a c t u a l l y c o n c l u d e t h a t
t h e s o u l d o e s b e l o n g t o t h e I n v i s i -
b l e , A l w a y s t h e S a m e , a n d D i v i n e , a n d t h
a t t h e r e f o r e t h e s o u l is i n d i s s o l u b l e ?
T h e f i n a l c o n c l u s i o n a t 8 o b 8 - 1 o - - t h a t t h

e s o u l is c o m p l e t e l y i n d i s s o l u b l e o r
s o m e t h i n g n e a r t o t h i s - - h a s b e e n t a k e n b
y c o m m e n t a t o r s t o m e a n t h a t P l a t o is
u n s u r e o f h i s c o n c l u s i o n o r t h a t t h e a r g u
m e n t d o e s n o t p r o v i d e s u f f i c i e n t
e v i d e n c e f o r t h e i m m o r t a l i t y o f t h e s o u l .
' ~
N o t e t h a t e v e n t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , a s q u a l i f
i e d a s it is, d o e s n o t f o l l o w i f t h e
a r g u m e n t is a m e r e a n a l o g y . I n a n y c a s e , S
o c r a t e s ' c o m p a n i o n s ' r e a c t i o n t o t h e
a r g u m e n t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e y t a k e t h i s c o
n c l u s i o n s e r i o u s l y , a n d t h e y t a k e it t o
c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e s o u l is i n d e s t r u c t i b l e . F
o r t h i s is t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h e y a t t a c k
( 8 6 a , 8 7 a ) , n o t t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e s o
u l is almost i n d e s t r u c t i b l e . A n d t o b e
s u r e , a c l o s e l o o k a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n i n d i c
a t e s t h a t S o c r a t e s d o e s n o t s a y t h i s ;
w h a t h e s a y s is t h a t t h e s o u l is completely o r
absolutely (~6 ~ a O ( x z m v ) i n d i s s o l u b l e
o r s o m e t h i n g n e a r t o t h i s . " " S o m e t h i n g n
e a r t o t h i s " m e a n s "nearly a b s o l u t e l y
i n d i s s o l u b l e , " w h i c h i n t u r n i m p l i e s t h a t
s o m e p a r t o f t h e s o u l is i n d i s s o l u b l e

a n d s o m e p a r t is n o t . "
" N e a r l y c o m p l e t e l y i n d i s s o l u b l e " i n w h a
t w a y ? P l a t o is n o t a s e x p l i c i t a s o n e
w o u l d l i k e h e r e . B u t it is e v i d e n t t h a t P l a t
o t h i n k s o f t h e s o u l a s c o m p o s e d o f
" p a r t s " - - t h e i n t e l l e c t , w h i c h P l a t o s o m e
t i m e s c a l l s " t h e s o u l " a n d t h i n k s is
i n c o m p o s i t e , a n d s o m e t h i n g e l s e . ' 3 I f s o
u l w e r e n o t c o m p o s e d o f p a r t s , t h e n
t h e w h o l e o f t h e s o u l w o u l d h a v e t o b e t h e
i n t e l l e c t . B u t t h i s c a n n o t b e so, f o r
t h e n s o m e o f S o c r a t e s ' s t a t e m e n t s c o n c e r
n i n g t h e s o u l w o u l d m e a n t h a t the
intellect b e c o m e s v i s i b l e a n d b o d y l i k e w h e n
it c o m m u n e s t o o c l o s e l y w i t h b o d -
i e s . T h e n t h e i n t e l l e c t w o u l d b e c o m e c o m
p o s e d o f p h y s i c a l p a r t s a n d c o u l d b e
d e s t r u c t i b l e . T h i s c a n n o t b e S o c r a t e s ' m
e a n i n g s i n c e i f t r u e it w o u l d r e n d e r
u n s o u n d a l l p r o o f s f o r t h e i m m o r t a l i t y o f
t h e s o u l .
I n a n y c a s e , w h a t P l a t o s o m e t i m e s m e a n s
b y " t h e s o u l " h a s t o b e m o r e t h a n
�9 o E.g., Dorter, Plato's "Phaedo" 75, White, Myth and

Metaphysics; cf. Gallop, Plato: Phaedo, 14o.
�9 ~ Dorter in "Plato's Image of Immortality," 298, fails to note
this point. He writes: " . . . and,
finally, it is concluded that the soul is indissoluble or close to it
(8oh8)." Cf. Hugh Tredennick's
translation in Hamilton and Cairns, eds., The Collected
Dialogues of Plato (Princeton University
Press, 197 l), 63: "Very well, then, in that case is it not natural
for the body to disintegrate rapidly,
but for the soul to be quite or very nearly indissoluble?"
" O f course this could also mean that the soul is completely
indissoluble except under some
conditions, hut I do not see what this could refer to other than
that some essential part of the soul
is indissoluble and some part is not.
"sContra W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol.
IV (Cambridge University Press,
1975), 346-47 and Terence Irwin, Classical Thought (Oxford,
1989), 235, n. 27. Guthrie writes:
� 9 in the Phaedo the psyche is simple and elemental,
synonymous with intelligence; and emotions
and desires (66c), as well as sense-perception, are assigned to
the body. This is well brought out at
94b, where the resistance of a thirsty man to the impulse to
drink is given as an instance of soul
opposing body, whereas at Rep. 439 c it exemplifies one
element of the soul opposing another."
Both Guthrie and Irwin assume that what is part of the soul
cannot be physical and vice-versa.

PLATO'S AFFINITY ARGUMENT 15
j u s t t h e intellect, since t h e soul is c a p a b l e o f b el i
ev in g t h e a b s u r d m e s s a g e s o f
t h e senses ( 8 3 d 5 - 6 ) a n d it c a n be filled with d e s i r
e s a n d p l e a s u r e s o f t h e b o d y ,
all w h e n t h e intellect is p r e s u m a b l y d o r m a n t . T
h e view t h a t in t h e Phaedo
p l e a s u r e s a n d d e s i r e s f o r e a r t h l y t h i n g s
a r e in t h e b o d y - - n o t in t h e s o u l - - i s
clearly false, b e c a u s e as 8 3 d 7 m a k e s clear, w h e n t
h e soul believes to b e t r u e
w h a t t h e b o d y (i.e., senses) says, it is b e c a u s e the
soul a g r e e s (61~o6o~e~v) with
t h e b o d y a n d delights ('~o~ a6"co~ Xa~Oetv) in t h e s a
m e t h in g s t h a t it is f o r c e d to
b e c o m e o f a similar h a b i t a n d b r e d t o g e t h e r
(606~Qo~t6g ~e xaL 6~t6~Oo(t~og). So
t h e soul is t h e seat o f s o m e p l e a s u r e s , a f t e r
all, a n d as a c o n s e q u e n c e it be-
c o m e s "filled w i t h " t h e b o d y ( 8 o d l o ) - - i . e . ,
this p a r t o f t h e soul r e m a i n s t h e
soul, a n d y e t b e c o m e s physical.24
I n this way, S o c r a t e s c a n say t h a t w h e n t h e soul
(i.e., intellect) s e p a r a t e s
a n d p u r i f i e s itself f r o m the body t h r o u g h p h i l o
s o p h y , h e c a n m e a n in p a r t t h e
physical p a r t o f t h e soul w h i c h has b e e n filled with
p l e a s u r e s a n d d e s i r e s o f t h e
b o d y . Since n o t h i n g is left o f t h e soul b u t w h a t
is essential to i t - - t h e i n t e l l e c t - -
S o c r a t e s c a n r e f e r to this simply as " t h e soul" at
this p o in t . I f so, t h e r e is a c l e a r
s e n s e in w h i c h t h e soul is o n l y nearly completely
indissoluble, f o r it c a n lose t h e

p a r t o f itself w h i c h a t t a c h e s itself to a n d b e c o
m e s p a r t o f t h e physical w o r l d .
B u t this follows o n l y if P l a t o is i m p l y i n g t h a t i
f t h e soul is m o s t similar to
t h e Invisible, N e v e r C h a n g i n g , etc., it m u s t also b
e l o n g to this kind. I f so, t h e
a r g u m e n t c a n n o t b e m e r e l y o n e f r o m a n a l
o g y . It m u s t d e p e n d i n s t e a d u p o n
t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e soul b e l o n g s to w h i c h
e v e r o f t h e two k in d s o f b e i n g it
m o s t closely r e s e m b l e s in t e r m s o f d e f i n i t i v
e a t t r i b u t e s .
3" THE SOUL IS MORE SIMILAR TO THE ALWAYS THE
SAME THAN TO
THE NOT EVER THE SAME
(a) A W r o n g I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f "Always t h e s a
m e " a n d " N e v e r t h e s a m e "
T h e p h r a s e s "always t h e s a m e " a n d " n e v e r t h
e s a m e " raise p r o b l e m s f o r
S o c r a t e s ' a r g u m e n t . As a l t e r n a t i v e n a m e s
f o r t h e Invisible a n d t h e Visible,
t h e y o b s c u r e t h e p o i n t t h a t t h e s e two kin d s
a r e g e n e r a l l y m e a n t to b e e x c l u -
sive. F o r w h a t d o we d o with a n o t h e r possible a l t
e r n a t i v e - - t h a t which is s o m e -
times t h e s a m e a n d s o m e t i m e s n o t t h e same? S
e c o n d l y , h o w c a n t h e soul b e
always t h e s a m e a n d y e t "be d r a g g e d by t h e b o
d y i n t o t h o s e th i n g s w h i c h a r e
n e v e r t h e s a m e " a n d " w a n d e r " a n d "whirl as if
i n t o x i c a t e d " ( 7 9 c 6 - 8 ) ? H o w

can it p u t aside t h e b o d y a n d c o n t e m p l a t e by
itself so as to e n t e r i n to t h e r e a l m
o f t h e F o r m s ( 7 9 d l - u ) ? H o w c a n it " s t o p f r
o m its w a n d e r i n g " a n d r e m a i n t h e
s a m e w h e n it c o n t e m p l a t e s t h e F o r m s i f it
is u n c h a n g i n g ( 7 9 d 4 - 5 ) ?
I d o n o t t h i n k t h a t t h e r e a r e a n y satisfactory a
n s w e r s to t h e s e q u e s t i o n s o n
�9 4 6 7 a 5 ; 8 lc4-d 4 makes the point three times. And at
83d4ff. he compares each pleasure and
pain to a rivet which attaches the soul to the body and makes it
bodylike.
O P H Y 5 4 : ~ J A N U A R Y 1 9 9 6
this u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f " c h a n g e " a n d " t h e s a
m e . " F o r e v e n i f S o c r a t e s is t h i n k -
i n g t h a t o n l y t h e intellect n e v e r c h a n g e s , this
is c l e a r l y n o t t r u e , since it f o r g e t s
a n d r e m e m b e r s k n o w l e d g e o f t h e F o r m s c o
n t a i n e d w i t h i n it, a n d it m o v e s
f r o m o n e life in o n e b o d y to a n o t h e r life in a n o t
h e r . B u t t h e c o n c l u s i v e
a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t this k i n d o f i n t e r p r e t a t i
o n o f " c h a n g e " a n d " t h e s a m e " is
t e x t u a l . A t 7 8 d - e , S o c r a t e s tells us w h a t h e

m e a n s b y " t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e . "
Socrates: And what o f the many beautiful things, such as m e n
or horses or cloaks, or
other such things, or equal things, or any things homonymous
with them? Are they the
same, or is it completely the opposite, so that they are never the
same as themselves or
as one a n o t h e r - - i n a word, never the same?
Cebes: T h e s e things are so, again: they are never the same.
N o w to b e s u r e , b e a u t i f u l m e n a n d h o r s e s a
n d cloaks c a n b e c o m e u g l y a n d
c a n c h a n g e in o t h e r ways as well. B u t this d o e s n
o t m e a n t h a t t h e y c h a n g e in
e v e r y w a y so as n e v e r to b e t h e s a m e e i t h e r
as t h e m s e l v e s o r as o n e a n o t h e r .
F o r S o c r a t e s m a k e s it c l e a r l a t e r t h a t s o m
e t h i n g c a n a n d d o e s r e m a i n t h e
s a m e t h r o u g h this s o r t o f c h a n g e w h e n h e
says t h a t he, S o c r a t e s , c a n t a k e o n
s h o r t n e s s a n d still r e m a i n t h e s a m e ( 1 o 2 e 4 -
5 ) . A n d w h a t a r e we to m a k e o f
t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e s e a r e n e v e r t h e s a m e as
o n e a n o t h e r ? T h i s c a n n o t m e a n
t h a t , e.g., b e a u t i f u l m e n c a n n o t all b e b e a u t
i f u l at t h e s a m e t i m e , so t h a t
w h e n o n e m a n b e c o m e s b e a u t i f u l , a n o t h e r
w h o was b e a u t i f u l m u s t n o w
b e c o m e ugly.

So S o c r a t e s m u s t h a v e m e a n t b y txtxct[~.~l a t
7 8 d 4 a n d 6s at d 7
s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n change in o u r s e n s e o f
q u a l i t a t i v e a l t e r a t i o n o r local
m o t i o n .
(b) W h a t P l a t o m u s t m e a n b y " a l w a y s t h e s a
m e " a n d " n e v e r t h e s a m e "
I n s t e a d , in s a y i n g t h a t s e n s i b l e p a r t i c u l a
r s a r e n e v e r t h e s a m e , S o c r a t e s
m u s t b e m a k i n g t h e f a m i l i a r p o i n t h e m a k
e s e l s e w h e r e , e.g., at Phaedo 74 a n d
Symposium ~ lo, t h a t sensibles w h i c h a r e b e a u t i f u
l a r e also u g l y a n d w h i c h a r e
e q u a l a r e also u n e q u a l . I n this way, a b e a u t i f u l
m a n is n o t t h e s a m e as h i m s e l f
qua b e a u t i f u l , b e c a u s e h e is also u g l y in c o m p
a r i s o n w i t h s o m e t h i n g else. T h a t
is, t h e r e is o p p o s i t i o n in h i m b e t w e e n t h e s e
two o p p o s i t e s . N o r is h e t h e s a m e
as o t h e r b e a u t i f u l m e n qua b e a u t i f u l , in t h e
s e n s e t h a t t h e y also c o n t a i n ugli-
n e s s . ~ A c c o r d i n g l y , w h a t is always t h e s a m e
is n e v e r F a n d n o t - F .
C i t i n g this p a s s a g e a n d o t h e r s , T e r e n c e I r
w i n h a s a c c o r d i n g l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d
f o r us t w o s e n s e s o f " c h a n g e " in G r e e k p h i l
o s o p h y : self-change ( s - c h a n g e ) - - l o c a l
m o v e m e n t a n d / o r q u a l i t a t i v e a l t e r a t i o n ;

a n d aspect-change ( a - c h a n g e ) - - m e r e
,5 Irwin's understanding of this passage is similar to mine. See
T. H. Irwin, "Plato's
Heracleiteanism," The Philosophical Quarterly 27/1o6 (January,
1977): 3-13.
P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T ~7
c o m p r e s e n c e o f o p p o s i t e p r o p e r t i e s . ' 6 A
l t h o u g h I r w i n f i n d s n o e v i d e n c e t h a t
P l a t o c o u l d clearly d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n s - c
h a n g e a n d a - c h a n g e , h e a l s o s e e s n o
r e a s o n t o t h i n k t h a t P l a t o c o n f l a t e d t h e m
e i t h e r . S o f a r , t h e n , I h a v e a r g u e d t h a t
P l a t o c a n n o t h a v e i n m i n d s - c h a n g e w h e n
h e s p e a k s o f " a l w a y s t h e s a m e " a n d
" n e v e r t h e s a m e . " I f s o , e v e n i f P l a t o h a d
n o precise w a y o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g s-
c h a n g e a n d a - c h a n g e , i t s e e m s o b v i o u s t h
a t h e m u s t h a v e m e a n t t o e x c l u d e a l l a -
c h a n g e f r o m t h e F o r m s , a n d w h e n h e s p o k
e h e r e o f t h o s e t h i n g s w h i c h a r e
a l w a y s c h a n g i n g , h e m u s t h a v e h a d i n m i n
d t h i n g s w h i c h e x h i b i t a - c h a n g e .
I n c o n t r a s t , t h e n , w i t h s e n s i b l e p a r t i c u l
a r s w e s h o u l d s a y t h a t t h e F o r m s

h a v e a - s a m e n e s s - - t h e y d o n o t a d m i t t h e i r
o p p o s i t e s . T h a t is t o s a y , t h e F is
n e v e r n o t - F ( a n d is n e v e r the N o t - F ) . 2 7
W h y s h o u l d c o m p r e s e n c e o f o p p o s i t e s , w
h e t h e r i n p a r t i c u l a r s , s e n s i b l e
p r o p e r t i e s , o r t y p e s o f p a r t i c u l a r s , b e t e
r m e d " c h a n g e " a t a l l ? O n e c a n r e a s o n -
a b l y s a y t h a t S i m m i a s " b e c o m e s " l a r g e w
h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h S o c r a t e s , a n d t h a t
h e " b e c o m e s " s m a l l w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h
P h a e d o , e v e n t h o u g h h e w a s l a r g e r
t h a n t h e o n e a n d s m a l l e r t h a n t h e o t h e r a l
l a l o n g . F u r t h e r , a s s u m i n g t h e
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f a s e n s i b l e p r o p e r t y l i k e
a c e r t a i n c o l o r w i t h b e a u t y , o b j e c t s
w h i c h h a v e t h i s p r o p e r t y w i l l " b e c o m e " b
e a u t i f u l o n s o m e c o m p a r i s o n s o r i n
�9 6 Irwin, "Plato's Heracleiteanism," 3 - l 3. Irwin defines "s-
changes" as "x s-changes iff at time
t I x is F and at time t, x is not-F, and x itself is not in the same
condition at t 2 as it was at t, (e.g., at t,
it is hot and at t, it has become not-hot, by becoming colder
than it was" (4)- He defines "a-
changes" as "x a-changes iff x is F in one aspect, not-F in
another, and x is in the same condition
when it is F and when it is not-F (e.g., x is big in comparison
with y, small in comparison with z)"
(4). Irwin later extends the definition o f a-change to include

compresence o f opposites within
different tokens o f the same type (8-9).
�9 T Just what is it that is said to he in flux at 7 8 d - e ? Irwin
argues that one o f the many
beautifuls will not be a particular man, but a class o f beautiful
things (lo), since Plato does not
think that every particular (e.g., every particular which has
justice o r piety) suffers compresence
o f opposites (9). Thus his "sticks and stones" arguments o f
Phaedo 74 can only be extended from
"equal" to the o t h e r predicates Socrates mentions at 7 5 d - e
on the assumption that he is thinking
o f types. Consider then the fact that the quality o f being
dark-complexioned is sometimes itself
beautiful, sometimes not. Thus the class o f dark-complexioned
men, under that description,
contains both beauty and ugliness (and thus are never the same
in relation to themselves). Con-
sider also the relationship between this class and another class--
the class o f pale-complexioned
men. Because in some cases, some members o f the former
class are more beautiful than the latter,
and in others, more ugly than the latter, the class o f dark-
complexioned men is both beautiful and
ugly in relation to the class o f pale-complexioned men (and
these classes are never the same in
relation to each other).
However, this cannot be the whole story. Many particulars do
suffer compresence of oppo-
sites. This is certainly clear from Plato's own examples o f
particular equal sticks and stones at 74 c
(which he alludes to again at 78el) and o f particular fingers at
Republic 523--25 . Irwin acknowl-
edges this in his discussion o f Phaedo i o2 ( ! 1 ), where

Simmias is large in relation to Socrates, small
in relation to Simmias, and yet is said to become both large and
small, i.e., large in one compari-
son. small in another. So a-change must occur not just for types
o f particulars and their sensible
properties, but also in many cases for those particulars as well.
I 8 J O U R N A L O F T H E H 1 S T O R Y O F P H I L O
S O P H Y 3 4 : 1 JANUARY ~996
s o m e c o n t e x t s , u g l y in o t h e r s . A n d s o t o o
f o r t y p e s o f b e a u t i f u l o b j e c t s . 2s
" C h a n g e " i n t h e s e n s e o f a - c h a n g e t h u s is
a n e p i s t e m i c t e r m a p p l i e d t o o b j e c t s
a n d k i n d s o f o b j e c t s w h i c h p r o d u c e t h e f o
l l o w i n g k i n d o f s - c h a n g e in t h e s o u l :
b e l i e f a t t, t h a t a is ( t h e t y p e o f t h i n g w h i c
h is) F, b e l i e f a t t~ t h a t a is ( t h e t y p e o f
t h i n g w h i c h ) is n o t - F .
T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a - c h a n g e a n d s - c
h a n g e ( a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g
s e n s e s o f " s a m e n e s s " ) h e l p s u s t o a r t i c u l
a t e t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o
k i n d s o f b e i n g . S o m e t h i n g t h a t h a s a - c h a
n g e is s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is F b u t w h i c h
is a l s o liable t o b e ( o r t o b e t h e s o r t o f t h i n g

w h i c h is) n o t - F . T h e s e n s e i n w h i c h
i t / s F d o e s n o t l o g i c a l l y e x c l u d e its a l s o b
e i n g n o t - F . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e
F o r m t h e F, w h i c h h a s a - s a m e n e s s , / s F ( o r /
s F - n e s s ) i n a s t r o n g e r s e n s e - - o n e
w h i c h e x c l u d e s its b e i n g n o t - F ( o r n o t - F - n
e s s ) . I n a d d i t i o n , F o r m s s e e m t o
e x c l u d e o t h e r p a i r s o f c o m p r e s e n t o p p o s i
t e s as well. T h u s t h e B e a u t i f u l , p r e -
s u m a b l y , w o u l d n o t b e b o t h e q u a l a n d u n e
q u a l a t t h e s a m e t i m e . F u r t h e r ,
b e i n g s w h i c h s u f f e r a - c h a n g e h a v e a s o r t
o f b e i n g w h i c h m a k e s t h e m a p p e a r t o
c o n f l a t e t h e o p p o s i t e s t h e y h a v e , w h e r e a
s b e i n g s w h i c h h a v e a - s a m e n e s s h a v e
a s o r t o f b e i n g w h i c h d o e s n o t d o t h i s . ' 9 T
h e o n e k i n d o f b e i n g is t h e k i n d t h a t
s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s h a v e ; t h e l a t t e r k i n d o f
b e i n g is t h e s o r t t h a t n o n s e n s i b l e
o b j e c t s , s u c h a s F o r m s , h a v e . S o u n d e r s t
o o d , t h e r e is n o a l t e r n a t i v e b e y o n d
w h a t is a l w a y s t h e s a m e a n d w h a t is n e v e r t
h e s a m e .
A - c h a n g e is s o m e t h i n g P l a t o t h i n k s is c o n f

u s i n g t o t h e soul. I t is n o t t h a t
s e n s i b l e p a r t i c u l a r s w h i c h a r e F's a r e b o t h
F a n d n o t - F in a c o n t r a d i c t o r y
s e n s e , s i n c e a - c h a n g e d o e s n o t i n v o l v e
this, a n d P l a t o k n o w s t h a t s o m e t h i n g
c a n b e F in o n e w a y , n o t - F i n a n o t h e r . S ~ T h
e c l e a r e s t p a s s a g e w h i c h i n d i c a t e s
h o w a - c h a n g e is c o n f u s i n g t o t h e s o u l is
Republic 5 9 3 - ~ 5 . P e r c e p t i o n c o n -
f o u n d s o p p o s i t e s s u c h as h a r d n e s s a n d s o f
t n e s s , l a r g e n e s s a n d s m a l l n e s s , t h i c k -
,s See Irwin, "Plato's Heracleiteanism," 5, l o - l i. Cf. Gregory
Vlastos, "Degrees of Reality in
Plato," in his P/aton~ Studies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, 198 ,), 63,
where, on the topic of particular F's
which are not F's at Republic 479, Vlastos writes: " . their F-
nature is adulterated by contrary
characters, so that we could only get a confused and uncertain
idea of what it is to be F, one that
would be subject to constant fluctuations [x,~.Lv6e/'r as we
encountered instances of F that
turned out to be different in one or more respects from those on
which we based our previous
conception of it."
,9 See Vlastos, "Degrees of Reality," 58-75, for the classic
discussion of these points. However,
I cannot agree with his identification of the two kinds of being
with logically necessary and
logically contingent being. The "is" in "This tree is a plant"
seems logically necessary to me (in the

sense that it is necessarily true that if this is a tree, it is a
plant), but quite clearly a tree is not
thereby subject to a-sameness. Nor does the fact that something
is necessarily F guarantee that it
won't also be not-F: a stick three inches long (qua three inches
long) is necessarily larger than one
two inches long and necessarily smaller than one which is four
inches long.
But perhaps what Vlastos has in mind is a distinction between
(a) necessarily unchanging
existents and necessary predications of them and (b) changing
existents and logically contingent
predications of them.
so Republic 436e.
ness and thinness. T h e t h o u g h t o f the soul cannot so
conflate these opposites.
So the soul must think o f opposites individually and
separately,3' i.e., as Forms.
So far, then, Socrates would appear to be speaking as if
perception cannot
be a source o f knowledge at all. This must be tempered,
however, by the fact
that he quite clearly calls m e m o r y derived from perception
"knowledge" at
Phaedo 73c; if so, the soul can derive some knowledge from
sense perception.3"
This is confirmed by the a r g u m e n t at 74ff. T h e a r g u m
e n t does not a t t e m p t to

show that a stick is ever not a stick, or a stone not a stone.~3 So
presumably
perception is capable o f portraying sticks and stones
accurately as sticks a n d
stones, but it is not capable o f conveying accurately their
equality and inequal-
ity. Perception all by itself cannot get accurate knowledge o f
bodies' opposite
propert/es, i.e., when it attempts to do so without the aid o f the
intellect, without
knowledge o f the Forms. For when the soul relies strictly upon
the senses,
since the objects o f the senses are both F a n d not-F, the soul
cannot know this,
because the senses cannot make accurate distinctions between
F-ness a n d non-
F-ness, F-things and non-F-things.S4
Socrates clearly infers that the soul, insofar as it knows objects
which are a-
the-same, must itself be a-the-same. How?
(c) Is Socrates Assuming "Like knows like"?
David Gallop35 has suggested that in the Affinity A r g u m e n
t , Socrates is as-
suming Empedocles' "Like knows like." But "Like knows like"
is a vague princi-
ple. What does it mean? T h e r e are several sorts o f
possibilities, but there are
g r o u n d s for rejecting each o f them. (a) In the manner
attributed to Empedo-
cles,36 if the soul knows x, the soul must be composed o f the
same dements that x is
composed of. (b) In thespirit o f Empedocles, if the soul knows
x, the soul must be

3, I agree with Gall Fine's characterization o f " s e p a r a t i o
n " o f the Forms: "A Form F is separate
just in case it can exist uninstantiated by F sensible particulars."
(See, inter alia, h e r " T h e Object o f
T h o u g h t A r g u m e n t : Forms a n d Thoughts," Apeiron
[Spring, 1989]: 120, n. ~o.) T h u s to think o f
Beauty "separately" is to think o f it as it is all by itself
without belonging to a face or a statue or a
h u m a n body, or any o t h e r beautiful thing, and to think o f
it as free from compresence in the same
object or type o f object with its opposite (Symposium 21 la).
3, For a fuller discussion o f this point in the Phaed0 and
elsewhere, see Nicholas White, Plato
on Knowledge and Reality (Indianapolis, 1976), 7 2 - 7 3 .
33 Cf. Plato's explicit statement at Republic 5 z 5 d - e that
sight never reports to the soul that a
finger is not a finger, as it does that what is small is also large,
or that smallness is largeness.
34 On the point that Forms are the basic objects o f knowledge,
see Gall Fine, On Ideas (Oxford,
t993), 59 a n d the c o r r e s p o n d i n g note 6x, as well as h
e r "Knowledge a n d Belief in Rei0ub//c V,"
Archly fi~r Geschichte der Philosophic 60 (1978): l ~ 1-39, a n
d "Knowledge a n d Belief in Republic V -
VII, in S. Evenson, ed., Companions to Ancient Thought I:
Epistemology (Cambridge, 199o), 8 5 - t 15.
35 Gallop, Plato: Phaedo, 14o. Gallop does not develop
precisely what this principle is s u p p o s e d
to be, however.
3~ Barnes has a r g u e d that even Empedocles did not hold

"Like knows like." See his
The Presocratic Philosophers, vol. 2 (Roudedge a n d Kegan
Paul, 1979), 18o--8L
9 0 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O
S O P H Y 3 4 : t J A N U A R Y 1 9 9 6
m a d e o f t h e s t u f f ( w h a t e v e r t h a t is) t h a t x
is. (c) I f a soul k n o w s x, it m u s t r e s e m -
ble x b y h a v i n g all t h e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t x has.
(d) I f a soul k n o w s x to b e F, t h e n it
m u s t b e F itself; in this w a y it r e s e m b l e s x b y o n l
y s h a r i n g t h e p r o p e r t i e s w i t h x
t h a t it k n o w s x has. (e) I f a soul k n o w s x, it m u s t
h a v e s o m e o f x ' s p r o p e r t i e s itself,
o r h a v e p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h r e s e m b l e a n d r e
p r e s e n t s o m e o f x's p r o p e r t i e s . T h e
soul w h i c h k n o w s is like a p a i n t i n g , t h e n , w h i
c h m u s t r e s e m b l e t h e o b j e c t it
p o r t r a y s . S o m e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e o b j e c t
(e.g., o f a m o u n t a i n ) it s h a r e s - - e . g . ,
c o l o r s a n d s h a p e s . O t h e r p r o p e r t i e s o f t h
e m o u n t a i n it c a n o n l y r e p r e s e n t b y
m e a n s o f p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h r e s e m b l e t h e m
o u n t a i n ' s in s o m e way ( b e c a u s e a
p a i n t i n g is flat a n d c a n o n l y p r o v i d e us with a
view f r o m o n e p e r s p e c t i v e ) : t h e

m o u n t a i n ' s size, d i s t a n c e f r o m t h e v i e w e r ,
its t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l i t y , its s u r f a c e
t e x t u r e . (f) I n t h e m a n n e r o f A r i s t o t l e , i f t
h e soul k n o w s x, x ' s f o r m m u s t b e in
t h e soul, so t h a t it w o u l d b e c o r r e c t to say in a s e
n s e t h a t x i t s e l f is in t h e soul. T h e
soul d o e s n o t b e c o m e a n x in k n o w i n g x b e c a u
s e t h e soul is i m m a t e r i a l , w h e r e a s x
is a n x b y h a v i n g its f o r m in its m a t t e r . (g) F o l l
o w i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n m a d e b y t h e
Scholastics ( a n d m o r e r e c e n t l y b y W i l f r e d
Sellars) b e t w e e n esse n a t u r a l e a n d esse
intentionale,37 i f t h e soul k n o w s x, t h e soul h a s i n t
e n t i o n a l l y all o f x ' s p r o p e r t i e s
w h i c h it k n o w s x to h a v e ; b u t ( a c c o r d i n g to
SeUars) t h e basis f o r this is t h a t t h e
s o u l r e a l l y o r n a t u r a l l y h a s at least s o m e o f
x ' s p r o p e r t i e s . T h u s , w i t h Sellars,
t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s o f x ' s w h i c h t h e soul
(Sellars says " m i n d " ) r e a l l y h a s " p i c t u r e "
o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s o f x ' s w h i c h t h e soul d o e s
n o t really s h a r e with x.
N o w (a) is c l e a r l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e , since P l a t o
c l e a r l y d o e s n o t wish to t h i n k
o f e i t h e r t h e soul o r t h e F o r m s as b e i n g c o m
p o s e d o f e a r t h , fire, w a t e r , a n d

air. (b) m i g h t b e m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e , b u t w h y
s h o u l d Plato a s s u m e it, u n l e s s (b)
is b a s e d u p o n o n e o r m o r e o f ( c ) - ( g ) ? (c) a n
d (d) a r e in e v e n w o r s e s h a p e , since
a c c o r d i n g t o (c) ( a n d a c c o r d i n g t o (d)), w h e
n t h e s o u l ' s k n o w l e d g e o f x is
c o m p l e t e , t h e soul b e c o m e s x in k n o w i n g it. T
h u s i f t h e soul k n o w s a n o m e l e t ,
t h e B e a u t i f u l , W i l f r e d Sellars, t h e O s c a r M e
y e r W i e n e r S l o g a n , etc., it b e -
c o m e s all o f t h e s e t h i n g s . A n d t h e soul is s u p
p o s e d to k n o w t h o r o u g h l y b o t h
t h e B e a u t i f u l a n d t h e U g l y a n d all s o r t s o f
o t h e r o p p o s i t e F o r m s . H o w c o u l d
P l a t o a v o i d t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h e soul is
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y m a n y p a i r s o f F o r m s
o p p o s i t e o n e a n o t h e r ?
s7 The Scholastics made this distinction as one between
material and intentional or immaterial
possession of attributes. If x possesses all the properties of a
horse materially, it is a horse. If x
possesses the same properties intentionally, it is a soul knowing
the horse (without becoming one
itself). In this way, if the soul knows the Forms, it can have all
their properties without becoming
them. For an account of this in Aquinas, see Herbert McCabe,
"The Immortality of the Soul," in
A. Kenny, ed. Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays
(Doubleday, 1969), 297-3o6.

For a contemporary defense of a version of "Like knows like"
(or "isomorphism of the
intellect and the real") and of a distinction between the way an
object x is F and the mind which
knows that x is F would itself be F, see Wilfred Sellars, "Being
and Being Known," ch. ~ in Science,
Perception and Reality (Humanities Press, 1963), 41-59.
P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T "~1
T h i s leaves (e), (f), a n d (g) as c o n t e n d e r s . B u t w
h e r e a s s o m e o f t h e s e m a y
be m o r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y plausible, t h e t e x t u a
l s u p p o r t f o r t h e m is n o n e x i s t e n t .
T h e Phaedo c o n t a i n s n o m e n t i o n o r discussion o
f a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n esse
intentionale a n d esse naturale. O n e seeks in vain f o r m e n
t i o n in t h e Phaedo o f a
p r o p e r t y in t h e soul r e p r e s e n t i n g a n o t h e r in
a n object. A n d t h e r e is a s e r i o u s
q u e s t i o n as to w h e t h e r (e) m a k e s sense. F o r it c
a n n o t e x p l a i n h o w t h e soul
c o u l d h a v e k n o w l e d g e o f p r o p e r t i e s which a
r e n o t in it. It seems t h a t f o r s o m e
p r o p e r t y to r e p r e s e n t a n o t h e r o n e , at t h e v
e r y least t h e id ea o f t h e p r o p e r t y
r e p r e s e n t e d m u s t exist in t h e soul. A n d t h a t i d
ea o f it e i t h e r consists o f t h e
p r o p e r t y itself o r s o m e o t h e r p r o p e r t y r e p r e
s e n t i n g it. T h e l a t t e r possibility
o n l y leads to an infinite r e g r e s s unless we assert t h a t
at s o m e p o i n t t h e id ea is
t h e v e r y p r o p e r t y it r e p r e s e n t s . B u t t h e n i

f to h a v e a n idea o f F-ness is f o r t h e
soul to be F, t h e n i f B-ness which is in t h e soul r e p r e s
e n t s F-hess to the soul, F-
ness m u s t be in t h e soul as well, since t h e id ea o f F-
ness m u s t b e p r e s e n t . A n d
t h e n t h e r e c a n b e n o s u c h s i t u a t i o n as t h a t
o f B-ness, a p r o p e r t y in t h e soul
which r e p r e s e n t s F-ness which is n o t in t h e soul. It
follows t h a t f o r a n y p r o p -
e r t y F, i f t h e soul k n o w s it, t h e soul is still F, a n d
(e) collapses i n t o (d).
At Phaedo 73 d, S o c r a t e s d o e s say t h a t w h e n a m a
n sees his lo v er's ly re, h e
"takes i n t o t h o u g h t t h e f o r m [e~6og] o f t h e b o y
w h o s e ly re it is." At first sight,
this looks like (f). A c l o s e r look, h o w e v e r , shows t h a
t t h e c o n t e x t is r a t h e r
casual. S o c r a t e s d o e s n o t s p e n d t h e t i m e r e q
u i r e d to e x p l a i n a n y t h i n g like
Aristotle's t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e p o i n t is
simply t h a t o n e m a y b e re-
m i n d e d o f o n e o b j e c t by s e e i n g an object
dissimilar to it. T h e w o r d ' f o r m ' ,
a c c o r d i n g l y , m o s t p r o b a b l y has its o r d i n a r y
n o n t e c h n i c a l sen se o f 'b o d ily
f o r m , s h a p e ' . A n d f o r S o c r a t e s to say t h a t t
h e l o v e r "takes i n t o t h o u g h t t h e
s h a p e o f t h e b o y w h o s e lyre it is" n e e d m e a n n
o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h a t t h e l o v e r
t h i n k s a b o u t t h e b o y w h o s e lyre it is. T h e r e is
n o h i n t o f a f o r m / m a t t e r
d i s t i n c t i o n , n o r o f t h e p e c u l i a r use Aristotl e
p u t s it to.

Sellars's o w n t h e o r y is a s o p h i s t i c a t e d r e a c t i
o n to Ari sto t l e a n d t h e Scholas-
tics. I f it is a n a c h r o n i s t i c to t r y to r e a d t h e i r
positions i n to t h e Phaedo, it m u s t
be e v e n m o r e a n a c h r o n i s t i c to t r y to i n t e r p r
e t t h e Phaedo in t e r m s o f (g).
I t h u s t h i n k it is a m i s t a k e to say with G a l l o p t h
a t S o crates is a s s u m i n g " L i k e
k n o w s like" in this a r g u m e n t . I will try to sh o w n e x
t t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t w o r k s
j u s t fine w i t h o u t s u c h a n a s s u m p t i o n , n o m
a t t e r h o w o n e tries to state t h e
a s s u m p t i o n precisely.
(d) H o w t h e Soul is Similar to t h e Always t h e S a m e a
n d Dissimilar to t h e
N e v e r t h e S a m e
I n fact, S o c r a t e s n e v e r says t h a t like kn o ws like.
W h a t h e d o e s say is t h a t it
is u n l a w f u l f o r a n y b u t t h e p u r e to g r a s p t h
e P u r e (67b2). T h e soul c o m e s to
b e " d r a g g e d by t h e b o d y i n t o t h o s e thin g s wh
i ch a r e n e v e r t h e s a m e " a n d
O P H Y 34:~ JANUARY ~ 9 9 6
" w a n d e r " a n d "whirl as if i n t o x i c a t e d " w h e n
it relies u p o n p e r c e p t i o n to p r o -
vide it k n o w l e d g e o f t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e
(79c). B u t w h e n it stops its w a n d e r i n g

a n d c o n t e m p l a t e s all by itself, it "stays t h e s a m e "
i n s o f a r as it g r a s p s t h e P u r e ,
Always B e i n g , I m m o r t a l , a n d Always t h e Same3S
( 7 9 c - d ) . T h e c o n t r a s t h e r e is
in t h e way t h e soul is said to " g r a s p " its objects. Q u i t
e clearly, this g r a s p o f t h e
N e v e r t h e S a m e is t h r o u g h p e r c e p t i o n , w h
e r e a s t h e g r a s p o f t h e Always t h e
S a m e is s u p p o s e d to b e t h o u g h t o r k n o w l e d
g e . In s o m e way, k n o w l e d g e o f
F o r m s n e v e r i n t r o d u c e s t h e c o m p r e s e n c e
o f o p p o s i t e s , w h e r e a s k n o w l e d g e o f
t h e Always C h a n g i n g does, b u t perception o f t h e
Always C h a n g i n g d o e s n o t .
B u t h o w ?
A n i m p o r t a n t clue, I t h i n k , is t h e m e a n i n g o f
t h e t e r m s " p u r e " ( •
"always b e i n g , " a n d " t h e s a m e " at 79d~. T h a t t h
e soul "stays the s a m e " i n s o f a r as
it g r a s p s t h e P u r e r e m i n d s us t h a t Plato's use o f
t h e t e r m " p u r e " (e0.txQtvf~gsg) as
a p p l i e d to t h o u g h t at 6 6 a is a p p a r e n t l y
parallel to his a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s a m e
t e r m to F o r m s . O p p o s i t e F o r m s a r e " p u r e "
in t h a t n e i t h e r s h a r e s in its o p p o -
site's c h a r a c t e r . T h i s m i g h t s u g g e s t t h a t t h
o u g h t s with c o n t r a d i c t o r y c o n t e n t s
m i g h t also b e also be c o n s i d e r e d o p p o s i t e s . A
t h o u g h t w o u l d b e p u r e , t h e n ,
b e c a u s e it c o u l d n o t h a v e t h e c o n t e n t o f t h
e t h o u g h t o p p o s i t e it.
T h i s c o n n e c t s u p with t h e soul r e m a i n i n g t h e

same i n s o f a r as it g r a s p s
Always B e i n g . &e~ 6v at 79d~ is a p p a r e n t l y a s y n o
n y m o f xa0ct~x~v. F o r w h e n
t h e soul g r a s p s a F o r m , which is j u s t w h a t it is a
n d n e v e r its o p p o s i t e , t h e
t h o u g h t t h a t g r a s p s it resists c o m p r e s e n c e
with t h e t h o u g h t o p p o s i t e to it, t h a t
t h e F o r m is o r c a n b e its o p p o s i t e .
B u t t h e l a t e r Republic 524 m a k e s c l e a r w h a t
was implicit e a r l i e r : t h a t t h e
p e r c e p t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g as soft a n d h a r d , t h
o u g h possible, involves o p p o s i -
tion, so t h a t t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f h a r d n e s s is " f
o r c e d " to take as its o b j e c t softness
also. T h o u g h t , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , has g r e a t e r
clarity, a n d t h u s m u s t distin-
g u i s h h a r d n e s s a n d softness as s e p a r a t e a n d
distinct (594c5). T h u s a t h o u g h t
t h a t s o m e t h i n g is h a r d n e s s c o u l d n o t be a t h
o u g h t t h a t s o m e t h i n g is also
softness.
I f c e r t a i n acts o f t h o u g h t o r k n o w l e d g e a r e
opposites to o n e a n o t h e r , a n d
c o u l d c o u n t as a - c h a n g e if t h e y a r e c o m p r e
s e n t in t h e s a m e soul, b u t a r e n o t
o r n e e d n o t b e c o m p r e s e n t , t h e n t h e soul
will be a - t h e - s a m e , j u s t as F o r m s
s8 TotoOz~w in ~iTe ~otoOzo~ ~ 0 o a r t o ~ at 79d6 refers
back to txe[va r xaz~ m~T~ at 79d5
which in turn refers back to r6 x a 0 a ~ v re xct~ ~ 6v •
tt0~tvarov xct~ r ~Xov at 79d~, so

in effect Socrates is claiming that the soul remains the same
insofar as it grasps the Pure, Always
Being, Immortal, and Always the Same.
~9 eO.txQtv~g at 65e6 is of course a synonym of xct0a~x%, at
65e, as it even more clearly is at
67ba-~, where both terms are applied to the Forms
interchangeably. Cf. the use of these terms
with r at Symposium 2~le, which makes clear that something is
pure if it is free from
opposites.
PLATO'S AFFINITY ARGUMENT 2 3
w h i c h resist t h e i r o w n o p p o s i t e s a r e a - t h e - s
a m e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i f c e r -
tain p e r c e p t i o n s a r e o p p o s i t e to o n e a n o t h e
r , a n d n e e d to b e c o m p r e s e n t in
t h e s a m e subject, p e r c e p t i o n i n t r o d u c e s a - c
h a n g e to w h a t e v e r su b ject is d o -
ing t h e p e r c e i v i n g .
W h a t sorts o f acts o f t h o u g h t , k n o w l e d g e , o r
p e r c e p t i o n , t h o u g h ? F re-
q u e n t l y it is t h e case t h a t Plato is p r e o c c u p i e d
with a n s w e r s to t h e q u e s t i o n
" W h a t is (the) F?" C l e a r l y h e is h e r e , f o r h e has
j u s t a r g u e d f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f
F o r m s as p r o v i d i n g t h e o n l y a d e q u a t e a n s
w e r to this question.4~ A c c o r d i n g l y , I
s u g g e s t t h a t Plato is viewing t h i n k i n g - t h a t - s o
m e - x - i s - F - n e s s a n d t h i n k i n g - t h a t -
x-is-Not-F-ness as t h e m s e l v e s opposites. A n d p e r c e

i v i n g - t h a t - x - i s - F - n e s s is t h e
o p p o s i t e to p e r c e i v i n g - t h a t - x - i s - N o t - F - n
e s s . N o w it is impossible f o r t h e soul to
t h i n k t h a t s o m e x is F-ness a n d at t h e s a m e t i m
e t h i n k t h a t x is No t-F -n ess, f o r
this a m o u n t s to its t h i n k i n g a n o b v i o u s i m p o s
s i b i l i t y - - t h a t F-ness is N o t - F -
ness. I f so, t h e soul m u s t be distinct f r o m t h e senses,
wh i ch d o t o l e r a t e t h e
c o m p r e s e n c e o f o p p o s i t e s , since t h e senses d o
p e r c e i v e t h e s a m e x as F-ness
a n d N o t - F - n e s s . T h a t is, t h e y d o c o n f l a t e c
o m p r e s e n t o p p o s i t e s .
T h e p o i n t m a y be m a d e w i t h o u t a s s u m i n g t
h a t t h e r e a r e F o r m s . T a k e a n y
p r o p o s i t i o n p a n d its c o n t r a d i c t o r y , not-p. T
h e t h o u g h t (belief) thatp is n o t t h e
contradictory o f t h e t h o u g h t (belief) that not-p, p a r t l
y b e c a u s e it is logically
possible f o r s o m e o n e n o t to t h i n k o r believe e i t h
e r o n e b y n o t t h i n k i n g o r
b e l i e v i n g a b o u t t h e i r subject m a t t e r at all, a n d
p a r t l y b e c a u s e p e o p l e can a n d
d o h o l d i n c o n s i s t e n t beliefs, s o m e t i m e s e v e
n consciously. N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e
intellect g e n e r a l l y feels c o m p e l l e d to reject t h e t
h o u g h t that notop i f it is c e r t a i n
o f p, a n d vice-versa, w h e n it is a w a r e o f t h e
inconsistency. I f t h e t h o u g h t that p
is a n o p p o s i t e o f t h e t h o u g h t that not-p, t h e n t
h e intellect's n a t u r e m u s t b e v e r y
d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t o f a n y physical b o d y . F o r
o p p o s i t e s in physical b o d i e s ( o r
in k i n d s o f physical bodies, as t h e case m a y be) b e h a

v e d i f f e r e n t l y - - t h e y a r e
c o m p r e s e n t unless t h e y a r e o p p o s i t e to t h e p
o i n t o f b e i n g c o n t r a d i c t o r y .
A n o t h e r way o f p u t t i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e is, o f
c o u r s e , t h a t t h e soul ( t h a t is,
t h e intellect) is rational; it f u n c t i o n s in a c c o r d a n c
e with reason. Physical b o d i e s
d o n o t h a v e this c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , n o r c a n
they. F o r i f t h e soul w e r e a physical
b o d y , t h e o p p o s i t e s in it would b e h a v e t h e
way t h e y d o in o t h e r physical
b o d i e s - - t h e y w o u l d necessarily be compresent.41 A
n d it w o u l d b e i m p o s s i b l e
f o r t h e soul to r e j e c t t h e b e l i e f that not-p if it h e
l d that p, o r vice-versa. F o r t h e
4~ Phaedo 74a, where he in effect is asking "What is (the)
equal?"
4~ Admittedly, this is necessity in a loose and hypothetical
sense. For example, because sticks a
and b are both two inches long, a is equal to b, but this
necessarily implies that a is unequal to c,/fc
is three inches long. Helen's degree of beauty makes Xanthippe
ugly in comparison, but on the
other hand it necessarily makes Helen ugly in comparison with
Aphrodite, given the degree of
beauty Aphrodite enjoys. However, I do not think that this
affects the argument.
O P H Y 3 4 : ~ JANUARY 1 9 9 6

b e l i e f that p a n d t h e b e l i e f that not-p w o u l d b e
identical to s o m e o p p o s i t e s in a
physical object, t h e b r a i n , a n d t h e s e w o u l d be
necessarily c o m p r e s e n t .
So to t h e d e g r e e t h e soul believes t h e i n c o n s i s t e
n t messages t h e senses give
it, t h e soul will still b e a r a r e s e m b l a n c e to physical
bodies, since it will s u f f e r a-
c h a n g e as d o they. In e a r l i e r passages in t h e
Phaedo, S o crates m a k e s t h e s a m e
c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n e m o t i o n s a n d d e s i r e s o n
th e o n e h a n d , a n d t h o u g h t a n d
k n o w l e d g e o n t h e o t h e r . E m o t i o n s a n d desi
res c o m e f r o m a n d b e l o n g to t h e
b o d y . T h e b o d y fills us with "loves a n d desi res a n d
f e a r s a n d all sorts o f fancies
a n d n o n s e n s e " ( 6 6 c ~ - 4 ) , which p r e v e n t us f r
o m t h o u g h t ( 6 6 c 4 - 5 ) a n d at t ai n -
i n g t h e t r u t h ( 6 6 b c - 7 ) . T h e p h i l o s o p h e r
is s u p p o s e d to dissociate h i m s e l f
f r o m t h e b o d y as m u c h as possible b e c a u s e c o m
m u n i n g with it fills us with its
n a t u r e (67a5). Plato d o e s n o t m a k e c l e a r wh y h
e believes all o f this, b u t p e r -
h a p s w h a t h e has in m i n d is t h e idea t h a t e m o t i
o n s a n d d esi res a r e similar to
p e r c e p t i o n s in t h a t t h e y c o n f l a t e o p p o s i t e
s . I f a g o l d o r n a m e n t which is b e a u t i -
f u l in o n e way b u t ugly in a n o t h e r is t h e object o f
d e s i r e , o n e in e f f e c t d e s i r e s
its b e a u t y and its ugliness, since its ugliness c o m e s r i g
h t a l o n g with its b e a u t y .
T h e soul w h i c h seeks b e a u t y o r s e c u r i t y o r h a
p p i n e s s in t h e s e objects will

inevitably be f r u s t r a t e d a n d c o n f u s e d , since t h e
y all s u f f e r a - c h a n g e in v a r i o u s
ways. A n d as t h e objects o f t h e senses c o n f u s e o p p
o s i t e s , so d o t h e s e s a m e
objects if t h e y a r e objects o f desire. I n b o t h cases, t h
e n , t h e soul takes o n t h e
n a t u r e o f t h e b o d y . It c a n take o n a - c h a n g e
if it takes o n t h e d e s i r e s o f t h e
b o d y , which inevitably c o n f l a t e o p p o s i t e s j u s t
as its objects a n d t h e p e r c e p t i o n s
o f t h o s e objects do.
So, o n t h e o n e h a n d , S o c r a t e s a p p e a r s to imp
ly t h a t t h e soul c a n b e subject
to a - c h a n g e , a n d can take o n s o m e o f t h e traits o
f physical bodies. A n d yet o n
t h e o t h e r h a n d , since it really is t h e n a t u r e o f t
h e soul to be r a t i o n a l a n d to
m a k e logically c o n s i s t e n t j u d g m e n t s , it follows
t h a t it is by n a t u r e n o n p h y s i c a l .
H o w d o we r e c o n c i l e t h e s e a p p a r e n t l y c o n
t r a d i c t o r y positions?
I a r g u e d a b o v e t h a t Plato m u s t h a v e b e e n t h i
n k i n g o f t h e soul as c o m p o s e d
o f distinct " p a r t s . " F u r t h e r , t h e fact t h a t t h e
soul is r a t i o n a l a n d t h a t it c a n
d i s e n t a n g l e itself f r o m i n c o n s i s t e n t beliefs c
o n s t i t u t i n g a - c h a n g e m e a n s t h a t
t h e r e m u s t be s o m e t h i n g m o r e to it t h a n j u s t
t h o s e o p p o s i n g o p i n i o n s a n d
beliefs. T h e r e has to be a r a t i o n a l aspect o r " p a r t "
o r capacity o f it wh ich in
itself d o e s n o t s u f f e r a - c h a n g e o f this s o r t 4 ~
- - t h e "pure r e a s o n " o f 6 6 a w h i c h
"seeks to h u n t d o w n e a c h o f t h o s e t h i n g s which

are, j u s t by itself a n d p u r e . "
4, Dorter, Plato's "Phaedo," 79, claims that if we take Socrates
literally here, there is no solution
as to how the soul could be visible and invisible at the same
time, and he must be speaking
metaphorically here. But this does not follow if part of the soul
is visible, i.e., the part having to do
with desires for physical objects. Otherwise one would have to
argue equally that Aristotle's view
of the soul must be taken metaphorically, since presumably the
intellect on his view is invisible,
whereas the sensible and vegetative souls are visible.
P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T ~ 5
Reason is "pure," presumably, in that it will not entertain
contraries (i.e.,
c o n t r a r y thoughts o r j u d g m e n t s ) . So even when I
entertain inconsistent be-
liefs, the " p u r e " aspect o f the soul opposes this if
conscious o f it. But this
passage also connects reason's purity with dissociation f r o m
the senses. This
" p u r e reason," u n d o u b t e d l y , is identical to the soul
which "all by itself" con-
templates the world o f the Forms, stripped o f its worldly
attachments by
philosophy.
H o w is it that the intellect would not suffer a-change in this
way? Plato does
not spell this o u t explicitly, b u t let us consider several d i f
f e r e n t kinds o f

situation which he at least distinguishes: (a) the soul believes
the messages the
senses give i t - - t h a t physical bodies are true r e a l i t y - -
a n d fails to recognize the
Forms (cf. 81b); (b) the soul comes to recognize the p h e n o m
e n o n o f a-change
in physical bodies a n d is c o n f u s e d by the conflicting j u
d g m e n t s that the senses
give it (79c); (c) the soul comes to recognize the existence o f
the Forms a n d
distinguishes t h e m f r o m objects o f the senses which
participate in them (79d).
Now case (c) is no problem, for here reason makes no
contradictory j u d g -
ments. But (a) is no p r o b l e m either, since reason has not
been a w a k e n e d to
make any j u d g m e n t s , including contradictory ones. (b) is
the situation in
which the soul is j u s t at the point o f being confused by the
presence o f o p p o -
sites in objects o f the senses. Clearly reason has been
awakened at this point;
b u t h e r e it calls on the soul to recognize the contradictions
in the messages that
the senses are giving it. So h e r e the intellect does not s u f f
e r a-change either.
But what a b o u t a n o t h e r kind o f situation? Reason
clearly is operative in
people who d o not recognize the Forms. People hold beliefs on
the basis o f
reason, b u t some o f these beliefs have hidden contradictions
which these
people d o not see. Plato does not consider this kind o f
situation, b u t quite

possibly he could d e n y that a part o f the soul which could
entertain such
beliefs could be immortal. In the end, it is perhaps only the part
o f the soul
which has knowledge o f the Forms that is free f r o m a-
change and hence is
eternal. (In the end, then, the kind o f immortality he offers is
impersonal at
best.)
Why assume that all a-change pertaining to the soul comes in
the f o r m o f
contradictory beliefs? Why could the soul not suffer a-change
by having
c o m p r e s e n t nonpsychological opposites? Again Plato
does not make this clear,
b u t p e r h a p s what he would claim is that since the soul is
not an object o f the
senses, and no o t h e r opposites could be present in the soul
besides psychologi-
cal ones a n d physical ones which can be objects o f the
senses, the only o p p o -
sites which could be present in the soul are psychological ones.
O n e might a r g u e quite plausibly, too, that Plato believed
that something
suffers the kind o f a-change he is concerned with here if and
only if it is
sensible. For Plato is c o n c e r n e d with the kind o f a-
change which consists o f
O P H Y 3 4 : 1 JANUARY 1 9 9 6

c o m p r e s e n t o p p o s i t e s in o n e p a r t i c u l a r - - t
h e i n d i v i d u a l soul. ( L e t u s call this
" t o k e n - a - c h a n g e . " ) S e n s i b l e o b j e c t s w o u
l d h a v e a t least s o m e , i f n o t all o f t h e
f o l l o w i n g : p h y s i c a l size, s h a p e , l o c a t i o n ,
o r i n t e n s i t y in a t least s o m e s e n s e s a n d
t h e s e f e a t u r e s m a k e e a c h o f t h e m e q u a l a
n d u n e q u a l t o o t h e r p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s
in v a r i o u s ways. Physical size, a t least, w o u l d m a k e
e a c h g r e a t e r in size t h a n
s o m e , l e s s e r in size t h a n o t h e r s . A n d p r e s u
m a b l y all c o u l d b e j u d g e d to b e
b e n e f i c i a l a n d n o t b e n e f i c i a l o r b e a u t i f u
l a n d n o t b e a u t i f u l in v a r i o u s d e g r e e s .
T h u s w h a t e v e r is s e n s i b l e s u f f e r s f r o m t o
k e n - a - c h a n g e .
F u r t h e r , w h a t e v e r s u f f e r s f r o m t o k e n - a - c
h a n g e is sensible. W h y ? T h e e x -
h a u s t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t is p e r c
e i v a b l e t h r o u g h t h e s e n s e s a n d w h a t
c a n b e t h o u g h t p e r h a p s p l a y s a r o l e in Plato's
t h i n k i n g here;4S w h a t is p e r c e i v -
a b l e d o e s s e e m to h a v e c o m p r e s e n t o p p o s i
t e s in it, b u t w h a t is n o t p e r c e i v a b l e
c a n o n l y b e k n o w n t h r o u g h t h o u g h t , a n d w

h a t c a n b e k n o w n t h r o u g h t h o u g h t
a l o n e c a n n o t h a v e c o m p r e s e n t o p p o s i t e s
in it. ( I t is f o r this r e a s o n t h a t it is
u n t h i n k a b l e t h a t t h e F i t s e l f s h o u l d b e not-
F.) So i f s o m e t h i n g h a s a - c h a n g e in
it, it c a n n o t b e accessible t h r o u g h t h o u g h t a l o n
e m t h e o n l y access t o it w o u l d
b e t h r o u g h t h e senses.
B u t s o m e t h i n g c a n s u f f e r a - c h a n g e in t h e s
e n s e t h a t it b e l o n g s to a t y p e in
w h i c h s o m e t o k e n s h a v e o n e o p p o s i t e a n d
o t h e r t o k e n s h a v e t h e o t h e r . ( L e t u s
call this " t y p e - a - c h a n g e . " ) Since s o m e souls b e l
i e v e t h a t t h e B e a u t i f u l is b e a u t y
a n d o t h e r s b e l i e v e ( m i s t a k e n l y , o f c o u r s
e ) t h a t c o l o r s a n d s h a p e s a n d t o n e s o f
c e r t a i n t h i n g s a r e b e a u t y , all souls, i n c l u d i n
g t h e p h i l o s o p h e r ' s , w o u l d s u f f e r
this s o r t o f a - c h a n g e . E v i d e n t l y , i f P l a t o n
o t i c e d a n y d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t y p e - a -
c h a n g e a n d t o k e n - a - c h a n g e , this d i d n o t b o
t h e r h i m a t all. F o r it s e e m s o d d t h a t
t h e b e l i e f s in s o m e o n e else's soul w o u l d d e t e r
m i n e w h e t h e r a p h i l o s o p h e r ' s s o u l
is s e n s i b l e o r i n s e n s i b l e ( o r p h y s i c a l o r n
o n - p h y s i c a l ) to a n y degree.44
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , o n e m a y t h i n k o f e x a m
p l e s o f t y p e - a - c h a n g e w h i c h a r e

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