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Route Hijacking and the role of RPKI in
Securing Internet Routing Infrastructure
Fakrul Alam
Senior Training Officer
APNIC
fakrul@apnic.net
2
BGP 101
2001:db8::/32
Network Next Hop AS_PATH Age Attrs
> 2406:6400::/32 2001:df2:ee00::1 65531 65533 65535 05:30:49 [{Origin: i}]
65530
65533
64512
65535
2001:db8:ab::1
655322406:6400::/32
> 2406:6400::/32 2001:df2:ee11::1 65530 65420 05:30:49 [{Origin: i}]
65531
65420
65534
> 2406:6400::/32 2001:df2:ee11::1 65530 65420 05:30:49 [{Origin: i}]
Current Practice
• Filtering limited to the edges facing the customer
• Filters on peering and transit sessions are often too
complex or take too many resources
• Check prefix before announcing it
3
Receive Request LOA Check
Create Associate
Prefix / AS Filter
Filter Where?
• Secure BGP Templates
– http://www.cymru.com/gillsr/doc
uments/junos-bgp-template.htm
– https://www.team-
cymru.org/ReadingRoom/Templ
ates/secure-bgp-template.html
4
5
IP Address & AS
Number
Digital Certificate
RPKI
Resource Public Key Infrastructure
6
BGP 101 + RPKI
2001:db8::/32
Network Next Hop AS_PATH Age Attrs
V*> 2406:6400::/32 2001:df2:ee00::1 65531 65533 65535 05:30:49 [{Origin: i}]
65530
65533
64512
65535
2001:db8:ab::1
655322406:6400::/32
I > 2406:6400::/32 2001:df2:ee11::1 65530 65420 05:30:49 [{Origin: i}]
65531
65420
65534
PKI In Other Application
• HTTPS
– Web Address as RESOURCE
– Hierarchical Trust Model
– CA as the root of the TRUST
– Browser does the VERIFICATION
• DNSSEC
– Zone as RESOURCE
– Hierarchical Trust Model
– . as the root of the TRUST
– DNS Resolver does the VERIFICATION
7
What About RPKI?
8
The Eco System
9
RPKI Trust Anchor
10
IANA
AFRINIC RIPE NCC ARIN APNIC LACNIC
NIR NIR
ISP ISP ISP ISP ISP
Trust Anchor CertificateResource
Allocation
Hierarchy
Issued
Certificates
match
allocation actions
RPKI Implementation
11
• As an Announcer/LIR
– You choose if you want certification
– You choose if you want to create ROAs
– You choose AS, max length
• As a Relying Party
– You can choose if you use the validator
– You can override the lists of valid ROAs
in the cache, adding or removing valid
ROAs locally
– You can choose to make any routing
decisions based on the results of the
BGP Verification (valid/invalid/unknown)
1. Publish ROA
2. RPKI Cache Validator
3. Router Configuration
Activate RPKI engine
12
Create ROA
13
• Create ROA for smaller block.
1. Write your ASN 2. Your IP Block 3. Subnet 4. Click Add
131107 2001:df2:ee00::/48 48
How Do We Verify?
14
RPKI in Action
15
• {bgp4} Routers validate
updates from other BGP
peers
• {rtr} Caches feeds routers
using RTR protocol with
ROA information
• {rsync} Caches retrieves
and cryptographically
validates certificates &
ROAs from repositories
ASBR
{rtr}
DNS
Trust Anchors
DNS
Trust AnchorsDNS
Trust Anchors
DNS
RPKI Cache Validator
{rsync}
{bgp4}
repository
upstream
RPKI Implementation Issues
16
RPKI Data Violation : Invalid ASN
• Invalid origin AS is visible
• From private ASN!
RPKI Data Violation : Fixed Length
Mismatch
• Most of the cases involve an invalid prefix (fixed length
mismatch)
– Further allocation
to the customer
Fiji
Total ASNs delegated by RIR: 8, Visible IPv4 routes: 50, Visible IPv6 routes: 5
http://rpki.apnictraining.net/output/fj.html
Moving Forward
• RPKI adoption is growing
– You are encouraged to create ROA. Experiment, test, play and develop
– You can implement in you infrastructure and do origin validation
• Something to consider
– Upgrade at least ASBRs to RPKI capable code
– In most cases, operators create ROAs for min length and advertise
longest prefix
– Some ROAs are invalid due to further allocation to customers
• https://www.apnic.net/ROA
20
Data Collection
• GoBGP
– https://github.com/osrg/gobgp
• RPKI Dashboard
– https://github.com/remydb/RPKI-Dashboard
• RIPE RPKI Statistics
– https://lirportal.ripe.net/certification/content/static/statistics/world-roas.html
• RIPE Cache Validator API
– http://rpki-validator.apnictraining.net:8080/export
21
Thank You

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Route Hijaking and the role of RPKI

  • 1. Route Hijacking and the role of RPKI in Securing Internet Routing Infrastructure Fakrul Alam Senior Training Officer APNIC fakrul@apnic.net
  • 2. 2 BGP 101 2001:db8::/32 Network Next Hop AS_PATH Age Attrs > 2406:6400::/32 2001:df2:ee00::1 65531 65533 65535 05:30:49 [{Origin: i}] 65530 65533 64512 65535 2001:db8:ab::1 655322406:6400::/32 > 2406:6400::/32 2001:df2:ee11::1 65530 65420 05:30:49 [{Origin: i}] 65531 65420 65534 > 2406:6400::/32 2001:df2:ee11::1 65530 65420 05:30:49 [{Origin: i}]
  • 3. Current Practice • Filtering limited to the edges facing the customer • Filters on peering and transit sessions are often too complex or take too many resources • Check prefix before announcing it 3 Receive Request LOA Check Create Associate Prefix / AS Filter
  • 4. Filter Where? • Secure BGP Templates – http://www.cymru.com/gillsr/doc uments/junos-bgp-template.htm – https://www.team- cymru.org/ReadingRoom/Templ ates/secure-bgp-template.html 4
  • 5. 5 IP Address & AS Number Digital Certificate RPKI Resource Public Key Infrastructure
  • 6. 6 BGP 101 + RPKI 2001:db8::/32 Network Next Hop AS_PATH Age Attrs V*> 2406:6400::/32 2001:df2:ee00::1 65531 65533 65535 05:30:49 [{Origin: i}] 65530 65533 64512 65535 2001:db8:ab::1 655322406:6400::/32 I > 2406:6400::/32 2001:df2:ee11::1 65530 65420 05:30:49 [{Origin: i}] 65531 65420 65534
  • 7. PKI In Other Application • HTTPS – Web Address as RESOURCE – Hierarchical Trust Model – CA as the root of the TRUST – Browser does the VERIFICATION • DNSSEC – Zone as RESOURCE – Hierarchical Trust Model – . as the root of the TRUST – DNS Resolver does the VERIFICATION 7
  • 10. RPKI Trust Anchor 10 IANA AFRINIC RIPE NCC ARIN APNIC LACNIC NIR NIR ISP ISP ISP ISP ISP Trust Anchor CertificateResource Allocation Hierarchy Issued Certificates match allocation actions
  • 11. RPKI Implementation 11 • As an Announcer/LIR – You choose if you want certification – You choose if you want to create ROAs – You choose AS, max length • As a Relying Party – You can choose if you use the validator – You can override the lists of valid ROAs in the cache, adding or removing valid ROAs locally – You can choose to make any routing decisions based on the results of the BGP Verification (valid/invalid/unknown) 1. Publish ROA 2. RPKI Cache Validator 3. Router Configuration
  • 13. Create ROA 13 • Create ROA for smaller block. 1. Write your ASN 2. Your IP Block 3. Subnet 4. Click Add 131107 2001:df2:ee00::/48 48
  • 14. How Do We Verify? 14
  • 15. RPKI in Action 15 • {bgp4} Routers validate updates from other BGP peers • {rtr} Caches feeds routers using RTR protocol with ROA information • {rsync} Caches retrieves and cryptographically validates certificates & ROAs from repositories ASBR {rtr} DNS Trust Anchors DNS Trust AnchorsDNS Trust Anchors DNS RPKI Cache Validator {rsync} {bgp4} repository upstream
  • 17. RPKI Data Violation : Invalid ASN • Invalid origin AS is visible • From private ASN!
  • 18. RPKI Data Violation : Fixed Length Mismatch • Most of the cases involve an invalid prefix (fixed length mismatch) – Further allocation to the customer
  • 19. Fiji Total ASNs delegated by RIR: 8, Visible IPv4 routes: 50, Visible IPv6 routes: 5 http://rpki.apnictraining.net/output/fj.html
  • 20. Moving Forward • RPKI adoption is growing – You are encouraged to create ROA. Experiment, test, play and develop – You can implement in you infrastructure and do origin validation • Something to consider – Upgrade at least ASBRs to RPKI capable code – In most cases, operators create ROAs for min length and advertise longest prefix – Some ROAs are invalid due to further allocation to customers • https://www.apnic.net/ROA 20
  • 21. Data Collection • GoBGP – https://github.com/osrg/gobgp • RPKI Dashboard – https://github.com/remydb/RPKI-Dashboard • RIPE RPKI Statistics – https://lirportal.ripe.net/certification/content/static/statistics/world-roas.html • RIPE Cache Validator API – http://rpki-validator.apnictraining.net:8080/export 21