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Community tools to fight
against DDoS
BKNIX Peering Forum
15-16 May 2017, Bangkok
Fakrul Alam
fakrul@apnic.net
DDoS
• Denial of Service (DoS) / Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) is the act of
– performing an attack which prevents the system from providing
services to legitimate users
• Denial of Service attacks take many forms, and utilize many
attack vectors
• Used to cover up other attack vectors
2
Types of Attacks
• Volume Based Attacks
• Application Layer Attacks
3
Addressing DDoS attacks
• Preparation
– Deploy necessary tools and grab list
• Detection
– Detect incoming fake requests
• Mitigation
– Diversion : Send traffic to a specialized device that removes the fake
packets from the traffic stream while retaining the legitimate packets
– Return : Send back the clean traffic to the server
4
3 Community tools
• Bogon Filter
– https://www.team-cymru.org/bogon-reference.html
• Flow Sonar
– https://www.team-cymru.org/Flow-Sonar.html
• UTRS (Unwanted Traffic Removal Service)
– https://www.team-cymru.org/UTRS/index.html
5
1. Bogon Filter
Bogon Filter
• A bogon prefix is a route that should never appear in the
Internet routing table
– Bogons are defined as Martians (private and reserved addresses
defined by RFC 1918, RFC 5735, and RFC 6598) and netblocks that
have not been allocated to a RIR by the IANA
• These are commonly found as the source addresses of
DDoS attacks
• Study shows 60% of the naughty packets were obvious
bogons
• Bogon and fullbogon lists are NOT static lists
7
Bogon Filter : Configuration IPv4
8
router bgp 17821
neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx remote-as 65332
neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx description CYMRUBOGONS
neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx ebgp-multihop 5
neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx password 7 070C134D575F0A5116
neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx update-source Loopback0
!
address-family ipv4
neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx activate
neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx soft-reconfiguration inbound
neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V4 out
neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V4 in
!
!configure community list to accept the bogon prefixes into the route-map
ip community-list 100 permit 65332:17821
!
!configure route-map. Remember to apply it to the proper peering sessions.
route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V4 permit 10
description IPv4 Filter bogons learned from cymru.com bogon route-servers
match community 100
set ip next-hop 192.0.2.1
!
!set a bogon next-hop on all routers that receive the bogons
ip route 192.0.2.1 255.255.255.255 Null0
!
ip prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V4 seq 5 deny 0.0.0.0/0 le 32
Bogon Filter : Configuration IPv6
9
router bgp 17821
neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx remote-as 65332
neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx description CYMRUBOGONS
neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx ebgp-multihop 5
neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx password 7 0458390716775F1A08
neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx update-source Loopback0
!
address-family ipv6
neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx activate
neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx soft-reconfiguration inbound
neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V6 out
neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V6 in
!
!configure community list to accept the bogon prefixes into the route-map
ip community-list 100 permit 65332:17821
!
!configure route-map. Remember to apply it to the proper peering sessions.
route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V6 permit 10
description IPv6 Filter bogons learned from cymru.com bogon route-servers
match community 100
set ipv6 next-hop 2001:DB8:0:DEAD:BEEF::1
!
!set a bogon next-hop on all routers that receive the bogons
ipv6 route 2001:DB8:0:DEAD:BEEF::1/128 Null0
!
ipv6 prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V6 seq 5 deny ::/0 le 128
Bogon Filter : Output
10
APNIC-Training-Lab01#show ip bgp 31.22.8.0/21
BGP routing table entry for 31.22.8.0/21, version 175332535
Paths: (1 available, best #1, table default, not advertised to EBGP peer)
Advertised to update-groups:
1
Refresh Epoch 1
65332, (received & used)
192.0.2.1 from 38.229.66.20 (38.229.66.20)
Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external, best
Community: 65332:17821 no-export
rx pathid: 0, tx pathid: 0x0
Bogon Filter : Status
• The IPv4 fullbogons list is approximately 3,803 prefixes.
– [date : 10th May 2017]
•
• The IPv6 fullbogons list is approximately 84,908 prefixes.
– [date : 10th May 2017]
Neighbor V AS MsgRcvd MsgSent TblVer InQ OutQ
Up/Down State/PfxRcd
38.229.xxx.xxx 4 65332 12017 12017 186072391 0 0
1w0d 3803
Neighbor V AS MsgRcvd MsgSent TblVer InQ OutQ
Up/Down State/PfxRcd
2404:A800:xxxx:xx::xxxx
4 9498 3239994 72131 40075514 0 0 3w1d
84908
Bogon Filter : Peering
• Contact bogonrs@cymru.com
1. Which bogon types you wish to receive (traditional IPv4 bogons,
IPv4 fullbogons, and/or IPv6 fullbogons)
2. Your AS number
3. The IP address(es) you want us to peer with
4. Does your equipment support MD5 passwords for BGP sessions?
5. Optional: your GPG/PGP public key
• https://www.team-cymru.org/bogon-reference-bgp.html
2. Flow Sonar
Flow Sonar
• The Team Cymru Flow Sonar system is a powerful tool for
network managers to visually identify and understand what
is happening on their network at any given time
• Leveraging the free and open-source framework provided
by Peter Haag of SWITCH
• Special plugins "dosrannu" developed by Team Cymru to
track malicious activity on your network
• Unique dosrannu feeds alerted to DDoS attacks,
compromised machines, and the presence of connections
to C&C hosts
Flow Sonar
It’s
nfsens/nfdump!!!
Flow Sonar : Get It
• Contact outreach@cymru.com
1. Team Cymru will send hardware
• 1 Server
• 1 Router
• https://www.team-cymru.org/Flow-Sonar.html
3. UTRS (Unwanted
Traffic Removal Service)
RTBH 101
CE
IP : 1.2.3.4
BGP : 1.2.3.0/24
PE
Transit I
Transit II
Provider InfraCustomer Infra
Website
Internet
IP : 203.0.113.114
BGP : 203.0.113.0/24
RTBH 101
CE
IP : 1.2.3.4
BGP : 1.2.3.0/24
PE
Transit I
Transit II
Provider InfraCustomer Infra
Website
Internet
DDoS Traffic
DDoS Traffic DDoS Traffic
IP : 203.0.113.114
BGP : 203.0.113.0/24
RTBH 101
CE
IP : 1.2.3.4
BGP : 1.2.3.0/24
PE
Transit I
Transit II
Provider InfraCustomer Infra
Website
Internet
DDoS Traffic
DDoS Traffic DDoS Traffic
BGP : 1.2.3.4/32
COM : 65420:666
IP : 203.0.113.114
BGP : 203.0.113.0/24
BGP :
203.0.113.114/32
COM : 65420:420
RTBH 101
CE
IP : 1.2.3.4
BGP : 1.2.3.0/24
PE
Transit I
Transit II
Provider InfraCustomer Infra
Website
Internet
DDoS Traffic
BGP : 1.2.3.4/32
COM : 65420:666
IP : 1.2.3.4/32 -> discard
IP : 1.2.3.4/32 -> discard
IP : 203.0.113.114
BGP : 203.0.113.0/24
IP : 203.0.113.114/32
IP : 203.0.113.114/32
BGP :
203.0.113.114/32
COM : 65420:420
RTBH Upstream
• Check whether your upsteam provider support RTBH
• Configure & Test RTBH before incident
• Only announce IPv4 /32's from address space you originate
or your customer
22
UTRS
• It’s based on the basic principle of DDoS filtering; Remotely
Triggered Black Hole Filtering
• UTRS is a system that helps mitigate large infrastructure
attacks by leveraging:
– an existing network of cooperating BGP speakers such as ISPs,
hosting providers and educational institutions
– that automatically distributes verified BGP-based filter rules from
victim to cooperating networks
UTRS : Configuration
router bgp 17821
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx remote-as 64496
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx description CYMRUBOGONS-UTRS
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx ebgp-multihop 5
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx transport connection-mode passive
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx password 7 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx update-source Loopback0
!
address-family ipv4
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx activate
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx send-community
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx soft-reconfiguration inbound
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx route-map UTRS-OUT out
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx route-map UTRS-IN in
!
access-list 1 remark utility ACL to deny everything
access-list 1 deny any
!
ip prefix-list 32-only permit 0.0.0.0/0 ge 32
ip community-list standard RTBH permit 17821:0
!
route-map UTRS-IN permit 10
match ip address prefix-list 32-only
route-map UTRS-IN deny 100
match ip address 1
!
route-map UTRS-OUT permit 10
match ip address prefix-list 32-only
match community RTBH
route-map UTRS-OUT deny 100
match ip address 1
ip route 203.176.189.10 255.255.255.255 null0
UTRS : Output
25
UTRS : Apply
• Newly launched service
– Quite picky to choose whom to peer
– Do organization verification
• https://www.team-cymru.org/UTRS/index.html
• FAQ:
– https://www.cymru.com/jtk/misc/utrs.html
How UTRS varies from
RTBH with upstream!
Other Efforts
• NANOG BCOP : DDoS-DoS-attack-BCOP
– http://bcop.nanog.org/index.php/DDoS-DoS-attack-BCOP
• Routing Resilience Manifesto
– Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS)
– https://www.routingmanifesto.org/manrs/
Questions!
Fakrul Alam
fakrul@apnic.net

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BKNIX Peering Forum 2017: Community tools to fight DDoS

  • 1. Community tools to fight against DDoS BKNIX Peering Forum 15-16 May 2017, Bangkok Fakrul Alam fakrul@apnic.net
  • 2. DDoS • Denial of Service (DoS) / Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is the act of – performing an attack which prevents the system from providing services to legitimate users • Denial of Service attacks take many forms, and utilize many attack vectors • Used to cover up other attack vectors 2
  • 3. Types of Attacks • Volume Based Attacks • Application Layer Attacks 3
  • 4. Addressing DDoS attacks • Preparation – Deploy necessary tools and grab list • Detection – Detect incoming fake requests • Mitigation – Diversion : Send traffic to a specialized device that removes the fake packets from the traffic stream while retaining the legitimate packets – Return : Send back the clean traffic to the server 4
  • 5. 3 Community tools • Bogon Filter – https://www.team-cymru.org/bogon-reference.html • Flow Sonar – https://www.team-cymru.org/Flow-Sonar.html • UTRS (Unwanted Traffic Removal Service) – https://www.team-cymru.org/UTRS/index.html 5
  • 7. Bogon Filter • A bogon prefix is a route that should never appear in the Internet routing table – Bogons are defined as Martians (private and reserved addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 5735, and RFC 6598) and netblocks that have not been allocated to a RIR by the IANA • These are commonly found as the source addresses of DDoS attacks • Study shows 60% of the naughty packets were obvious bogons • Bogon and fullbogon lists are NOT static lists 7
  • 8. Bogon Filter : Configuration IPv4 8 router bgp 17821 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx remote-as 65332 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx description CYMRUBOGONS neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx ebgp-multihop 5 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx password 7 070C134D575F0A5116 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx update-source Loopback0 ! address-family ipv4 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx activate neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx soft-reconfiguration inbound neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V4 out neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V4 in ! !configure community list to accept the bogon prefixes into the route-map ip community-list 100 permit 65332:17821 ! !configure route-map. Remember to apply it to the proper peering sessions. route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V4 permit 10 description IPv4 Filter bogons learned from cymru.com bogon route-servers match community 100 set ip next-hop 192.0.2.1 ! !set a bogon next-hop on all routers that receive the bogons ip route 192.0.2.1 255.255.255.255 Null0 ! ip prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V4 seq 5 deny 0.0.0.0/0 le 32
  • 9. Bogon Filter : Configuration IPv6 9 router bgp 17821 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx remote-as 65332 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx description CYMRUBOGONS neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx ebgp-multihop 5 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx password 7 0458390716775F1A08 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx update-source Loopback0 ! address-family ipv6 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx activate neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx soft-reconfiguration inbound neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V6 out neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V6 in ! !configure community list to accept the bogon prefixes into the route-map ip community-list 100 permit 65332:17821 ! !configure route-map. Remember to apply it to the proper peering sessions. route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V6 permit 10 description IPv6 Filter bogons learned from cymru.com bogon route-servers match community 100 set ipv6 next-hop 2001:DB8:0:DEAD:BEEF::1 ! !set a bogon next-hop on all routers that receive the bogons ipv6 route 2001:DB8:0:DEAD:BEEF::1/128 Null0 ! ipv6 prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V6 seq 5 deny ::/0 le 128
  • 10. Bogon Filter : Output 10 APNIC-Training-Lab01#show ip bgp 31.22.8.0/21 BGP routing table entry for 31.22.8.0/21, version 175332535 Paths: (1 available, best #1, table default, not advertised to EBGP peer) Advertised to update-groups: 1 Refresh Epoch 1 65332, (received & used) 192.0.2.1 from 38.229.66.20 (38.229.66.20) Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external, best Community: 65332:17821 no-export rx pathid: 0, tx pathid: 0x0
  • 11. Bogon Filter : Status • The IPv4 fullbogons list is approximately 3,803 prefixes. – [date : 10th May 2017] • • The IPv6 fullbogons list is approximately 84,908 prefixes. – [date : 10th May 2017] Neighbor V AS MsgRcvd MsgSent TblVer InQ OutQ Up/Down State/PfxRcd 38.229.xxx.xxx 4 65332 12017 12017 186072391 0 0 1w0d 3803 Neighbor V AS MsgRcvd MsgSent TblVer InQ OutQ Up/Down State/PfxRcd 2404:A800:xxxx:xx::xxxx 4 9498 3239994 72131 40075514 0 0 3w1d 84908
  • 12. Bogon Filter : Peering • Contact bogonrs@cymru.com 1. Which bogon types you wish to receive (traditional IPv4 bogons, IPv4 fullbogons, and/or IPv6 fullbogons) 2. Your AS number 3. The IP address(es) you want us to peer with 4. Does your equipment support MD5 passwords for BGP sessions? 5. Optional: your GPG/PGP public key • https://www.team-cymru.org/bogon-reference-bgp.html
  • 14. Flow Sonar • The Team Cymru Flow Sonar system is a powerful tool for network managers to visually identify and understand what is happening on their network at any given time • Leveraging the free and open-source framework provided by Peter Haag of SWITCH • Special plugins "dosrannu" developed by Team Cymru to track malicious activity on your network • Unique dosrannu feeds alerted to DDoS attacks, compromised machines, and the presence of connections to C&C hosts
  • 16. Flow Sonar : Get It • Contact outreach@cymru.com 1. Team Cymru will send hardware • 1 Server • 1 Router • https://www.team-cymru.org/Flow-Sonar.html
  • 17. 3. UTRS (Unwanted Traffic Removal Service)
  • 18. RTBH 101 CE IP : 1.2.3.4 BGP : 1.2.3.0/24 PE Transit I Transit II Provider InfraCustomer Infra Website Internet IP : 203.0.113.114 BGP : 203.0.113.0/24
  • 19. RTBH 101 CE IP : 1.2.3.4 BGP : 1.2.3.0/24 PE Transit I Transit II Provider InfraCustomer Infra Website Internet DDoS Traffic DDoS Traffic DDoS Traffic IP : 203.0.113.114 BGP : 203.0.113.0/24
  • 20. RTBH 101 CE IP : 1.2.3.4 BGP : 1.2.3.0/24 PE Transit I Transit II Provider InfraCustomer Infra Website Internet DDoS Traffic DDoS Traffic DDoS Traffic BGP : 1.2.3.4/32 COM : 65420:666 IP : 203.0.113.114 BGP : 203.0.113.0/24 BGP : 203.0.113.114/32 COM : 65420:420
  • 21. RTBH 101 CE IP : 1.2.3.4 BGP : 1.2.3.0/24 PE Transit I Transit II Provider InfraCustomer Infra Website Internet DDoS Traffic BGP : 1.2.3.4/32 COM : 65420:666 IP : 1.2.3.4/32 -> discard IP : 1.2.3.4/32 -> discard IP : 203.0.113.114 BGP : 203.0.113.0/24 IP : 203.0.113.114/32 IP : 203.0.113.114/32 BGP : 203.0.113.114/32 COM : 65420:420
  • 22. RTBH Upstream • Check whether your upsteam provider support RTBH • Configure & Test RTBH before incident • Only announce IPv4 /32's from address space you originate or your customer 22
  • 23. UTRS • It’s based on the basic principle of DDoS filtering; Remotely Triggered Black Hole Filtering • UTRS is a system that helps mitigate large infrastructure attacks by leveraging: – an existing network of cooperating BGP speakers such as ISPs, hosting providers and educational institutions – that automatically distributes verified BGP-based filter rules from victim to cooperating networks
  • 24. UTRS : Configuration router bgp 17821 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx remote-as 64496 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx description CYMRUBOGONS-UTRS neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx ebgp-multihop 5 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx transport connection-mode passive neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx password 7 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx update-source Loopback0 ! address-family ipv4 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx activate neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx send-community neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx soft-reconfiguration inbound neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx route-map UTRS-OUT out neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx route-map UTRS-IN in ! access-list 1 remark utility ACL to deny everything access-list 1 deny any ! ip prefix-list 32-only permit 0.0.0.0/0 ge 32 ip community-list standard RTBH permit 17821:0 ! route-map UTRS-IN permit 10 match ip address prefix-list 32-only route-map UTRS-IN deny 100 match ip address 1 ! route-map UTRS-OUT permit 10 match ip address prefix-list 32-only match community RTBH route-map UTRS-OUT deny 100 match ip address 1 ip route 203.176.189.10 255.255.255.255 null0
  • 26. UTRS : Apply • Newly launched service – Quite picky to choose whom to peer – Do organization verification • https://www.team-cymru.org/UTRS/index.html • FAQ: – https://www.cymru.com/jtk/misc/utrs.html
  • 27. How UTRS varies from RTBH with upstream!
  • 28. Other Efforts • NANOG BCOP : DDoS-DoS-attack-BCOP – http://bcop.nanog.org/index.php/DDoS-DoS-attack-BCOP • Routing Resilience Manifesto – Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS) – https://www.routingmanifesto.org/manrs/
  • 29.