This document summarizes Pakistan's military operations against militants in tribal areas from 2003-2014. It notes that from 2003-2008, the state lost control of tribal areas due to strategic failures rather than militant strength. From 2008-2014, the military embarked on cautious operations to push back militants and regain control. These operations involved asking civilians to leave areas before operations, which allowed many militants to escape. By 2012, the army had regained control of major towns and agencies, except North Waziristan. The final operation against North Waziristan began in 2014 under Army Chief Raheel Sharif. However, military operations led to significant local resentment due to bombings and treatment of civilians as hostile.

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23. Foreword
ISIS is not a strategic threat to the west
Agha H Amin
The west has been experimenting with the
east and 95 % of the so called threats are
fabricated threats or manipulated threats.
At the strategic level there is no threat to
the west from any state or non state actor
in the Middle East.
A brief examination of the threats
countrywise can explain the point :--
Afghanistan
This was the most peaceful country in the
east till 1978 . Afghanistans local disputes
with Pakistan forced it to seek US
assistance and when US assistance was
denied it turned to USSR.
From 1978 to 1989 Afghanistan became a
proxy battle ground between USSR and
USA and so called Islamic extremists were
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24. created in this state initially as US
Pakistani proxies and later as Taliban.
In 1989 instead of reconstruction the US
simply carried out an abrupt
disengagement that led to Afghanistan
becoming a Pakistani nursery of proxy
warriors .
None of the 9/11 attackers had any
connection with Afghanistan while all
attackers were connected to close US
allies in Middle East Saudi Arabia etc.
Iraq
Iraq was destabilised by US strategic
follies and a secular regime replaced by
absolute chaos that led to creation of
groups like ISIS.
Libya
Libya was stable state under a secular
regime but was deliberately destabilised
by the USA and NATO and remains a
citadel of instability.
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25. Syria
Syria was a stable secular state
destabilised by a proxy war with US Saudi
Turkish Qatari French UK and Jordanian
support . If Russia had not intervened
Syria would have suffered the fate of
Libya.
So called Paris and Belgium Attacks
At strategic level these attacks have no
meaning . Neither they had the potential
to destroy France or Belgium nor did they
produce any strategic fracture of dent.
ISIS as we are seeing it in Syria Iraq
and Afghanistan
ISIS remains a midwife creation of
US Iraq war . At the strategic level
ISIS only attacks Shia state , shia
Muslim individuals, Arab Christians
and Yazidis .
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26. ISIS never attacks Israel nor does it
attack any core strategic US or
NATO interest .
Paris attack and Belgium attacks
are two sole incidents where ISIS
targeted a NATO state but not an
English speaking core NATO
attack.It is entirely possible that
both attacks were carried out as
False flag attacks to prove that ISIS
attacks EU/NATO also but only non
English speaking states .Both
attacks despite much hue and cry
had minor tactical affects only. They
did not change the strategic balance
of power nor did the ISIS conquer
France or Belgium.
ISIS as MEAT GRINDER TO
Internalise the Middle East Chaos
and to destroy anti US groups like
Taliban
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27. In Afghanistan I closely saw the so called
ISIS which likes to operate only in
Ningrahar province close to the main
roads and towns. According to many
Afghan Intelligence officers who I met
ISIS had links with Intelligence support
contractors of US/EU origin.
In last two years ISIS was unable to upset
the Taliban who it was attacking and
remains a minor player in Afghanistan at
the strategic level.
What stands out is the fact that despite
much hue and cry ISIS is a cockroach
level threat for the west and its 99 %
victims are Shia Muslims , Shia states and
Kurds and Arab Christians and Yazidis.
Much earlier in 2002 outstanding western
strategic thinker and my mentor ED
LUTTWAK had summed up Islamists as
minor irritants :--
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30. Introduction
By Dr Hamid Hussain Editor
Intelligence Review
Thanks Agha. I agree with you. In most
operations especially post 2008, army asked
everybody to leave and then considered the
territory 'hostile'.
Along with 'innocents' most of the militants
also moved out of the operational area. Only
a small number remained and those who were
killed were mainly when they attacked
security forces. The 'innocents' who remained
were treated as hostiles and also suffered
except those who are paid to man some 'first
line' posts. In Khyber agency they are called
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31. 'askar' where a local commander (from
Barelvi Ansar ul Islam faction) is paid
according to how many men he commands. I
agree with you that 'risk averse' behavior
prevented many COs to play offensive. Both
from military as well as other point of view,
army was given unprecedented authority (not
given to Indian or Israeli army) where they
could use artillery, air assets as well as
leveling residential, commercial etc
buildings. Large swaths are now empty and
schools and dispensaries are taken over by
army. Local resentment is at an unprecedented
level and these locals are not militant
sympathizers but distressed by indiscriminate
bombings. You can now travel for miles in
some operational areas and not see a single
soul. However, at general public level the
'success' is mainly at psychological level
where average Pakistani not aware about the
nuances came out of depression and some
sense of confidence is visible.
These were my observations during my recent
trip and talking to a number of military and
non-military folks. I didn't go on any military
escorted tour but one western defnce attaché
based in Islamabad who went on such a tour
to Waziristan on my asking a question what he
saw, he replied, 'they have turned the whole
town into a large car parking lot'. My brother
went on an escorted tour to Tirah and
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32. according to him miles and miles on and he
never saw a single soul; whole villages empty.
The water is getting muddier.
Good luck and be safe.
Pakistan Army Military
Operations –
Summary
Hamid Hussain
"War is uncertainty, characterized by friction,
chance and disorder". Clausewitz
From 2003 to 2008, for a variety of reasons,
Pakistani state gradually lost control over
federally administered tribal areas. The
reasons were more related to strategic myopia
at the highest level rather than strength of the
militants. It took a while before military
leadership understood the nature of the threat
and started more professional planning,
training and overhauling doctrine to face the
new threat. The nature of modern militaries is
such that from conception to application on
the ground takes time.
In post 2008 period, military embarked on a
cautious push back. In an effort to limit
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33. civilian casualties, civilians were asked to
leave the intended area of operation. This
approach while beneficial on one level had a
serious drawback as militants also moved on
to their next rest stop before the start of
operations. The nature of the terrain with
hills, forests and narrow gorges meant that
interdiction attempts will be high risk. In the
early part of the operations, Special Services
Group (SSG) was used to interdict some
escape routes but when casualties mounted,
this approach was scaled back. The result was
that majority of the militants including
important leaders escaped the net. Many mid
and high level commanders of Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were eliminated by
U.S. drone strikes. By 2012, army was able to
take control of major towns of Malakand
division and many tribal agencies. Only
swamp left was North Waziristan. Under the
direction of the office of the Chief of General
Staff (CGS), final push towards North
Waziristan was finalized and inner circle of
Corps Commanders gave the nod for the
operation. However, Chief of Army Staff
(COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani didn't
give the final go for reasons best known to
him. In my view, his own nature of
contemplation and slower decision making
process, deteriorating relations with United
States and quarrels with political leadership
made him think twice. He was criticized for
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34. this and some ridiculed him with 'analysis-
paralysis' syndrome. To be fair to Kayani,
people tend to forget the environment in
which he was working. General public
opinion was not in favor of military
operations, army was not trained for the task,
security forces had experienced some
embarrassing early reversals and state had lost
not a small geographic area but lost control
over large swaths of a very difficult terrain.
Army had gradually asserted control over
Malakand division, Kurram, South Waziristan,
Mohmand and Bajawar agencies as well as
large parts of Orakzai and Khyber agencies
during the tenure of Kayani. However, he
could have proceeded with North Waziristan
operation earlier. When General Raheel
Sharif succeeded Kayani in November 2013,
he gave the final order and wheels were set in
motion for North Waziristan operation. In
June 2014, operation was formally started
after many announcements asking locals to
leave. A large number of militants also
listened and moved across the border.
In most operations especially post 2008, army
asked everybody to leave and then considered
the territory 'hostile'. Those who remained
were viewed with suspicion either as outright
'hostile' in sympathy with militants or not
serving as 'gracious hosts' to the army. Army
was given unprecedented authority of kill and
capture and they could use artillery and air
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35. assets as well as authority to destroy
residential and commercial buildings. There is
significant local resentment and it is not due
to sympathy with militants but tribesmen are
distressed by liberal use of bombings. These
sentiments could have been ameliorated by
more robust engagement of tribesmen and
explaining to them the need for some of the
measures such as curfews and neutralization
of heavily fortified areas and tunnels with
artillery and air assets. A large number of
tribesmen (not militant sympathizers) from
Waziristan have taken refuge in Afghanistan.
In moving forward, one main hurdle is deep
suspicion between army and civilian
administrators of tribal areas. Currently, there
is almost universal denouncement of civilian
administration by the army. In my
conversations with a number of army officers
they consider civilian political agent system as
corrupt and inefficient and there is an element
of truth in it (even today, many tribesmen
recount with fond memory to me the bygone
era of British political agents). On the other
hand, civilians criticize army for focusing
only on kinetic operations and monopolizing
all development projects in tribal areas thus
not allowing civilian set up to gradually re-
assert and they also have a valid point. In
current situation, tribesmen know where the
power center lies and they work directly with
Colonels and Brigadiers. In the long run,
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36. army has to hand over to the civilian set up in
tribal areas. This is army's ticket out and no
matter how imperfect ultimately civilian
structure needs to be put in place in secured
areas. Both parties should remember that they
are on the same team and need to work
together if they want to succeed. When army
helped to equip and train police, the
performance of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KPK)
provincial police markedly improved. Similar
joint efforts can improve working relationship
but army should be willing to share power
while civilian administrators have to take
some risks and go back to work among
people.
At general public level the 'success' of
Operation Zarb-e-Azb is mainly at
psychological level where average Pakistani
not aware about the nuances came out of the
depression and some sense of confidence is
visible. Operationally, securing of main towns
and major roads removed industrial scale
bomb making factories resulting in marked
reduction in large scale bombings of military
and civilian targets. This also resulted in
removal of militants from general population
which is an important piece of any counter-
insurgency struggle. There has been marked
improvement of efficiency of the army. I can
see a sea change in terms of morale, training,
efficiency, vigor and willing to tough it out in
a very harsh terrain. One would not recognize
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37. the company, battalion and brigade level
commanders of present army when compared
with pre 2001 era. War is a great auditor and
teacher of institutions. Army has reeled back
from a perilous course and learned some very
valuable and right lessons from the conflict.
This is good omen both for the army and for
the country.
The question of Pakistani TTP militants taking
refuge in Afghanistan needs special
elaboration. First, the nature of Pakistan-
Afghanistan border is such that it is very
difficult to control cross border movement. In
the past, when Afghans and Americans
complained about Afghan militants taking
refuge on Pakistani territory after attacking
targets in Afghanistan, Pakistanis told them
that it was beyond their capacity. To my
knowledge, up to 2008, Afghans, Americans
and Indians had no business with TTP (also
hands off as far Baluch were concerned). One
needs to make a distinction between
intelligence gathering and intelligence based
covert operations using local assets. In view
of multifaceted challenge, Pakistan's
neighbors as well as western intelligence
agencies need information about the cauldron
just as Pakistan needs information about
threats to its own national interests.
Intelligence gathering is an accepted norm (in
addition channels are also used especially for
negotiating prisoner swaps or release of
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38. prisoners for money and Pakistan,
Afghanistan, United States and Iran have used
the channels for this specific purpose) but one
needs to take a long deep breath before
embarking on covert operations where
unintended consequences usually surpass
intended consequences. Afghan and
American outrage followed by Indian outrage
at Mumbai carnage in 2008 changed the
dynamics. All three parties were convinced
that Pakistan will not change its behavior and
in internal debate, hawks got an upper hand.
Now, TTP became another bargaining chip in
the dirty games and national narrative on each
side became more confused and erratic. In
February 2013, commander of militants in
Bajawar Faqir Muhammad and in October
2013 Hakimullah Mahsud's envoy Latif
Mahsud were arrested in Afghanistan. There
was some confusion regarding Latif and he
was snatched by U.S. Special Forces from
intelligence personnel of National Directorate
of Security (NDS) in Afghanistan. Later, he
was handed over to Pakistan and a shaved and
more humbled Latif is now singing like a
canary. If Pakistan had no interest in going
after Afghan Taliban on its territory then
surely Afghans and Americans were in no
hurry to go after Mullah Fazlulluah parked in
Nazyan in eastern Ningarhar province.
The complexity of current situation can be
judged from events in remote areas of
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39. Ningarhar and Kunar where there is great pow
wow of Afghan Taliban, Pakistani TTP and
Daesh. Pakistani militants who escaped from
Pakistan army's operation in Orakzai and
Khyber agencies crossed the border into
eastern Afghanistan and strengthened the hand
of nascent Daesh. With this newly acquired
muscle, Daesh starting from Shinwar district
cleared the Taliban and expanded influence in
Achin, Nazyan, Spin Ghar, Khogyani and
Chaparhar districts. When Pakistanis obliged
Washington, U.S. drones started to hunt for
Fazlullah and he narrowly escaped. Afghans
and United States gave a free pass to Afghan
Taliban while Tehran happily handed some
cash so that Afghan Taliban could thin the
ranks of Daesh. Afghan Taliban assembled a
large posse and went after Daesh and in the
process downgraded their structure. Since the
start of 2016, U.S. has expanded its drone
policy against Daesh in eastern Afghanistan
with more wider targeting authority. Militants
will now likely move towards Kunar and
drones will also likely follow them there.
Drones need to be integrated with Afghan
security forces and local militias to prevent
militants from entrenching in a specific
geographic area. It will be interesting to see
how the conflict unfolds in Kunar as there will
be a volatile mix of militants from Taliban,
Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbadin Hikmatyar, local
Salafi armed groups and newly arrived Daesh
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40. as well as Pakistani militants who have
crossed over from Bajawar.
All concerned parties (Pakistan, United States,
Afghanistan, Iran, India; in that order of
importance) suffer from the same illness and
that is sacrificing long term interests for short
term gains. The desire of 'instant gratification'
is so strong that they lose the larger picture.
All this is happening in the backdrop of deep
suspicions about motives of the 'other'.
Reminds me Henry Kissinger's words quoted
in Beschloss's May Day about Cold war when
he summed up the behavior of the two super
powers as 'like two heavily armed men feeling
their way around a room, each believing
himself in mortal peril from the other, whom
he assumes to have perfect vision. Each tends
to ascribe to the other a consistency, foresight
and coherence that its own experience belies'.
Some adult supervision is needed at many
levels where each party understands its own
limitations and finds ways to work on
common grounds despite genuine differences.
"They who run for cover with every reverse,
the timid and faint of heart, will have no part
in winning the war. Harry Hopkins
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41. Note: These views are based my interaction
with diverse groups of people not only well
informed but also ordinary folks including
Pakistanis, Indians, Afghans and Americans as
well as travels to the region.
Hamid Hussain
April 17, 2016
coeusconsultant@optonline.net
Hamid
MAJOR
FAILURES
OF
OPERATION
ZARB E
AZAB
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42. 1. Bad Intelligence team –
Pakistani military
intelligence as well as ISI
was not well led and also
team wise weak. DG ISI
Lieutenant General Rizwan
is a well meaning and good
professional but his ISI
team is weak and
inexperienced. Pakistans
DG MI Major General
Nadeem Zaki Manj was not
a strong military
professional but promoted
based on pliability and
having a docile
personality .He was a total
failure as Pakistans
intelligence boss when he
replaced DG MI Major
General Sarfaraz Sattar.
2. Irresolute military
commanders- The FATA
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43. operation commanders did
not lead from the front and
thus the operation was
doomed and handicapped
all along.
3. Mixed motives of avoiding
casualties by allowing TTP
to escape to Afghanistan
Rather than face casualties
fighting against a desperate
encircled enemy , Pakistani
military commanders
created a loud scare about
the impending operation
allowing bulk of TTP to
withdraw in good order to
Afghanistan.
4. Weak Pakistani intelligence
presence in Kunnar ,
Khost,Paktia and Paktika
provinces- As Pakistans
priority was South
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44. Afghanistan from 2001
Eastern Afghanistan had a
weak Pakistani ISI
presence and
penetration.This proved to
be the basic reason for
Zarb e Azabs failure.
5. Pakistans TTP Taliban
pushed into Afghanistan
rather than destroyed-
Pakistans TTP was pushed
into Afghanistan and also
allowed to escape. Thus
what happened was a
horizontal shift westwards
of the TTP rather than its
destruction.The TTP by and
large remains intact and
now totally an Afghan state
asset under Afghan/NATO
intelligence control.
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47. 6. Pakistans military action
created a Afghan state
proxy asset in shape of
TTP- At the strategic level
Pakistani action created a
long term Afghan state
proxy which Afghan state
can use to counter
Pakistani Afghan Taliban
proxies in Afghanistan.
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50. 7. Reliance on US Drone
Strikes to destroy TTP
retreating into Afghanistan
proved faulty- The Pakistani
understanding with US that
US would destroy retreating
TTP in Afghanistan with
drones was faulty and
fallacious.Firstly dtones
cannot destroy retreating
insurgents.Secondly why
should the US destroy a
proxy that could prove
useful in the future in
manipulating or
pressurizing Pakistani
state ?
CONCLUSION
Zarb e Azab proved another
mirage in Pakistans war on
terror that Pakistani state
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51. created through its own
follies as well as fear of US
retaliation in the period 2001-
2014.
General Raheel Sharif and his
intelligence as well as
operational team bears a
major responsibility for this
strategic failure.
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61. About the Author
About the Author About the Author About the
Author Agha H. Amin , Retired Tank corps
major who served in five tank regiments and
commanded an independent tank squadron
and served in various staff , instructional and
research assignments. Presently heads think
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62. tank Centre for Study of Intelligence
Operations. Editor in Chief of monthly
Intelligence Review and monthly Military and
Security Review. In his Pakistan Army tenure
he wrote three original tactical papers on
Reconnaissance Troops Tactical handling,
Reconnaissance support group , and RFS
Concept. His writings were published in
Pakistan Armys prime journals , Pakistan
Army Journal and Citadel Journal of
Command and Staff College Quetta. His
recommendations regarding bifurcation of
officer corps into command and staff cadre
advanced in 1998 were later accepted. In
addition his recommendation of grouping
various corps into army commands advanced
in an article published in Citadel Journal in
1998 were accepted in 2005 or so. Wrote
Pakistan Armys first tactical paper on Tactical
handling of Reconnaissance Troop in 1986
which is now being incorporated in Pakistan
Armys most important general staff
publication " The Armored Regiment in
Battle". Wrote The Essential Clausewitz in
1993, Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 in 1998 ,
Pakistan Army till 1965 in 1999
,Development of Taliban Factions in
Afghanistan and Pakistan (2010) ,Taliban
War in Afghanistan (2009). Served as
Assistant Editor of Defence Journal
,Executive Editor of globe and Founder Editor
of Journal of Afghanistan Studies . An
associate of the think tanks ORBAT and
Alexandrian Defense group. Expert in social
impact and environmental assessment
carried out various LARP surveys for Asian
Bank and World Bank projects. He has
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63. lectured at various think tanks and
organisations worldwide and shares his
knowledge without any honorarium and at
zero financial benefits. Carried out various oil
and gas and power transmission line surveys
in West Asia. One time Assistant Editor
Defence Journal , Executive Editor Globe,
Editor Journal of Afghanistan Studies
Feedback is welcome at e mail address
L19aircraft@gmail.com
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